Edwards v. LaValley et al
Filing
16
DECISION AND ORDER denying petition for writ of habeas corpus and dismissing the petition. Signed by Hon. Michael A. Telesca on 5/9/12. (JMC)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
___________________________________
THOMAS EDWARDS, JR.,
DECISION AND ORDER
No. 11-CV-00331
Petitioner,
-vsTHOMAS LAVALLEY, SUPERINTENDENT
CLINTON CORRECTIONAL FACILITY
Respondent.
________________________________
I.
Introduction
Petitioner
Thomas
Edwards,
Jr.
(“Petitioner”),
through
counsel, has filed a timely petition for a writ of habeas corpus
under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging the constitutionality of his
custody pursuant to a judgment entered April 3, 2008, in New York
State, County Court, Erie County, convicting him, upon a plea of
guilty, of Criminal Possession of a Controlled Substance in the
First Degree (N.Y. Penal Law (“Penal Law”) § 220.21[1]) and Assault
in the Third Degree (Penal Law § 120.00[2]).
Petitioner was
sentenced to twelve years imprisonment and five years of postrelease supervision.
II.
Factual Background and Procedural History
A.
Introduction
Indictment No. 02188-2006 charged Petitioner with First Degree
Criminal
Possession
of
a
Controlled
-1-
Substance
(Penal
Law
§ 220.21[1]), Second Degree Assault (Penal Law § 120.05[3]), Second
Degree
Obstructing
Governmental
Administration
(Penal
Law
§ 195.05), Resisting Arrest (Penal § 205.30), and Unlawfully Tinted
Windows (Vehicle & Traffic Law § 375.12-a[b][2]).
The charges
arose from an incident that occurred on the evening of August 30,
2006 in Buffalo, New York, in which Petitioner was pulled over by
Buffalo police for driving a vehicle with excessively tinted
windows.
B.
Facts
Between 6:30 and 7:00 p.m. on August 30, 2006, Petitioner was
driving his 2003 GMC Suburban Yukon in Buffalo, New York.
At that
time, Erie County Sheriff’s Deputies Gregory McCarthy and Matthew
Noecker, narcotics officers on duty in Buffalo that evening, were
patrolling
in
an
unmarked
vehicle.
The
deputies
observed
Petitioner’s vehicle, which had heavily tinted front driver and
passenger side windows.
Deputy McCarthy activated his vehicle’s
emergency lights and siren, and Petitioner’s vehicle pulled to the
curb and stopped.
Record [“R.”] 42-45, 156.1
Deputy McCarthy
approached the driver side of the vehicle and Deputy Noecker
approached the passenger side.
Petitioner lowered his driver side
window and Deputy McCarthy requested Petitioner’s license and
1
In conjunction with its Response, Respondent has submitted a bound original
of the record on appeal. See Resp’t Ex. A. This record includes, inter alia,
the transcripts of the proceedings conducted before the Erie County Court.
Accordingly, the numbers following the denotation “R.” refer to the pages of the
record on appeal, rather than particular pages of the transcript.
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registration, which Petitioner handed to him.
At the same time,
Deputy McCarthy also noticed that Petitioner’s “right hand was
trembling . . . appeared to be trembling.”
R. 47.
Deputy Noecker
observed that Petitioner “appeared excessively nervous.”
R. 159.
Deputy McCarthy asked Petitioner where he was going, to which he
responded that he was on his way to his son’s football meeting and
that he had his son’s birth certificate inside the vehicle.
R. 47,
80. Petitioner then asked Deputy McCarthy why he had been stopped,
to
which
Deputy
MCarthy
responded
Petitioner’s tinted windows.
R. 48.
that
it
was
because
of
Deputy McCarthy explained
that he had an instrument in his vehicle that could gauge the
amount of tint, and that he was going to return to his vehicle to
retrieve that instrument.
Deputy McCarthy testified that he
“noticed that [Petitioner’s] chest was rising and falling at a
rapid pace, his right leg was bouncing at a constant pace, and he
appeared to [Deputy McCarthy] to be excessively nervous.”
Deputy
McCarthy walked back to his vehicle to retrieve the tint meter.
R. 47-48.
When Deputy McCarthy returned to Petitioner’s vehicle, he
explained to Petitioner how the tint meter worked.
Upon testing,
the windows on Petitioner’s vehicle were considerably darker than
permitted by law.
R. 48-49, 160.
Deputy McCarthy examined
Petitioner’s registration and noted that Petitioner’s license and
registration
were
listed
to
different
-3-
addresses.
He
asked
Petitioner where he lived and if he had been issued a summons
recently, to which Petitioner initially replied “no” but then
indicated that he had received a summons approximately three months
earlier.
R. 49-50.
Deputy McCarthy returned the tint meter back to his vehicle.
He and Deputy Noecker conferred with each other, both agreeing that
Petitioner appeared “excessively nervous.” R. 51. Deputy McCarthy
then returned to Petitioner’s vehicle, and observed Petitioner
rearranging business cards from his wallet.
Deputy McCarthy
observed a white substance on Petitioner’s right lower palm that,
based on his training and experience, had the same color, form, and
consistency of crack cocaine.
R. 51. Not “want[ing] to alarm
[Petitioner] or get him jerky” since the vehicle was still running
and Petitioner was behind the wheel, Deputy McCarthy questioned
Petitioner about his criminal history, asking if Petitioner had
previously been arrested for possession of cocaine or marijuana.
R. 52.
Petitioner denied a criminal history involving marijuana,
but admitted he had previously served time in prison for cocaine
possession.
Deputy McCarthy then walked away from Petitioner’s
vehicle and again conferred with Deputy Noecker.
told
Deputy
hands.”
the car.”
Noecker
“of
[his]
observations
of
Deputy McCarthy
[Petitioner’s]
The deputies agreed they would “get [Petitioner] out of
R. 53, 163.
-4-
The deputies returned to Petitioner’s vehicle a fourth and
final time and told Petitioner to get out of his vehicle.
164.
R. 54,
Petitioner asked if he was under arrest, to which Deputy
McCarthy responded that Petitioner was not and that he wished to
speak
with
Petitioner
about
his
license.
R.
54,
164-165.
Petitioner refused to leave his vehicle and rolled up his window,
which prevented the deputies to see him.
R. 54, 166.
Deputy
McCarthy pulled on the door, which was unlocked, and Petitioner
started to exit the vehicle.
R. 56.
Petitioner turned the engine
off, removed the keys from the ignition, and locked the doors using
the remote door lock on the ignition key.
R. 56, 166.
Deputy
McCarthy testified that “it looked like [Petitioner] was going to
throw the keys.”
R. 56-56a.
Deputy McCarthy asked Petitioner to
proceed to the back of the vehicle and asked Petitioner for his
keys.
Petitioner refused.
R. 56a. Fearing the keys could be used
as a weapon, the deputies asked Petitioner again for the keys.
R. 57, 167.
When Petitioner refused to surrender the keys, the
deputies attempted to physically remove them from Petitioner’s
“grip.”
R. 57, 167.
In doing so, the deputies braced Petitioner
against the vehicle in an attempt to place handcuffs on him.
A
struggle ensued. Deputy McCarthy told Petitioner that he was under
arrest and repeatedly ordered him to put his hands behind his back.
The three men fell to the ground a number of times during the
struggle.
R. 58, 167-168.
In the course of the struggle, Deputy
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McCarthy felt a “popping crunch in [his] left breast area.”
R. 59,
169.
Eventually, Deputy Noecker managed to place handcuffs on
Petitioner.
Deputy
McCarthy
searched
Petitioner,
removing
approximately $823 in cash “and a lot of crack cocaine crumbs.”
R. 60, 169.
Shortly thereafter, Detective Charlie Tirone arrived
at the scene and drove Deputy McCarthy to the hospital.
121.
R. 61-62,
Petitioner’s vehicle was impounded and cocaine was found
inside of it.2
C.
R. 170, 175, 187-188.
The Suppression Hearing Decision
Petitioner moved to suppress the physical evidence seized from
his vehicle and his person.
On July 19 and October 4, 2007, a
hearing was conducted in the Erie County Court before the Hon.
Sheila DiTullio, at which Deputies McCarthy and Noecker testified.
On January 7, 2008, the court handed down its decision, crediting
the testimony of Deputies McCarthy and Noecker and determining that
the stop of Petitioner’s vehicle, his arrest, and subsequent
searches of Petitioner and his vehicle were lawful.
denied Petitioner’s motion to suppress.
D.
The court
R. 189-195.
The Guilty Plea
On January 10, 2008, Petitioner appeared in Erie County Court
before the Hon. DiTullio and entered a plea of guilty to one count
2
A ticket for the tinted windows was not issued until after Petitioner’s
vehicle was searched. R. 175.
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of Criminal Possession of a Controlled Substance in the First
Degree and one count of Assault in the Third Degree.
reserved his right to appeal.
Petitioner
The court agreed to impose the
minimum possible sentence of twelve years imprisonment with a
period of five years post-release supervision.
E.
R. 199-204.
The Motion to Re-Open the Suppression Hearing
On or about March 21, 2008, Petitioner moved, pro se, to reopen the suppression hearing and sought reconsideration of the
court’s
decision,
constitutional
arguing
right
to
that
testify
he
on
had
his
been
own
denied
behalf
at
his
the
suppression hearing and that he had been denied his constitutional
right to offer expert testimony in his defense at the suppression
hearing.
R. 206-226.
After conducting oral arguments, the court
denied Petitioner’s motion.
F.
R. 264-272, 278-281.
Sentencing
On April 3, 2008, Petitioner was sentenced, as agreed, to
twelve years imprisonment followed by a five year period of postrelease supervision.
G.
R. 285.
Direct Appeal
Petitioner
appealed
his
judgment
of
conviction
to
the
Appellate Division, Fourth Department on the following grounds:
(1)
the
court
should
reverse
the
order
denying
Petitioner’s
suppression motion because Petitioner’s detention, pursuant to a
pre-textual traffic stop for tinted windows, was deliberately
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extended through multiple trips to and from Petitioner’s vehicle by
officers hoping to develop a speculative narcotics investigation;
(2) Petitioner was entitled to use reasonable force to resist an
unlawful arrest;
and (3) the lower court abused its discretion in
denying Petitioner’s motion to re-open the suppression hearing.
See Pet’r Br. on Appeal, Points I-III at Resp’t Ex. B.
On
August 28, 2009, the Appellate Division, Fourth Department reversed
the judgment of conviction, granted suppression, and dismissed the
indictment.
(Justices
People v. Edwards, 65 A.D.3d 829 (4th Dep’t 2009)
Scudder,
P.J.,
and
Peradotto,
J.,
dissenting).
Respondent applied for leave to appeal to the New York Court of
Appeals, which was granted on October 21, 2009.
See Resp’t Ex. C.
On February 16, 2010, the New York Court of Appeals unanimously
reversed the Appellate Division and reinstated the judgment of
conviction. People v. Edwards, 14 N.Y.3d 741 (2010). Petitioner’s
request for re-argument was denied on March 30, 2010.
People v.
Edwards, 14 N.Y.3d 794 (2010).
F.
The Habeas Corpus Petition
This habeas corpus petition followed, wherein Petitioner seeks
habeas relief on the following grounds: (1) the New York Court of
Appeals lacked jurisdiction to entertain Respondent’s appeal; and
(2) Petitioner’s conviction was obtained by use of evidence gained
pursuant to an unconstitutional arrest, search, and seizure.
Pet., Grounds One-Three (Dkt. No. 1); Reply (Dkt. No. 14).
-8-
See
Petitioner also requests that a writ of habeas corpus be
issued, or, alternatively, that an evidentiary hearing, pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2254(e), be ordered.
See Reply at 8, 39-47.
“A
district court has broad discretion to hear further evidence in
habeas cases.”
Nieblas v. Smith, 204 F.3d 29, 31 (2d Cir. 1999)
(citing Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 318 (1963)). “[W]here
specific allegations before the court show reason to believe that
the petitioner may, if the facts are fully developed, be able to
demonstrate that he is . . . entitled to relief, it is the duty of
the court to provide the necessary facilities and procedures for an
adequate inquiry.”
Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 908-09 (1997)
(quoting Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 300, 89 S. Ct. 1082, 22 L.
Ed.2d 281 (1969));
see also Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465,
474 (2007) (“In deciding whether to grant an evidentiary hearing,
a federal court must consider whether such a hearing could enable
an applicant to prove the petition’s factual allegations, which, if
true, would entitle the applicant to federal habeas relief.”).
As
discussed below, it is abundantly clear from the record before this
Court that Petitioner’s claims have no merit and that there are no
grounds for habeas relief.
Accordingly, Petitioner’s request for
an evidentiary hearing and habeas relief is denied and the petition
is dismissed.
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II.
The AEDPA Standard of Review
For federal constitutional claims adjudicated on the merits by
a state court, the deferential standard of review codified in the
Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) applies.
A habeas petitioner can only obtain habeas corpus relief by showing
that the state court decision was “contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” or was based
on “an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
evidence presented in the State court proceeding.”
28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d)(1)-(2).
III. Analysis of the Petition
1.
Ground One of the Petition is Not Cognizable
In ground one of the petition, Petitioner argues “that the
decision and order of the New York State Court of Appeals . . .
which purported to reverse the decision and order of the state
appellate division . . . is null and void and of no effect . . . .”
Reply at 3.3
In support of his argument, Petitioner states that
the Appellate Division’s decision reversing Petitioner’s conviction
involved a mixed question of law and fact and was therefore outside
the jurisdictional limit of the New York Court of Appeals insofar
as said court is jurisdictionally limited, pursuant to the New York
3
The pages of Petitioner’s Reply are misnumbered. Accordingly, the numbers
following “Reply” refer to the CM/ECF pagination.
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State constitution, to reviewing questions of law.
Ground One; Reply at 1-9.
See Pet.,
As discussed below, this claim provides
no basis for habeas relief.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) permits federal habeas corpus review only
where the petitioner has alleged that he is in custody in violation
of the Constitution or law and treaties of the United States.
See
generally, Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 68(1991) (A federal
habeas court “is limited to deciding whether a conviction violated
the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”).
Although
Petitioner
has
creatively
cast
this
claim
in
broad
constitutional terms arguing that the decision of the New York
Court of Appeals to entertain the People’s appeal effectively
“worked to deprive [him] of his State and Federal constitutional
right to due process and equal protection under the law,” the basis
of the claim is an alleged violation of the
New York State
constitution, namely § 3 of article VI of the New York State
constitution.
See Pet., Ground One; Reply at 2.
As such, this
claim presents no federal constitutional issue and is therefore not
cognizable by this Court on federal habeas review.
The claim is
dismissed.
2.
Grounds Two and Three are Meritless
In grounds two and three of the petition, Petitioner contends
that his conviction was obtained by use of evidence gained pursuant
to an unconstitutional arrest, search and seizure.
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Further, he
argues
that
there
was
an
“unconscionable”
in
the
litigation of his Fourth Amendment claim in the state courts.
See
Pet., Grounds Two-Three; Reply at 9-46.
breakdown
The New York Court of
Appeals rejected Petitioner’s Fourth Amendment claim on the merits
and, as such, the AEDPA applies. Under that standard, Petitioner’s
claim is meritless.
In Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), the Supreme Court
established that, “where the state has provided an opportunity for
full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, a state
prisoner may not be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the
ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or
seizure was introduced at his trial.”
Id. at 494;
Capellan v. Riley, 975 F.2d 67, 70 (2d Cir. 1992).
see also
Thus, a federal
court “ha[s] no authority to review the state record and grant the
writ simply because [it] disagree[s] with the result reached by the
state courts” on a Fourth Amendment issue. Gates v. Henderson, 568
F.2d 830, 840 (2d Cir. 1977);
see also Torres v. Irvin, 33 F.
Supp. 2d 257, 264 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (stating that “[a] petition for
a writ of habeas corpus must be dismissed where it seeks simply to
relitigate a Fourth Amendment claim”). Indeed, a federal court may
only
review
such
a
claim
where
“the
state
has
provided
no
corrective procedures at all” or where the state has provided a
corrective mechanism, but the defendant is precluded from using
that mechanism “because of an unconscionable breakdown in the
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underlying process.”
F.2d at 840);
Capellan, 975 F.2d at 70 (citing Gates, 568
Torres, 33 F. Supp. 2d at 264 (“[A] disruption or
obstruction of a state proceeding” or an instance of serious
judicial
or
prosecutorial
breakdown in process);
misconduct
may
constitute
such
a
see also Cappiello v. Hoke, 698 F. Supp.
1042, 1050 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (explaining that an “unconscionable
breakdown in the state’s process must be one that calls into
serious question whether a conviction is obtained pursuant to those
fundamental notions of due process that are at the heart of a
civilized society,” such as the bribing of a state court judge, the
government’s knowing use of perjured testimony, and the use of
torture to extract a guilty plea), aff’d, 852 F.2d 59 (2d Cir.
1988) (per curiam).
Here, Petitioner does not dispute that he had the opportunity
to
litigate
his
Fourth
Amendment
claim in the
state courts.
Indeed, the record reflects that Petitioner extensively litigated
his claim at all levels of the state court proceedings: at the
trial phase (via the suppression hearing and subsequent motion to
re-open the suppression hearing); on direct appeal (at which he
prevailed); and before the New York Court of Appeals (via his
opposition to Respondent’s leave application and in his submission
pursuant to Rule 500.11 addressing the basis of the Appellate
Division’s reversal).
See Resp’t Exs. A-D.
Petitioner argues,
however, “that an ‘unconscionable breakdown’ occurred in the trial
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and appellate courts’ litigation of his Fourth Amendment claim, in
that: (i) [t]he suppression court’s denial of Petitioner’s motion
to re-open the pre-trial suppression hearing . . . was an abuse of
discretion of constitutional error in that the ruling was without
legitimate basis, and rendered the fact-finding procedure employed
by the state court inadequate to afford Petitioner a full and fair
hearing on the Fourth Amendment claim; (ii) the Court of Appeals’
factual
determinations
are
so
blatantly
erroneous
so
as
to
constitute ‘egregious errors’ in its fact finding determination
relevant to Petitioner’s Fourth Amendment claim . . ., and ;
(iii) as a matter of law, the police officers did not inordinately
prolong
the
detention
beyond
what
was
reasonable
circumstances to address the traffic infraction.”
under
the
Pet. at 17-18.
Yet, “the focus of the inquiry as to whether there has been an
‘unconscionable breakdown’ in the state corrective process is on
‘the
existence
themselves’
and
rather
application
than
on
the
of
the
corrective
‘outcome
resulting
procedures
from
the
application of adequate state court corrective procedures.’” Singh
v. Miller, 104 F. App’x 770, 772 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Capellan,
975 F.2d at 71).
The record clearly reveals that Petitioner was afforded a
suppression hearing during which the instant claims were litigated
at length.
He then moved to re-open the suppression hearing and,
after oral arguments were conducted, that request was denied.
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Petitioner then raised the claim on direct appeal and succeeded in
having
his
conviction
reversed.
He
was
then
afforded
the
opportunity to oppose the People’s leave application, as well as an
opportunity to address the basis of the Appellate Division’s
reversal.
Moreover, based on a review of the proceedings before
the state courts, it is clear that the state courts conducted “a
reasoned method of inquiry into relevant questions of fact and
law.”
Capellan, 975 F.2d at 71 (citation omitted).
Accordingly, Petitioner has not demonstrated that the state
failed to provide a corrective procedure or that an “unconscionable
breakdown” occurred in that corrective process.
Accordingly, his
Fourth Amendment claim is not reviewable by this Court and the
claim is dismissed.
V.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, the petition for a writ of
habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Dkt. No. 1) is denied,
and the petition is dismissed.
Because Petitioner has failed to
make “a substantial showing of a denial of a constitutional right,”
28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), the Court declines to issue a certificate
of appealability.
See, e.g., Lucidore v. New York State Div. of
Parole, 209 F.3d 107, 111-113 (2d Cir. 2000).
The Court also
hereby certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that any
appeal from this judgment would not be taken in good faith and
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therefore denies leave to appeal as a poor person.
Coppedge v.
United States, 369 U.S. 438 (1962).
Petitioner must file any notice of appeal with the Clerk’s
Office, United States District Court, Western District of New York,
within thirty (30) days of the date of judgment in this action.
Requests to proceed on appeal as a poor person must be filed with
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in accordance
with the requirements of Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
S/Michael A. Telesca
HONORABLE MICHAEL A. TELESCA
United States District Judge
DATED:
May 9, 2012
Rochester, New York
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