Hardy v. Erie County Sheriff's Department
Filing
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DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING in part and DENYING in part Defendants' 16 Motion to Dismiss. Signed by William M. Skretny, Chief Judge U.S.D.C. on 5/17/2012. (MEAL)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
NINA M. HARDY,
Plaintiff,
v.
DECISION AND ORDER
10-CV-1011S
ERIE COUNTY, NEW YORK; SHERIFF
TIMOTHY B. HOWARD; POLICE OFFICER
“JOHN DOE,” INDIVIDUALLY,1
Defendants.
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Nina M. Hardy brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging
violations of the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Plaintiff’s claims arise out of
the alleged deprivation of her civil rights as a result of a one-hour detention by police
officers. Presently before this Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 16). For
the following reasons, Defendants’ motion is granted in part and denied in part.
II. BACKGROUND
A.
Facts
For purposes of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, this Court assumes the truth of the
following factual allegations. See Sharkey v. Quarantillo, 541 F.3d 75, 83 (2d Cir. 2008);
Hamilton Chapter of Alpha Delta Phi, Inc. v. Hamilton Coll., 128 F.3d 59, 63 (2d Cir. 1997).
On May 7, 2010 Plaintiff, an African-American woman, while on a lunch break,
entered the Best Buy store located at 4401 Transit Road, Williamsville, New York 14221.
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The actual caption on Plaintiff’s am ended com plaint reads: POLICE OFFICER “JONH DOE,
INDIVIDUALLY. This typographical error is corrected in Plaintiff’s later subm ission.
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(Am. Comp. ¶¶ 6, 14, Docket No. 15.) Plaintiff decided to purchase a camera and use a
pair of coupons to lower its cost. (Id. ¶¶ 15, 16.) Unable to finish the transaction in time
to return to her job, Plaintiff asked that the camera be held, along with the coupons, until
5:30 p.m., when she would return to complete the purchase. (Id. ¶ 17.)
Plaintiff returned to the Best Buy store at approximately 5:35 p.m., and approached
the register at which she had previously been assisted. (Id. ¶ 18.) Due to problems
processing her coupons, the sales representative asked the store manager for assistance.
(Id.) The manager did not immediately assist Plaintiff, but instead looked at her for a
period of time, during which two Erie County Sheriff’s deputies entered the store. (Id.)
Plaintiff completed her purchase, but, while exiting the store, was stopped by the deputies
who instructed her to accompany them. (Id. ¶ 19.) The deputies refused to answer
Plaintiff’s queries about what they wished to speak to her about. (Id.) Meanwhile, a crowd
of onlookers gathered. (Id. ¶ 20.)
The deputies then took Plaintiff into a side room inside the store. (Id.) There, she
was questioned for approximately one hour.
(Id.)
It was over the course of this
questioning that Plaintiff learned that there had been a theft in the shopping mall containing
the Best Buy store by an individual described by the deputies as a “black girl with blonde
hair.” (Id. ¶ 21.) The deputies accused Plaintiff of being that individual. (Id. ¶¶ 21, 22.)
At the time Plaintiff’s hair was almost black. (Id. ¶ 22.)
The deputies proceeded to search Plaintiff’s person. (Id. ¶ 24.) Thereafter, she was
released and informed that a detective would contact her later. (Id. ¶ 26.)
B.
Procedural History
Plaintiff commenced this action on December 16, 2010 by filing a complaint in the
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United States District Court for the Western District of New York. (Docket No. 1.) When
Defendants failed to respond, Plaintiff filed a request for entry of default. (Docket No. 3.)
Defendants thereafter filed a notice of appearance, but an entry of default was
nevertheless entered on February 1, 2011. (Docket No. 6.) This Court, on August 3, 2011,
issued a Decision and Order granting Defendants’ motion to set aside default and vacating
the entry of default. (Docket No. 10.) Defendants filed their first Motion to Dismiss on
August 24, 2011. (Docket No. 11.) Plaintiff responded by filing an amended complaint on
September 12, 2011 (Docket No. 15), which this Court took to moot Defendants’ motion
(Docket No. 22.) Defendants filed a second motion to dismiss on September 26, 2011.
(Docket No. 16.) Briefing on Defendants’ motion concluded on October 24, 2011, at which
time this Court took Defendants’ motion under advisement without oral argument.
III. DISCUSSION
A.
Motion to Dismiss Standard
Rule 12 (b)(6) allows dismissal of a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 (b)(6). Federal pleading standards are generally
not stringent: Rule 8 requires only a short and plain statement of a claim. Fed. R. Civ. P.
8 (a)(2). But the plain statement must “possess enough heft to show that the pleader is
entitled to relief.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1966, 167 L.
Ed. 2d 929 (2007).
When determining whether a complaint states a claim, the court must construe it
liberally, accept all factual allegations as true, and draw all reasonable inferences in the
plaintiff’s favor. ATSI Commc’ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 98 (2d Cir. 2007).
Legal conclusions, however, are not afforded the same presumption of truthfulness. See
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Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009) (“The
tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is
inapplicable to legal conclusions.”).
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct.
at 1945 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Labels, conclusions, or a “formulaic recitation
of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Facial
plausibility exists when the facts alleged allow for a reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct charged. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. The plausibility
standard is not, however, a probability requirement: the pleading must show, not merely
allege, that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. at 1950; Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 (a)(2). Wellpleaded allegations must nudge the claim “across the line from conceivable to plausible.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
Courts therefore use a two-pronged approach to examine the sufficiency of a
complaint, which includes “any documents that are either incorporated into the complaint
by reference or attached to the complaint as exhibits.” Blue Tree Hotels Inv. (Can.), Ltd.
v. Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc., 369 F.3d 212, 217 (2d Cir. 2004). This
examination is context specific and requires that the court draw on its judicial experience
and common sense. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950. First, statements that are not entitled to
the presumption of truth – such as conclusory allegations, labels, and legal conclusions –
are identified and stripped away. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950. Second, well-pleaded, nonconclusory factual allegations are presumed true and examined to determine whether they
“plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id.
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B.
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff brings her claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Civil liability under § 1983
is imposed only upon persons who, acting under color of state law, deprive an individual
of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. On its own, § 1983 does not provide a source of substantive rights, but rather, a
method for vindicating federal rights conferred elsewhere in the federal statutes and
Constitution. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 1870, 104
L. Ed. 2d 443 (1989) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145 n. 3, 99 S. Ct. 2689,
2695, 61 L. Ed. 2d 433 (1979)).
Plaintiff claims Defendants violated her Fourth
Amendment right to be free from unlawful seizure, as well as her Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights to due process of law, including the right to be free from unjustified and
excessive use of force.
1.
Erie County, New York
A municipality cannot be held liable on a theory of respondeat superior or simply
because it employs a tortfeasor. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 98 S. Ct.
2018, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1978). It may, however, be held liable for damages under § 1983
when execution of government policy or custom inflicts the injury in question. Id. The
existence of such a municipal policy or custom may be demonstrated in a number of ways,
including: (1) showing an officially promulgated and endorsed policy, Id. at 690; (2) showing
that actions taken by officials with final policymaking authority caused a constitutional
violation, Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480-81, 106 S. Ct. 1292, 89 L. Ed.
2d 452 (1986); (3) showing that municipal decision-making evidences “deliberate
indifference” to the rights of those with whom municipal employees come in contact,
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including failure to remedy an otherwise constitutional policy so deficient that policymakers
knew or should have known with a high degree of certainty that constitutional violations
could result, City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 819, 105 S. Ct. 2427, 85 L. Ed.
2d 791 (1985), or failure to train employees when training is necessary to prevent the
violation of federal rights, City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 109 S. Ct. 1197, 103 L.
Ed. 2d 412 (1989).
Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to allege that a municipal policy was
responsible for her injuries. This Court agrees.
Plaintiff’s complaint merely states that Sheriff Howard failed to “assure proper
training and supervision of the personnel, or to implement meaningful procedures to
discourage lawless official conduct” and against the County “as employer of the police
personnel.” (Am. Comp. ¶ 2.) Nothing further is alleged. Plaintiff neither identifies the
contours of the purported policy, nor identifies what types of conduct needed to be
protected against, or how the policies were to protect against them.
Merely alleging that Defendants failed to institute adequate procedures is not
enough to survive dismissal. Such a failure must first rise to the level of deliberate
indifference to be actionable. See Mislin v. City of Tonawanda Sch. Dist., No. 02-CV-273S,
2007 WL 952048, at *17 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2007) (citing Dwares v. City of New York, 985
F.2d 94, 100 (2d Cir. 1993)). Such deliberate indifference is present where a plaintiff
shows “(1) that a policy maker knows to a moral certainty that her employees will confront
a given situation; (2) that the situation either presents the employee with a difficult choice
of the sort that training or supervision will make less difficult or that there is a history of
employees mishandling the situation; and (3) that the wrong choice by the . . . employee
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will frequently cause the deprivation of a citizen’s constitutional rights.” Okin v. Vill. of
Cornwall-On-Hudson Police Dep’t, 577 F.3d 415, 440 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Walker v. City
of New York, 974 F.2d 293, 297-98 (2d Cir. 1992)) (quotation marks omitted).
This Court has no problem concluding that Plaintiff’s minimalist pleading fails to
identify facts satisfying this standard. See Fanelli v. Town of Harrison, 46 F. Supp. 2d 254,
259 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (“[B]oilerplate allegation that the [municipality] failed to train and
supervise its police officers . . . is insufficient to sustain the action.”). At best, Plaintiff has
identified a single incident of misconduct. This also is not enough to sustain a claim of
municipal liability. See Dwares, 985 F.2d at 100 (“A single incident alleged in a complaint,
especially if it involved only actors below the policymaking level, generally will not suffice
to raise an inference of the existence of a custom or policy.”).
2.
Sheriff Timothy B. Howard
“A claim asserted against an individual in his official capacity . . . is in effect a claim
against the governmental entity itself, rather than a suit against the individual personally,
for ‘official-capacity suits generally represent only another way of pleading an action
against an entity of which an officer is an agent.’” Lore v. City of Syracuse, 670 F.3d 127,
164 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 691 n. 55). Thus, to the extent Plaintiff
asserts a claim against Sheriff Howard in his official capacity, that claim will be dismissed.
See Odom v. Matteo, 772 F. Supp. 2d 377, 392 (D. Conn. 2011) (“Because an official
capacity claim against an official is tantamount to a claim against a governmental entity .
. . [where] a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim [is brought] against both a municipal entity and a
municipal official in his official capacity, the official capacity claim should be dismissed as
duplicative or redundant.”).
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Plaintiff argues, however, that, in addition to having established that the Sheriff’s
actions constituted part of a municipal policy or custom, an argument this Court has
already rejected, Sheriff Howard was also personally liable.
A supervisor may be held personally liable where he (1) “directly participated in the
infraction,” (2) “after learning of the violation through a report or appeal . . . failed to remedy
the wrong,” (3) “created a policy or custom under which unconstitutional practices occurred
or allowed such a policy or custom to continue,” or (4) “was grossly negligent in managing
subordinates who caused the unlawful condition or event.” Blyden v. Mancusi, 186 F.3d
252, 264 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Wright v. Smith, 21 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1994)); see
also Atkinson v. N.Y. State Olympic Reg’l Dev. Auth., 822 F. Supp. 2d 182 (N.D.N.Y.
2011).
Here, there is no indication that Sheriff Howard was personally involved in the
incident in question. See Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d
107, 122 (2d Cir. 2004) (“[I]n this Circuit personal involvement of defendants in alleged
constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under § 1983.”).
Further, no facts are pled that Sheriff Howard was made aware of the incident and failed
to take remedial steps. This Court has already observed that Plaintiff’s amended complaint
fails to identify a custom or practice. Finally, none of the alleged facts create an inference
that Sheriff Howard was grossly negligent in managing the two deputies involved in this
action.
3.
Police Officer John Does2
Defendants, in their Motion to Dismiss, do not, at this stage, dispute that Plaintiff
2
Although the caption only identifies a single police officer, the factual allegations m ake clear that
Plaintiff’s claim is really against the two deputies who questioned her for approxim ately one hour.
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may, at least, have a § 1983 claim against the two deputies who were personally involved
in the underlying incident. Defendants argue, instead, that Plaintiff’s claim for punitive
damages must be dismissed. Plaintiff does not dispute that punitive damages would not
be available against any of the defendants in their official capacities, but reaffirms that she
is also bringing suit against them in their individual capacities.
“Punitive damages are available in a § 1983 action ‘when the defendant’s conduct
is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous
indifference to the federally protected rights of others.’” Wilson v. Aquino, 233 F. App’x 73,
77 (2d Cir. 2007) (summary order) (quoting Lee v. Edwards, 101 F.3d 805, 808 (2d Cir.
1996)). Municipalities, however, are immune from punitive damages awards under § 1983.
Ace Partners, LLC v. Town of East Hartford, No. 3:09-CV-1282 (RNC), 2011 WL 4572109,
at *7 (D. Conn. Sept, 30, 2011) (citing City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247,
271, 101 S. Ct. 2748, 69 L. Ed. 2d 616 (1981)). As already discussed, claims against the
Defendants in their official capacities are really brought against the municipality, and thus
Plaintiff is precluded from seeking punitive damages on such a claim. See Kentucky v.
Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 n. 13, 105 S. Ct. 3099, 87 L. Ed. 2d 114 (1985) (“[P]unitive
damages are not available under § 1983 from a municipality, but are available in a suit
against an official personally.”).
Defendants having only argued for dismissal of Plaintiff’s punitive damages claims
against them in their official capacities, this Court will not consider whether Plaintiff’s
punitive damages claims against Defendants in their personal capacities might also face
dismissal at this stage.
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IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is granted to the extent
it seeks dismissal of claims against Erie County and Sheriff Howard, as well as Plaintiff’s
punitive damages claim against any of the defendants in their official capacities.
Defendants’ motion is denied as to Plaintiff’s claims against the two John Doe police
officers, as well as to Plaintiff’s punitive damages claim against the two deputies in their
personal capacities.
V. ORDERS
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED, that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 16) is
GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
SO ORDERED.
Dated:
May 17, 2012
Buffalo, New York
/s/William M. Skretny
WILLIAM M. SKRETNY
Chief Judge
United States District Court
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