Aurecchione v. Falco et al

Filing 114

OPINION & ORDER re: 108 MOTION to Dismiss Third Amended Complaint filed by Louis Falco, III, Mark Colon, Seamus Lyons, Kerri Kralik, Tom Walsh, Inv. Budnick, James VanCura. For the above-mentioned reasons, Defendants' motio n to dismiss is GRANTED. Plaintiff's claims of unreasonable search and seizure and unreasonable delay against Defendant Officers Lyons and Kralik and procedural due process violations against Defendant Officers Lyons, Kralik, Colon, VanCura, a nd Budnick are dismissed with prejudice. The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate the motion at ECF No. 108. Defendants are directed to file an answer to the two remaining causes of action in the Third Amended Complaint by March 26, 2025, and the parties are directed to confer and file a Case Management Plan and Scheduling Order (blank form attached) by April 9, 2025. SO ORDERED. (Signed by Judge Nelson Stephen Roman on 3/5/2025) (mml)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

3/5/2025

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
PHILIP S. AURECCHIONE,
Plaintiff,

7:22-CV-04538 (NSR)
OPINION & ORDER

-againstSHERIFF LOUIS FALCO III, et al.,
Defendants.
NELSON S. ROMÁN, United States District Judge:

Plaintiff Philip S. Aurecchione (“Plaintiff”) brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(“Section 1983”) against the following Defendants: Seamus Lyons, James VanCura, Mark
Colon, Kerri Kralik, and Investigator Budnick in their official and individual capacities as law
enforcement officers in the Rockland County Sheriff’s Department (collectively, the “County
Defendants”). Plaintiff asserts four causes of action, including: (1) unlawful search and seizure
and unreasonable delay in violation of substantive due process rights against Officers Lyons and
Kralik (2) procedural due process violations against Officers Lyons, Kralik, Colon, VanCura,
and Budnick; (3) unrelated special conditions of parole and violation of freedom of association in
violation of substantive due process against Officers Ryan and Johnson-Richardson; and (4)
unlawful search and seizure in violation of substantive due process against Officer Ryan. On
October 25, 2023, Plaintiff filed the Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”) (ECF No. 89). Pending
before the Court are the County Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s first two causes of
action. (ECF No. 108.) For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS the County Defendants’
motion in full.

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BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
On September 3, 2018, Plaintiff was arrested on state firearm charges and detained in
Rockland County Jail. (TAC at ¶ 11.) Plaintiff was also charged with violating the terms of his
federal supervised release, which were imposed as part of a prior federal case. (Id. at ¶ 12.)
Plaintiff was then transferred to federal custody on a writ of habeas corpus. (Id. at ¶ 13.) On
September 26, 2019, a federal judge sentenced Plaintiff to two 18-month terms of imprisonment
for Plaintiff’s violation of federal supervised release. (Id. at ¶ 15.) On February 7, 2019, Plaintiff
pleaded guilty in his New York State (“NYS”) case and was sentenced to two to four years of
incarceration with his federal sentence. (Id. at ¶ 16.) Both Plaintiff’s federal and NYS sentences
were to run concurrently. (Id. at ¶¶ 15-16.) No supervision was to follow either sentence. (Id. at
¶¶ 15-16.) The Plaintiff was discharged from federal custody on February 25, 2020 (Id. at ¶ 18.)
Plaintiff was incarcerated from September 3, 2018, through February 25, 2020, for a total
of 17 months and 22 days. As such, he still owed approximately six months on his minimum
state sentence, and he owed more than two-and-a-half years on his maximum state sentence. The
Department of Corrections and Community Services (“DOCCS”) failed to file a timely detainer
with the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”). (Id. at ¶ 18.) On July 23, 2020, Judge Russo of Rockland
County Court issued a Certificate of Conviction and Order of Commitment. (Declaration of
Robert B. Weissman in Support of County Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (“Weissman Decl.”)
at Ex. M, ECF No. 72-13.) The Certificate committed Plaintiff into the custody of the Rockland
County Sheriff’s Department to serve the remainder of his state sentence. (Id.)
Following his release from Federal Custody, officials from DOCCS, the Rockland
County Sheriff’s Office, and Rockland County District Attorney’s Office worked to re-arrest the
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Plaintiff as he still had outstanding time on his NYS sentence. (Id. at ¶ 19.) Officers Lyons and
Kralik were assigned to Plaintiff’s case (Id. at ¶ 22.) Officers Lyons and Kralik sought a warrant
from Judge Russo but were denied. (Id. at ¶ 23.) Plaintiff’s Attorney was present to discuss the
warrant and argue against its issuance. (Id. at ¶ 24.) Following the denial of the warrant, Plaintiff
was not directed to surrender himself to the Rockland County Sheriff’s Department to serve the
rest of his state sentence. Id.
Officers Lyons and Kralik then physically and electronically surveilled the Plaintiff for
11 months. (Id. at ¶ 28.) This surveillance was joined by the Town of Newburgh Police
Department and the FBI who worked to extract information from Plaintiff’s social media and
communications providers. (Id. at ¶ 29.) Plaintiff was arrested on June 21, 2021, by Officers
Lyons Kralik, Colon, Kralik, VanCura, and Budnick. (Id. at ¶ 30.) Defendant Officers halted
Plaintiff’s vehicle, forcibly removed him, and “pushed [Plaintiff’s] head against the car with
significant force”. (Id. at ¶ 32.)
Following his arrest, Defendant Officers Lyons and Kralik did not present Plaintiff before
a sentencing court, which Plaintiff argues deprived him of his due process rights. (Id. at ¶¶ 3334.) Following his arrest, Plaintiff was brought to Rockland County Jail. (Id. at ¶ 34.) After
several weeks in Rockland County Jail, the Plaintiff was brought to the Downstate Correctional
Facility in Dutchess County, New York without any new orders of re-commitment. (Id. at ¶¶ 3738.) Plaintiff spent several months in custody of DOCCS and was released on May 11, 2022. (Id.
at ¶ 39.)
On August 25, 2021, Plaintiff retained counsel. (Id. at ¶ 41.) Plaintiff’s counsel filed a
Habeas petition for his release from custody and to award him with credit he spent at liberty. (Id.
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at ¶ 41.) DOCCS released Plaintiff under supervised release to Officers Dierdre Ryan and Lynn
Johnson-Richardson. (Id. at ¶ 42.) On November 10, 2021, Plaintiff’s petition was rendered moot
due to his release, but he was given 16 months credit for liberty against his Rockland County
Sentence. (Id. at ¶ 44.) Plaintiff alleges that, although he informed Parole Officers Ryan and
Johnson-Richardson about his awarded time credit, they continued to harass him on parole. (Id.
at ¶ 46.) DOCCS moved to overturn Plaintiff’s Habeas ruling which was denied. (Id. at ¶¶ 4850.) In response, Plaintiff filed a federal Habeas petition challenging his continued detention.
(Id. at ¶ 51.) DOCCS discharged Plaintiff’s sentence before Plaintiff’s federal petition could be
heard. (Id. at ¶ 52.)
During Plaintiff’s parole, he was unable to live with his romantic partner due to a
conviction from over 20 years ago. (Id. at ¶ 56.) Parole Officers Ryan and Johnson-Richardson
placed restrictions on Plaintiff’s ability to drive, work, and attend commercial driving training.
(Id. at ¶ 57.) Plaintiff was placed under mandated substance abuse counseling. (Id. at ¶ 57.) On
May 11, 2022, Plaintiff’s parole ceased, and Parole Officers Ryan and Johnson-Richardson were
notified of Plaintiff’s parole status. (Id. at ¶ 59.) Despite this, on May 18, 2022, Parole Officer
Ryan entered Plaintiff’s property, where she searched his residence, detained, and questioned
him. (Id. at ¶ 60.) Officer Ryan never notified Plaintiff that his parole had ceased. (Id. at ¶ 61.)
Plaintiff was formally notified of this termination weeks later. (Id. at ¶ 62.)
B. Procedural History
Plaintiff filed this action on June 1, 2022. (ECF No. 3.) This Court granted Plaintiff leave to
amend his pleadings twice. Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint on August 27, 2022.
(ECF No. 23), and his Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) on October 11, 2022. (ECF No.

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42.) On January 27, 2023, Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s SAC. (ECF No. 70.) On
September 25, 2023 the Court issued its opinion granting Defendants’ motion. (ECF No. 88.)
On October 25, 2023, Plaintiff filed his TAC, alleging substantive and procedural due
process violation against County Defendants. (ECF No. 89.) On March 31, 2024, Defendants
filed their motion to dismiss the TAC. (ECF No. 108.) On the same day, Defendants filed a
memorandum of law in support of their motion to dismiss. (“Defs.’ MoL.”) (ECF No. 109) as
well as a reply memorandum of law (“Reply”). (ECF No. 111.) On March 31, 2024, Plaintiff
filled a memorandum of law in opposition to Defendants’ motion. (“Opp.”) (ECF No. 112.)
LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Rule 12(b)(6)
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), dismissal is proper unless the complaint
“contain[s] sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). When there are well-pled factual allegations in the complaint, “a
court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an
entitlement to relief.” Id. at 679.
While the Court must take all material factual allegations as true and draw reasonable
inferences in the non-moving party’s favor, the Court is “not bound to accept as true a legal
conclusion couched as a factual allegation,” or to credit “mere conclusory statements” or
“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action.” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550
U.S. at 555). “Because a Rule 12(b)(6) motion challenges the complaint as presented by the
plaintiff, taking no account of its basis in evidence,” this Court “may review only a narrow
universe of materials.” Goel v. Bunge, Ltd., 820 F.3d 554, 559 (2d Cir. 2016). The critical
inquiry is whether the plaintiff has pled sufficient facts to nudge the claims “across the line from
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conceivable to plausible.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. A motion to dismiss will be denied where
the allegations “allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for
the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
B. Section 1983
Section 1983 provides, in relevant part, that “[e]very person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section
1983 “is not itself a source of substantive rights, but a method for vindicating federal rights
elsewhere conferred by those parts of the United States Constitution and federal statutes that it
describes.” Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979); see Cornejo v. Bell, 592 F.3d 121,
127 (2d Cir. 2010).
To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: “(1) that
the defendants deprived him of a right ‘secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States’;
and (2) that they did so ‘under color of state law.’” Giordano v. City of New York, 274 F.3d 740,
750 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49–50 (1999)).
Therefore, a Section 1983 claim has two essential elements: (1) the defendant acted under color
of state law, and (2) as a result of the defendant’s actions, the plaintiff suffered a denial of his
federal statutory rights, or his constitutional rights or privileges. See Annis v. County of
Westchester, 136 F.3d 239, 245 (2d Cir. 1998); Quinn v. Nassau Cty. Police Dep’ t, 53 F. Supp.
2d 347, 354 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (stating Section 1983 “furnishes a cause of action for the violation
of federal rights created by the Constitution.”).

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C. Law of the Case Doctrine
The law-of-the-case doctrine asserts that once “a court decides upon a rule of law, that
decision should continue to govern the same issues in subsequent stages in the same case.”
Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 618 (1983). Further, “when a court has ruled on an issue,
that decision should generally be adhered to by the court in subsequent stages in the same case
unless cogent and compelling reasons militate otherwise.” Delville v. Firmenich Inc., 23 F. Supp.
3d 414, 425 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (quoting United States v. Quintieri, 306 F.3d 1217, 1225 (2d Cir.
2002)). Such compelling reasons include “major grounds justifying reconsideration [such as]
intervening change of controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a
clear error or prevent manifest injustice.” United States v. Plugh, 648 F.3d 118, 123 (2d Cir.
2011) (quoting Doe v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 709 F.2d at 782, 789 (2d Cir.
1983).
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff brings the following claims:
(1) Unreasonable Search and Seizure and Unreasonable Delay, in violation of the Fourth,
Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments against Defendant Officers Seamus Lyons and Kerry
Kralik in their official and individual capacities; and
(2) Procedural Due Process Claim, in violation of the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth
Amendments against Defendant Officers Seamus Lyons, Mark Colon, Kerry Kralik,
James VanCura, and Investigator Budnick in their official and individual capacities.
Defendants move to dismiss these claims on several grounds.

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I.

Plaintiff’s Dismissed Monell Claims

On September 25, 2023 the Court dismissed claims against Defendants in their official capacity
with prejudice. The TAC reiterates these same claims against Defendants. Despite this, Plaintiff
requests the Court, sua sponte, reconsider its finding.
Motions for reconsideration are governed by Local Civil Rule 6.3 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
The standard for granting a reconsideration motion is strict. Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d
255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995). “The major grounds justifying reconsideration are ‘an intervening change
of controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a clear error or prevent
manifest injustice.’” Doe v. N.Y. City Dep't of Soc. Servs., 709 F.2d 782, 789 (2d Cir. 1983). The
motion “will generally be denied unless the moving party can point to controlling decisions or data
that the court overlooked and that might reasonably be expected to alter the conclusion reached by
the court.” In re Optimal U.S. Litig., 886 F. Supp. 2d 298, 311-12 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
Reconsideration of a court’s previous order is “an extraordinary remedy to be employed sparingly
in the interests of finality and conservation of scarce judicial resources.” In re Initial Pub. Offering
Sec. Litig., 399 F. Supp. 2d 298, 300 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (internal citation and quotation omitted),
aff’d sub nom. Tenney v. Credit Suisse First Boston Corp., Nos. 05 Civ. 3430, 05 Civ. 4759 & 05
Civ. 4760, 2006 WL 1423785, at *1 (2d Cir. 2006). Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a legal basis
for the Court to reconsider its prior ruling. Accordingly, the claims remain dismissed.
II.

Plaintiff’s Substantive and Procedural Due Process Claims

A. Defendant Officers Lyons and Kralik Are Responsible for Substantive Due Process
Violations in their Individual Capacity
1. Unlawful Search and Seizure
When a Plaintiff brings a Section 1983 claim “[w]here a particular Amendment provides

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an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against a particular sort of government
behavior, that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of substantive due process, must be
the guide for analyzing these claims.” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 (1994). Section 1983
claims for unreasonable search and seizure implicate the textual source of the Fourth
Amendment. The Fourth Amendment protects “against unreasonable searches and seizures ... but
upon probable cause.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. In considering reasonableness, “a warrantless
arrest by a law officer is reasonable ... where there is probable cause to believe that a criminal
offense has been or is being committed.” Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 152 (2004). The
determination of “whether probable cause exists depends upon the reasonable conclusion to be
drawn from the facts known to the arresting officer at the time of the arrest.” Id. Therefore, an
officer has a defense against a Section 1983 claim against unreasonable search and seizure if
their search was reasonable and justified by probable cause. See Jenkins v. City of New York, 478
F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2007)) (stating “[t]he existence of probable cause to arrest constitutes
justification and is a complete defense to an action for false arrest … whether the action is
brought under state law or under § 1983.”) (internal quotations omitted). Probable cause does not
need to be considered in a vacuum of one officer’s knowledge. An arrest is permissible “even if
an arresting officer lacks personal knowledge sufficient to establish probable cause, so long as
the officer acts as a result of communication with a ... [fellow] officer and the police as a whole
were in possession of information sufficient to constitute probable cause to make the arrest.”
Hoyos v. City of New York, 999 F. Supp. 2d 375, 386 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (citing Annunziata v. City
of New York, 2008 WL 2229903, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 28, 2008) (internal quotations omitted).
Here, Plaintiff asserts in his TAC that Officers Lyons and Kralik surveilled him following
their denial of a warrant request on September 14, 2020. (TAC at ¶ 61.) However, although no
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warrant was issued, the Defendants conducted their search of Plaintiff “with county sanction.”
(Id. at ¶ 78.) On this basis, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his Fourth Amendment
Rights. In response, Defendants argue that “[t]his is simply a reformulated false arrest claim,”
which the Court already found was meritless because probable cause existed for Plaintiff’s arrest.
(Defs.’ MoL. at 11.) Defendant’s contentions are persuasive. In its September 25, 2023 Opinion,
the Court concluded that Officers Lyons and Kralik had probable cause to re-arrest the Plaintiff.
(ECF No. 88 at 19-20.) On February 5, 2020, Judge Russo issued a Certificate of Conviction and
an Order of Commitment against the Plaintiff. (Weissman Decl. at Ex. M, ECF No. 72-13.)
Despite Judge Russo declining to extend a bench warrant to arrest the Plaintiff (TAC at ¶ 67),
Judge Russo’s Certificate of Conviction provided Defendants Lyons and Kralik with the
authority to re-arrest the Plaintiff. Given that Officers Lyons and Kralik had knowledge of the
Certificate of Conviction and of Plaintiff’s remaining state sentence, there was probable cause to
re-arrest the Plaintiff. For these reasons, and those cited in the September 25, 2023 Opinion,
Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims for unreasonable search and seizure are dismissed with prejudice.
2. Unreasonable Delay
A Plaintiff may bring a claim of unreasonable delay under the Fourth Amendment if the
“individual can prove that his or her probable cause determination was delayed unreasonably.”
Cnty. of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991). The standard for probable cause “is a
practical, nontechnical conception that deals with the factual and practical considerations of
everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.” Maryland v.
Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370 (2003) (internal quotations omitted). Examples of a probable cause
delay under the Fourth Amendment include “delays for the purposes of gathering additional
evidence to justify the arrest, a delay motivated by ill will, or delay for delay’s sake.”
McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 56 (1991). The probable cause determination seeks to limit the
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government in warrantless arrests against officers who cannot give probable cause as to why the
arrest occurred. Id at 45. See also U.S. v. Pabon, 871 F.3d 164, 179-181 (2d Cir. 2017)
(discussing unreasonable delay under the Fourth Amendment primarily pertains to delays
following an arrest, not prior). Such claims of delay can be rendered moot when “they either
received probable cause determinations or were released.” McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 52 (1991). In
asserting the existence of such delays, the Plaintiff “bears the burden of proving the delay was
unreasonable.” Case v. City of New York, 233 F. Supp. 3d 372, 387 (S.D.N.Y. 2017).
Here, and as mentioned supra, this Court has concluded that there was probable cause to
arrest Plaintiff following Judge Russo’s Certificate of Conviction. The Fourth Amendment
primarily protects against unreasonable delays following an arrest. In his TAC, the Plaintiff
alleges delays prior to this arrest. Despite this difference, Judge Russo’s certificate provided
Defendant Officers Lyons and Kralik with the necessary probable cause in either instance.
Accordingly, because (1) the Fourth Amendment’s protection is confined to delays following an
arrest, and not prior to an arrest, and (2) there was probable cause to arrest Plaintiff, the Court
dismisses Plaintiff’s unreasonable delay claim.
Under the Fifth Amendment, “delay prior to arrest or indictment may give rise to a due
process claim.” U.S. v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 7 (1982). A Plaintiff may successfully bring this
claim [argument] if they could prove that the delay “caused substantial prejudice to [Plaintiff’s]
right[] to a fair trial and the delay was an intentional device to gain tactical advantage over the
accused.” U.S. v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 324 (1971). The determination of whether or not
prejudice has occurred under due process “are fact-specific inquiries that will turn on the
particular circumstances of a case.” U.S. v. Santiago, 987 F. Supp. 2d 465, 489 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
But that “nonetheless, [under these inquiries] there is an indisputably high burden on [one] who
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argues that delay rises to the level of a due process violation.” Id. Although the protection of
unreasonable delay under “due process [may] bar[] prosecution whenever a defendant suffers
prejudice,” it must be remembered, “that proof of actual prejudice makes a due process claim
concrete and ripe for adjudication, not that it makes the claim automatically valid.” U.S. v.
Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 789 (1977). The prejudice must be of the nature that violates the basic
principles of justice which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions, and which define
the community's sense of justice and equity. Id. at 790 (internal citations omitted).
Here, the Plaintiff has not alleged how his claim of unreasonable delay prejudiced his right to
a fair trial, or whether the government engaged in some strategic unfair conduct against him.
Under Lovasco, to be ripe for adjudication, there must be proof of actual prejudice. It is not
enough to simply state Plaintiff suffered an unreasonable delay. Plaintiff asserts that Defendant
Officers Lyons and Kralik attempted to receive a warrant following the Certificate of Conviction
due to “doubts concerning its authoritative weight.” (TAC at ¶ 67.) Following the denial of the
warrant, Plaintiff maintains that Defendant Officers engaged in a prolonged surveillance
operation against him and that this “delay remains undisclosed and inexplicable.” (Id. at ¶¶ 6869.) However, despite the gap between Plaintiff’s release and re-arrest, “[t]here is no
constitutional right to be arrested.” Hoffa v. U.S., 385 U.S. 293, 310 (1966). Plaintiff’s TAC
provides no factual assertion nor points to evidence of actual prejudice. Instead, Plaintiff offers
the Court only conclusory statements concerning an inexplicable surveillance, which does not
establish actual prejudice. In this district, courts have generally found “actual prejudice” to mean
the “loss of documentary evidence or the unavailability of a key witness.” Santiago, 987 F. Supp.
2d at 485. In Santiago, the defendant was accused of committing a shooting and one of the only
witnesses present at the shooting who could offer testimony that undermined the Government’s
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theory of the case went missing. Id. There, the court held that the loss of this key witness
provided proof of actual prejudice. Similarly, in United States v. Gross, the Defendant was
accused of making false statements in connection with a mortgage application. There, it was the
loss of documents that contained substantial evidence about who made those false statements and
when those statements were made that provided proof of actual prejudice. 165 F. Supp. 2d 372
(E.D.N.Y. 2001). No showing has been made to this Court that Plaintiff’s alleged surveillance
prejudiced him such that he could not receive a fair trial Accordingly, the Court dismisses with
prejudice Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims for unreasonable delay. 1
B. Defendant Officers Lyons, Colon, Kralik, VanCura, and Investigating Officer
Budnick Are Responsible for Plaintiff’s Procedural Due Process Violations in Their
Individual Capacity
Plaintiff alleges Defendants violated his due process rights through his arrest, denial of
hearings before a Court, and failure to provide Defendant counsel throughout his reimprisonment. (TAC at ¶¶ 83-95.) In its September 25, 2023 Opinion, this Court previously
dismissed this claim without prejudice because Plaintiff failed to plead personal involvement of
Defendants. (ECF No. 88.) Accordingly, this Court now dismisses the Plaintiff’s claim with
prejudice.
The Due Process Clause provides freedom of bodily restraint and confinement as a
guaranteed protection under the Constitution. The Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572
(1972). As such, “[f]reedom from bodily restraint has always been at the core of the liberty
protected by the Due Process Clause from arbitrary government action.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542

The Court refrains from ruling on the County Defendants’ qualified immunity argument. Given Plaintiff’s
insufficient pleadings, the Court is unable to resolve the defense at this early stage in the proceedings. See
Chamberlain Est. of Chamberlain v. City of White Plains, 960 F.3d 100, 110 (2d Cir. 2020).

1

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U.S. 507, 529 (2004). In order to bring a due process claim, “a plaintiff must plead that each
Government-official defendant, through the defendant’s own individual actions, has violated the
Constitution.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009). Under Section 1983, it is not enough
to name the Defendant Officers, the Plaintiff must “plead and prove the elements of the
underlying constitutional violation directly against the official[s].” Tangreti v. Bachmann, 983
F.3d 609, 620 (2d Cir. 2020). Further, a plaintiff cannot “lump[] all the defendants together in
each claim and provid[e] no factual basis to distinguish their conduct.” Eisenberg v. Cnty. of
Westchester, No. 21-CV-4507 (VB), 2022 WL 768311, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 2022) (quoting
Atuahene v. City of Hartford, 10 F. App’x 33, 34 (2d Cir. 2001) (summary order)).
Plaintiff’s TAC alleges Defendant Officers violated his due process rights. However,
Plaintiff fails to allege each of their particular involvement in his constitutional deprivation. The
TAC asserts “[t]he individually named County Defendant Officers (Lyons, Kralik, Colon,
VanCura and Budnick) collectively caused the blatant disregard for Plaintiff’s procedural due
process rights.” (TAC at ¶ 84.) The Plaintiff further states the officers initiated criminal
proceedings against Plaintiff without probable cause, acted with malice in effecting the arrest,
and left the Plaintiff without any procedural due process following his arrest. (TAC at ¶ 85.)
First, it has been ruled that the County Defendants had probable cause to arrest the Plaintiff.
(ECF No. 88 at 18). Second, on the issue of [for] malice in effectuating the arrest, the Court
previously ruled that Defendants had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff. Id. Finally, the Plaintiff
does not provide any factual basis in the TAC that details how these Officers were directly
involved in his alleged deprivations to see a sentencing court upon his arrest, to be presented
before the court following his transfer from Rockland County Jail, or his lack of legal counsel.
“Without more, such vague, conclusory allegations do not satisfy the personal involvement
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standard.” Collins v. City U. of New York, No. 21 CIV. 9544 (NRB), 2023 WL 1818547, at *6
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2023). Such complaints that “essentially regurgitate[] the personal
involvement standard, without offering any facts indicating that, or how, an individual in a
supervisory role was personally involved in a constitutional violation, cannot withstand
dismissal. Id. (quoting Davis v. County of Nassau, 355 F. Supp. 2d 668, 677 (E.D.N.Y. 2005)).
In conclusory fashion, Plaintiff alleges the County Defendants individually and collectively
caused “blatant disregard for the Plaintiff's procedural due process rights” and the duty to present
the Plaintiff before the court post-arrest “rested unequivocally” on their shoulders. (TAC at ¶¶
84, 89.) Plaintiff fails to provide any factual reasoning as to why or how Defendant officers were
responsible for his continued deprivation. (Id. at 3, 13.) For these reasons, the Court dismisses
the Plaintiff's claims with prejudice.

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CONCLUSION
For the above-mentioned reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s
claims of unreasonable search and seizure and unreasonable delay against Defendant Officers
Lyons and Kralik and procedural due process violations against Defendant Officers Lyons,
Kralik, Colon, VanCura, and Budnick are dismissed with prejudice. The Clerk of Court is
directed to terminate the motion at ECF No. 108. Defendants are directed to file an answer to the
two remaining causes of action in the Third Amended Complaint by March 26, 2025, and the
parties are directed to confer and file a Case Management Plan and Scheduling Order (blank
form attached) by April 9, 2025.
SO ORDERED.
Dated:

March 5, 2025
White Plains, New York

________________________________
NELSON S. ROMÁN
United States District Judge

16

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Rev. Jan. 2012

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
-------------------------------------------------------------x

CIVIL CASE DISCOVERY PLAN
Plaintiff(s),

AND SCHEDULING ORDER

- against -

Defendant(s).

CV

(NSR)

-------------------------------------------------------------x

This Civil Case Discovery Plan and Scheduling Order is adopted, after consultation with counsel,
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 16 and 26(f):

1.

All parties [consent] [do not consent] to conducting all further proceedings before a
Magistrate Judge, including motions and trial, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). The
parties are free to withhold consent without adverse substantive consequences. (If all
parties consent, the remaining paragraphs of this form need not be completed.)

2.

This case [is] [is not] to be tried to a jury.

3.

Joinder of additional parties must be accomplished by _______________________.

4.

Amended pleadings may be filed until _____________________.

5.

Interrogatories shall be served no later than ___________________, and responses
thereto shall be served within thirty (30) days thereafter. The provisions of Local Civil
Rule 33.3 [shall] [shall not] apply to this case.

6.

First request for production of documents, if any, shall be served no later than
____________________.

7.

Non-expert depositions shall be completed by ____________________________.

a.

Unless counsel agree otherwise or the Court so orders, depositions shall not be
held until all parties have responded to any first requests for production of
documents.

b.

Depositions shall proceed concurrently.

c.

Whenever possible, unless counsel agree otherwise or the Court so orders, nonparty depositions shall follow party depositions.

8.

Any further interrogatories, including expert interrogatories, shall be served no later than
_______________________.

9.

Requests to Admit, if any, shall be served no later than ______________________.

10.

Expert reports shall be served no later than ______________________.

11.

Rebuttal expert reports shall be served no later than ______________________.

12.

Expert depositions shall be completed by ______________________.

13.

Additional provisions agreed upon by counsel are attached hereto and made a part hereof.

14.

ALL DISCOVERY SHALL BE COMPLETED BY ______________________.

15.

Any motions shall be filed in accordance with the Court’s Individual Practices.

16.

This Civil Case Discovery Plan and Scheduling Order may not be changed without leave
of Court (or the assigned Magistrate Judge acting under a specific order of reference).

17.

The Magistrate Judge assigned to this case is the Hon.

.

18.

If, after entry of this Order, the parties consent to trial before a Magistrate Judge, the
Magistrate Judge will schedule a date certain for trial and will, if necessary, amend this
Order consistent therewith.

19.

The next case management conference is scheduled for _____________________, at
____________. (The Court will set this date at the initial conference.)

SO ORDERED.

Dated: White Plains, New York
_______________________

Nelson S. Román, U.S. District Judge