Myers v. Hon. Sara Sperrazza
Filing
11
DECISION AND ORDER granting Defendant's 5 MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction. The complaint is dismissed. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment for defendant. (Clerk to follow up.) Signed by Hon. John T. Curtin on 12/19/2012. (JEC)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
MICHAEL MYERS,
Plaintiff,
-vs-
11-CV-292(JTC)
HON. SARA SPERAZZA,
Defendant.
APPEARANCES:
MICHAEL MYERS, Plaintiff Pro Se.
HON. ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN, ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, (KIM S.
MURPHY, ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, OF
COUNSEL), Buffalo, New York, Attorneys for
Defendant.
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff brought this action pursuant to Title II of the Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12131, et seq. (“ADA”) and section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (“Section 504"). He seeks compensatory and punitive
damages for the alleged denial of accommodations for a hearing impairment during his
Sex Offender Registration Act (“SORA”) hearing. He also seeks a new SORA hearing.
Currently pending before the court is the defendant’s motion to dismiss (Item 5).
BACKGROUND and FACTS
Plaintiff commenced this action on April 4, 2011 with the filing of a pro se
complaint (Item 1). Specifically, plaintiff alleges that in 1996 he was sentenced on state
criminal charges of sexual abuse to a term of 7 1/3 to 21 years in prison (Item 1, ¶ 1).
In 2010, he was granted parole and was scheduled to appear at a SORA hearing in
Niagara County Court. Id., ¶¶ 5-6. Plaintiff alleges that, while in prison, he learned that
he was hearing impaired. Id., ¶ 2. Prior to his SORA hearing, plaintiff informed his
public defender that he would require certain accommodations such as “text display.”
Id., ¶ 7. The defendant, Judge Sara Farkas, f/k/a Sara Sperazza, postponed the
hearing and directed the Department of Correctional Services to provide a “TTY”
telephone. Id., ¶ 10. On June 30, 2010, plaintiff appeared for the hearing but was not
provided a TTY telephone. Id., ¶ 18. Judge Farkas conducted the hearing with the
sound amplified and directed plaintiff to stop her if he did not understand anything. Id.,
¶ 19. Plaintiff alleges that he “had a lot of trouble understanding” what was said at the
hearing and had to intervene several times. Id., ¶¶ 22-23. Plaintiff further alleges that
Judge Farkas “used a lot of false information” and determined that he was a Level 3
offender. Id., ¶¶ 24-25.
On March 28, 2012, plaintiff was granted permission to proceed in forma
pauperis (Item 3). In lieu of an answer, on June 12, 2012, defendant filed a motion to
dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) on the grounds of lack of
subject matter jurisdiction, sovereign immunity, absolute judicial immunity, and failure to
state a claim (Item 5). On July 20, 2012, the parties consented to the referral of this
matter to United States Magistrate Judge H. Kenneth Schroeder, Jr. pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 636 (c) for all further proceedings including the entry of judgment (Item 7).
Plaintiff was directed to file a response to the motion to dismiss on or before
August 31, 2012. To date, he has not filed a response to the motion. On November 16,
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2012, the case was transferred to the docket of the undersigned (Item 10). The court
has determined that oral argument is unnecessary. For the reasons that follow, the
defendant’s motion to dismiss is granted.
DISCUSSION
1. Standard of Review
The standards of review for a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction and under 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim are
“substantively identical.” Lerner v. Fleet Bank, N.A., 318 F.3d 113, 128 (2d. Cir. 2003).
Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a district court to dismiss a
case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction if the court “lacks the statutory or
constitutional power to adjudicate [the case].” Aurecchione v. Schoolman Transp. Sys.,
Inc., 426 F.3d 635, 638 (2d Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). It is well
established that, when opposing a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss, the plaintiff
asserting subject matter jurisdiction has the burden of proving that jurisdiction exists by
a preponderance of the evidence. Luckett v. Bure, 290 F.3d 493, 497 (2d Cir. 2002). In
contrast, “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss [under Rule 12(b)(6)], a complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation
marks omitted). In deciding both types of motions, the court must accept all factual
allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences from those
allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Holmes v. Grubman, 568 F.3d
329, 335 (2d Cir. 2009). While pro se complaints must contain sufficient factual
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allegations to meet the plausibility standard, see Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 71–72 (2d
Cir. 2009), the court should look for such allegations by reading pro se complaints with
“special solicitude” and by interpreting them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they
suggest.” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474–75 (2d Cir. 2006)
(per curiam) (emphasis omitted). Finally, the Second Circuit has held that “district
courts generally should not dismiss a pro se complaint without granting the plaintiff at
least one opportunity to amend.” DeBoe v. DuBois, 2012 WL 5908447, *1 (2d Cir.
November 27, 2012) (citing Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000)); see
also Branum v. Clark, 927 F.2d 698, 705 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that district courts
should not dismiss pro se complaints “without granting leave to amend at least once
when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be
stated”). Leave to amend is not necessary, however, when it would be futile. See
Cuoco, 222 F.3d at 112 (finding leave to replead would be futile when the complaint,
even when read liberally, did not “suggest[ ] that the plaintiff has a claim that she has
inadequately or inartfully pleaded and that she should therefore be given a chance to
reframe”).
2. Jurisdiction
Defendant argues that plaintiff’s case must be dismissed for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. Pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, “federal district courts
lack jurisdiction over suits that are, in substance, appeals from state-court judgments.”
Phillips ex rel. Green v. City of New York, 453 F.Supp.2d 690, 712 (S.D.N.Y.2006)
(internal quotation marks omitted); see generally Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S.
413, 414–15 (1923); D.C. Ct. of App. v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). The
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Rooker–Feldman doctrine applies if: (1) the federal court plaintiff lost in state court; (2)
the plaintiff's alleged injuries are caused by the state court judgment; (3) the plaintiff's
claims invite the district court to review and reject that state court judgment; and (4) the
state court judgment was rendered prior to the commencement of the district court
proceedings. Hoblock v. Albany Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 422 F.3d 77, 85 (2d Cir. 2005).
In this case, the plaintiff seeks a reversal of Judge Farkas’ decision after his
SORA hearing, in addition to money damages for the alleged denial of accommodations
at the hearing. He was the loser in the state court proceeding that was commenced
prior to the filing of this action. Plaintiff’s “injury,” the determination that he is a Level 3
offender, was the result of the state court proceeding, and he seeks vacatur of that
determination by this court. To the extent that plaintiff seeks review of a state court
determination, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars this claim in federal court. See
Montesano v. New York, 2006 WL 944285, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. April 12, 2006) (observing
that a “plaintiff cannot circumvent the appropriate state appellate process by bringing a
declaratory action, couched in terms of a civil rights violation, seeking federal review
and vacatur of adverse state-court decisions”). Plaintiff’s proper course of action was
an appeal of the SORA determination in the state court system, which may have been
pursued but is not apparent on the record in this case. In any event, this court has no
jurisdiction over plaintiff’s claim related to the state court decision after the SORA
hearing.
3. Absolute Judicial Immunity
To the extent that plaintiff seeks money damages for the actions of defendant
during the course of his SORA hearing, those claims are barred by the doctrine of
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absolute judicial immunity. It is well settled that judges are absolutely immune from suit
for any actions taken within the scope of their judicial responsibilities. See generally,
Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9 (1991). “[I]t is a general principle of the highest importance
to the proper administration of justice that a judicial officer, in exercising the authority
vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of
personal consequences to himself.” Id. at 10 (quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335,
347 (1871)). This immunity holds fast, even against allegations that a judge acted in
bad faith or with malice. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967).
In determining whether an act is “judicial,” thereby warranting absolute judicial
immunity, courts are instructed to take a “functional approach.” Bliven v. Hunt, 579 F.3d
204, 209 (2d Cir. 2009). Considering the nature of the act itself and the expectations of
the parties, the court must decide whether the conduct is a function “normally performed
by a judge” and whether the parties dealt with the judge in her judicial capacity. Stump
v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 362 (1978). In employing this functional analysis, courts
have generally concluded that acts arising out of, or related to, individual cases before
the judge are considered judicial in nature. See Bliven, 579 F.3d at 210.
Plaintiff alleges that Judge Farkas relied on false information in adjudicating him
to be a Level 3 offender and that she conducted the SORA hearing without the benefit
of an unspecified accommodation for his hearing impairment. According to the plaintiff,
Judge Farkas amplified the courtroom proceedings and instructed him to interrupt her if
he failed to understand anything that was said. Plaintiff’s allegations relate solely to the
involvement of Judge Farkas in the SORA hearing and fall within the course of her
judicial function. Accordingly, plaintiff’s claim for money damages pursuant to the ADA
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and Section 504 is barred by the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity. 1
CONCLUSION
Based on a liberal reading of the complaint, there is no indication that a valid
claim can be stated and the court has determined that leave to amend the complaint
would be futile. Accordingly, the defendant’s motion to dismiss (Item 5) is granted and
the complaint is dismissed. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment for defendant.
The court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this
order would not be taken in good faith and in forma pauperis status is denied for
purpose of an appeal. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444–45 (1962).
So Ordered.
_____\s\ John T. Curtin_______
HON. JOHN T. CURTIN.
United States District Judge
Dated: 12/19/2012
p:\pending\2011\11-292.nov1412
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As plaintiff’s claims must be dismissed pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and the
doctrine of absolute judicial immunity, the court need not address the defendant’s remaining arguments
regarding sovereign immunity and individual liability under the ADA and Section 504.
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