DeRaffele et al v. Unified Court System of New York et al

Filing 2

ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH LEAVE TO REPLEAD: Plaintiffs' complaint is dismissed as barred by judicial immunity, the Eleventh Amendment, and the Younger abstention and Rooker-Feldman doctrines. The Court denies Plaintiffs' request to have this case designated as a class action, and Plaintiffs may not assert claims on behalf of C.D. and C.M. The Court grants Plaintiffs leave to replead valid claims within 30 days of this order. If Plaintiffs choose to replead their claims, they must submit an amended complaint to this Court's Pro Se Intake Unit within thirty days of the date of this order, caption the document as an "Amended Complaint," and label the document with docket number 24-CV-1920 (CS). No summons will issue at this time. If Plaintiffs fail to comply within the time allowed, and they cannot show good cause to excuse such failure, the Court will enter civil judgment consistent with this order. The Clerk of Court is instructed to hold this matter open on the docket until a civil judgment is entered. The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. Cf. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962) (holding that an appellant demonstrates good faith when he seeks review of a nonfrivolous issue). SO ORDERED. (Signed by Judge Cathy Seibel on 3/26/2024) (mml)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
CHRISTOPHER DeRAFFELE; JOHN DeRAFFELE;
C.D., a minor; C.M., a minor,
Plaintiffs,
-againstUNIFED COURT SYSTEM OF NEW YORK;
FAMILY COURT OF NEW ROCHELLE;
HONORABLE JUDGE MELISSA LOEHR;
DEBORAH CLEGG; CLAUDETTE LAMELLE;
GUADALUPE MENDOZA; GAIL DeRAFFELE
CARRETA,

24-CV-1920 (CS)
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
WITH LEAVE TO REPLEAD

Defendants.
CATHY SEIBEL, United States District Judge:
Plaintiffs Christopher DeRaffele and John DeRaffele, who are father and son and
appearing pro se, bring this action on behalf of themselves and Christopher’s minor children,
C.D. and C.M, asserting violations of their rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiffs paid the
filing fees to bring this action. For the reasons set forth in this order, the Court dismisses
Plaintiffs’ claims, but grants Plaintiffs 30 days’ leave to replead valid claims.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court has the authority to dismiss a complaint, even when the plaintiff has paid the
filing fees, if it determines that the action is frivolous, Fitzgerald v. First E. Seventh Tenants
Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 363-64 (2d Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (citing Pillay v. INS, 45 F.3d 14, 16-17
(2d Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (holding that Court of Appeals has inherent authority to dismiss
frivolous appeal)), or that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon
Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999). Moreover, the court “has the power to dismiss a complaint
sua sponte for failure to state a claim,” Leonhard v. United States, 633 F.2d 599, 609 n. 11 (2d

Cir. 1980), so long as the plaintiff is given notice and “an opportunity to be heard,” Thomas v.
Scully, 943 F.2d 259, 260 (2d Cir.1991) (per curiam); see Perez v. Ortiz, 849 F.2d 793, 797 (2d
Cir. 1988); Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1357, at 301 & n. 3. The Court
is obliged, however, to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d
Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v.
Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474-75 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
Although pro se litigants enjoy the Court’s “special solicitude,” Ruotolo v. I.R.S., 28 F.3d
6, 8 (2d Cir. 1994) (per curiam), their pleadings must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief. A complaint states a claim for relief if the claim is plausible. Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007)). To review a complaint for plausibility, the Court accepts all well-pleaded factual
allegations as true and draws all reasonable inferences in the pleader’s favor. Id. (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). But the Court need not accept “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements
of a cause of action,” which are essentially legal conclusions. Id. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550
U.S. at 555). As set forth in Iqbal:
[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require detailed factual
allegations, but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfullyharmed-me accusation. A pleading that offers labels and conclusions or a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Nor does a
complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual
enhancement.
Id. (internal citations, quotation marks, and alteration omitted). After separating legal
conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the court must determine whether those facts
make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id.

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BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs, who seek to have this action designated as a class action, assert that they bring
this action “to rectify an injustice that violates the very basic rights of individuals such as to the
1st amendment right of free speech, the 14th amendment right of due process and a violation of
their civil rights of deprivation under Title 42 USC 1983.” 1 (ECF No. 1 at 2.) They assert further
that they are presenting their case to this court “regarding the abusive and improper practices of
the Unified Court System of New York, Department of State in allowing Family Courts and their
Judges to abuse the temporary orders of protection that were given to Defendants in this case,
Miss Guadalupe Mendoza, and Mrs. Gail DeRaffele Cerrata against the Plaintiffs. Christopher J.
DeRaffele and John DeRaffele based on false and unfounded allegations.” (Id.)
Plaintiffs bring this action against the Unified Court System of New York, the Family
Court of New Rochelle, Judge Melissa Loehr, Child Guardian Deborah Clegg, Social Worker
Claudette Lamelle, Family Court Petitioner Guadalupe Mendoza, and Gail DeRaffele Cerreta.
They seek to have this court “declare a class action suit so the thousands of mostly males can
seek closure and compensation for the abuse they suffered by the misuse of the temporary orders
of protection in the State of New York and the consequences of violations of these faulty orders
stemming in most cases from false allegation by Petitioners against Respondents, that can result
in criminal charges, heavy legal fees, loss of job, incarceration and family damage that takes
years to mend.” (Id. at 6.)
The following allegations are taken from Plaintiffs’ complaint. Plaintiffs allege that their
rights as father and grandfather have been violated by false allegations that were made against

1

The Court quotes from the complaint verbatim. All grammar, punctuation,
capitalization, and spelling are in the original unless otherwise indicated.
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them. Judge Loehr, who Plaintiffs describe as “male biased,” together with Deborah Clegg and
Claudette Lamelle, who Plaintiffs describe as Judge Loehr’s “cohorts” and “coconspirators,”
have made sure that minors C.D. and C.M. cannot see their father and grandfather. (Id. at 5-6.)
Plaintiffs bring this action seeking $50 million, injunctive relief relating to how temporary orders
of protection are granted, and a declaration from this court that appeal instructions be included
when temporary orders of protection are granted.
A review of the records of the New York State Unified Court System reveals that Plaintiff
Christopher DeRaffele has five pending matters in the New York State Supreme Court,
Westchester County: four matters against Defendant Guadalupe Mendoza and one matter against
Defendant Gail DeRaffele Cerreta. See https://iapps.courts.state.ny.us/webcivil/FCASSearch
[https://perma.cc/J6RZ-9Y6J].
DISCUSSION
A.

Claim on behalf of C.D. and C.M. and Class Certification
Plaintiffs cannot proceed pro se and assert claims on behalf of C.D. and C.M. or seek

class certification. The statute governing appearances in federal court, 28 U.S.C. § 1654, allows
for two types of representation: “that by an attorney admitted to the practice of law by a
governmental regulatory body, and that by a person representing himself.” Lattanzio v. COMTA,
481 F.3d 137, 139 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting Eagle Assocs. v. Bank of Montreal, 926 F.2d 1305,
1308 (2d Cir. 1991)). Generally, a non-attorney parent cannot bring an action on behalf of his
minor child in federal court without counsel. See Tindall v. Poultney High Sch. Dist., 414 F.3d
281, 284 (2d Cir. 2005). Because a nonlawyer cannot bring suit on behalf of others, a plaintiff
proceeding pro se also cannot act as a class representative. Rodriguez v. Eastman Kodak Co., 88
F. App’x 470, 470 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing Iannaccone v. Law, 142 F.3d 553, 558 (2d Cir. 1998));
Phillips v. Tobin, 548 F.2d 408, 412-15 (2d Cir. 1976).
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Accordingly, Plaintiffs may not assert claims on behalf of C.D. and C.M. and they cannot
proceed as class representatives because they cannot represent the interests of any other
individual; they may only represent their own interests. Plaintiffs’ claims on behalf of C.D. and
C.M. are therefore dismissed, and Plaintiffs’ request to have this action designated as a class
action is denied.
B.

Judicial Immunity
Plaintiff’s claims against Judge Melissa Loehr must be dismissed. Judges are absolutely

immune from suit for damages for any actions taken within the scope of their judicial
responsibilities. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991). Generally, “acts arising out of, or
related to, individual cases before the judge are considered judicial in nature.” Bliven v. Hunt,
579 F.3d 204, 210 (2d Cir. 2009). “Even allegations of bad faith or malice cannot overcome
judicial immunity.” Id. (citations omitted). This is because, “[w]ithout insulation from liability,
judges would be subject to harassment and intimidation . . . .” Young v. Selsky, 41 F.3d 47, 51
(2d Cir. 1994). In addition, Section 1983, as amended in 1996, provides that “in any action
brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity,
injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated, or declaratory
relief was unavailable.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Judicial immunity does not apply when the judge takes action “outside” his judicial
capacity, or when the judge takes action that, although judicial in nature, is taken “in absence of
jurisdiction.” Mireles, 502 U.S. at 9-10; see also Bliven, 579 F.3d at 209-10 (describing actions
that are judicial in nature). But “the scope of [a] judge’s jurisdiction must be construed broadly
where the issue is the immunity of the judge.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978).
Plaintiff has not alleged any facts showing that Judge Loehr acted beyond the scope of
her judicial responsibilities or outside her jurisdiction. See Mireles, 509 U.S. at 11-12. Because
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Plaintiff sues Judge Loehr for “acts arising out of, or related to, individual cases before [her],”
she is immune from suit for such claims. Bliven, 579 F.3d at 210. The Court therefore dismisses
Plaintiffs’ claims against Judge Loehr as barred by judicial immunity.
C.

Eleventh Amendment
Plaintiffs’ claims against the Unified Court System of New York must also be dismissed.

“[A]s a general rule, state governments may not be sued in federal court unless they have waived
their Eleventh Amendment immunity, or unless Congress has abrogated the states’ Eleventh
Amendment immunity . . ..” Gollomp v. Spitzer, 568 F.3d 355, 366 (2d Cir. 2009). “The
immunity recognized by the Eleventh Amendment extends beyond the states themselves to state
agents and state instrumentalities that are, effectively, arms of a state.” Id. New York has not
waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity to suit in federal court, and Congress did not abrogate
the states’ immunity in enacting 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Trotman v. Palisades Interstate Park
Comm’n, 557 F.2d 35, 40 (2d Cir. 1977).
Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 claims against the New York State Unified Court System are
therefore barred by the Eleventh Amendment and are dismissed.
D.

Private Defendants
Plaintiffs’ claims against Child Guardian Deborah Clegg, Social Worker Claudette

Lamelle, Family Court Petitioner Guadalupe Mendoza, and Gail DeRaffele Cerreta must also be
dismissed. A claim for relief under Section 1983 must allege facts showing that each defendant
acted under the color of a state “statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. Private parties therefore generally are not liable under the statute. Sykes v. Bank of Am.,
723 F.3d 399, 406 (2d Cir. 2013) (citing Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic
Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001)); see Ciambriello v. Cnty. of Nassau, 292 F.3d 307, 323 (2d Cir.
2002) (“[T]he United States Constitution regulates only the Government, not private parties.”);
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see also Milan v. Wertheimer, 808 F.3d 961, 964 (2d Cir. 2015) (law guardians appointed to
represent children in family court proceedings are not state actors who can be sued under
§ 1983); Malek v. New York Unified Ct. Sys., No. 22-CV-5416, 2023 WL 2429528, at *18
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 2023) (same with respect to social workers who submit reports to court),
appeal dismissed (July 7, 2023 and July 10, 2023); Davis v. Whillheim, No. 17-CV-5793, 2019
WL 935214, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 2019) (same as to social worker appointed by court).
As these Defendants are private parties who are not alleged to work for any state or other
government body, Plaintiffs cannot state a claim against these Defendants under Section 1983.
E.

Younger Abstention Doctrine
The status of the state-court proceedings is unclear from Plaintiffs’ complaint. To the

extent that Plaintiffs, in seeking injunctive relief, ask this Court to intervene in proceedings
pending in state court, the Court must dismiss those claims. In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37
(1971), the United States Supreme Court held that a federal court may not enjoin a pending statecourt criminal proceeding in the absence of special circumstances suggesting bad faith,
harassment, or irreparable injury that is both serious and immediate. See Heicklen v.
Morgenthau, 378 F. App’x 1, 2 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 57374 (1973)). This doctrine has been extended to civil actions. See Kaufman v. Kaye, 466 F.3d 83,
86 (2d Cir. 2006); Diamond “D” Const. Corp. v. McGowan, 282 F.3d 191, 198 (2d Cir. 2002)
(“Younger generally requires federal courts to abstain from taking jurisdiction over federal
constitutional claims that involve or call into question ongoing state proceedings.”).
Younger abstention seeks to avoid federal court interference with ongoing state criminal
prosecutions, state-initiated civil enforcement proceedings, and state civil proceedings that
involve the ability of state courts to perform their judicial functions. Jones v. Cnty. of
Westchester, 678 F. App’x 48, 49-50 (2d Cir. 2017) (summary order). Thus, abstention is
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appropriate in only three categories of state court proceedings: (1) state criminal prosecutions;
(2) civil enforcement proceedings that are “akin to criminal prosecutions”; and (3) civil
proceedings “that implicate a State’s interest in enforcing the orders and judgments of its courts.”
Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 72-73 (2013).
If a “federal lawsuit implicates the way that New York courts manage their
own . . . proceedings — a subject in which ‘the states have an especially strong interest’” — a
State’s interest is most likely implicated, warranting abstention under Younger. Falco v. Justices
of the Matrimonial Parts of Sup. Ct. of Suffolk Cnty., 805 F.3d 425, 427 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting
Phillips, Nizer, Benjamin, Krim & Ballon v. Rosenstiel, 490 F.2d 509, 516 (2d Cir. 1973)).
When any of these types of proceedings are pending in state court, the Younger doctrine
bars federal courts from ordering injunctive relief that interferes with the state court proceedings.
“State proceedings are pending for Younger purposes until all appellate court remedies have been
exhausted.” People United for Children, Inc. v. City of New York, 108 F. Supp. 2d 275, 290 n.6
(S.D.N.Y. 2000).
Plaintiffs’ request “that an injunction be granted . . . that no temporary orders of
protection be granted without a hearing within 5 days and which proof of allegations must be
presented to the Court in order to keep the temporary order of protection in effect,” (ECF No. 1
at 40), implicates how the state court performs it judicial function and manages its proceedings.
Younger abstention therefore applies, and this Court refrains from exercising jurisdiction over
this action and will not intervene in those proceedings. See Falco, 805 F.3d at 427-28 (lawsuit
that “implicates the way that New York courts manage their own divorce and custody
proceedings” requires abstention because it would interfere with procedures uniquely integral to
state’s ability to perform its functions in such proceedings); Skillings v. City of New York, No.

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21-CV-3034, 2023 WL 8531493, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 2023) (Younger absention applies
where lawsuit seeks declaratory and/or injunctive relief that would interfere with ongoing state
custody proceedings) (collecting cases).
F.

Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
Federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to review cases “brought by state-court

losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court
proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.”
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). The Rooker-Feldman
doctrine – named for Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923), and District of
Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482-86 (1983) – applies where the
federal-court plaintiff: (1) lost in state court, (2) complains of injuries caused by the state-court
judgment, (3) invites the district court to review and reject the state court judgment, and
(4) commenced the district court proceedings after the state-court judgment was rendered.
Vossbrinck v. Accredited Home Lenders, Inc., 773 F.3d 423, 426 (2d Cir. 2014).
To the extent that Plaintiffs are challenging a final state-court judgment and seek an order
from this Court vacating that judgment, their claim is for injuries “caused by the state-court
judgment[s].” Exxon, 544 U.S. at 284. As Plaintiffs cannot ask this Court to review and reject
state-court decisions, their claim for relief is barred under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
Plaintiffs’ avenue for review of a final decision of the family court is to appeal within the state
court system, and then from New York’s highest court to the Supreme Court of the United
States. See, e.g., Gilmore v. Greene Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., No. 07-CV-919, 2007 WL
4180749, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 20, 2007) (“inferior federal courts have no authority to review
judgments of state courts in judicial proceedings and that federal review, if any, can occur only
by way of a certiorari petition to the Supreme Court”).
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G.

Leave to Replead
Plaintiffs proceed in this matter without the benefit of an attorney. District courts

generally should grant a self-represented plaintiff an opportunity to amend a complaint to cure its
defects unless amendment would be futile. See Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir.
2011); Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988). Indeed, the Second Circuit has
cautioned that district courts “should not dismiss [a pro se complaint] without granting leave to
amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid
claim might be stated.” Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Gomez v.
USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795 (2d Cir. 1999)). Although the Court finds that it is
unlikely that Plaintiffs can allege additional facts to state a valid claim, in light of their pro se
status, the Court grants Plaintiffs 30 days’ leave to replead.
Plaintiffs must provide a short and plain statement of the relevant facts supporting each
claim against Defendant. If Plaintiffs have an address for any named defendant, Plaintiffs must
provide it. Plaintiffs should include all of the information in the amended complaint that
Plaintiffs want the Court to consider in deciding whether the amended complaint states a claim
for relief. That information should include:
a) the names and titles of all relevant people;
b) a description of all relevant events, including what each defendant did or failed to do,
the approximate date and time of each event, and the general location where each
event occurred;
c) a description of the injuries Plaintiffs suffered; and
d) the relief Plaintiffs seek, such as money damages, injunctive relief, or declaratory
relief.
Essentially, Plaintiffs’ amended complaint should tell the Court: who violated their
federally protected rights and how; when and where such violations occurred; and why Plaintiffs

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are entitled to relief. Plaintiffs must bear in mind the legal principles set forth in this Order in
preparing their amended complaint.
Because Plaintiffs’ amended complaint will completely replace, not supplement, the
original complaint, any facts or claims that Plaintiffs want to include from the original complaint
must be repeated in the amended complaint.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs’ complaint is dismissed as barred by judicial immunity, the Eleventh
Amendment, and the Younger abstention and Rooker-Feldman doctrines.
The Court denies Plaintiffs’ request to have this case designated as a class action, and
Plaintiffs may not assert claims on behalf of C.D. and C.M.
The Court grants Plaintiffs leave to replead valid claims within 30 days of this order. If
Plaintiffs choose to replead their claims, they must submit an amended complaint to this Court’s
Pro Se Intake Unit within thirty days of the date of this order, caption the document as an
“Amended Complaint,” and label the document with docket number 24-CV-1920 (CS). No
summons will issue at this time. If Plaintiffs fail to comply within the time allowed, and they
cannot show good cause to excuse such failure, the Court will enter civil judgment consistent
with this order.
The Clerk of Court is instructed to hold this matter open on the docket until a civil
judgment is entered.
The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would
not be taken in good faith, and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose of an

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appeal. Cf. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962) (holding that an appellant
demonstrates good faith when he seeks review of a nonfrivolous issue).
SO ORDERED.
Dated:

March 26, 2024
White Plains, New York
CATHY SEIBEL
United States District Judge

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