Caswell v. Green et al
Filing
40
-CLERK TO FOLLOW UP-DECISION AND ORDER granting 31 Motion for Summary Judgment and dismissing the complaint. (clerk to close case.) Signed by Hon. Michael A. Telesca on 8/6/13. (JMC)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
REGGIE CASWELL,
Plaintiff,
DECISION AND ORDER
No. 1:10-CV-0166(MAT)
-vsMICHAEL C. GREEN, Monroe County
D.A., NANCY A. GILLIGAN, A.D.A.,
JULIE M.
FINOCCHINO, A.D.A.,
Defendants.
I.
Introduction
Pro se plaintiff Reggie Caswell (“Caswell” or “Plaintiff”), an
inmate at Clinton Correctional Facility, is incarcerated pursuant
to a judgment of conviction against him entered on April 11, 2006.
He instituted the present action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
alleging that Defendants denied him due process on his state direct
appeal by failing to provide him with copies of certain exhibits
from his trial and sentencing proceeding. Presently before the
Court is Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt #31), which
Plaintiff has opposed (Dkt ##33, 34, 36, 37).
II.
Background
Caswell was convicted following a jury trial in on charges of
Robbery in the Second Degree, Attempted Robbery in the Third
Degree, and two counts of Burglary in the Second Degree. Caswell’s
conviction was upheld on direct appeal. People v. Caswell, 56
A.D.3d 1300 (4th
Dept. 2008), lv. denied, 11 N.Y.3d 923 (N.Y.),
recons. denied, 12 N.Y.3d 781 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2775
(2009). During Caswell’s direct appeal, he made a motion for a
subpoena
duces
tecum
compelling
the
Monroe
County
District
Attorney’s Office to produce certain exhibits he wished to use for
his appeal. That motion was denied. See People v. Caswell, Motion
No. KA 06-01104 (4th Dept. Jan. 16, 2008), attached to Defendants’
Discovery Response (“Defs’ Resp.”) (Dkt #24).
After his conviction was affirmed, Caswell filed a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in this
Court, asserting, inter alia, that his due process rights were
violated on direct appeal because the prosecutor refused to provide
him copies of the exhibits he sought in his subpoena duces tecum on
direct appeal. This Court denied Caswell’s request for a writ and
dismissed the petition, finding unpersuasive his argument that he
was denied a meaningful appeal since he received copies of all the
exhibits he claimed to have been denied. See Caswell v. Racetti,
No. 11–CV–0153(MAT), 2012 WL 1029457, at *16-17, *18 (W.D.N.Y.
Mar. 26, 2012).
Caswell filed the instant complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 on March 2, 2010, raising variations on the same argument
contained in his habeas petition–namely, that Defendants deprived
him of a constitutionally adequate appeal record by failing to
-2-
provide
him
with
copies
of
trial
exhibits
#9
and
#22,
and
sentencing exhibits ##4-7 (“the Exhibits”).
On
initial
screening,
this
case
was
dismissed
without
prejudice on the basis that Caswell’s claims were barred by Heck v.
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994). The United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit disagreed, finding that Caswell’s
§ 1983 action did not itself challenge any conduct that occurred at
trial or at sentencing; instead, Caswell sought access to certain
exhibits
at
his
trial
and
sentencing
for
his
use
in
future
proceedings. The Second Circuit concluded that Caswell’s § 1983
suit,
“if
successful,
would
not
necessarily
invalidate
his
conviction or sentence,” and thus it was not barred by Heck.
Caswell v. Green, No. 10-1259-cv, 424 F. App’x 44, 46 (2d Cir.
2011) (summary order) (emphasis in original). Accordingly, the
matter was remanded to this Court for proceedings consistent with
the Second Circuit’s opinion.
On June 13, 2012, Defendants responded to Caswell’s discovery
demands by providing copies of Trial Exhibits #9 (Surveillance
Videotape) and #22 (Surveillance Videotape), Sentencing Exhibits
#4,
#5,
and
#7,
and
the
Persistent
Violent
Felony
Offender
Information dated March 28, 2006. See Defs’ Resp., Exhibits C, D,
E, F & G.
provided
Defendants explained that Sentencing Exhibit #6 was not
because,
upon
information
and
belief,
it
was
never
received into evidence during Caswell’s criminal proceeding and
-3-
therefore was not relevant to Plaintiff’s current claims. See Defs’
Resp. at 3, ¶ 3.
Defendants have now moved for summary judgment pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“F.R.C.P.”) 56 arguing that
Caswell’s complaint has been rendered moot by their disclosure of
the Exhibits during discovery. Plaintiff has opposed the motion,
asserting
in conclusory
videotape
from
a
fashion
convenience
that
store
one
of
the
surveillance
exhibits,
a
system,
is
incomplete.
The motion is now fully submitted and ready for decision. For
the reasons discussed below, Defendants’ Motion is granted, and
Plaintiff’s Complaint is dismissed with prejudice.
III. Summary Judgment Standard
A motion for summary judgment shall be granted “if the movant
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV.
P. 56(a). The movant has the initial burden of showing entitlement
to summary judgment. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323
(1986)). If the movant meets its burden, the burden shifts to the
non-movant to identify evidence in the record that creates a
genuine issue of material fact. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd.
v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).
-4-
IV.
The Mootness Doctrine
“Mootness
is
a
doctrinal
restriction
stemming
from
the
Article III requirement that federal courts decide only live cases
or controversies[.]” In re Zarnel, 619 F.3d 156, 162 (2d Cir.
2010). Mootness deprives a court of subject matter jurisdiction
over the action. Fox v. Board of Trustees of State Univ. of N.Y.,
42 F.3d 135, 140 (2d Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). Defects in
subject matter jurisdiction are non-waivable and may be waived at
any time during the proceedings by the parties or by the court sua
sponte. Id. (citation omitted). A case becomes moot when “the
parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome” of the
case. Id. (quotation omitted). In other words, “when interim relief
or events have eradicated the effects of the defendant’s act or
omission, and there is no reasonable expectation that the alleged
violation will recur[,]” a case is said to have become moot. Irish
Lesbian and
Gay
Organization
v.
Guiliani,
143
F.3d
638, 647
(2d Cir. 1998) (citing, inter alia, County of Los Angeles v. Davis,
440 U.S. 625, 631 (1979)).
V.
Discussion
A.
As
Plaintiff’s Requests for Injunctive Relief
his
First
Claim,
Caswell
alleges
that
Defendants
“knowingly, willfully, wantonly, deprived [him] of a sufficient
appeal record by repeatedly refusing to provide [him] with copies
of their Trial Exhibits #9 and #22 [and] Surveillance Videotapes”
-5-
which resulted in his being “unable to demonstrate on direct appeal
or collateral review, that [he] [is] Actually Innocent . . . .”
As
his
Second
Claim,
Caswell
alleges
that
Defendants
“knowingly, willfully, wantonly, deprived [him] of a sufficient
appeal record by repeatedly refusing to provide [him] with a copy
of Peoples Sentencing Hearing Exhibits #4-7” and thus he was unable
to demonstrate on direct appeal or collateral review that his
sentence is illegal as a matter of law.
To the extent that Caswell claims that he was denied a
meaningful appeal, this assertion is without merit. As this Court
stated in its Decision and Order dismissing Caswell’s habeas
petition, this claim lacks a factual basis. This Court explained,
People’s Exhibit #9 is the original liquor store
surveillance videotape. When played on a normal VCR its,
speed is substantially faster than real time. People’s
Exhibit #22 is a fair and accurate recording of the same
images that appear in Exhibit #9, but it depicts those
images in real time and may be played on a regular VCR.
At trial, both exhibits were introduced into evidence,
but only People’s Exhibit #22 was played for the jury.
Contrary to Petitioner’s contention, he was provided,
before trial, with both People’s Exhibits #9 and #22.
When Petitioner moved for a subpoena duces tecum from the
Appellate Division directing production of those
exhibits, the prosecution stated that they had “no
objection to making an additional copy of each exhibit”
if Petitioner provided a blank VHS tape suitable for
copying. The prosecution further stated that they had no
objection to providing the original exhibits to the
Appellate Division. In light of this factual background,
the Court finds that Petitioner's claim is spurious and
must be dismissed.
Petitioner also contends that he was denied a meaningful
appeal because he was deprived of a copy of his
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persistent violent felony statement and a copy of the
prosecution’s sentencing exhibits. These contentions are
belied by the record. The prosecution served Petitioner
with a copy of his persistent violent felony statement,
Copies of the exhibits that the prosecution introduced
into evidence at the sentencing hearing appear to be
annexed to the appendix on appeal submitted by Petitioner
to the Appellate Division.
Caswell v. Racetti, 2012 WL 1029457, at *18 (citations to record
omitted).
Caswell’s request for injunctive relief, in the form of
production of the Exhibits is moot. During the pendency of this
litigation, Defendants provided the Exhibits requested in his
Complaint to him. See Defs’ Resp. (Dkt #24) & Exhibits. The only
requested Exhibit (#6) that Defendants did not produce was not
introduced
at
Caswell’s
underlying
criminal
proceeding
and
therefore is not relevant to his constitutional claims. See Defs’
Resp. at 3, ¶ 3. Because it is now impossible for this Court to
grant any effective relief to Plaintiff, his First and Second
Claims are moot. See Cook v. Colgate Univ., 992 F.2d 17, 19 (2d
Cir. 1993) (noting that case is mooted “when it becomes impossible
for the courts, through the exercise of their remedial powers, to
do anything to redress the [plaintiff’s] injury”) (quotation and
citation omitted).
Moreover, this action arguably was moot at the time it was
filed, based upon the fact that, as this Court found in its March
2012 Decision
and
Order,
Caswell
had been
provided
requested Exhibits prior to trial or on appeal.
-7-
with the
Finally, the Court notes that Caswell has attempted to argue
that this action is not moot because the surveillance videotape is
purportedly incomplete. This speculative assertion is insufficient
to
defeat
summary
judgment
in
Defendants’
favor.
See,
e.g.,
Bickerstaff v. Vassar College, 196 F.3d 435, 452 (2d Cir. 1999)
(“Statements that are devoid of any specifics, but replete with
conclusions, are insufficient to defeat a properly supported motion
for summary judgment.”), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1242 (2000).
B.
Plaintiff’s Request for a Declaratory Judgment
As his Third Claim, Caswell requests a declaratory judgment
stating the following:
When a state provides for an appeal of a criminal
conviction as a right ([N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW] § 450.10) and
[the] State Appellate Court grants a defendant poor
person status and request to proceed pro se, that said
pro se appellant has a right to a sufficient appeal
record in which all appealable issues can be demonstrated
on direct appeal and collateral review . . . .
Complaint, p. 6(a) (Dkt #1) (citations to Plaintiff’s direct appeal
and constitutional amendments omitted). As noted above, this action
has been rendered moot based upon Defendants’ disclosure of the
Exhibits to Plaintiff claims. No actual controversy remains between
the parties under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201.
Federal
district
courts
“have
no
jurisdiction
to
render
declaratory judgments when the underlying questions are moot or
otherwise nonjusticiable.” Pancake v. McCarthy, 806 F. Supp. 378,
379 (E.D.N.Y. 1992); accord Scheiner v. ACT Inc., No. 10–CV–0096
-8-
(RRM)(RER), 2013 WL 685445, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2013); see
also Shariff v. Coombe, 655 F. Supp.2d 274, 297 n. 27 (S.D.N.Y.
2009) (“The Declaratory Judgment Act cannot resurrect substantive
claims that are defeated by jurisdictional, exhaustion, mootness,
or other defenses.”) (citation omitted); Mallinckrodt v. Barnes,
272 A.D.2d 651, 652-53 (3d Dept. 2000) (denying plaintiff’s request
to amend complaint to request judgment declaring that her refusal
to
allow
euthanasia
Agriculture
and
of
her
horses
is
not
in
Markets
Law
Article
26
because
violation
such
of
conduct
involves the free exercise of her religion, where initial relief
sought by plaintiff was permanent injunction prohibiting defendants
from euthanizing her injured horse, and horse died during pendency
of case, thereby mooting the action).
In any event, Caswell’s requested declaratory relief–that
pro
se
defendants
appeal–is
are
unnecessary.
entitled
Under
to
New
a
“sufficient”
York
State
record
and
on
Federal
constitutional law, an indigent criminal defendant is entitled to
a
free
copy
of
the
transcript
from
his
underlying
criminal
proceeding. See, e.g., People v. Gill, 40 Misc.3d 246, 247-48 (N.Y.
Crim. Ct. 2013) (citations omitted).
VI.
Conclusion
For
the
reasons
discussed
above,
Defendants’
Motion
For
Summary Judgment (Dkt #31) is granted, and Plaintiff’s Complaint
-9-
(Dkt #1) is dismissed with prejudice. The Clerk of the Court is
requested to close this case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
S/Michael A. Telesca
_____________________________________
HONORABLE MICHAEL A. TELESCA
United States District Judge
DATED:
August 6, 2013
Rochester, New York
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