Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. Jacques et al

Filing 61

DECISION AND ORDER in favor of defendant Anne M. Jacques. Clerk of Court is directed to deliver proceeds, deposited with the court by plaintiff to defendant Anne M. Jacques. Clerk of Court to close case. Signed by Hon. Richard J. Arcara on 12/11/2009. (JMB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT W E S T E R N DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

M E T R O P O L IT A N LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, P la in tiff, D E C IS IO N AND ORDER 0 6 -C V -4 4 4 A v.

ANNE M. JACQUES and C R A IG JACQUES, D e fe n d a n ts .

IN T R O D U C T IO N O n July 6, 2006, plaintiff Metropolitan Life Insurance Company commenced th is interpleader action by filing a complaint against defendants Anne M. Jacques ("A n n e ") and Craig Jacques ("Craig"). Plaintiff commenced this action to resolve w h ic h defendant was entitled to half of the proceeds of life insurance policies is s u e d to decedent Steven D. Jacques ("Steven"). On September 1, 2009, this C o u rt presided over a non-jury trial and received testimony and trial exhibits from th e two interpleader defendants. After the trial, the Court gave defendants an o p p o rtu n ity to file proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, which they file d on October 16 and 30, 2009. For the reasons below, the Court finds that A n n e has established her entitlement to the proceeds in question by a p re p o n d e ra n c e of the evidence, and will direct payment of those proceeds to her.

BACKGROUND AND FINDINGS OF FACT T h e following background information will constitute the Court's findings of fa c t pursuant to Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("FRCP"). In 1986, according to Joint Exhibit 8 from the trial, Steven became an e m p lo ye e of Eastman Kodak Company ("Kodak"). Sometime thereafter, Steven b e c a m e eligible to participate in two life insurance plans that Kodak administered. One of the plans was called the Kodak Life Insurance Plus Plan (the "Life Plan"); th e other was called the Kodak Group Universal Life Insurance Plan (the "GUL P la n "). The Life Plan is governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security A c t of 1974 ("ERISA"), while the GUL Plan is governed by analogous New York la w . Under the Life Plan, Steven's designated beneficiaries were eligible to re c e ive benefits in the amount of $50,000. Under the GUL Plan, Steven's d e s ig n a te d beneficiaries were eligible to receive benefits in the amount of $ 1 9 4 ,0 0 0 . The money at issue in this case is an amount (the "Proceeds") equal to half of the benefits available under these two plans. E xte n s iv e regulations and practices govern the administration of Steven's tw o life insurance plans, but the regulations and practices that are relevant to this c a s e are those concerning how an employee may change designated b e n e fic ia rie s . According to Joint Exhibit 6, Bates-numbered page MET 0132, K o d a k instructed its employees that "[y]ou can name or change your beneficiary a t any time without your beneficiary's consent by contacting Human Resources or 2

the Kodak Benefits Center for Basic and company-paid coverage and MetLife for O p tio n a l coverage and completing the proper forms . . . . W h e n Kodak or MetLife re c e ive s notice of the change, it will take effect as of the date you signed the fo rm , even if you die between the time you sign the form and the time it is re c e ive d by Kodak or MetLife." Additionally, current Kodak benefits specialist D e ird re Irvine and retired Kodak benefits analyst James M. Georger testified at tria l1 regarding the procedure for changing a designated beneficiary. At all times re le va n t to this case, an employee who wanted to change designated b e n e fic ia rie s would call the Kodak call center and speak to a representative about th e proposed change. The representative would verify the employee's identity by a s k in g for information including the employee's insurance number, date of birth, S o c ia l Security number, and address. The representative also would note w h e th e r a male or female voice was on the line. Theoretically, any male voice p o s in g as a male employee and reciting the requested information could pass th ro u g h the verification. Once the call center representative verified the employee's identity, she w o u ld retrieve on her computer screen the employee's electronic benefits file. The Court finds that the testimony of these two witnesses generally was ve ry credible and in agreement. To the extent that Ms. Irvine's testimony differed in any details from Mr. Georger's, the Court has given her testimony additional w e ig h t because she is a current employee and was the benefits specialist who p ro c e s s e d the particular claim form at issue in this case. Ms. Irvine thus has a m o re specific recollection of how Kodak's computer system operated relative to S te ve n 's benefits. 3
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This file consisted of two screens or electronic pages. The first screen was the b e n e fic ia ry information or "BBN" screen. This screen listed the life insurance p la n s in which the employee participated and the employee's current status with re s p e c t to those plans. The screen contained the effective date for the e m p lo ye e 's plans. The BBN screen also had a listing of all of the employee's d e s ig n a te d beneficiaries, with codes for each beneficiary's primary or contingent s ta tu s and relationship to the employee. Finally, the BBN screen listed the e ffe c tive date of the most recent update of designated beneficiaries. The second screen in an employee's electronic file was the beneficiary d e s ig n a tio n or "BBF" screen. The BBF screen was a reverse chronological listing o f any change in beneficiary designation that the employee ever made, with the e ffe c tive date of each change. Each entry on the BBF screen also indicated w h ic h roll and which frame in Kodak's microfiche archives contained a scanned c o p y of the written change form that the employee had submitted. W h e n an employee called the Kodak call center and requested a change in d e s ig n a te d beneficiaries, the call center representative would create a temporary th ird screen in the employee's electronic file, called a beneficiary pending or "B P N " screen. The BPN screen held the information that the employee provided b y telephone regarding the proposed change. This information would remain u n o ffic ia l and separated from the official information on the first two screens until c o n firm e d through a written change form. 4

Although Ms. Levine hinted at rare occasions when changes in b e n e fic ia rie s were completed entirely by telephone (see Trial Tr. at 61), official p ro c e d u re at this point turned to written forms. Once an employee phoned in a re q u e s te d change and a BPN screen stored the information, the call center re p re s e n ta tiv e would send the employee two copies of a written beneficiary c h a n g e form along with an instruction sheet. The employee would be instructed to complete, sign, and date both copies of the change form and to mail them back to Kodak. Kodak then would take one copy and process it, meaning that a b e n e fits specialist would use the form to confirm the proposed update entered p re vio u s ly in the temporary BPN screen. Upon confirmation of the update, the b e n e fits specialist would enter a command that finalized the change. Finalizing th e change was known as "releasing" the pending information to the first two s c re e n s . Upon release, the BPN screen disappeared entirely, and the in fo rm a tio n that was in it transferred over to the BBN and BBF screens as official b e n e fic ia ry information. The processed form then was sent to a third-party c o m p a n y to be scanned into Kodak's microfiche archive and then destroyed.2 K o d a k did not retain original change forms. The other copy of the written form, n o w stamped as received and processed, was returned to the employee for his file s . Both Ms. Irvine and Mr. Georger testified that, in their experience, a p ro c e s s e d change form was lost in transit, from Kodak to the archiving company, p e rh a p s once out of thousands of forms processed over the years. 5
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Three features of the beneficiary change procedure noted above are im p o rta n t to the resolution of this case. First, although benefits specialists could u p d a te employee electronic files without having written change forms in front of th e m (i.e., the absence of a written form did not lock a benefits specialist out of an e m p lo ye e 's electronic file), custom and practice required having a written form b e fo re finalizing any changes. Second, a call center representative never created a temporary BPN screen in an electronic file unless the employee called to re q u e s t a change. Third, that temporary screen, once created, never d is a p p e a re d unless a benefits specialist released the information to the first two s c re e n s in the electronic file. T h is case centers around how many times Steven went through the c h a n g e procedure noted above. The parties do not dispute that, as noted on p a g e 2 of Joint Exhibit 1, Steven went through the procedure once in 1990. The 1 9 9 0 change was not addressed at trial and is not relevant to any of the issues in th e case. T h e parties also do not dispute a second change that Steven made in 1 9 9 2 . W h e n Stephen updated his beneficiary designations then, he was not m a rrie d . He had a son, Brian Jacques ("Brian"), who was three years old at the tim e . Brian's mother is not a party to this case. Because Steven apparently did n o t want to name Brian's mother as a beneficiary, he named his brother Craig a n d Brian as beneficiaries who each would receive half of Steven's life insurance 6

benefits. The BBF screen from Steven's electronic file notes that the change fo rm establishing Craig and Brian as co-equal beneficiaries appears at roll 239, fra m e 901 of Kodak's microfiche archives. In 1994, Stephen married Anne. In 2004, Steven and Anne separated.3 O n February 26, 2005, Steven killed himself. On April 21, 2005, Anne submitted a life insurance claim form that was entered into evidence as Joint Exhibit 7. A n n e 's submission of her life insurance claim form set in motion the events th a t led to the pending litigation. W h e n Ms. Irvine received the claim form, she re trie ve d Steven's electronic file to compare the information on the claim form w ith the information in the system. At that point, Ms. Irvine noticed a problem. Although Anne's name appeared on Steven's BBN screen, the most recent c h a n g e of beneficiaries that appeared on the BBF screen was the 1992 change th a t established Craig as a co-equal beneficiary with Brian. There was no third B P N screen. Ms. Irvine checked the archive rolls that were noted on the BBF s c re e n but did not find any forms for Steven that mentioned Anne. Ms. Irvine also

A t trial, both Anne and Brian testified about numerous examples of d ys fu n c tio n within the Jacques family over the years, either between Anne and S te ve n or between Anne and Brian. The Court found the testimony of Anne and B ria n credible with respect to major events in this case and to establishing, in g e n e ra l, an unfortunate amount of discord in the Jacques family. That said, the C o u rt has rejected all testimony about specific instances of family events and a b o u t Anne's description, for the first time at trial, of personally witnessing the s ig n in g of a change of beneficiary form. Given the amount of family discord that b e c a m e apparent at trial, this testimony was too motivated by personal animosity to be credible. 7

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noticed that, according to the BBN screen in Steven's electronic file, the change in beneficiaries that replaced Craig with Anne occurred on July 13, 1995. Accordingly, Ms. Irvine conducted a search of all archived forms for all employees fro m the year 1995, just in case any change form submitted in 1995 was in the a rc h ive s and simply not noted on Steven's BBF screen. Ms. Irvine found no c h a n g e form in the 1995 archives pertaining to Steven. U n a b le to resolve the discrepancy in Steven's electronic file, plaintiff took s te p s to inform defendants that a dispute arose regarding the entitlement to the P ro c e e d s .4 Plaintiff asked defendants to determine whether they could resolve th e dispute among themselves, or whether interpleader litigation would be n e c e s s a ry . By correspondence dated May 1, 2006, Craig informed plaintiff that h e and Anne could not reach an agreement about the Proceeds. Plaintiff s u b s e q u e n tly commenced this action on July 6, 2006. Through filings dated July 1 0 and 31, 2006, both Anne and Craig waived service of process. By stipulation file d on September 25, 2006 and approved by the Court on September 26, 2006, p la in tiff deposited the Proceeds with the Clerk of the Court and subsequently was d is m is s e d from the case with prejudice. A s the factual background above makes apparent, the difficulty of this case is that it cannot be resolved on direct evidence alone. Of the people who have

T h e parties never have disputed Brian's entitlement to half of the life in s u ra n c e benefits. 8

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been involved in this case and who testified at trial, no one knows why Steven's B B N screen lists Anne as a beneficiary as of July 1995 while his BBF screen lists n o changes after the 1992 change involving Craig. There is no reliable direct e vid e n c e that Steven called Kodak at any time, let alone in 1995, to replace Craig w ith Anne. Similarly, there is no reliable direct evidence that Steven ever s u b m itte d a written change form after 1992. W ith o u t reliable direct evidence, the C o u rt will have to resolve this case by assessing the competing inferences that d e fe n d a n ts have asked it to make. Among other proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, Anne asks th e Court to give particular consideration to Kodak's practices when finalizing c h a n g e s to designated beneficiaries. Anne emphasizes that, with perhaps rare e xc e p tio n s , Kodak does not release information from any BPN screen unless it h a s received a signed and completed change form that confirms the proposed c h a n g e . Also, Anne points out that information does not appear on the BBN s c re e n unless it has been released from the BPN screen. In that context, and g ive n that Anne appears in Steven's BBN screen and that there is no BPN screen in Steven's electronic file, Anne asks the Court to infer that Steven called Kodak to request a change in 1995, approximately a year after he married her, and that h e did submit a signed and completed change form sometime thereafter. As a c o ro lla ry, Anne asks the Court to infer that the discrepancy in Steven's electronic file arose because someone at Kodak or at the third-party scanning company lost 9

the form or otherwise failed to archive it after it was processed. In the alternative, A n n e contends that the Court has enough circumstantial evidence to infer that S te ve n at least initiated a change of beneficiaries and substantially complied with K o d a k 's policies, even if it should conclude that Kodak never received a c o m p le te d change form. In contrast, Craig asks the Court to give particular consideration to the c o m p le te absence of any direct evidence that Steven ever called Kodak or s u b m itte d a written change form. Craig emphasizes that this case differs from o th e rs in which a form was submitted but not filled out properly, or in which at le a s t one objective and credible witness distinctly remembered handling a c o m p le te d form that later was lost. Craig emphasizes further that written c h a n g e s almost never were lost after processing, implying that the probability h e re of a form arriving and then being lost is low. From there, Craig asks the C o u rt to consider Kodak's procedure stating that no change in beneficiaries was c o n s id e re d official without receipt of a completed change form. As a corollary, C ra ig asks the Court to infer that the BBN screen in Steven's electronic file looks th e way that it does now because of one or more unspecified administrative e rro rs . Craig suggests that the evidence that Steven submitted a completed c h a n g e form is so lacking that inferring an error in the BBN screen is more re a s o n a b le than inferring that Kodak possessed a completed change form at s o m e point. 10

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW In te r p le a d e r Jurisdiction A s a preliminary matter, this Court has jurisdiction to resolve entitlement to th e Proceeds. As stated in the complaint, plaintiff commenced this case under F R C P 22. In a rule interpleader case, as opposed to a statutory interpleader c a s e under 28 U.S.C. § 1335, a federal question confers subject-matter ju ris d ic tio n even if the diversity of citizenship required by Section 1335 does not e xis t. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Bigelow, 283 F.3d 436, 440 (2d Cir. 2002) (h o ld in g , in an interpleader case concerning insurance proceeds governed by E R IS A , that "federal subject matter jurisdiction exists under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1) and 28 U.S.C. § 1331") (citations omitted); Gelfgren v. Republic Nat. L ife Ins. Co., 680 F.2d 79, 81 (9th Cir. 1982) ("Unlike statutory interpleader, 28 U .S .C . § 1335, in which jurisdiction is based solely on diversity of citizenship, ju ris d ic tio n in interpleader under [FRCP 22] can be based on a claim arising u n d e r federal question jurisdiction.") (citations omitted). Here, part of the P ro c e e d s comes from the Life Plan, which is governed by ERISA.5 Even though th e re is no diversity of citizenship at all between plaintiff and defendants, the re la tio n s h ip between the Life Plan and ERISA displaces the diversity requirement a n d suffices on its own to give this Court jurisdiction.

T o the extent necessary, the Court asserts jurisdiction over the portion of th e Proceeds coming from the GUL Plan pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). 11

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Burden of Proof in Interpleader Actions "In an interpleader action, each claimant must succeed in establishing his rig h t to the property by a preponderance of the evidence." Midland Ins. Co. v. F rie d g o o d , 577 F. Supp. 1407, 1411 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (citations omitted). In this c a s e , the parties do not dispute Craig's entitlement to the Proceeds as of 1992. Accordingly, a preponderance of the evidence establishing a successful claim to th e Proceeds will have to address whether Steven made any changes in d e s ig n a te d beneficiaries after 1992. "A s a general rule, under Pennsylvania, Delaware and New York law, the m e th o d prescribed by the insurance contract must be followed in order to effect a c h a n g e of beneficiary." McCarthy v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 704 N.E.2d 557, 560 (N .Y . 1998) (citations omitted). That said, "an insurer waives strict compliance w ith the policy provisions by bringing an action in interpleader. But interpleader d o e s not waive the requirement that a change of beneficiary be in at least s u b s ta n tia l compliance with the terms of the policy." William Penn Life Ins. Co. of N e w York v. Viscuso, 569 F. Supp. 2d 355, 365 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (citations o m itte d ). Substantial compliance when changing a designated beneficiary means th a t "[t]here must be an act or acts designed for the purpose of making the c h a n g e , though they may fall short of accomplishing it." McCarthy, 704 N.E.2d at 5 6 0 (citations omitted).

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Competing Inferences T h is case presents the Court, as finder of fact, with an unusual challenge. In most interpleader cases, the finders of fact must sort through specific acts ta k e n by the decedent--unsigned, undated, or otherwise incomplete change fo rm s ; ambiguous instructions; telephone calls or written correspondence; e tc .-- to determine whether those acts, alone or in combination, established s u b s ta n tia l compliance. See generally, e.g., Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Wise, 184 F .3 d 660 (7th Cir. 1999) (finding substantial compliance after reviewing an in c o m p le te life insurance enrollment form and a suicide note specifying who w o u ld receive the life insurance proceeds); Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Adams, 3 0 F.3d 554 (4th Cir. 1994) (finding substantial compliance after reviewing d o c u m e n ts and testimony about the decedent's direct instructions to his insurer to c h a n g e beneficiaries). Put another way, most interpleader cases require finders o f fact to review the beginning and the middle of the story of a decedent's in te ra c tio n with his insurer to determine the end result, and whether that end re s u lt constitutes substantial compliance. In contrast, this case presents the o p p o s ite situation. The Court here has only the end of the story--an entry in S te ve n 's electronic file that normally occurs after acts constituting strict c o m p lia n c e , not just substantial compliance. From there, the Court must resort to in fe re n c e s to decide whether those preceding acts occurred.

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In the face of the challenge to fill in a story based on what happened at the ve ry end, the Court finds two evidentiary principles particularly helpful. The first is th e general principle that a fact finder "may make common-sense inferences from th e proven facts in both civil and criminal cases." U.S. v. Hines, 256 F.2d 561, 5 6 4 (2d Cir. 1958) (citations omitted). As a district court in this circuit explained ye a rs ago in an accident case, "Fact finding does not require mathematical c e rta in ty and fact finders are supposed to reach their conclusions on the basis of c o m m o n sense, common understanding and fair beliefs, grounded on evidence c o n s is tin g of direct statements by witnesses or proof of circumstances from which in fe re n c e s can fairly [be] drawn. Inference is never certainty, but it may be plain e n o u g h to justify a finding of fact." Universe Tankships, Inc v. Pyrate Tank C le a n e rs , Inc., 152 F. Supp. 903, 921­22 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (internal quotation m a rk s and citations omitted). Here, defendants do not dispute that Steven's e le c tro n ic file looks the way it looks in Joint Exhibit 1. The parties do not dispute th a t, as noted on Steven's BBN screen, the substitution of Anne for Craig o c c u rre d in July 1995. A common-sense assessment of all of the evidence p ro d u c e d at trial suggests that only three scenarios could explain why Steven's B B N screen looks that way. In the first scenario, person or persons unknown impersonated Steven on th e telephone to initiate a change, and then either forged Steven's signature on a w ritte n change form that subsequently was lost, or persuaded someone at Kodak 14

to accept final verbal instructions in lieu of a written form. This scenario would re q u ire the Court to assume that at least one person 1) knew that Steven worked a t Kodak; 2) knew that he had life insurance policies at Kodak; 3) knew in 1995 th a t he married Anne a year before and had not yet made her a beneficiary; 4) k n e w that Craig was a beneficiary; 5) had motive in 19956 both to add Anne as a b e n e fic ia ry and specifically to remove Craig; 6) had both a male voice and the p e rs o n a l information necessary to slip through Kodak's verification process; 7 ) convinced Kodak to send written change forms to an address that it would h a ve noticed was not Steven's, or, alternatively, stole Steven's mail when the fo rm s arrived at his address; and 8) forged Steven's signature. Counsel for Craig h in te d at this scenario, or something like it, at trial when he emphasized Anne's 2 0 0 5 forgery charges during her cross-examination. Craig never proposed, h o w e ve r, who was in Steven's life in 1995 who would have been in such a p o s itio n to fulfill this scenario. Consequently, the Court rejects this scenario as w ith o u t factual foundation. In the second scenario that would explain the current state of Steven's e le c tro n ic file, Steven himself initiated the change process by contacting the K o d a k call center. Steven then failed to follow through either with final verbal in s tru c tio n s or with a completed change form. Sometime after the initial change T h e timing of the change of beneficiaries in Steven's electronic file, which th e parties again do not dispute, makes Anne's forgery charges 10 years later ir r e le v a n t. 15
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request, someone at Kodak would have released the proposed change from S te ve n 's BPN screen by mistake. This scenario reduces the number of in fe re n c e s or assumptions that the Court would have to make compared to the firs t scenario, but leaves one critical question unanswered. This scenario fails to e xp la in how Kodak would have known to retrieve Steven's electronic file in July 1 9 9 5 to release its pending information. Kodak is a large corporation that p ro b a b ly has thousands, if not tens of thousands, of employees worldwide. Kodak's computer system probably maintains countless thousands of electronic e m p lo ye e files that keep track of every employee's life insurance benefits. W ith s o many electronic files to maintain for so many employees, Kodak would have h a d no reason to retrieve any one employee's electronic file to finalize a b e n e fic ia ry change unless prompted to do so. The Court thus rejects this second s c e n a rio and its suggestion that the finalization of any beneficiary changes noted in Steven's BBN screen occurred by mistake. In the third scenario that would explain the current status of Steven's e le c tro n ic file, Steven initiated a change by telephone. Steven later submitted a w ritte n change form that was received and processed, but somehow lost after p ro c e s s in g . This scenario eliminates the need to make any unfounded a s s u m p tio n s about people impersonating Steven on the telephone. This scenario fu rth e r eliminates the difficulty of explaining that someone at Kodak would have re trie ve d Steven's electronic file, among all others, and finalized any pending 16

information in there for no particular reason. Finally, this scenario fits Kodak's p ro c e d u re and practice that, with rare exceptions, beneficiary information simply d o e s not reach the BBN screen without a telephone call and a written change fo rm from the employee in question. Given that the Court cannot resolve this c a s e without making some set of inferences from the facts presented at trial, the C o u rt hereby adopts this third scenario as the beginning and middle story that m o s t likely led to the undisputed end result that appears in Joint Exhibit 1. T h e second evidentiary principle on which the Court has relied--res ipsa lo q u itu r-- fu rth e r supports the Court's inference that a satisfactory written change fo rm existed at some point. "The res ipsa doctrine permits, but does not require, a n inference of negligence without direct proof of specific negligent acts or o m is s io n s by the accused." Point-Du-Jour v. Am. Airlines, No. 07-CV-3371, 2009 W L 3756627, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 2009) (citations omitted). Adapted from its o rig in s in tort law, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur permits this Court to infer that a c o m p le te d change form existed because 1) Anne's appearance in Steven's BBN s c re e n is an event that normally does not occur without the receipt and p ro c e s s in g of a written change form; 2) her appearance resulted from commands e n te re d by Kodak into a computer system entirely within Kodak's control; and 3) th o s e commands were entered without any voluntary action or contribution on A n n e 's part. Cf. Stone v. Courtyard Mgmt. Corp., 353 F.3d 155, 157 (2d Cir. 2 0 0 3 ) (summarizing the res ipsa loquitur doctrine in its original context). 17

This type of analysis was used once before in an interpleader case whose fa c ts were essentially identical to the facts of this case. In Prudential Insurance C o . of America v. Lehman, No. 99 C 4304, 2001 W L 138922 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 16, 2 0 0 1 ), a decedent purchased life insurance coverage in 1984, and named his th e n -firs t wife as a Class 1 beneficiary and their three children as Class 2 b e n e fic ia rie s . In 1988, the decedent divorced. In July 1989, the decedent m a rrie d his second wife. The insurance company's computer records reflected th a t on or about January 12, 1993, the Class 1 beneficiary under the policy was c h a n g e d from the first wife to the second wife even though the insurance c o m p a n y was "unable to locate the ultimately processed written form that trig g e re d that beneficiary change." Id. at *2. The decedent was divorced from his s e c o n d wife in 1996 and died in 1999. After the decedent's death, the two exw ive s submitted rival claims to the insurance company, each claiming to be the p rim a ry beneficiary under the decedent's coverage. Similar to Craig in this case, th e first ex-wife in Lehman argued in subsequent interpleader litigation that the d e c e d e n t's file at the insurance company did not indicate receipt of a written re q u e s t for change of beneficiary, and that "the change of beneficiary that a p p e a rs in the computer records was erroneously entered into the system." Id. at * 3 . Similar to Anne, the second ex-wife in Lehman argued that the insurance c o m p a n y's "computer records would not reflect a change in beneficiary unless it h a d first received a written request for that change signed by [the decedent]. 18

Because those computer records specifically show [her] as the Class 1 b e n e fic ia ry . . . [the decedent] must have submitted the required form." Id. The c o u rt ruled in favor of the second ex-wife, holding that the insurance company's failure to turn up the Change of Beneficiary form in its records cannot o b s c u re the only reasonable inference from the record that [it] did p ro vid e : that [the decedent] had indeed requested a change of b e n e fic ia ry in a manner satisfactory to [it]. Any other purported e xp la n a tio n really defies reason, for the record here provides a c la s s ic res ipsa loquitur scenario. Is it to be imagined that [it] (or any o th e r major insurer) goes about changing beneficiaries under its life in s u ra n c e policies on its own? And pray tell, from what source could [it] conceivably have derived [the second ex-wife's] name to begin w ith , if not from [the decedent]? Any such fanciful notion is belied n o t only by [the insurance company's] ultimate computer entry but by th e attached photocopy of [its] printed form used for beneficiary d e s ig n a tio n s , with the information underlying the computer entry fille d in by typewriter. Thus [the] assertion that the change of b e n e fic ia ry that is expressly reflected by [the insurance company's] re c o rd s had been "erroneously entered"--if that assertion is intended to say (as [the first ex-wife] would have it) that the change had not e m a n a te d from [the decedent's] request for that change to be m a d e -- is so bizarre as to call for its outright rejection. Id . at *4. In choosing to infer that a completed written change form existed at some p o in t in this case, the Court adopts the analysis from Lehman as persuasive. Although the Court did hear testimony at trial that Kodak has changed designated b e n e fic ia rie s in the past without a completed written change form in hand, the C o u rt infers from all of the evidence in this case that such occasions occur so in fre q u e n tly that they can be disregarded. For all practical purposes, Steven's B B N screen simply would not have assumed its current appearance without 19

some prompting from Steven himself that Kodak found satisfactory. Any other e xp la n a tio n for the current status of Steven's BBN screen would take the Court d o w n a path of increasing speculation and paranoia. C O N C L U S IO N F o r all of the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby finds that Anne has e s ta b lis h e d her claim to the Proceeds by a preponderance of the evidence, and th a t her claim supersedes the claim that Craig had as of 1992. The Clerk of the C o u rt is directed to take the steps necessary to deliver the Proceeds, deposited w ith the Court by plaintiff, to Anne. All parties shall bear their own costs. Upon d e live ry of the Proceeds to Anne, the Clerk of the Court shall close this case.

SO ORDERED.

s/ Richard J. Arcara
HONORABLE RICHARD J. ARCARA CHIEF JUDGE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DATED: December 10, 2009

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