Amaker et al v. Goord et al

Filing 358

FINAL PRETRIAL ORDER. Signed by Hon. H. Kenneth Schroeder, Jr on 6/5/2015. (KER)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
_________________________________
ANTHONY D. AMAKER,
06-CV-490A(Sr)
Plaintiff,
v.
COMMISSIONER GLENN S. GOORD,
et al.,
Defendants.
_________________________________

DECISION AND ORDER
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), the parties have consented to
have the undersigned conduct all further proceedings in this case, including entry of
final judgment. Dkt. #345.

Currently before the Court is defendants motion in limine. Dkt. #352.

Criminal History
Defendants shall be permitted to elicit from plaintiff upon crossexamination the fact that plaintiff has been convicted of a felony and, during the time
frame relevant to the instant action, was incarcerated within the New York State
Department of Corrections and Community Supervision. Defendants shall not question
plaintiff as to the nature of the felony conviction or the length of his sentence.

Compensatory Damages
The Prison Litigation Reform Act provides that “[n]o Federal civil action
may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for
mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical
injury.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). In Thompson v. Carter, the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit determined that this statute encompasses federal civil rights actions
brought to vindicate constitutional rights. 284 F.3d 411, 417 (2d Cir. 2002). Although
the constitutional provision at issue in Thompson was the Eighth Amendment, the Court
of Appeals noted that the weight of authority applied the limitation on recovery to
constitutional claims generally, including First Amendment claims. Id., citing Searles v.
Van Bebber, 251 F.3d 869 (10th Cir. 2001) (rejecting determination in Canell v. Lightner,
143 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir. 1998), and Amaker v. Haponik, No. 98 CIV 2663, 1999 WL
76798 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 1999), that 1997e(e) does not apply to First Amendment
Claims because “the plain language of the statute does not permit alteration of its clear
damages restrictions on the basis of the underlying rights being asserted), cert. denied,
536 U.S. 904 (2002), and Allah v. Al-Hafeez, 226 F.3d 247 (3rd Cir. 2000) (finding
damages for the harm suffered as a result of defendants’ alleged violation of plaintiff’s
First Amendment right to free exercise of religion barred by 1997e(e)); but see King v.
Zamiara, __ F.3d __, 2015 WL 3448699, at *3 (collecting cases reflecting circuit split
with respect to applicability of 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) to First Amendment claims before
determining that “deprivations of First Amendment rights are themselves injuries, apart
from any mental, emotional, or physical injury that might also arise from the
deprivation”).

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In the instant case, although the Court has no doubt that plaintiff suffered
injury as a result of defendants’ violation of his free exercise rights pursuant to the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution, to wit, disciplinary confinement to special
housing for approximately 200 days and repeated denial of access to religious services
and celebrations, in accordance with the precedent of the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, compensation for such injury is barred by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e)
because of the absence of an accompanying physical injury.

Nominal Damages
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) does not affect the availability of nominal damages
for the violation of a constitutional right. Thompson, 284 F.3d at 418. Accordingly, the
Court awards plaintiff $1.00 as nominal damages for the violation of his right to free
exercise of religion pursuant to the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.

Punitive Damages
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) does not affect the availability of punitive damages
for the violation of a constitutional right. Thompson, 284 F.3d at 418.

“In order to justify an award of punitive damages, the defendant’s unlawful
conduct must surpass a certain threshold.” McCardle v. Haddad, 131 F.3d 43, 52 (2d
Cir. 1997). “A jury may be permitted to award punitive damages in a § 1983 action
when it finds that the defendant’s violation of federal law was intentional, or ‘when the
defendant’s conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it

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involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.’” Id.
at 52-53, quoting Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983). “[P]laintiff is not entitled to an
instruction allowing the jury to award punitive damages unless there is evidence that the
defendant’s conduct could be so characterized.” Id. at 53.

Plaintiff’s amended complaint successfully challenged a decision of the
Central Office Review Committee, which was afforded the status of a directive of the
New York State Department of Correctional Services, allowing only those inmates who
identified as Rastafarian the ability to maintain dreadlocks. Specifically, the Court
determined that there was “no legitimate reason for DOCS to afford members of only
one religious denomination the opportunity to adhere to a sincerely held religious belief
precluding cutting of hair.” Dkt. #235, p.24. However, the enforcement of DOCS’ policy
regarding dreadlocks does not, standing alone, rise to the level of conduct evincing an
evil motive or callous indifference to inmates’ rights.

The Court invited plaintiff to proffer evidence which would support his
claim of punitive damages against individual defendants. Upon consideration of that
proffer (Dkt. #356), and review of the amended complaint (Dkt. #22), the Court
determines that the only defendant potentially subject to a claim of punitive damages is
defendant Klodzinski, who is alleged to have “pointed out Plaintiff Amaker in front of
Plaintiff Hizbullah to another officer, stating that Amaker was going to be his next
victim.” Dkt. #22, ¶ 8. As such a statement could infer evil motive, plaintiff’s claim of
punitive damages may proceed to trial against defendant Klodzinski.

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Plaintiff’s request for Ruhullah Hizbullah to testify as a witness is granted.
The remainder of plaintiff’s requests for inmate witnesses are denied as plaintiff has
proffered no basis for the Court to infer that such witnesses have information relevant to
the issue remaining in this trial, to wit, whether defendant Klodzinski demonstrated an
evil motive by selecting plaintiff for enforcement of the policy restricting dreadlocks to
Rastafarian inmates. Plaintiff’s request to call all of the defendants, with the exception
of defendant Klodzinski, is denied for the same reason.

SO ORDERED.
DATED:

Buffalo, New York
June 5, 2015
s/ H. Kenneth Schroeder, Jr.
H. KENNETH SCHROEDER, JR.
United States Magistrate Judge

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