Chakraborty v. Town of Amherst, New York

Filing 27

DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING Defendant's 16 Motion for Summary Judgment; DIRECTING the Clerk of the Court to close this case. Signed by William M. Skretny, Chief Judge U.S.D.C. on 1/28/2012. (MEAL)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
MAYA CHAKRABORTY,
Plaintiff,
v.

DECISION AND ORDER
10-CV-516S

TOWN OF AMHERST, NEW YORK,
Defendant.

I. INTRODUCTION
In this action Plaintiff Maya Chakraborty brings suit against Defendant, the Town of
Amherst (“Amherst”), claiming violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title
VII”), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., and the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967 (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634. Plaintiff’s claims arise out of her termination
from the position of part-time Survey Assistant/Case Manager with Amherst’s Senior
Services, and Defendant’s subsequent failure to rehire her for various positions that
became available thereafter.

Presently before this Court is Defendant’s Motion for

Summary Judgment.1 For the reasons discussed below, Defendant’s motion is granted.

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In support of its Motion for Sum m ary Judgm ent, Defendant filed a Statem ent of Facts, with
Exhibits; a Mem orandum of Law; the Affidavit of Mary Ellen W alsh; the Affidavit of Robert McCarthy; a
Reply Affidavit; and a Reply Mem orandum . (Docket Nos. 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 25, 26.)
In opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Sum m ary Judgm ent, Plaintiff filed a Mem orandum of Law,
included in which was a Statem ent of Facts. (Docket No. 24.)

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II. BACKGROUND
A.

Facts2
Plaintiff, Maya Chakraborty was employed with Defendant Amherst’s Department

of Senior Services from February 19, 2005 to November 2005, and again from April 2006
to early 2010. (Def.’s Stmt. ¶¶ 2, 3, 4, 5, Docket No. 15.) During her first eight month
period, she worked as a part-time survey assistant/case manager. (Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 1.) After
she was rehired, she worked as a youth activity leader on a part-time basis. (Def.’s Stmt.
¶ 4.) While employed as a survey assistant/case manager, she was informed of various
complaints by Amherst residents who disliked her Indian accent and intended to cancel
their visits to Amherst’s outreach center should they be scheduled to meet with Plaintiff.
(Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 23, Docket No. 24.) Amherst allegedly took no further action to protect
Plaintiff from these complaints. (Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 25.)
Sometime in 2005, Amherst received grant-funding for a full-time case manager
position. (Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 3.) As part of this funding, Amherst was required to terminate a
part-time outreach worker position as of November 1, 2005. (Id.) Defendant terminated
Plaintiff’s position, but informed her that the position was being eliminated due to budget
cuts. (Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 4.) Additionally, Amherst’s town records mistakenly stated that Plaintiff
had resigned her position. (Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 5.)
Prior to her termination, Plaintiff expressed a desire to resume employment if and
when funds became available, as well as a willingness to work at a full-time level. (Pl.’s

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This Court has accepted facts included in Plaintiff's and Defendant’s Statem ent of Facts to the
extent that they have not controverted each other's statem ents. See Local Rule 56(a)(2) (statem ents of
m aterial fact that are not specifically controverted by the non-m oving party are deem ed adm itted).

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Stmt. ¶¶ 6, 7.) Plaintiff was informed that she was not eligible for the new full-time position
(“November 2005 position”), having not taken and passed the civil service examination
required by New York State Civil Service Laws. (Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 8; Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 6.)
Defendant allegedly discouraged Plaintiff from taking the examination by telling her that
there was a five-year waiting list, and that applicants higher up on the list would be given
first priority. (Pl.’s Stmt. ¶¶ 9, 10.) The position was ultimately filled by a younger
Caucasian applicant who had passed the civil service examination. (Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 11; Def.’s
Stmt. ¶ 6.)
In January 2007, a second full-time case manager position was created (“January
2007 position”). This position was also filled by a Caucasian applicant, though it is
disputed whether this applicant had passed the civil service examination. (Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 12.)
In October 2007, one of the two case manager positions became vacant (“October
2007 position”). (Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 8.) Although, as before, this position required a person
who had passed the civil service examination, no valid civil service list existed from which
to fill the position. (Id.) Plaintiff applied for the position, but was not hired. (Pl.’s Stmt. ¶
17.) Instead, Judy Kwarta, another Caucasian employee in her early 30's was provisionally
hired for the position. (Id.; Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 9). Ms. Kwarta had been an Amherst employee
since 2001 and was advised that she would have to take and pass the civil service
examination when it was next offered. (Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 9.)
At the end of February 2008, a part-time survey assistant and case manager
position became vacant (“February 2008 position”). (Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 19.) Although Plaintiff
was given an interview, Amherst ultimately decided not to hire Plaintiff for the position.
(Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 20.) The position was instead filled by a younger Caucasian employee who
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held a Masters in Social Work. (Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 21; Walsh Aff. ¶ 13, Docket No. 18.)
B.

Procedural History
Plaintiff commenced this action on June 21, 2010 by filing a complaint in the United

States District Court for the Western District of New York. (Docket No. 1.) Defendant filed
an Answer on July 12, 2010 (Docket No. 4) and the case was referred to the Honorable
Judge Leslie G. Foschio, United States Magistrate Judge, for pre-trial non-dispositive
matters (Docket No. 7). Following discovery, Defendant filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment on August 25, 2011. The parties’ briefs were deemed submitted as of October
24, 2011, at which time this Court took Defendant’s motion under advisement without oral
argument.
III. DISCUSSION
A.

Summary Judgment Standard
Summary Judgment is warranted when there is no genuine issue of material fact

and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A
genuine issue of material fact exists "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the non-moving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986); Ford v. Reynolds, 316 F.3d 351, 354
(2d Cir. 2003). A fact is material if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under governing
law." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
The party seeking summary judgment must first demonstrate the absence of any
disputed material facts. The opposing party is then required to “go beyond the pleadings”
and “designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Celotex Corp.

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v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986); Holcomb v. Iona
Coll., 521 F.3d 130, 137 (2d Cir. 2008). To carry this burden, the opposing party “must do
more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,”
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S. Ct. 1348,
89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986), and it “may not rely simply on conclusory statements or on
contentions that the affidavits supporting the motion are not credible . . . or upon the mere
allegations or denials of the adverse party’s pleading,” Goenaga v. March of Dimes Birth
Defects Found., 51 F.3d 14, 18 (2d Cir. 1995) (internal quotation and citations omitted).
In assessing whether summary judgment is appropriate, the court’s obligation is to
view the evidence and the inferences drawn from the evidence “in the light most favorable
to the party opposing the motion." Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-59, 90
S. Ct.1598, 1609, 26 L. Ed. 2d 142 (1970). The court’s function is not “to weigh the
evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine
issue for trial." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. "Only when reasonable minds could not differ
as to the import of evidence is summary judgment proper." Bryant v. Maffucci, 923 F.2d
979, 982 (2d Cir. 1991).
In the context of employment discrimination cases, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit has explicitly cautioned district courts to use extra care
when deciding whether to grant summary judgment because “the ultimate issue to be
resolved in such cases is the employer’s intent, an issue not particularly suited to summary
adjudication.” Eastmer v. Williamsville Cent. Sch. Dist., 977 F. Supp. 207, 212 (W.D.N.Y.
1997) (quoting Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs., 22 F.3d 1219, 1224 (2d Cir. 1994)).

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Nonetheless, “[t]he summary judgment rule would be rendered sterile . . . if the mere
incantation of intent or state of mind would operate as a talisman to defeat an otherwise
valid motion.” Meiri v. Dacon, 759 F.2d 989, 998 (2d Cir. 1985). Indeed, the Second
Circuit has noted that “the salutary purposes of summary judgment – avoiding protracted,
expensive and harassing trials – apply no less to discrimination cases than to commercial
or other areas of litigation.” Id.
C.

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment
Plaintiff’s verified complaint does not enumerate any specific causes of action, but

instead asserts jurisdiction pursuant to Title VII and the ADEA, before describing the facts
of this case. Although Plaintiff has not clarified which acts by Defendant form the nucleus
of her claims, this Court can surmise that Plaintiff challenges her original termination,
Defendant’s remarks with regards to Plaintiff taking the civil service examination, and
Defendant’s failure to rehire her for the November 2005, January 2007, October 2007, or
February 2008 positions.

As discussed below, none of these allegations survives

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
It is well settled that where, as here, a plaintiff does not come forward with direct
evidence of discrimination, her Title VII and ADEA claims are analyzed under the three-part
burden-shifting framework first set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
792, 802-804, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973). See Reeves v. Sanderson
Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142-43, 120 S. Ct. 2097, 2106, 147 L. Ed. 2d 105
(2000) (Title VII); Roge v. NYP Holdings, Inc., 257 F.3d 164, 168 (2d Cir. 2001) (ADEA).
Under this framework, the plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of

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discrimination by demonstrating that (1) she is a member of a protected class, (2) she is
qualified for her position, (3) she suffered an “adverse employment action,” and (4) the
circumstances of the adverse action give rise to an inference of discrimination. Lawrence
v. Nyack Emergency Physicians, P.C., 659 F. Supp. 2d 584, 593 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (citations
omitted). An “adverse employment action” is a “materially adverse change” in the terms
and conditions of an individual’s employment. Sanders v. N.Y.C. Human Res. Admin., 361
F.3d 749, 755 (2d Cir. 2004); Galabya v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Educ., 202 F.3d 636, 640 (2d Cir.
2000). It is “more disruptive than a mere inconvenience, and might be indicated by a
termination of employment, a demotion evidenced by a decrease in wage or salary, a less
distinguished title, a material loss of benefits, significantly diminished material
responsibilities, or other indices unique to a particular situation.” Galabya, 202 F.3d at 640
(quotations, citations, and alterations omitted); see also Pimentel v. City of New York, No.
00 Civ. 326, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8454, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. May 14, 2002) (“[W]here there
is no loss of salary, benefits, seniority, tenure or promotion opportunities, there is no
adverse employment action.”).
“The burden of establishing a prima facie case of disparate treatment is not
onerous. Tex. Dep’t of Comt’y Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253, 101 S. Ct. 1089,
1094, 67 L. Ed. 2d 207 (1981)). Indeed, the Second Circuit has characterized the burden
as “minimal.” Carlton v. Mystic Transp., Inc., 202 F.3d 129, 134 (2d Cir. 2000). If the
plaintiff meets this minimal burden, a rebuttable presumption of discrimination arises, and
the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for
the employment action. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254. If the defendant succeeds in making

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this showing, “the presumption of discrimination arising with the establishment of the prima
facie case drops from the picture.” Weinstock v. Columbia Univ., 224 F.3d 33, 42 (2d Cir.
2000) (citing St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 510-11, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 125
L. Ed.2d 407 (1993)). The burden then returns to the plaintiff.
On Title VII claims, the plaintiff must come forward with “sufficient evidence to
support a rational finding that the legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons proffered by the
defendant were false, and that more likely than not discrimination was the real reason for
the action.” Weinstock, 224 F.3d at 42 (citation, quotation marks, and alteration omitted).
“In short, the question becomes whether the evidence, taken as a whole, supports a
sufficient rational inference of discrimination.” Id. But, “[t]o get to the jury, ‘it is not enough
. . . to disbelieve the employer; the factfinder must [also] believe the plaintiff’s explanation
of intentional discrimination.’” Id. (quoting St. Mary’s, 509 U.S. at 519). With regard to
ADEA claims, it is not enough to show that age was a contributing or motivating factor of
the alleged adverse employment action; the plaintiff must be able to show that age was the
“but-for” cause of the adverse action. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 129
S. Ct. 2343, 2351-52, 174 L. Ed. 2d 119 (2009); Hogan v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, No.
09-3048-CV, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 24464, at *6 (2d Cir. Nov. 30, 2010) (summary order).
At the outset, this Court notes that, considering only Plaintiff’s memorandum in
opposition to Defendant’s motion, Plaintiff has failed to establish so much as a prima facie
case of discrimination.3 Although reiterating the allegations in her verified complaint,

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Plaintiff counsel’s m em orandum is actually entitled “Defendant’s Response and Mem orandum of
Law in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Sum m ary Judgm ent.” (Docket No. 24) (em phasis added).
Given that Plaintiff in this action has filed no m otion for sum m ary judgm ent, this Court assum es, for the
sake of Plaintiff, that it is in fact m eant to oppose Defendant’s m otion.

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Plaintiff’s memorandum does not so much as waive at the McDonnell Douglas framework.
Stripped of its statement of facts and the case law describing the standard for a motion for
summary judgment, Plaintiff’s memorandum consists of a single paragraph asserting the
existence of disputed facts as to whether Defendant discriminated against Plaintiff based
on her age and national origin.
Viewed generously, and liberally expanding on Plaintiff counsel’s bare-boned
memorandum, this Court finds that at least some of the allegedly discriminatory acts make
out a prima facie case. As to all of them, Plaintiff has at least satisfied two of the prima
facie requirements. It is undisputed that she was a member of a protected class on the
basis of her age and ethnicity, and that she suffered an adverse employment action when
she was originally terminated from her part-time position in November 2005 and not rehired
for any of the other positions for which she applied. See Leibowitz v. Cornell Univ., 584
F.3d 487, 501 (2d Cir. 2009) (“An employee seeking a renewal of an employment contract,
just like a new application or a rehire after a layoff, suffers an adverse employment action
when an employment opportunity is denied and is protected from discrimination in
connection with such decisions under Title VII and the ADEA.”).
Turning to Plaintiff’s first claim, that she was terminated for discriminatory reasons,
this Court finds that there is no evidence even suggesting discrimination. As to her ADEA
claim, Plaintiff nowhere contends that she was terminated because of her age. On her
Title VII claim, Plaintiff only asserts that there were complaints regarding her ethnicity, but
there is no hint that Defendant acted on those complaints or was acting with a
discriminatory intent in accepting a grant that would create a full-time case manager
position at the expense of a part-time assistant position. In fact, Plaintiff was rehired by
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Defendant for another part-time position, that of youth activity leader, a few months later.
There is, in short, no evidence to support an inference of discrimination on the part of
Defendant in eliminating Plaintiff’s position.
Similarly, although Plaintiff claims she was “stonewalled” when Defendant told her
that there was a five year waiting list associated with the civil service examination and that
those ahead on the list would be given first consideration, Plaintiff nowhere asserts, or
presents anything more than her own deposition testimony, that these facts were false.
Nor does she show how this prevented her from taking the civil service examination.
Finally, even assuming that she was lied to, Plaintiff has presented nothing to show that
Defendant gave her this information for discriminatory reasons. See Lizardo v. Denny’s,
Inc., 270 F.3d 94, 104 (2d Cir. 2001) (noting that even if “defendants exaggerated or lied
about plaintiffs’ behavior, the record does not support a finding that they did so to mask
race discrimination”). Again, given the fact that Defendant did actually rehire Plaintiff for
a part-time position, Plaintiff has not established the necessary inference of discrimination.
Because the November 2005, January 2007, October 2007, and February 2008
positions were filled by Caucasians who were younger in age than Plaintiff, she has
sufficiently identified such an inference with respect to Defendant’s decision not to hire her.
See Earvin v. City Univ. of N.Y., No. 03 CV 9521(BSJ)(DCF), 2008 WL 5740359, at *4
(quoting Fisher v. Vasser Coll., 114 F.3d 1332, 1335 (2d Cir. 1997)) (filling of position by
person not in the protected class sufficient to make out a prima facie case). However, as
to the November 2005 and January 2007 positions, Plaintiff has not shown that she was
qualified. Defendant has demonstrated, and Plaintiff has not disputed, that the full-time
positions were only open to qualified applicants who had passed the civil service
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examination. Plaintiff does not deny that she never passed the civil service examination.
See Ruskowski v. Kaleida Health Sys., 422 Fed. Appx. 58 (2d Cir. 2011) (summary order)
(“[A]bsent any evidence that Appellant was eligible to apply for the positions at issue, he
has failed to establish a prima facie case that his age was the ‘but for’ cause of Appellee’s
failure to hire him.”).4
As to the October 2007 position, because Defendant did hire an applicant who had,
like Plaintiff, not passed the examination, Plaintiff can meet her burden as to this particular
claim.

But this only shifts the burden to Defendant to present a legitimate, non-

discriminatory reason for its decision not to hire Plaintiff. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254.
Here, Defendant has shown that it only hired someone who had not passed the
examination because, at the time the position became available, there was no valid civil
service list from which to fill the position. (Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 8.) Moreover, Defendant’s
decision to hire Ms. Kwarta, instead of Plaintiff, was based on the fact that Kwarta had
worked for Defendant since 2001. (McCarthy Aff. ¶ 11, Docket No. 19.) Kwarta’s six-year
employment history prior to filling the position dwarfs Plaintiff’s own, much shorter, two-year
part-time record, and provides ample support for Defendant’s decision. See Scaria v.
Rubin, 117 F.3d 652, 654 (2d Cir. 1997) (superior qualifications are legitimate reason for
hiring one employee over another).
Similarly, although Defendant could have rehired Plaintiff when a part-time position
opened up in February 2008, Defendant was entitled to hire an individual with the best

4

Plaintiff disputes that the January 2007 position was filled by an individual who had passed the
civil service exam ination. However, Defendant has presented the hiring records of the applicant which
show that the individual had, in fact, been chosen from the civil service list, and Plaintiff has not
challenged the authenticity of this evidence. (Ex. 8, Docket No. 14-2.)

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qualifications. This it did when it hired an applicant who had a Masters degree in Social
Work, the preferred qualification for the part-time position of assistant surveyor/case
manager. (Walsh Aff. ¶¶ 4, 13.)5
Defendant having met its burden at the second stage of the McDonnell Douglas
analysis, Plaintiff had the opportunity to show that Defendant’s reasons were pretextual.
But, as already discussed, Plaintiff wholly failed to make any effort at presenting a
comprehensive argument, much less one that follows the standard under governing case
law. Although Plaintiff gamely asserts that statistical and other evidence will show that she
was discriminated against, no such evidence is to be found anywhere in the record, and
Plaintiff has not requested additional time to complete discovery.
Having failed to rebut Defendant’s legitimate and non-discriminatory reasons,
Plaintiff has failed its burden at the third stage of the McDonnell Douglas analysis. Plaintiff
has not shown that Defendant’s given reasons were false or that age was the “but for”
cause of any allegedly discriminatory acts. Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Judgment will be granted.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is
granted.

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Plaintiff’s own education was in the field of geography. (W alsh Aff. ¶ 4.)

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V. ORDERS
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket
No. 16) is GRANTED.
FURTHER, that the Clerk of the Court is direct to take the steps necessary to close
this case.
SO ORDERED.

Dated:

January 28, 2012
Buffalo, New York
/s/William M. Skretny
WILLIAM M. SKRETNY
Chief Judge
United States District Court

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