Grant v. Davis et al

Filing 65

DECISION AND ORDER: For the reasons stated in the attached Decision and Order, the Court declines to adopt the Report and Recommendation 62 and denies the Defendants' motion for summary judgment 39 . A meeting to set a trial date is scheduled for February 5, 2019 at 9:00 a.m. before Hon. Richard J. Arcara.SO ORDERED. Signed by Hon. Richard J. Arcara on 1/23/2019. (LAS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
_______________________________________
JEFFREY GRANT,
Plaintiff,
v.

11-CV-1012-A
DECISION AND ORDER

SEAN F. DAVIS, Correction Officer;
MATT B. MATWIEJOW, Correction Officer;
TIMOTHY R. STRONG, Correction Officer;
BRANDON COON, Correction Officer;
MARK VANDEGRIFT, Correction Officer; and
DANIEL JOHNSON, Correction Officer,
Defendants.
_______________________________________
This case is before the Court on the Plaintiff’s objections to Magistrate Judge
Michael J. Roemer’s Report and Recommendation (Docket No. 62), which recommends
granting a motion for summary judgment filed by Defendants Coon, Vandegrift, and
Johnson. See Docket No. 50. 1 For the reasons stated below, the Court declines to adopt
the Report and Recommendation and therefore denies the Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment.
DISCUSSION
The Court assumes familiarity with Judge Roemer’s Report and Recommendation,
the record, and the parties’ arguments. The Court reviews the Plaintiff’s objections de
novo. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

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The remaining Defendants did not move for summary judgment.

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It is “axiom[atic] that in ruling on a motion for summary judgment, ‘the evidence of
the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his
favor.’” Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 560, 651 (2014) (per curiam) (quoting Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)) (brackets omitted). Nonetheless, as Judge
Roemer noted, there may be “rare circumstances where the plaintiff relies almost
exclusively on his own testimony, much of which is contradictory and incomplete,” such
that “it will be impossible for a district court to determine whether ‘the jury could
reasonably find for the plaintiff,’ and thus whether there are any ‘genuine’ issues of
material fact, without making some assessment of the plaintiff’s account.” Jeffreys v. City
of New York, 426 F.3d 549 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252). A court,
in other words, need not deny summary judgment merely because the plaintiff disputes
the defendant’s account of events. Rather, a court is only required to draw “justifiable”
inferences in the non-moving party’s favor. Thus, “[w]hen opposing parties tell two
different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no
reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt the facts for purposes of ruling
on a motion for summary judgment.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007) (emphasis
added). Even with this standard, however, the moving party must still carry “the difficult
burden of demonstrating that there is no evidence in the record upon which a reasonable
factfinder could base a verdict in the plaintiff’s favor.” Jeffreys, 426 F.3d at 554.
The Court agrees with Judge Roemer’s careful analysis of the record, which shows
a number of inconsistencies between the Plaintiff’s version of events and the Defendants’
version. But the Court does not believe that, either individually or collectively, those
inconsistencies are so “blatant[]” that summary judgment is appropriate.

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The Plaintiff, for instance, has inconsistently reported the number of corrections
officers who allegedly assaulted him, and his physical descriptions of the alleged
assailants have not been accurate. See Docket No. 50 at 16-17. It would not, however,
be unreasonable to infer that the Plaintiff could not accurately recall the number and
identities of his alleged attackers in the midst of what he claims was a brutal assault. This
inference is made more reasonable by the fact that no party disputes that there was, in
fact, an altercation involving the Plaintiff and several corrections officers; rather, the
dispute is over the identities of the corrections officers involved in the altercation. This
makes it less likely that the Plaintiff’s claim is “wholly fanciful,” such that summary
judgment is appropriate. Jeffreys, 426 F.3d at 554 (quotation marks omitted).
The Court has also carefully considered a video taken after the alleged assault
(Docket No. 39, Ex. B), which shows the Plaintiff moving about with relative ease,
dressing and undressing himself, and following commands from corrections officers.
There is no question that this evidence undermines the Plaintiff’s version of the assault.
But the video (as well as the Plaintiff’s medical records) still show that the Plaintiff
sustained a ¾” laceration on his ear lobe, an abrasion on his cheek, and bruising.
Likewise, the Plaintiff’s version of post-assault events is consistent with what is seen in
the video. Again, this makes it less likely that the Plaintiff’s version of the alleged assault
immediately preceding the video is “wholly fanciful.”
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, a reasonable jury
could conclude, after viewing the video and reviewing the medical evidence, that the
Plaintiff was, as he claims, assaulted, but that he exaggerated certain aspects of the
assault. Of course, a jury could also conclude that the video undermines the Plaintiff’s

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credibility to such a degree that none of his claims are worthy of belief. Choosing which
of these inferences to draw, however, is a task reserved solely for the jury. See Rule v.
Brine, Inc., 85 F.3d 1002, 1011 (2d Cir. 1996) (“Assessments of credibility and choices
between conflicting versions of the events are matters for the jury, not the court on
summary judgment.”)

In other words, because the video and medical records do not

“blatantly” contradict the Plaintiff’s version of events, summary judgment is not
appropriate.
Finally, the Court agrees with Judge Roemer that the moving Defendants have
each put forward reasonable explanations for why they could not have participated in the
alleged assault. Id. at 17-18. Again, however, viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the Plaintiff, the Court cannot conclude that summary judgment is warranted.
The Plaintiff’s claim that he was assaulted is supported by his own testimony, the injuries
he sustained, and the video, which is consistent with the Plaintiff’s testimony about the
events following the assault. This Court recognizes that this evidence is not robust. But
under these circumstances, the Court would need to conclude that the Plaintiff’s version
of events is entirely fabricated in order to justify summary judgment. Jeffreys, however,
“‘does not authorize district courts to ‘engage in searching, skeptical analyses of parties’
testimony in opposition to summary judgment.’” Matheson v. Kitchen, 515 F. App’x 21,
24 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Rojas v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Rochester, 660 F.3d 98,
106 (2d Cir. 2011)).
This is a close case. The Court is mindful that many of “the inconsistencies
identified by [the moving defendants] might well lead a jury to reject the credibility of [the
Plaintiff’s] testimony.”

Id.

Nonetheless, they do not “place this case among the

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‘extraordinary cases, where the facts alleged are so contradictory that doubt is cast upon
their plausibility.’” Id. (quoting Rojas 660 F.3d at 106). Thus, after careful consideration
of the record as a whole, and after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
Plaintiff, the Court cannot conclude that “no reasonable jury could believe” the Plaintiff’s
version of events. Scott, 550 U.S. at 380.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court declines to adopt the Report and
Recommendation (Docket No. 62) and denies the Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment. Docket No. 39. A meeting to set a trial date is scheduled for February 5, 2019
at 9:00 a.m.
SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 23, 2019
Buffalo, New York

s/Richard J. Arcara___________
HONORABLE RICHARD J. ARCARA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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