Steuben Foods, Inc. v. Oystar USA, Inc.
DECISION AND ORDER DENYING the Oystar Defendants' 24 Motion to Dismiss; DENYING the GTP Defendants' 37 Motion to Dismiss; GRANTING Plaintiff Leave to Amend its Complaint and submit a Second Amended Complaint by 5/31/2012. ADVISING Plaintiff that if a Second Amended Complaint is not filed by 5/31/2012, Hamba USA, Inc. and Aseptic Innovation, Inc. will be dismissed as defendants. Signed by William M. Skretny, Chief Judge U.S.D.C. on 5/18/2012. (MEAL)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
STEUBEN FOODS, INC.,
DECISION AND ORDER
OYSTAR USA, INC., et al.
Plaintiff, Steuben Foods, Inc. (“Steuben), brings this patent infringement action
against eight related defendants.1 Two groups of defendants each presently move for
dismissal. (Docket Nos. 24, 37.) The first group consists of Oystar Group, Oystar North
America-Edison, Inc. (“Oystar N.A.”), Oystar USA, Inc., Oystar Hamba, and Hamba Filltec.
The second group is comprised of Hamba USA, Inc., Aseptic Innovation, Inc., and GTP
Companies, Ltd. (“GTP”).2 For the following reasons, each of the motions to dismiss are
Steuben alleges that Defendants violated six patents pertaining to the equipment
and processes for the aseptic bottling and packaging of consumable food and drink
products. Steuben contends that each of these defendants are potentially liable due to
The precise nature of their relationship is disputed and relevant to this Decision and Order. It is
discussed further below.
This Court will hereafter refer to the first group collectively as the “Oystar Group Defendants” and the
second group as the “GTP Defendants.”
some association with Oystar Group. Steuben alleges that despite their separate identities,
each company is owned by, controlled by, a subsidiary of, identical to, or doing business
as Oystar Group, their alleged parent, which is headquartered in Stutensee, Germany.
(Am. Compl., ¶¶ 44-79; Docket No. 23.)
Steuben asserts that Defendants conduct business in New York and have engaged
in actual, induced, and contributory infringement. It further asserts that it sent written notice
to Oystar USA, Inc. on November 18, 2008, notifying Defendants about the existence of
its patents. (Id., ¶ 104.) Defendants allegedly never acknowledged receipt of that notice.
(Id., ¶ 105)
Steuben filed a complaint in this Court on September 29, 2010. (Docket No. 1.) With
leave, on August 30, 2011, it later filed an amended complaint naming each of the present
defendants. (Docket No. 23.) Shortly thereafter, on September 27, 2011, the Oystar
Defendants moved for dismissal of the complaint. (Docket No. 24.) On December 2, 2011,
the GTP Defendants followed suit. (Docket No. 37.) Briefing concluded on these motions
on January 11, 2012, at which time this Court took the motions under consideration without
a hearing on the issue of personal jurisdiction.
Oystar Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
The Oystar Defendants argue that this Court cannot exercise personal jurisdiction
over them and that Steuben has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Each argument will be discussed below.
A United States district court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant
if the defendant “is subject to the jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction in the state
where the district court is located.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A); Spiegel v. Schulmann, 604
F.3d 72, 76 (2d Cir.2010). Jurisdiction conferred by the state, however, is constrained by
the Due Process Clause, which “gives a degree of predictability to the legal system that
allows potential defendants to structure their primary conduct with some minimum
assurance as to where that conduct will and will not render them liable to suit.” See
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297, 100 S. Ct. 559, 567, 62
L. Ed. 2d 490 (1980); see also Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, --- U.S.
----, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851-52 180 L. Ed. 2d 796 (2011) (“A state court's assertion of
jurisdiction exposes defendants to the State's coercive power, and is therefore subject to
review for compatibility with the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.”). Thus,
this Court can exercise jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant provided that it is
permitted by both New York State's statutes and the strictures of due process. See Burger
King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 473, 105 S. Ct. 2174, 85 L. Ed. 2d 528 (1985).4
Further, there are two types of personal jurisdiction: general and specific. Licci ex
The parties both agree that Federal Circuit law applies to these m otions. But they are m istaken as
to statutory long-arm jurisdiction. The Federal Circuit has explicitly found that “in interpreting the m eaning of
state long-arm statutes, we elect to defer to the interpretations of the relevant state and federal courts.”
G raphic Controls Corp. v. Utah Med. Prods., Inc., 149 F.3d 1382, 1386 (Fed. Cir. 1998). By contrast,
regarding com portm ent with the Due Process Clause, they are correct. See id. (“W ith regard to the federal
constitutional due process analysis of the defendant's contacts with the forum state in patent cases, we do
not defer to the interpretations of other federal and state courts”); Touchcom , Inc. v. Bereskin & Parr, 574 F.3d
1403, 1410 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (explaining the distinction). The parties’ confusion, however, has little bearing on
this case, as they both predom inantly cite New York and Second Circuit law in their respective discussions
of New York’s long-arm statute.
Steuben does not argue that personal jurisdiction would be proper under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2).
rel. Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL, 673 F.3d 50, 60 n.9 (2d Cir. 2012). “General
jurisdiction is authorized where the defendant's ‘affiliations with the State are so
‘continuous and systematic’ as to render it essentially at home in the forum State.’” Id.
(quoting Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2851). Such jurisdiction in permitted in New York under
N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 301. Id. “‘Specific jurisdiction,’ however, ‘depends on an affiliation between
the forum and the underlying controversy, principally, activity or an occurrence that takes
place in the forum State and is therefore subject to the State's regulation.’” Id. (quoting
Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2851). Jurisdiction of this type is permitted in New York under N.Y.
C.P.L.R. § 302(a). Id.
At this stage of the proceedings, “[b]ecause the parties have not conducted
discovery, the plaintiff need only to make a prima facie showing that the defendants [are]
subject to personal jurisdiction.” Silent Drive, Inc. v. Strong Indus., Inc., 326 F.3d 1194,
1201 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “As such, the
pleadings and affidavits are to be construed . . . in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.”
Id. The Second Circuit’s standard is identical: A plaintiff may carry his burden by “pleading
in good faith legally sufficient allegations of jurisdiction, i.e., by making a prima facie
showing of jurisdiction.” Whitaker v. Am. Telecasting, Inc., 261 F.3d 196, 208 (2nd Cir.
2001) (internal citations, quotations marks, and modifications omitted). Particularly
significant here, “[a] plaintiff can make this showing through his own affidavits and
supporting materials, containing an averment of facts that, if credited, would suffice to
establish jurisdiction over the defendant.” Id. Where, as here, “the issue is addressed on
affidavits, all allegations are construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and doubts
are resolved in the plaintiff's favor.” Id.
The parties do not dispute that N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a), New York’s long-arm statute,
comports with due process. See Pieczenik v. Dyax Corp., 265 F.3d 1329, 1333 (Fed. Cir.
2001). Therefore, if New York would allow this Court to exercise jurisdiction over
Defendants, the Oystar Defendants’ motion regarding personal jurisdiction must be denied.
In pertinent part, N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a) reads:
As to a cause of action arising from any of the acts
enumerated in this section, a court may exercise personal
jurisdiction over any non-domiciliary, or his executor or
administrator, who in person or through an agent:
1. transacts any business within the state or contracts
anywhere to supply goods or services in the state; or
2. commits a tortious act within the state.
For a court to assert jurisdiction over a defendant under section 302(a)(1), the
plaintiff must satisfy two requirements: the defendant must (1) “transact business” in New
York and (2) the plaintiff's cause of action must arise from the business transaction. Best
Van Lines, Inc. v. Walker, 490 F.3d 239, 246 (2d Cir. 2007). “The second requirement, the
so-called nexus test, is interpreted very narrowly by the New York courts. A single business
transaction is sufficient to satisfy the nexus test under section 302(a)(1), but the cause of
action must arise from the transaction of business in New York.” Id. (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted).
Considering the procedural posture of this case, this Court finds that Steuben has
satisfied its burden.
Steuben offers an affidavit and submits documentation that Defendant Hamba
Filltec offered to sell Steuben an allegedly infringing product – the Hamba Flexline Filler
– in 2005. (Taggart Aff., ¶ 13; “Ex. G” of Taggart Aff.; Docket Nos. 34-1, 34-8.) If credited,
this alone would be sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction under N.Y. C.P.L.R. §
302(a)(1) because it demonstrates that the Oystar Defendants have a financial interest in
a New York company purchasing its product, and “that it has taken actions in New York
with an eye toward promoting the sale of its [infringing product]”. See Gleason Works v.
Klingelnberg-Oerlikon Geartec Vertriebs-GmbH, 58 F. Supp. 2d 47, 51-52 (W.D.N.Y.
1999); see also Best Van Lines, 490 F.3d at 246. Furthermore, it would establish
jurisdiction under § 302(a)(2). See Id. (“The offer for sale of one copy of an infringing work
in New York, even if the offer results in no sale, ‘constitutes commission of a tortious act
within the state sufficient to imbue this Court with personal jurisdiction over the infringers
. . . ”); Houbigant, Inc. v. ACB Mercantile, Inc., 914 F. Supp. 964, 979-80 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)
(collecting cases in the copyright context finding that a single offer of a copy of an infringing
work for sale in New York, even absent an actual sale, satisfies N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302).
Relying primarily on Ricoh Co., Ltd. v. Asustek Computer, Inc., 481 F. Supp. 2d 954,
959-60 (W.D. Wis. 2007), the Oystar Defendants argue that this offer of sale was solicited
by Steuben and, as a result, it cannot use the offer as basis for jurisdiction.5 Putting aside
the lack of controlling legal authority, this Court must resolve doubts in Steuben’s favor and
look to its “averment of facts, which if credited, would suffice to establish jurisdiction.”
Whitaker, 261 F.3d at 208. Under this liberal standard, Steuben’s averment that
The Oystar Defendants reliance on M. Shanken Com m unications, Inc. v. Variant Events, LLC, No.
10 Civ. 4747 (CM), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108923, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 2010) is m isguided, if not
m isleading. The court there found sim ply that sending generic em ails and flyers to New York com panies did
not am ount to the conduct of business in New York. Acts like these are quite distinct from this case, where,
via proposed written agreem ent, the Oystar Defendants directly offered to sell Steuben an allegedly infringing
Defendants’ offered to sell it an infringing product satisfies its burden.
Further, Oystar N.A. does not contest jurisdiction, and Steuben alleges that the
remaining companies are interchangeable. It supports this charge by noting that it has
received communications from the Oystar Defendants with various letterheads, including
“Oystar Hamba” (Taggart Aff., ¶ 29) and “Oystar USA” (Taggart Aff., ¶ 32), and as noted,
Hamba Filltec, alleged to be intertwined with Oystar Group, offered to sell it a product. This
confusion about the Oystar Defendants’ corporate structure, which seems to have been
generated in part by Defendants’ division of company entities and which generally goes
without clarification by them, coupled with Steuben’s allegation that the companies are
interchangeable, is sufficient at this point to allow discovery to proceed. See, e.g., Elecs.
for Imaging, Inc., v. Coyle, 340 F.3d 1344, 1349 n. 2 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (discussing personal
jurisdiction and finding that “[b]ecause [plaintiff] alleges that [defendant] does business
[under a different name], all contacts made by [defendant] are also attributable to [the other
corporate entity]”). No Oystar Defendants will be dismissed at this time, but leave is
granted to bring a later motion challenging personal jurisdiction when more facts are before
Failure to State a Claim
The Oystar Defendants also argue that they should be dismissed because they did
not violate the patents in question. But federal pleading standards are generally not
stringent: Rule 8 requires only a short and plain statement of a claim. Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(a)(2). When determining whether a complaint states a claim, the court must construe it
liberally, accept all factual allegations as true, and draw all reasonable inferences in the
plaintiff's favor. ATSI Commc'ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 98 (2d Cir. 2007).
Steuben has alleged that the Oystar Defendants have violated the patents by
“manufacturing, making, using, selling, offering to sell, importing, and/or distributing
products, including . . . aseptic filling machines . . . and the Flexline Filler. (Am. Compl. ¶
101.) Whether the Oystar Defendants have or have not violated Steuben’s patents is a
factual determination, inappropriate on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. It is thus denied.
GTP Defendants’ Motion
The GTP Defendants argue that (1) Hamba USA, Inc. and Aseptic Innovation, Inc.
do not exist and therefore cannot be sued and (2) GTP did not violate the patents in
As initial matter, the argument concerning GTP can be summarily dismissed for the
same reasons as discussed above. This Court declines any suggestion to convert the GTP
Defendants’ motion into one for summary judgment. See Friedl v. City of New York, 210
F.3d 79, 83 (2d Cir. 2000) (when presented with additional material on a motion to dismiss,
the district court can either exclude it or convert the motion).
Regarding Hamba USA, Inc. and Aseptic Innovation, Inc., it appears that both
Steuben and Defendants agree that these entities serve as trade names for the legal
entity, GTP. As such, Steuben will be permitted leave to amend its complaint to reflect this
fact. Otherwise, those parties will be dismissed.
For the reasons discussed above, Defendants’ motions are denied.
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED, that the Oystar Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Docket
No. 24) is DENIED.
FURTHER, that the GTP Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is (Docket No. 37) is
FURTHER, that Plaintiff is GRANTED Leave to Amend its Complaint and submit a
Second Amended Complaint. If it chooses to so file, it must do so by May 31, 2012. If not
filed, this Court will dismiss Hamba USA, Inc. and Aseptic Innovation, Inc. at that time.
May 18, 2012
Buffalo, New York
/s/William M. Skretny
WILLIAM M. SKRETNY
United States District Court
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?