Maldonado v. Fischer et al

Filing 91

ORDER denying 87 Motion for Reconsideration re 86 Order on Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Hon. H. Kenneth Schroeder Jr. on 9/30/2020. (KER)-CLERK TO FOLLOW UP- by mailing copy of Order to plaintiff

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

ANGEL MALDONADO, 03-R-2519,
Plaintiff,
-v-

11-CV-1091Sr

SUSANNA MATTINGLY
Parole Officer,
Defendant.

DECISION AND ORDER
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), the parties have consented to the
assignment of this case to the undersigned to conduct all proceedings in this case,
including the entry of final judgment. Dkt. #15.

By Decision and Order entered November 6, 2019, the Court granted
defendant Susanna Mattingly’s motion for summary judgment except with respect to
plaintiff’s claim that the special conditions of parole imposed upon him by P.O. Mattingly
prevented him from contact with his children between February 24, 2010 and March 16,
2010 in violation of his constitutional right to substantive due process and his claim that
he was prevented from attending religious services between February 24, 2010 and
March 16, 2010, in violation of his constitutional right to religious freedom. Dkt. #86.

Currently before the Court is defendant’s motion for reconsideration. Dkt.
#87. In support of the motion, P.O. Mattingly argues that plaintiff’s deposition testimony

limited his claims to the time period between September, 2010 and May, 2011. Dkt.
#87-1, p.2. Defendant argues that this constitutes a mistake of fact as set forth in Rule
60(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Dkt. #87-1, p.2.

“It is well established that the interlocutory orders and rulings made pretrial by a district judge are subject to modification by the district judge at any time prior
to final judgment . . . .” In re U.S., 733 F.2d 10, 13 (2d Cir. 1984). However, the
standard for granting a motion for reconsideration “is strict, and reconsideration will
generally be denied unless the moving party can point to controlling decisions or data
that the court overlooked – matters, in other words, that might reasonably be expected
to alter the conclusion reached by the court.” Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d
255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995). Such a motion “should not be granted where the moving party
seeks solely to re-litigate an issue already decided.” Id. Stated another way, a motion
for reconsideration should be granted only when the moving party identifies an
intervening change of controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or the need to
correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice. Kolel Beth Yechiel Mechil of Tartikov,
Inc. v. YLL Irrevocable Trust, 729 F.3d 99, 104 (2d Cir. 2013). Rule 60(b)(1) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure specifically provides that a court may relieve a party
from an order based upon mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect.

Defendant’s motion for summary judgment argued that she had no
personal involvement in the implementation of plaintiff’s conditions of parole during his
release from September 20, 2010 through his arrest on violation of those conditions in
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May of 2011. Dkt. #78-1, pp.5-6. However, plaintiff’s third amended complaint identifies
February 24, 2010 as the date of the incident supporting his claims. Dkt. #52-2, pp.5-7.
Plaintiff’s second amended complaint identifies February 24, 2010 (as well as
September 29, 2011), as the date of the incident supporting his claims. Dkt. #34, pp.24
& 26. Plaintiff’s amended complaint identifies February 24, 2010 as the date of the
incident supporting his claims. Dkt. #12, p.5. Plaintiff’s initial complaint identifies special
conditions of parole imposed upon him originally on May 28, 2009 and renewed on
February 24, 2010 and September 29, 2010. Dkt. #1, pp. 8, 11 & 16. T hus, every
complaint has asserted February 24, 2010 as relevant to plaintiff’s claims.

Plaintiff was granted permission to file his third amended complaint on
September 23, 2010 and, in fact, the third amended complaint was filed on October 7,
2015, one day before plaintiff’s deposition on October 8, 2015. At plaintif f’s deposition,
however, the Assistant Attorney General (“AAG”), asked plaintiff whether it was correct
that plaintiff’s lawsuit was about the period of time between September of 2010 and
May of 2011 when he was subjected to illegal terms and conditions of parole. Dkt. #781, p.5. Plaintiff responded affirmatively. Dkt. #78-1, p.5. Plaintiff also agreed that he was
complaining that P.O. Mattingly imposed the special conditions which restricted his
liberty during this time period. Dkt. #78-1, p.5.

In reliance upon this exchange, defendant argued that she was entitled to
summary judgment because she was not involved in the implementation of plaintiff’s
conditions of parole for his release on September 29, 2010. Dkt. #78-1, pp.5-6. In
response, plaintiff argued that he advised the AAG and the AAG acknowledged that
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plaintiff was being deposed without the benefit of his legal papers, which he had not yet
received following his transfer to the facility where the deposition was taking place. Dkt.
#80-1, pp.37-38.

In light of the clarity and consistency with which plaintiff identified
February 24, 2010 as the relevant date for his claims, it would be manifestly unfair to
preclude plaintiff from pursuing his claims because the New York State Department of
Corrections and Community Supervision (“NYSDOCCS”), was unable to transfer his
personal property with him to the location of his deposition so that he could refresh his
recollection at his deposition. Defendant has identified no prejudice from her reliance
upon plaintiff’s inability to recall February 24, 2010 rather than September 29, 2010 as
the relevant date and the Court notes that the term s and conditions of parole imposed
upon his release on September 29, 2010 were the same terms and conditions imposed
upon plaintiff upon his release on February 24, 2010, both of which were the
consequence of defendant’s recommendation that plaintiff be designated as a
Discretionary Sex Offender (“DSO”). Defendant’s motion for reconsideration is,
therefore, denied.

SO ORDERED.

DATED:

Buffalo, New York
September 30, 2020
s/ H. Kenneth Schroeder, Jr.
H. KENNETH SCHROEDER, JR.
United States Magistrate Judge

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