Armstrong Pump, Inc. v. Hartman et al
Filing
145
DECISION AND ORDER ADOPTING in part and SETTING aside in part the 136 Report and Recommendation. Signed by William M. Skretny, Chief Judge U.S.D.C. on 10/7/2013. (MEAL)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
ARMSTRONG PUMP, INC.,
Plaintiff,
v.
DECISION AND ORDER
10-CV-446S
THOMAS HARTMAN, and OPTIMUM
ENERGY LLC,
Defendants.
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff, Armstrong Pump, Inc. (“Armstrong”), and Defendant Optimum Energy LLC
(“Optimum”), seek claim construction for various claims found in three patents filed by
Thomas Hartman. To that end, the Honorable Hugh B. Scott, United States Magistrate
Judge, held a Markman hearing and issued the now-pending Report and Recommendation
(“R&R”), which construes and defines various claims.
Presently before this Court are objections from each party. For the following
reasons, the R&R is accepted in large part, but set aside as to some matters.
II. DISCUSSION
A.
Standard of Review
This Court reviews specific objections to reports and recommendations de novo.
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). When only a general objection is made to a
portion of a magistrate judge's report and recommendation, district courts subject that
portion of the report and recommendation to a clear error review. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2)(3). District courts, however, are not required to review the factual findings or legal
conclusions of the magistrate judge as to which no proper objections are interposed.
Ianniello v. Hartford Life & Acc. Ins. Co., No. 10-CV-370, 2012 WL 314872, at *1 (E.D.N.Y.
Feb. 1, 2012) (citing Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150, 106 S. Ct. 466, 88 L. Ed. 2d 435
(1985). Ultimately, this Court may accept, reject, or modify any of the Magistrate’s findings
or recommendations. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b).
B.
Armstrong’s Objections
Generally, Armstrong’s objections take one of two forms: it either objects on the
ground that (1) Judge Scott assigned some claim terms an unnecessary special
construction when the claim term has an ordinary meaning; or it objects on the ground that
(2) Judge Scott failed to perform “indefiniteness analysis” and, relatedly, his construction
of some claim terms refers only to a functional limitation – it fails to disclose an adequate
structure.
Reviewing them de novo, this Court finds Armstrong’s objections unavailing on
each of the claim terms to which they apply.
As for the first type of objection, this Court finds no error in Judge Scott’s clarification
of some claim terms despite the fact that they may be commonly understood by those with
ordinary skill in the art. As noted by the Magistrate, further clarification may help the jury
understand these terms. And, although Armstrong cites authority supporting the proposition
that terms such as these sometimes do not need further construction, it offers no authority
for the proposition that these claims cannot be specially defined. To the contrary, even
cases relied on by Armstrong demonstrate that in some circumstances, commonly
understood terms require construction. See O2 Micro Int'l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech.
Co., Ltd., 521 F.3d 1351, 1361–62 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“A determination that a claim term
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‘needs no construction’ or has the ‘plain and ordinary meaning’ may be inadequate when
a term has more than one ‘ordinary’ meaning or when reliance on a term's ‘ordinary’
meaning does not resolve the parties' dispute.”). Finally, and perhaps most importantly,
Armstrong does not argue that the constructions at issue are wrong or misleading.
Accordingly, this group of objections is dismissed.
In Armstrong’s second group of objections, which comprises two separate but
related forms of objection, it argues:
First, because of the deficiencies of the specifications of the
patents-in-suit, the R&R does not identify a structure for the
means-plus-function limitations as required by law or perform
an indefiniteness analysis for any “structure” that is disclosed.
Second, the R&R adopts constructions for the means-plusfunction limitations which recite functions rather than specific
structures identified in the specifications.
(Armstrong’s Objections, at 1; Docket No. 139.)
After a careful analysis, this Court finds that each of the disputed
means-plus-function limitations adequately reference disclosed structures. To the extent
that Judge Scott did not, this Court explicitly adopts the identification of the disclosed
structures in the comprehensive exhibit to Defendants’ claim-construction brief. (See
Docket No. 125-3.) Further, this Court finds that those structures are sufficiently definite
and are adequately incorporated into the various constructions.
Finally, this Court has considered objections that do not fit neatly with these two
groupings but finds no error in the Magistrate Judge’s Report.
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C.
Optimum’s Objections
Optimum identifies five terms that it argues require revision. Armstrong agrees that
the first three claim terms identified by Optimum require revision; though the parties’
proposed constructions differ.
1.
Centrifugal Chiller
The R&R defines a “centrifugal chiller” as a “chiller whose compressor uses a
centrifugal pump.” The parties agree that a centrifugal chiller does not have a pump.
Accordingly, the construction will be revised to read: “a chiller whose compressor uses a
centrifugal chiller.” This aligns with both parties proposed construction.
2.
Acquiring an indication of power
The R&R defines this term as “the amount of power used to operate a device.” But
this construction omits the act of “acquiring.” Both the parties agree that this term
construction requires revision. Although the parties disagree as to the correct construction,
this Court will construe the term as follows: “acquiring the information regarding the amount
of power used to operate a device.”
3.
Cooling Tower
The R&R defines “cooling tower” as “a structure that receives chilled water exiting
a condenser and cools it for recirculation through fan-assisted evaporative cooling.” This
appears to be a simple clerical error, as elsewhere Judge Scott correctly noted that heated
– not chilled – water is involved here. The word “heated” is thus substituted for “chilled” in
this term construction.
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4.
Predetermined Procedure
The R&R defines “predetermined procedure” in '946 Claim 2 as “a stepwise logic
or decision making process that compares the average operating differential pressure
across the operating compressors to the natural efficiency curve for the overall system and
guides the common controller to a decision whether to add or to shed a chiller.”
Optimum points out that “average operating differential pressure” and “natural
efficiency curve for the overall system” are not strictly comparable and that the procedure
can include comparing other criteria. It proposes that the term does not need separate
construction. Armstrong does not dispute this. Accordingly, based on the R&R’s earlier
constructions from ‘946 Claim 1, this claim term will not be defined further.
5.
Means for measuring a power draw/ Means for calculating the motor
speed based on the measured driving motor power draw
The R&R construes “means for measuring a power draw” as “a device that
measures the total electrical energy usage by a compressor motor over a given amount
of time.” It also construes “Means for calculating the motor speed based on the measured
driving motor power draw” as “the use of formulas, algorithms, or similar predetermined
logic to convert total electrical energy usage by a compressor motor into an indirect
measurement of motor speed.”
Optimum argues that these definitions are “unduly narrowing because the
measuring power draw, as found in Optimum's proposed construction, should include any
instantaneous measurement of power supplied, not only total energy over time.” Aside from
its objection that these terms are indefinite, Armstrong does not dispute the validity of
Optimum’s proposed constructions. Because this Court has already rejected Armstrong’s
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indefiniteness argument, and because it finds Optimum’s constructions valid, it will adopt
those constructions.
Accordingly, “Means for measuring a power draw” is construed as “a device that
measures the level of power applied to a compressor motor at a given time.” Further,
“Means for calculating the motor speed based on the measured driving motor power draw”
is construed as “the use of formulas, algorithms, or similar predetermined logic to convert
the level of power applied to a compressor motor into an indirect measurement of motor
speed.”
III. ORDERS
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED, that the Report and Recommendation (Docket No. 136)
is ADOPTED in part and SET ASIDE in part, in accordance with this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: October 7, 2013
Buffalo, New York
/s/William M. Skretny
WILLIAM M. SKRETNY
Chief Judge
United States District Court
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