New York Life Insurance Company v. Hassan et al

Filing 34

ORDER granting 23 Motion for dismissal and awarding costs and fees. The Clerk of Court is directed to take the steps necessary to arrange for the payment and to terminate plaintiff from the docket. Signed by Hon. Richard J. Arcara on 8/4/2010. (JMB)

New York Life Insurance Company v. Hassan et al

Doc. 34

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT W E S T E R N DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

N E W YORK LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, P la in tiff, D E C IS IO N AND ORDER 0 9 -C V -1 0 7 5 A v.

DANYAL HASSAN et al., D e fe n d a n ts .

IN T R O D U C T IO N O n April 16, 2010, plaintiff New York Life Insurance Company filed a m o tio n for dismissal and for costs and attorney fees that it incurred when c o m m e n c in g the case and depositing the insurance proceeds in question with the C o u rt. This Court has held the motion in abeyance and has issued orders d ire c tin g plaintiff to provide supplemental information confirming its jurisdiction o ve r the case. The Court was concerned that the minimal diversity needed in s ta tu to ry interpleader cases might not be present here. Plaintiff now has filed s u p p le m e n ta l information in evidentiary form that satisfies the Court's concerns a b o u t jurisdiction. Consequently, the Court will grant plaintiff's motion and award c o s ts and fees as described below.

Dockets.Justia.com

BACKGROUND T h e Court set forth the relevant background for this case in its Decision a n d Order (Dkt. No. 27) holding plaintiff's motion in abeyance. Briefly, this case is an interpleader case concerning the proceeds of a life insurance policy that d e c e d e n t Aasiya Z. Hassan purchased from plaintiff several years before her d e a th in February 2009. The proceeds amount to $450,000. Plaintiff c o m m e n c e d this case and deposited the proceeds with the Court once it realized th a t it could not resolve whether a change-in-beneficiary form that it received in J u n e 2008 had been authentic. After depositing the proceeds with the Court and s e rvin g all the potential claimants, plaintiff made the pending motion and sought d is m is s a l on the grounds that it commenced this case properly and that it fulfilled a ll of its obligations here. W h e n the Court held the pending motion in abeyance, it did so out of c o n c e rn that the none of the named defendants was known to be a citizen of a d o m e s tic state, i.e., a state in the United States. As explained in the previous D e c is io n and Order, even the "minimal diversity" rules governing statutory in te rp re te r cases require that at least one defendant be a citizen of a domestic s ta te . Of the defendants whose citizenship was known at the time, all of them w e re citizens of foreign countries. The citizenship of a few of the named d e fe n d a n ts , including Sonia Hassan, Michael Hassan, and Acea M. Mosey, was u n c e rta in . The Court gave plaintiff an opportunity to file supplemental information 2

concerning the citizenship of those defendants. Plaintiff filed supplemental in fo rm a tio n on May 21, 2010 (Dkt. Nos. 28­31), but out of an abundance of c a u tio n , the Court wanted to ensure that any information that it reviewed was in e vid e n tia ry form. Accordingly, the Court issued a second Order on June 10, 2010 (D k t. No. 32) directing the filing of affirmations from defendants Sonia and M ic h a e l Hassan along with those documents from Erie County Surrogate's Court th a t would confirm the appointment of Ms. Mosey as the administrator of the d e c e d e n t's estate. Plaintiff filed the requested information on June 29, 2010 (Dkt. N o . 33). D IS C U S S IO N C o n fir m a tio n of Jurisdiction W ith o u t repeating the analysis from the Court's previous Decision and O rd e r, the statutory interpleader rule in 28 U.S.C. § 1335(a) requires "minimal d ive rs ity," meaning diversity of citizenship between at least two defendants. The s ta tu to ry interpleader rule refers to the general diversity jurisdiction statute, 28 U .S .C . § 1332, for a definition of diversity. All four definitions of diversity found in S e c tio n 1332 require that at least one litigant be a citizen of a domestic state. "An individual's citizenship, within the meaning of the diversity statute, is d e te rm in e d by his domicile. Domicile is the place where a person has his true fixe d home and principal establishment, and to which, whenever he is absent, he h a s the intention of returning." Palazzo ex rel. Delmage v. Corio, 232 F.3d 38, 42 3

(2d Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Here, defendants S o n ia and Michael Hassan have submitted affirmations setting forth multiple in d ic ia of New York citizenship. They have resided continuously in New York S ta te since they were young children. They currently attend the State University o f New York at Buffalo. They each hold New York driver's licenses and pay New Y o rk taxes. They both consider New York to be their full-time place of residence a n d have no intention of moving anytime soon. Additionally, plaintiff has s u b m itte d the Certificate of Appointment from Erie County Surrogate's Court c o n firm in g that Ms. Mosey is the administrator of the decedent's estate. Under 2 8 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(2), "the legal representative of the estate of a decedent shall b e deemed to be a citizen only of the same State as the decedent" for cases such a s this one. The evidence available in the docket indicates that the decedent was a citizen of New York when she died, meaning that Ms. Mosey would be c o n s id e re d a citizen of New York. Plaintiff thus has confirmed to the Court's s a tis fa c tio n that three named defendants are New York citizens. W ith the other named defendants being citizens of Pakistan and South A fric a , plaintiff now has established the minimum diversity necessary for the C o u rt to continue to exercise jurisdiction over this case. Since plaintiff deposited th e life insurance proceeds in question in January 2010, it has no other o b lig a tio n s to fulfill. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss plaintiff from the case.

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Costs and Attorney Fees "T h e general rule is that a party properly invoking interpleader is entitled to c o s ts and attorney's fees, particularly when that party asserts no claim upon the re s deposited with the Court." Chem. Bank v. Richmul Assocs., 666 F. Supp. 6 1 6 , 619 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (citations omitted). "[A]ny attorney--whether a private p ra c titio n e r or an employee of a nonprofit law office--who applies for c o u rt-o rd e re d compensation in this Circuit for work done after the date of this o p in io n must document the application with contemporaneous time records. These records should specify, for each attorney, the date, the hours expended, a n d the nature of the work done." N.Y. State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. C a re y , 711 F.2d 1136, 1148 (2d Cir. 1983). "In determining the amount of a tto rn e ys ' fees awarded, courts typically weigh several factors. Relevant factors m a y include the complexity of the case, whether the stakeholders performed any u n iq u e services to the court or claimant, good faith and diligence on the part of th e stakeholder, whether the services rendered benefitted the stakeholder, and to w h a t extent the stakeholder protracted the proceedings." Landmark Chems., SA. v . Merrill Lynch & Co., 234 F.R.D. 62, 63­64 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (citations omitted). H e re , plaintiff has submitted an itemization of the hours that it spent w o rk in g on the case. "The typical interpleader claim does not involve extensive o r complicated litigation, and thus fees should be `relatively modest,'" Estate of

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Ellington v. EMI Music Publ'g, 282 F. Supp. 2d 192, 194 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (citation o m itte d ), but the Court does appreciate the extra time that plaintiff had to spend on the unusual issues of foreign service of process and confirmation of c itiz e n s h ip . That said, though, the Court is concerned that plaintiff's request for n e a rly $50,000­one-ninth of the entire amount of the life insurance p ro c e e d s ­ c o ve rin g 165.3 hours appears excessive. Several corrections are n e ce s s a ry. First, plaintiff's itemization includes entries totaling 2.4 hours for "docketing" a n d research into "reporting requirements for court payment." The Court will d is re g a rd these hours because they describe tasks of only a clerical nature. N e x t, plaintiff's itemization includes multiple entries about unspecified c o n fe re n c e s , telephone calls, e-mail correspondence, "reviews," and "work." These entries at times appear somewhat repetitive, and they do not make clear h o w the time described advanced the filing of the complaint and the confirmation o f diversity of citizenship. Cf. Sabatini v. Corning-Painted Post Area Sch. Dist., 1 9 0 F. Supp. 2d 509, 522 (W .D .N .Y . 2001) (Larimer, C.J.) (finding as inadequate b illin g entries like "hearing preparation," "prepare for hearing," "review records," "te le p h o n e conference with client," and "prepare for discovery"). The itemization a ls o includes 8.7 hours for preparation of the application for costs and fees, even th o u g h the motion papers contain only five affirmation paragraphs and two m e m o ra n d u m pages regarding the entitlement to attorney fees. A reduction in 6

the hours claimed is appropriate under these circumstances, but because "it is u n re a lis tic to expect a trial judge to evaluate and rule on every entry in an a p p lic a tio n ," Walker v. Coughlin, 909 F. Supp. 872, 881 (W .D .N .Y . 1995) (L a rim e r, J.) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), the Court finds that a 25% across-the-board reduction in claimed hours is appropriate. See Disabled P a trio ts of America, Inc. v. Niagara Group Hotels, LLC, 688 F. Supp. 2d 216, 227 (W .D .N .Y . 2010) (Skretny, C.J.) (applying percentage reduction) (citing Sabatini). The adjusted total of claimed time thus amounts to 122.18 hours. F in a lly , the Court needs to assess the appropriate hourly rate for plaintiff's ite m iz a tio n . To the Court's best knowledge, every attorney listing entries in the ite m iz a tio n is a partner at the firm that has represented it. Across different types o f cases, the highest hourly rate that this District currently awards for partners is $ 2 4 0 per hour. See id. at 225. The Court will apply this hourly rate to the a d ju s te d total of 122.18 hours to arrive at a fee total of $29,323.20. T h e claimed $2,908.50 in costs appear reasonable. The Court accepts th o s e costs without modification. In total, the Court arrives at a final award of costs and fees totaling $ 3 2 ,2 3 1 .7 0 . C O N C L U S IO N F o r all of the foregoing reasons, the Court grants plaintiff's motion to d is m is s (Dkt. No. 23) and awards plaintiff $32,231.70 in costs and fees from the 7

life insurance proceeds on deposit. The Clerk of the Court is directed to take the s te p s necessary to arrange for the above payment and to terminate plaintiff from th e docket. SO ORDERED.

s/ Richard J. Arcara
HONORABLE RICHARD J. ARCARA UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE DATED: August 4, 2010

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