Ford v. Conway et al
Filing
71
ORDER granting 49 Motion for Summary Judgment. The Clerk of Court is directed to close this case. Signed by Hon. H. Kenneth Schroeder, Jr. on July 1, 2009. (APG)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
VICTOR CLARKE FORD, JR., Plaintiff, v. JAMES CONWAY, et al., Defendants. 03-CV-0927(Sr)
DECISION AND ORDER Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), the parties have consented to have the undersigned conduct any and all further proceedings in this case, including entry of final judgment. Dkt. #45.
Plaintiff, a former inmate at the Attica Correctional Facility, filed this pro se action on or about November 20, 2003 in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York seeking relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985. Dkt. #1. Plaintiff's remaining claim against defendants James Conway, Richard A. Savage and Glenn S. Goord alleges that he was illegally detained beyond his maximum release date of May 14, 2003 in violation of his rights pursuant to the United States Constitution.1 Currently before the Court is defendants' motion for summary judgment.
By Decision and Order dated March 16, 2004, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A, United States District Judge Michael A. Telesca ordered that unless plaintiff filed an amended complaint by April 1, 2004, plaintiff's (1) "reasonable accommodation claim (Complaint, First and Second Causes of Action, ¶¶ 5-6), which this Court construes as a claim under Title II of the Americans With
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Dkt. #49. For the following reasons, defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted.
BACKGROUND Plaintiff, a former inmate at the Attica Correctional Facility ("Attica") filed this pro se action on or about November 20, 2003 in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York against defendants James Conway, T.G. Eagen, Richard A. Savage, Glenn S. Goord and K. Bellamy. Dkt. #1. Plaintiff alleges that while he was incarcerated at Attica, defendants, inter alia, denied him reasonable accommodation for a disability, disregarded a "proscribed [sic] order" requiring "no shower chair," violated his right to equal protection, and "detain[ed plaintiff] beyond [his] court assigned maximum release date." Dkt. #1. Thereafter, because the acts about which plaintiff complains in his complaint allegedly occurred at Attica, located within the W estern District of New York, this action was transferred from the Northern District of New York to the Western District of New York. Dkt. #4.
Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12132 is dismissed with prejudice against the named defendants"; (2) plaintiff's equal protection claim in relation to his delayed application for SSI benefits (Complaint, Third Cause of Action) is dismissed; (3) plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claims based on defendants' alleged failure to provide adequate medical care and failure to rectify deficiencies (Complaint, First, Second, Fourth, and Fifth Causes of Action, ¶¶ 5-8) are dismissed. Dkt. #7. District Judge Telesca did, however, order that the complaint be served on defendants James Conway, Richard Savage and Glenn Good with respect to plaintiff's claim that he was held in custody beyond his claimed maximum release date. Id. Thereafter, by Decision and Order dated June 8, 2004, United States District Judge William M. Skretny ordered that by reason of plaintiff's failure to file an amended complaint by April 1, 2004 and in accordance with District Judge Telesca's prior Decision and Order (Dkt. #7), plaintiff's First through Fifth causes of action be dismissed with prejudice and defendants Eagen and Bellamy be terminated as parties to this action. Dkt. #14. -2-
Following the transfer to the Western District of New York, United States District Judge Michael A. Telesca issued an Order dismissing several of plaintiff's claims unless plaintiff filed an amended complaint by April 1, 2004. Specifically, District Judge Telesca's Order dismissed: (1) plaintiff's "reasonable accommodation claim (Complaint, First and Second Causes of Action, ¶¶ 5-6), which this Court construes as a claim under Title II of the Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12132;" (2) plaintiff's equal protection claim in relation to his delayed application for SSI benefits (Complaint, Third Cause of Action); and (3) plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claims based on defendants' alleged failure to provide adequate medical care and failure to rectify deficiencies (Complaint, First, Second, Fourth, and Fifth Causes of Action, ¶¶ 5-8). Dkt. #7. Notwithstanding District Judge Telesca's Order giving plaintiff the opportunity to file an amended complaint by April 1, 2004, plaintiff failed to file an amended complaint. Accordingly, consistent with District Judge Telesca's prior Order (Dkt. #7), United States District Judge William M. Skretny issued an Order dated June 8, 2004 dismissing with prejudice plaintiff's First through Fifth Causes of Action and terminating defendants T.G. Eagen and K. Bellamy as parties. Dkt. #14.
Plaintiff's only remaining cause of action states in its entirety: [d]efendants Conway, Savage, and Goord further acted in such an [sic] deliberate and evil manner, by illegally detaining me beyond my court assigned maximum release date of May 14, 2003, and thereby not only violated plaintiff's civil rights, but the Constitution of the United States and the New York State Constitution's Article 1 Section 6. Dkt. #1, ¶ 9. In the introductory paragraphs to the complaint, plaintiff alleges that he -3-
was "previously incarcerated legally" at Attica from August 15, 2002 to May 14, 2003. Id. at ¶ 4. From May 14, 2003 until June 6, 2003, however, plaintiff alleges that his incarceration at Attica was "illegal." Id.
In support of their motion for summary judgment, defendants submit the affidavit of Richard de Simone, Associate Counsel in charge of New York's Department of Correctional Services ("DOCS") Office of Sentencing Review. Dkt. #57. In his affidavit, Mr. de Simone calculates the maximum expiration date of plaintiff's original sentence and thereafter, re-calculates the maximum expiration date of plaintiff's sentence following, inter alia, his return to DOCS as a conditional release violator. On November 7, 1985, plaintiff was sentenced by the Oneida County Court to a term of six (6) years to eighteen (18) years for Sodomy 1st and two terms of two (2) years to six (6) years for Sexual Abuse 1st (hereinafter referred to as "the 1985 sentences"). Dkt. #58, ¶ 6. The three terms were ordered to run concurrent. Id. The 1985 sentences commenced when plaintiff was transferred to DOCS on December 24, 1985 pursuant to N.Y. Penal Law § 70.30(1). Id. at ¶ 7. At that time, pursuant to N.Y. Correction Law § 600-a and N.Y. Penal Law § 70.30(3), the eighteen (18) year maximum term was credited with 218 days of jail time "certified to the 1985 sentences by the Oneida County Sheriff's Department." Id. The certification from the Oneida County Sheriff's Department did not, however, specify the dates included in the 218 day period. Id.
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As explained in the de Simone affidavit, the maximum expiration date of the 1985 sentences was initially calculated as follows (years-months-days): 18-00-00 - 00-07-08 17-04-22 + 1985-12-24 2003-05-15 controlling maximum term of concurrent 1985 sentences credit of 218 days of jail time time to serve on maximum term date 1985 sentences commenced upon transfer to DOCS initial maximum expiration date
Dkt. #57, ¶ 4 and Exhibit B thereto; Dkt. #58, ¶ 8. Thereafter, on September 27, 1996, the maximum expiration date of the 1985 sentences was recalculated pursuant to an undated, amended jail time certificate issued by the Oneida County Sheriff's Department. Id. at ¶ 9. The certificate increased plaintiff's jail time credit from 218 days to 219 days for the period May 19, 1985 and December 23, 1985 and plaintiff's maximum expiration date was re-calculated as follows. 18-00-00 - 00-07-09 17-04-21 + 1985-12-24 2003-05-14 controlling maximum time of concurrent 1985 sentences credit of 219 days of jail time time to serve on maximum term date 1985 sentences commenced upon transfer to DOCS adjusted maximum expiration date
Dkt. #57, ¶ 5 and Exhibits C & D thereto; Dkt. #58, ¶ 9.
On May 17, 1999, plaintiff was conditionally released to supervision by the New York State Division of Parole ("Parole"). Thereafter, Parole declared plaintiff delinquent as of July 5, 2000. Dkt. #57, ¶ 6; Dkt. #58, ¶ 10. Accordingly, the 1985
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sentences were interrupted during the period between the July 5, 2000 delinquency date and the September 27, 2000 date on which plaintiff was returned to DOCS as a conditional release violator. Dkt. #57, ¶ 6 and Exhibits A & E thereto; Dkt. #58, ¶ 10; see also N.Y. Penal Law § 70.40(3)(b). Upon plaintiff's return to DOCS as a conditional release violator on September 27, 2000, the 1985 sentences were thereafter credited with fifty-three (53) days of parole jail time for the period between August 5, 2000 (the date on which plaintiff was arrested) and September 26, 2000. Dkt. #57, ¶ 7; Dkt. #58, ¶ 11. Accordingly, on October 2, 2000, the July 5, 2000 delinquency date and the 53 days parole jail time credit resulted in the following re-calculation of the plaintiff's maximum expiration date: 2003-05-14 - 2000-07-05 02-10-09 - 00-01-23 02-08-16 + 2000-09-27 2003-06-13 adjusted maximum expiration date declared delinquent by Parole delinquent time owed to maximum term 53 days of parole jail time net delinquent time owed to maximum term date returned to DOCS as a conditional release violator adjusted maximum expiration date
Dkt. # 57, ¶ 7 and Exhibit F thereto; Dkt. #58, ¶ 11. Thereafter, DOCS updated the calculation of plaintiff's maximum expiration date to reflect that Parole had adjusted his delinquency date from July 5, 2000 to July 11, 2000. Dkt. # 57, ¶ 8 and Exhibit G thereto; Dkt. #58, ¶ 12. Below is the updated calculation:
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2003-05-14 - 2000-07-11 02-10-03 - 00-01-23 02-08-10 + 2000-09-27 2003-06-07
adjusted maximum expiration date declared delinquent by Parole (adjusted) delinquent time owed to maximum term 53 days of parole jail time net delinquent time owed to maximum term date returned to DOCS as a conditional release violator adjusted maximum expiration date
Id. Because plaintiff's maximum expiration date of June 7, 2003 was a Saturday, plaintiff was released and discharged from DOCS on Friday, June 6, 2003. Dkt. # 57, ¶ 9; Dkt. #58, ¶ 13.
As set forth above, plaintiff alleges that he was unconstitutionally detained beyond his "court assigned maximum release date of May 14, 2003." Dkt. #1, ¶ 9. To the extent plaintiff is alleging that his maximum release date should have remained May 14, 2003, defendants argue that he fails to take into account the mandatory provisions of N.Y. Penal Law § 70.40(3) as they apply to the revocation of his release and his return to DOCS as a conditional release violator. Dkt. #57, ¶ 10; Dkt. #58, ¶ 14. In further support of their motion for summary judgment, defendants argue that none of the named defendants were responsible for inmate sentence computations. Rather, according to defendants, inmate sentence computations and related determinations are made by the Inmate Records Coordinator and/or the Facility Parole Officer.
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In addition to the foregoing, defendants argue that DOCS Commissioner Goord had no personal involvement in the calculation of any DOCS' inmate's release dates, including those of plaintiff. Dkt. #58, ¶ 15. Defendants further assert that defendant Goord does not have "any technical understanding of the numerous calculation statutes that are applied in the determination of inmates' release dates." Id. At all times relevant to the allegations in the complaint, defendant James T. Conway was the Deputy Superintendent at Attica and Acting Superintendent at Attica. Id. at ¶ 16. Defendant Conway did not make any determination about plaintiff's maximum expiration date nor did he perform any calculations concerning the length of plaintiff's sentence. Id. at ¶¶ 20-21. Defendant Conway did, however, respond to a piece of correspondence from plaintiff on or about February 13, 2003. Dkt. #55, ¶ 9. In his Memorandum to plaintiff, defendant Conway advised plaintiff that the Attica Inmate Records Coordinator Office "has been doing time computations for many years, very successfully." Id. at ¶ 10 and Exhibit A thereto. Defendant Conway further advised plaintiff that, "Mrs. Priestley has advised you in writing of your time computation. Your recourse is `Sentencing Review' or court." Id. Thereafter, by memo dated February 20, 2003, Mrs. Priestley stated to plaintiff, Penal Law 70.40, Note 8 and 9, Article 70 reflects how a time computation is completed for a parole violator. As Acting Superintendent Conway, stated to you in his memo, your recourses [sic] are to contact the Office of Sentencing Review, State Office Building #2, 1220 Washington Ave., Albany, NY 12226, or bring an Article 78 in local court.
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Dkt. #55, ¶¶ 11-12 and Exhibit B thereto. With the exception of his February 13, 2003 memo to plaintiff, defendant Conway states that he had no involvement with this matter. Dkt. #55, ¶ 13.
Finally, defendants argue that at all times relevant to the allegations in plaintiff's complaint, defendant Richard A. Savage was the Deputy Superintendent of Programs at Attica. Dkt. #58, ¶ 27. Defendant Savage was not responsible for inmate sentence computations; as described above, those determinations were made by the Inmate Records Coordinator and/or the Facility Parole Officer. Id. at ¶ 29. Moreover, defendant Savage did not receive any correspondence from plaintiff with respect to plaintiff's claim that his maximum expiration date was improperly calculated. Id. at ¶ 30. Defendant Savage further asserts that he has no personal knowledge of plaintiff's claims alleged in the complaint. Id. at ¶ 31.
DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS Summary Judgment Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). "In reaching this determination, the court must assess whether there are any material factual issues to be tried while resolving ambiguities and drawing reasonable inferences against the moving party, and
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must give extra latitude to a pro se plaintiff." Thomas v. Irvin, 981 F. Supp. 794, 798 (W .D.N.Y. 1997) (internal citations omitted).
A fact is "material" only if it has some effect on the outcome of the suit. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); see Catanzaro v. Weiden, 140 F.3d 91, 93 (2d Cir. 1998). A dispute regarding a material fact is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; see Bryant v. Maffucci, 923 F.2d 979 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 849 (1991).
Once the moving party has met its burden of ?demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party must come forward with enough evidence to support a jury verdict in its favor, and the motion will not be defeated merely upon a
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