Gainer v. United Automobile Aerospace Agricultural Implement Workers (UAW) Region 9
Filing
250
DECISION AND ORDER DENYING Plaintiff's 245 Motion for Reconsideration. Signed by William M. Skretny, United States District Judge on 12/12/2017. (MEAL) Copy mailed to Plaintiff.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
ROBERTA GAINER,
Plaintiff,
v.
DECISION AND ORDER
08-CV-501S
UNITED AUTOMOBILE AEROSPACE
AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT WORKERS
(UAW) REGION 9, ET AL.,
Defendants.
1.
On September 22, 2017, this Court accepted the Report and
Recommendation filed by the Honorable Michael J. Roemer, United States Magistrate
Judge, and denied Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment in part and granted it in
part.
(Docket No. 244.)
Specifically, this Court granted Defendants’ request for
summary judgment on Plaintiff’s state and federal disparate-impact and retaliation claims,
but denied their request for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s state and federal failure-tohire claims. (Id.)
2.
On October 20, 2017, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Reconsideration of this
Court’s Order accepting Judge Roemer’s Report and Recommendation, under Rules 59
and 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Docket No. 245.) Alternatively, Plaintiff
seeks entry of judgment on her state and federal disparate-impact and retaliation claims
under Rule 54 so that she can file an immediate appeal to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit. (Id.) Defendants oppose reconsideration. For the
following reasons, Plaintiff’s motion is denied in its entirety.
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3.
A district judge may modify pre-trial rulings and interlocutory orders at any
time prior to final judgment. See In re United States, 733 F.2d 10, 13 (2d Cir. 1984).
Reconsideration of a prior decision is generally justified in any one of the following three
circumstances: (1) an intervening change in controlling law; (2) new evidence; or (3) the
need to correct a clear error of law or to prevent manifest injustice. See Virgin Atl.
Airways, Ltd. v. Nat=l Mediation Bd., 956 F.2d 1245, 1255 (2d Cir.1992); see also
Amerisure Ins. Co. v. Laserage Tech. Corp., No. 96-CV-6313, 1998 WL 310750, *1
(W.D.N.Y. Feb. 12, 1998) (citing United States v. Adegbite, 877 F.2d 174, 178 (2d Cir.
1989)).
4.
The decision whether to grant or deny a motion to reconsider lies in this
Court=s discretion. See McCarthy v. Manson, 714 F.2d 234, 237 (2d Cir. 1983). Parties
bringing motions to reconsider Ashould evaluate whether what may seem to be a clear
error of law is in fact simply a point of disagreement between the Court and the litigant.@
Duane v. Spaulding and Rogers Mfg. Inc., No. 92-CV-305, 1994 WL 494651, *1 (N.D.N.Y.
Aug. 10, 1994) (quoting McDowell Oil Serv. v. Interstate Fire and Cas., 817 F. Supp. 538,
541 (M.D.Pa. 1993)). Motions for reconsideration are not to be used as a means to
reargue matters already disposed of by prior rulings or to put forward additional
arguments that could have been raised before the decision. See Duane, 1994 WL
494651 at *1. After all, a Amotion for reconsideration is not a device intended to give an
unhappy litigant one additional chance to sway the judge.@ Nossek v. Bd. of Ed. of
Duanesburg Cent. Sch. Dist., No. 94-CV-219, 1994 WL 688298, *1 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 10,
1994).
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5.
Upon consideration of Plaintiff’s motion, this Court is not convinced that its
September 22, 2017 Order must be revisited. Plaintiff requests that this Court reconsider
its ruling granting summary judgment to Defendants on her retaliation claims, but she has
not persuasively alleged any of the three circumstances under which reconsideration may
be warranted. See Virgin Atl. Airways, 956 F.2d at 1255. Instead, she simply reargues
and reiterates her objections to Judge Roemer’s Report and Recommendation. These
arguments have already been raised, considered, and rejected.
6.
Plaintiff is obviously dissatisfied with this Court’s decision to accept Judge
Roemer’s Report and Recommendation. But use of a motion to reconsider as a vehicle
to reargue a case is improper. See Nossek, 1994 WL 688298 at *1; United States v.
Chiochvili, 103 F. Supp. 2d 526, 530-31 (N.D.N.Y. 2000) (reargument is not a proper
basis for a motion to reconsider); Schonberger, 742 F. Supp. at 119 (Athe provision for
reargument is not designed to allow wasteful repetition of arguments already briefed,
considered and decided@). Accordingly, reconsideration is denied.
7.
Rule 59 (e) permits a party to seek reconsideration of a court’s judgment,
so long as the party files its motion to amend or alter the judgment no later than 28 days
after its entry. AThe standard for granting such a motion is strict, and reconsideration will
generally be denied unless the moving party can point to controlling decisions or data that
the court overlookedCmatters, in other words, that might reasonably be expected to alter
the conclusion reached by the court.@ Shrader v. CSX Transp. Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257
(2d Cir. 1995). Relief can also be granted to Acorrect a clear error or prevent manifest
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injustice.@ Int=l Ore & Fertilizer Corp. v. SGS Control Servs., Inc., 38 F.3d 1279, 1287
(2d Cir. 1994) (quoting Virgin Atl., 956 F.2d at 1255).
8.
The existence of new evidence may also justify reconsideration.
See
Virgin Atl., 956 F.2d at 1255. The rule is not, however, Aa vehicle for relitigating old
issues, presenting the case under new theories, securing a rehearing on the merits, or
otherwise taking a >second bite at the apple.=@ Sequa Corp. v. GBJ Corp., 156 F.3d 136,
144 (2d Cir. 1998). The decision to grant a Rule 59(e) motion is within the sound
discretion of the court. New York v. Holiday Inns, Inc., No. 83-CV-564S, 1993 WL 30933,
at *4 (W.D.N.Y. 1993).
9.
Here, although Plaintiff’s motion is timely, she points to no persuasive
matters or controlling caselaw that this Court overlooked, and there is no clear error or
manifest injustice in this Court’s Order.
Plaintiff simply seeks to relitigate her
unsuccessful positions. For these reasons, Plaintiff=s motion under Rule 59 is denied.
10.
This Court also considers Plaintiff=s motion under Rule 60. Rule 60 (b)
enumerates certain circumstances under which a district court may relieve a party from a
final judgment, including (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect, and
(2) any other reason that justifies relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60 (b)(1) and (6). Generally, a
Rule 60 (b) motion should be granted only in Aextraordinary circumstances@ when it is
necessary to Aoverride the finality of judgments in the interest of justice.@ Andrulonis v.
United States, 26 F.3d 1224, 1235 (2d Cir. 1994); see also Nemaizer v. Baker, 793 F.2d
58, 61 (2d Cir. 1986) (noting that A[s]ince 60 (b) allows extraordinary judicial relief, it is
invoked only upon a showing of exceptional circumstances@).
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11.
When evaluating a Rule 60 (b) motion, courts strive to Astrike[ ] a balance
between serving the ends of justice and preserving the finality of judgments.@ Nemaizer,
793 F.2d at 61. Thus, the Second Circuit has set forth a three-prong test that must be
satisfied for a Rule 60 (b) motion to succeed: A(1) there must be >highly convincing=
evidence in support of the motion; (2) the moving party must show good cause for failing
to act sooner; and (3) the moving party must show that granting the motion will not impose
an undue hardship on any party.@ Esposito v. New York, No. 07 Civ. 11612, 2010 WL
4261396, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 2010) (citing Kotlicky v. United States Fid. Guar. Co.,
817 F.2d 6, 9 (2d Cir. 1987)). The decision to grant relief under Rule 60 (b) is left to the
Asound discretion@ of the district court. In re Lawrence, 293 F.3d 615, 623 (2d Cir. 2002)
(citing Parker v. Broad. Music, Inc., 289 F.2d 313, 314 (2d Cir. 1961)).
12.
Here again, Plaintiff does not meet the high standard for relief under Rule
60. No extraordinary circumstances are presented; no mistakes have been made; and
no highly convincing evidence warranting a change in this Court’s decision has been
submitted. Moreover, no final judgment has been entered. Consequently, Plaintiff=s
motion under Rule 60 is denied.
13.
Finally, this Court finds that Plaintiff’s alternate request for entry of judgment
on her dismissed claims should be denied. Under Rule 54 (b), a court may direct entry
of a final judgment as to one or more (but not all) claims, if the court expressly determines
that there is no just reason for delay. To grant a motion under Rule 54 (b) “(1) multiple
claims or multiple parties must be present, (2) at least one claim, or the rights and
liabilities of at least one party, must be finally decided within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. §
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1291, and (3) the district court must make ‘an express determination that there is no just
reason for delay’ and expressly direct the clerk to enter judgment.” Info. Res., Inc. v.
Dun and Bradstreet, Corp., A.C., 294 F.3d 447, 451 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Ginett v.
Computer Task Group, Inc., 962 F.2d 1085, 1092 (2d Cir. 1992)).
14.
Rule 54 (b) “provides an exception to the general principle that a final
judgment is proper only after all claims have been adjudicated.” Harriscom Svenska AB
v. Harris Corp., 947 F.2d 627, 629 (2d Cir. 1991). The decision whether to enter a final
judgment under Rule 54 (b) is “committed to the discretion of the district court.” Id. But
the Second Circuit has cautioned that a district court’s power under Rule 54 (b) should
be exercised "sparingly," Advanced Magnetics, Inc. v. Bayfront Partners, Inc., 106 F.3d
11, 16 (2d Cir. 1997)(citation omitted), and that the court should provide a “brief, reasoned
explanation” for its decision on such a motion. Harriscom, 947 F.2d at 629.
15.
Here, this Court finds nothing unusual about the circumstances of this case
that warrant departure from the general rule that final judgments be entered only after all
claims have been adjudicated. While Plaintiff’s desire to immediately pursue her appeal
and defer trial is understandable, the interests of judicial economy and continuity counsel
in favor of entering final judgment in the district court once all claims have been resolved.
Plaintiff has therefore not sufficiently established that there is “no just reason for delay”
or that entry of final judgment would be “in the interest of sound judicial administration.”
Ginett, 962 F.2d at 1092. Entry of a final judgment under Rule 54 (b) is therefore denied.
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IT HEREBY IS ORDERED, that Plaintiff=s Motion for Reconsideration (Docket No.
245) is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Dated:
December 12, 2017
Buffalo, New York
/s/William M. Skretny
WILLIAM M. SKRETNY
United States District Judge
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