Ceglia v. Zuckerberg et al
Filing
284
DECISION AND ORDER. Based on this court's review of the record, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate Defendants are guilty of any wrongdoing warranting sanctions with regard to the five computers. Accordingly, Plaintiff's motion for sanctions (Doc. No. 231), is DENIED.. Signed by Hon. Leslie G. Foschio on 1/1/2012. (SDW)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
PAUL D. CEGLIA,
Plaintiff,
v.
MARK ELLIOT ZUCKERBERG, and
FACEBOOK, INC.,
DECISION
and
ORDER
10-CV-00569A(F)
Defendants.
APPEARANCES:
BOLAND LEGAL, LLC
Attorneys for Plaintiff
DEAN M. BOLAND, of Counsel
18123 Sloane Avenue
Lakewood, Ohio 44107
JEFFREY ALAN LAKE, ESQ.
Attorney for Plaintiff
835 5th Avenue
Suite 200A
San Diego, California 92101
PAUL A. ARGENTIERI, ESQ.
Attorney for Plaintiff
188 Main Street
Hornell, New York 14843
GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER, LLP
Attorneys for Defendants
ORIN S. SNYDER and
ALEXANDER H. SOUTHWELL, of Counsel
200 Park Avenue
47th Floor
New York, New York 10166-0193
and
THOMAS H. DUPREE, JR., of Counsel
1050 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Washington, District of Columbia 20036
ORRICK, HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE LLP
Attorneys for Defendants
LISA T. SIMPSON, of Counsel
51 West 52nd Street
New York, New York 10019
HARRIS BEACH LLP
Attorneys for Defendants
TERRANCE P. FLYNN, of Counsel
Larkin at Exchange
726 Exchange Street
Suite 1000
Buffalo, New York 14210
This case was referred to the undersigned by Honorable Richard J. Arcara on
May 27, 2011 for pretrial matters. The action is presently before the court on Plaintiff’s
motion filed November 25, 2011 (Doc. No. 231), requesting sanctions against
Defendants and Defendants’ counsel.
The parties to this action dispute the authenticity of a contract (“the contract”)1
allegedly executed between Plaintiff Paul D. Ceglia (“Plaintiff”) and Defendant Mark
Elliot Zuckerberg (“Zuckerberg”), on April 28, 2003, pursuant to which Plaintiff and
Zuckerberg, then a student at Harvard University (“Harvard”), established a partnership
for the development and commercialization of two separate internet business ventures,
including StreetFax.com (“StreetFax”), an on-line database developed by Plaintiff, and
“The Face Book,” the social-networking website created and maintained by Zuckerberg,
and now known as Defendant Facebook, Inc. (“Facebook”). The putative contract
provides that Plaintiff would hire Zuckerberg to perform web programming for
StreetFax, and Plaintiff would help fund the development of Facebook in exchange for a
1
A copy of the contract is attached as Exhibit A to the Am ended Com plaint (Doc. No. 39).
2
one-half interest in Facebook. In the First Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 39)
(“Amended Complaint”), Plaintiff quotes several email exchanges between himself and
Zuckerberg which Plaintiff maintains supports his allegations that the contract
establishes a partnership between Plaintiff and Zuckerberg and gives Plaintiff 50%
ownership in Facebook. See, e.g., Amended Complaint ¶ 32 (quoting from email
Zuckerberg allegedly sent Plaintiff on July 30, 2003 that “. . . I’ve been tweaking the
search engine today [referring to the StreetFax.com project] and I’m pleased with its
results. I’d like to use it for the Harvard site [referring to the Face Book], I think it will
really help people find each other, even if the spell names incorrectly. Would it be
agreeable with you if I adapt the source code? Thanks!” (bracketed text in original)).
Nowhere within the papers filed in this action, however, are there any copies of the
actual emails quoted by Plaintiff in the Amended Complaint.
No scheduling conference pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 16(b) has yet been held or
scheduled, nor have the parties conferred, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(f), to develop a
discovery plan; rather, the parties agreed to expedited discovery designed to establish
whether the putative contract and emails allegedly exchanged between Plaintiff and
Zuckerberg in connection with the contract are forgeries. Accordingly, by Order filed
July 1, 2011 (Doc. No. 83) (“July 1, 2011 Order”), the undersigned directed that Plaintiff
produce, on or before July 15, 2011, certain emails and make all computers and
electronic media within Plaintiff’s possession available for inspection by Stroz Friedberg
LLC (“Stroz Friedberg”, a digital forensic consulting firm whose services Defendants
have retained in connection with this action. July 1, 2011 Order at 1. With regard to
Defendants’ discovery obligations, the July 1, 2011 Order directed only “that five (5)
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days subsequent to Plaintiff’s production of the Electronic Assets and his sworn
declaration, Defendant shall produce all emails in their original, native and hard-copy
form between Defendant Zuckerberg and Plaintiff and/or other persons associated with
StreetFax that were captured from Zuckerberg’s Harvard email account. . . .” July 1,
2011 Order at 2-3.
On November 23, 2011, Plaintiff submitted to the court an ex parte motion
(“Plaintiff’s ex parte motion”) seeking a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) prohibiting
the destruction of forensic copies of five computers (“the five computers”) belonging to
and used by Defendant Zuckerberg while a student at Harvard. The five computers
were at issue in an unrelated action filed against Defendants in United States District
Court for the District of Massachusetts, ConnectU, Inc. v. Facebook, Inc., Civil Action
No. 2007-10593-DPW (“the ConnectU action”), in which Zuckerberg and Facebook
were sued for having stolen the idea for Facebook from three Harvard seniors who had
arranged for Zuckerberg to assist in developing a similar website referred to as
“ConnectU.” In a teleconference conducted by the court with the parties on November
23, 2011, after Judge Arcara refused an ex parte consideration of Plaintiff’s requested
TRO, to discuss the ex parte motion with Plaintiff’s attorney, Dean M. Boland, Esq.
(“Boland”), and Defendants’ attorney Orin Snyder (“Snyder”), Boland agreed to
withdraw the request for a TRO, but maintained Defendants should be sanctioned for
failing to disclose the existence of the five computers and failing to take steps to ensure
the forensic copies of the five computers were not destroyed. Plaintiff then filed on
November 24, 2011 the instant motion (Doc. No. 231) (“Plaintiff’s motion”), seeking
largely the same relief as sought in Plaintiff’s ex parte motion including, inter alia, a
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temporary restraining order prohibiting the destruction of the forensic copies of the five
computers, and requesting Defendants be sanctioned for failing to disclose the
existence of the five computers and their forensic copies. Plaintiff’s motion is supported
by the Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and
for Sanctions Against Defendants and Defense Counsel (Doc. No. 232) (“Plaintiff’s
Memorandum”), with attached exhibits A through M (“Plaintiff’s Exh(s). __”), and the
Declaration of Dean Boland, Esq. in Support of Motion for TRO and for Sanctions
Against Defendants and Defense Counsel (Doc. No. 233) (“Boland Declaration”).
According to Plaintiff, although the five computers potentially contain electronic
communications and may also include an email server, not only have Defendants
suppressed the existence of the five computers from Plaintiff, but Defendants have also
sought the destruction of forensic copies of the five computers, created by Jeff Parmet
and Associates, LLC (“Parmet”), a computer forensic consulting firm whose services
where retained by Defendant Facebook in connection with the ConnectU action.
Plaintiff’s Memorandum at 2-4. The electronic assets at issue in the ConnectU action,
including the five computers, are subject to a protective order (“the ConnectU protective
order”) issued in that action, permitting Parmet to create forensic copies of the
electronic assets, and requiring the copies to be destroyed when the ConnectU litigation
is complete. Id.
Plaintiff maintains that although the forensic copies of the five computers have,
in connection with the ConnectU action, been searched for evidence of computer code
related to the plaintiffs’ claims in that action, the forensic copies have never been
searched for other information, including evidence of electronic communications such
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as email. Plaintiff’s Memorandum at 2. Moreover, Plaintiff argued that because the
parties to the ConnectU action had reached a settlement, with only post-settlement
motions pending before the court that could be ruled upon at any time and, if denied,
would trigger the ConnectU protective order’s provision requiring the destruction of the
forensic copies, the forensic copies of the five computers were “in danger of imminent
destruction. . . .” Id. at 3. One of the law firms listed as counsel of record and
representing Defendants in this action, Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe, LLP (“the Orrick
law firm”), is also counsel of record for the defendants in the ConnectU action.
Attached as exhibits to Plaintiff’s Memorandum are copies of emails dated August 5,
2011, from Monte Cooper, Esq. (“Cooper”), of counsel to the Orrick law firm, to other
counsel of record in the ConnectU action seeking confirmation that the forensic copies
of the five computers were destroyed or returned to the original owners by August 12,
2011 in accordance with the ConnectU protective order. Plaintiff’s Exhs. E and F.
By letter to the undersigned filed December 1, 2011 (Doc. No. 246), Plaintiff
withdrew his request for a TRO, but not his request that Defendants be sanctioned for
fraud based on Mr. Snyder’s assertion that he was unaware that the Orrick law firm was
actively seeking to have the forensic copies of the five computers destroyed pursuant to
the ConnectU protective order.
On December 21, 2011, Defendants filed Defendants’ Memorandum in
Opposition to Ceglia’s Motion for Sanctions Against Defendants and Defense Counsel
(Doc. No. 276) (Defendants’ Response”), and the Declaration of Alexander H.
Southwell, Esq. (Doc. No. 277) (“Southwell Declaration”), with attached exhibit A
(“Defendants’ Exh. A”). According to Defendants, although the self-executing provision
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of the ConnectU protective order calls for the destruction of Parmet’s forensic copies of
the five computers upon completion of the ConnectU case, the original electronic
materials, including the five computers, are not also required to be destroyed and, in
fact, have been preserved since the commencement of the instant action. Defendants’
Response at 2-3. Defendants have also represented that all copies of the electronic
data relating to the five computers have been returned to their respective owners and
have not been destroyed. Id. at 3. Defendants further maintain that in the instant
action, Defendants have yet been required to produce only emails Zuckerberg sent
from the Harvard server, but have not been required to identify and disclose the five
computers to Plaintiff. Id. at 4. According to Defendants, Plaintiff misrepresents the
scope of the search conducted by Defendants’ forensic expert Bryan Rose (“Rose”) of
Stroz Friedberg, given that although Rose searched Zuckerberg’s Harvard email
account, Rose made no representations about having searched “other electronic
communications records” or conducting a “full search of Mr. Zuckerberg’s electronic
assets . . . .,” id. at 4-5, as Plaintiff claims. As such, Defendants cannot be faulted for
failing to disclose the five computers. Id. at 5. Finally, Defendants maintain that,
contrary to Plaintiff’s assertion, Defendants’ attorneys from the Orrick law firm did not
actively seek the destruction of the forensic copies of the five compuers but, rather,
merely reminded all counsel involved in the ConnectU action of their obligation under
the self-executing provision of the ConnectU protective order to destroy copies of
confidential information within their possession upon the conclusion of the ConnectU
litigation and that such copies have not been destroyed pending the instant motion. Id.
at 5-6. As such, Defendants urge the court to deny Plaintiff’s request for sanctions. Id.
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at 6
On December 30, 2011, Plaintiff filed his Reply to Defendants’ Response in
Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions for Fraud (Doc. No. 279) (“Plaintiff’s
Reply”), the Declaration of Paul Argentieri, Esq. (Doc. No. 280) (“Argentieri
Declaration”), and the Declaration of Dean Bolond, Esq. (Doc. No. 281) (“Boland Reply
Declaration”). Plaintiff characterizes Defendants’ opposition to Plaintiff’s motion as a
“fraud on the court. . . ” upon which Defendants have obtained a court order. Plaintiff’s
Reply at 1. According to Plaintiff, once Defendants made any argument that depended
on any undisclosed electronic assets, including the five computers and their forensic
copies made by Parmet, Defendants’ duty to disclose such electronic assets was
triggered. Id. Plaintiff further asserts that because Defendants’ contention that the
emails on which Plaintiff relies as establishing the authenticity of the contract are
fraudulent is based on a comparison of emails exchanges that are attached to the
Amended Complaint with the Harvard emails, Defendants were required to disclose the
five computers. Id. at 1-2. Plaintiff maintains that the five computers should have
been disclosed because they may contain email instant messages, unpublished blog
posts, or contemporaneous notes by Zuckerberg or any other person involved in the
early development stages of Facebook that could defeat Defendants’ “fake contract”
claim. Id. at 3. Plaintiff further argues that Defendants’ failure to disclose the five
computers and their forensic copies was intended to convince the court to issue the
expedited discovery order on July 1, 2011 (Doc. No. 83), which did not require
Defendants to disclose the five computers and the copies. Id. at 3-4. Accordingly,
Plaintiff seeks to have Defendants sanctioned for perpetuating a fraud on the court. Id.
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at 8-9.
“It is well settled that district courts enjoy wide discretion in sanctioning litigants
appearing before them.” Novak v. Wolpoff & Abramson, LLP, 536 F.3d 175, 177 (2d
Cir. 2008) (citing Design Strategy, Inc. v. Davis, 469 F.3d 284, 295 (2d Cir. 2006)). See
also Southern New England Telephone Company v. Global NAPs Inc., 624 F.3d 123,
143 (2d Cir. 2010) (reviewing for abuse of discretion district court’s imposition of
sanctions for failure to comply with court-ordered discovery). “Whether imposed
pursuant to Rule 37 or the court’s inherent power, a contempt order is . . . a ‘potent
weapon to which courts should not resort where there is a fair ground of doubt as to the
wrongfulness of the [contemnor’s] conduct.’” Southern New England Telephone Co.,
624 F.3d at 144-45 (quoting King v. Allied Vision Ltd., 65 F.3d 1051, 1058 (2d Cir.
1995)). A party may be sanctioned for civil contempt (1) for violating Fed.R.Civ.P. 11
(“Rule 11"); (2) for failing to comply with court-ordered discovery in violation of
Fed.R.Civ.P. 37 (“Rule 37"); (3) for failing to make initial disclosures as required under
Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(a) (“Rule 26(a)”); and (4) pursuant to the court’s inherent powers where
warranted by the unique circumstances of the case. None of these circumstances are
present here.
First, with regard to Rule 11, Plaintiff maintains that Mr. Snyder has repeatedly
assured the court that Stroz Friedberg has “comprehensively searched Defendant
Zuckerberg’s email and other electronic communications records,” Plaintiff’s
Memorandum at 13 (citing Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Motion
for Expedited Discovery (Doc. No. 45) (“Defendants’ Memorandum Supporting
Discovery”), and Declaration of Bryan J. Rose in Support of Defendants’ Motion for
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Expedited Discovery (Doc. No. 47) (“Rose Declaration Supporting Discovery”)), and that
Snyder, in papers filed in this action, “made assurances to the court about the full
search of Mr. Zuckerberg’s electronic asserts for email communications,” id., such that
Snyder’s failure to reveal the existence of the five computers and their forensic copies
establishes either Snyder, the Orrick law firm, Stroz Friedberg, or some combination of
the three, has perpetuated a fraud on the court. Id. at 12-15. According to Plaintiff,
Defendants engaged in fraud by making arguments in support of expedited discovery
that depended on a comparison of Plaintiff’s emails with Zuckerberg’s emails, despite
Defendants’ knowledge that the entirety of Zuckerberg’s electronic assets, specifically
date stored on the five computers, has not been searched. Id. at 15-17. Plaintiff further
asserts that Defendants, by actively seeking the destruction of relevant evidence, i.e.,
the five computers and their forensic copies, have further perpetuated a fraud on the
court. Id. at 17-18. Despite these assertions, Plaintiff fails to point to any paper
Defendants have presented to the court, either by signing, filing, submitting, or later
advocating, in violation of Rule 11(b), so as to warrant sanctions pursuant to Rule 11(c).
In particular, Plaintiff has misrepresented Snyder’s assertions regarding the
scope of Defendants’ examination for relevant emails. The record establishes
Defendants have only represented to the court that Defendants, through Stroz
Friedberg, have searched Zuckerberg’s Harvard email account, but have never claimed
to have searched, contrary to Plaintiff’s assertion, “‘other electronic records’” nor
“conducted a ‘full search of Mr. Zuckerberg’s electronic assets for email
communications.’” Defendants’ Response at 4-5 (quoting Plaintiff’s Memorandum at
13). Defendants further explain that the forensic examination of Zuckerberg’s Harvard
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email account was conducted by Rose and, based on the allegations of the Amended
Complaint, limited to the emails purportedly exchanged between Plaintiff and
Zuckerberg while Zuckerberg was a Harvard student, the purported emails were not
found anywhere on Zuckerberg’s Harvard email account, and Defendants have never
made any statements to the court to the contrary. Id. at 5. Defendants argue that
Plaintiff’s assertion that Defendants have “actively sought” the destruction of the
forensic copies made by Parmet of the five computers is based on emails written by
Cooper to all counsel of record in the ConnectU action that merely reminds counsel of
their obligations under the self-executing provision of the ConnectU protective order to
destroy, upon conclusion of the ConnectU litigation, all copies of confidential
information, including copies of electronic materials, but that neither Cooper nor
Defendants have ever sought destruction of the original electronic materials. Id. at 5-6.
Finally, Defendants point out that although Cooper did email all counsel of record in the
ConnectU action, Cooper also requested that copies of electronic materials subject to
the ConnectU protective order be returned to their original owners, rather than be
destroyed. Id. at 6.
A plain review of the documents on which Plaintiff relies in support of his
argument that Defendants have perpetrated a fraud on the court by filing papers that
falsely state Defendants have reviewed all of Zuckerberg’s electronic assets, yet failed
to disclose the existence of the five computers or their forensic copies demonstrates, as
Defendants maintain, that Defendants never made such representations. Rather,
Defendants merely stated that Zuckerberg’s Harvard email account had been examined
by Stroz Friedberg for the emails which Plaintiff maintains he exchanged with
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Zuckerberg in connection with the putative contract by which Zuckerberg allegedly gave
Plaintiff a one-half ownership interest in Facebook in return for Plaintiff’s assistance
with the development of Facebook. See, e.g., Defendants’ Memorandum Supporting
Discovery at 10-13 (explaining that the emails to which Plaintiff refers as establishing
the contract’s authenticity are forgeries given that Stroz Friedberg’s forensic
examination of Zuckerberg’s Harvard email account recovered more than 175 emails
exchanged between Zuckerberg and Plaintiff (or another person affiliated with
StreetFax) from 2003 to 2004, but no mention of Facebook); and Rose Declaration
Supporting Discovery ¶¶ 4-8 and exhibits D-F (stating that Stroz Friedberg, in
connection with the ConnectU action, preserved the contents of a Harvard University
email account assigned to and used by Zuckerberg, as the account resided on
Harvard’s server in April 2011, while Harvard provided Stroz Friedberg with a copy of
Zuckerberg’s Harvard emial account as it resided on Harvard’s server in October 2010
(collectively, “the Harvard email data”), and that the Harvard email data was searched
by Stroz Friedberg for any email communications relevant to the instant case, but that
the three email exchanges between Plaintiff and Zuckerberg found did not mention
Facebook). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s assertion that Defendants’ counsel have
perpetuated a fraud on the court to obtain discovery orders favorable to Defendants are
without merit.
Nor does the record support Plaintiff’s assertion that Defendants’ attorneys,
particularly Mr. Cooper, have actively sought the destruction of relevant and
discoverable evidence, including the forensic copies of the five computers. Rather, as
Defendants’ explain, Mr. Cooper was only reminding all counsel of record in the
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ConnectU action of their responsibilities pursuant to the self-executing provision of the
ConnectU protective order to destroy the copies of the five computers after the
ConnectU litigation had concluded. Defendants’ Response at 5-6. The ConnectU
protective order, however, did not require destruction of the actual, original five
computers, which Defendants maintain are preserved, and Mr. Cooper also proposed
that rather than destroying the forensic copies, the attorneys with such copies in their
possession could choose to return the copies to the original owners of the information.
Id. at 6. As such, the record fails to support Plaintiff’s assertion that Cooper directed
the destruction of relevant and discoverable evidence. There is thus no basis for
sanctioning Defendants under Rule 11, and the court next considers whether the record
supports sanctioning Defendants under Rule 37.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(b) provides a non-exclusive list of sanctions that the court may,
in its discretion, impose on a party who “fails to obey an order to provide or permit
discovery . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2). As such, the plain language of Rule 37(b)
requires that a court order be in effect before sanctions are imposed. Daval Steel
Products v. M/V Fakredine, 951 F.2d 1357, 1363 (2d Cir. 1991) (“Provided that there is
a clearly articulated order of the court requiring specified discovery, the district court
has the authority to impose Rule 37(b) sanctions for noncompliance with that order.”
(citing Salahuddin v. Harris, 782 F.2d 1127, 1131 (2d Cir. 1986))). See also Buffalo
Carpenters Pension Fund v. CKG Ceiling and Partition Company, 192 F.R.D. 95, 97-98
(W.D.N.Y. 2000) (observing that “Rule 37(b)(2) only enables the court to sanction a
party for failure ‘to obey an order to provide or permit discovery . . . .’” (quoting Fed. R.
Civ. P. 37(b)(2))). Here, Plaintiff does not argue, and a thorough review of the docket
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fails to establish, that Defendants’ failure to produce the forensic copies of the five
computers was in violation of any court order. Rather, the July 1, 2011 Order directs
Defendants to produce only emails between Plaintiff, Zuckerberg, and others
associated with StreetFax, captured from Zuckerberg’s Harvard email account. July 1,
2011 Order at 2-3.2 As such, there is no basis for holding Defendants in contempt of
court under Rule 37 for violating a court order. Southern New England Telephone Co.,
624 F.3d at 145.
Nor has Defendants’ failure to disclose the five computers run afoul of any initial
disclosure required under Rule 26(a). Rather, Rule 26(a) provides that discovery that
would otherwise be required as an initial disclosure may be exempted by court order.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(a)(1)(A). Here, the July 1, 2011 Order specifically limited discovery in
this action to the categories listed therein, none of which are broad enough to include
the five computers. Moreover, because no scheduling conference pursuant to Rule
16(b) has yet been scheduled, Defendants have also been exempted from participating
in any discovery conference under Rule 16(f). Thus, even assuming Defendants could
have been expected to reference the five computers in complying with Rule
26(a)(1)(A)(ii), including disclosure of “electronically stored information, and tangible
things” potentially supportive of the disclosing party’s defense, such disclosure
obligations have not yet attached to Defendants (or Plaintiff) in this case.
Finally, district courts have the inherent authority to find a party in contempt for
2
The court notes that the published articles attached as exhibits to Plaintiff’s papers suggest that
Zuckerberg did not m ake the acquaintance of the plaintiffs in the ConnectU case until Novem ber 2003.
Accordingly, if there was any truth to the ConnectU plaintiffs’ allegations that Zuckerberg stole their idea
for Facebook, such fact is inconsistent with Plaintiff’s assertion in this case that Zuckerberg shared his
idea for Facebook with Plaintiff on April 28, 2003, when the putative contract was executed.
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bad faith conduct in violating an order of the court. Southern New England Telephone
Co., 624 F.3d at 144. The court also has inherent power “to impose contempt
sanctions upon attorneys while those attorneys are engaged in matters intended to
further the interests of their client,” upon a finding of bad faith on the part of the
attorney. In re Pennie & Edmonds LLP, 323 F.3d 86, 90 (2d Cir. 2003). Nevertheless,
Plaintiff fails to point to, and the court’s review of this action does not disclose, any bad
faith conduct by Defendants’ attorneys, a violation of any court order, or any other
circumstances supporting sanctioning Defendants pursuant to this court’s inherent
powers.
In sum, based on this court’s review of the record, Plaintiff has failed to
demonstrate Defendants are guilty of any wrongdoing warranting sanctions with regard
to the five computers. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion for sanctions (Doc. No. 231), is
DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Leslie G. Foschio
LESLIE G. FOSCHIO
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
DATED:
January 10, 2012
Buffalo, New York
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