M.O.C.H.A. Society, et al v. City of Buffalo, et al

Filing 453

DECISION AND ORDER granting 444 Plaintiffs' MOTION for Entry of Judgment under Rule 54(b). The Clerk is directed to enter final judgment in favor of defndants on the claims raised in Complaint B pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). Signed by Hon. John T. Curtin on 5/23/2011. (JEC)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

M.O.C.H.A. SOCIETY, INC., et al.,
Plaintiffs,
-vs-

98-CV-99C

CITY OF BUFFALO, et al.,
Defendants.

In this action, originally filed in February 1998, plaintiffs (an organization of African
American firefighters employed by the City of Buffalo Fire Department, and several
individual firefighters) claimed that the City’s (1) use of a statewide promotional
examination administered in March 1998 as a basis for promoting firefighters to the rank
of lieutenant (the “1998 Lieutenant’s Exam”), and (2) implementation of an employee drugtesting policy, resulted in unlawful disparate impact and intentional discrimination against
African American firefighters. Due to the complex nature of the original pleading, the court
directed plaintiffs to file separate amended complaints setting forth the claims relating to
the drug-testing program (Complaint “A”) and the promotional practices (Complaint “B”)
(see Item 23).
Following protracted litigation of the promotion issues raised in Complaint “B,”
including a five-day evidentiary hearing conducted in June-August 2008, this court found
that the 1998 Lieutenant's Exam was "job-related for the position and consistent with
business necessity," as required under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act to validate the use
of the Exam notwithstanding its disparate impact. M.O.C.H.A. Society, Inc. v. City of

Buffalo, 2009 WL 604898, at *18 (W.D.N.Y. March 9, 2009). As a result, the court
dismissed Complaint “B” to the extent it sought relief under Title VII based upon disparate
impact, leaving unresolved plaintiffs’ remaining claim that the City’s use of the Exam as the
sole criteria for promotion constituted a pattern or practice of intentional discrimination.
The City subsequently moved for summary judgment on this remaining claim, and
on May 10, 2010, the court entered an order granting the motion and dismissing Complaint
“B” in its entirety (Item 432). Plaintiffs immediately moved for entry of judgment pursuant
to Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(a) (Item 433), but shortly thereafter withdrew that motion upon filing
a notice of appeal with the Second Circuit (see Items 435, 439). The parties did not
request, and this court therefore did not direct, entry of final judgment pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 54(b) on the claims presented in Complaint “B.”
In an order dated April 6, 2011, the Second Circuit dismissed plaintiffs’ appeal sua
sponte for lack of appellate jurisdiction, because “the district court did not direct the entry
of final judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b).” Item 445, Ex. A.
As a result, on April 11, 2011, plaintiffs filed a motion for an order directing the Clerk
of the Court to enter final judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b) as to the claims raised in
Complaint “B” (Items 444, 445). The City initially advised the court of its intent to oppose
the motion, but recent correspondence indicates that the City has “elected not to submit
any opposition . . . [and][t]he parties are now awaiting the District Court’s decision on that
motion.” Item 451.
Rule 54(b) provides:
When an action presents more than one claim for relief . . . or when multiple
parties are involved, the court may direct entry of a final judgment as to one
or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties only if the court expressly
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determines that there is no just reason for delay. Otherwise, any order or
other decision, however designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the
claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties does not end
the action as to any of the claims or parties and may be revised at any time
before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties'
rights and liabilities.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b).
As explained briefly above, this action as originally filed involved two distinct claims
for relief–discriminatory promotion policy and practice based on the City’s use of the results
of the 1998 Lieutenant’s Exam, and discriminatory enforcement of the City’s employee
drug-testing program. The record reflects that, at the time the court directed the parties
to separately plead these claims for the sake of clarity and convenience, the court did not
specifically enter an order of severance pursuant to Rule 21.1 However, the court and the
parties have proceeded throughout the long history and course of this litigation under the
assumption that the cognizable claims in Complaint “A” and Complaint “B” involve
completely different legal and factual issues. Clearly, the nature of the claims in Complaint
“B,” which were finally and fully disposed of by the court’s March 9, 2009 and May 10, 2010
orders, “was such that no appellate court would have to decide the same issues more than
once” even if there should be a subsequent appeal of the court’s disposition of the issues
raised in Complaint “A.” Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. General Electric Co., 446 U.S. 1, 8 (1980).
Accordingly, in the absence of any showing to the contrary, the court finds that there
is no just reason for delay of appeal of the May 10, 2010 order dismissing Complaint “B”
in its entirety. Therefore, in the interest of finality within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291

1

Rule 21 provides that, “[o]n m otion or on its own, the court m ay at any tim e, on just term s, add or
drop a party. The court m ay also sever any claim against a party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 21.

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(“The courts of appeals . . . shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the
district courts”), and “in the interest of sound judicial administration,” Sears, Roebuck & Co.
v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 437 (1956), the Clerk of the Court is now directed to enter “final
judgment” in favor of defendants on the claims raised in Complaint “B,” pursuant to Rule
54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
So ordered.

\s\ John T. Curtin
JOHN T. CURTIN
United States District Judge
Dated: May 23, 2011
p:\pending\1998\98-99.may18.2011

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