Kattu et al v. Metro Petrolium Inc.
Filing
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DECISION AND ORDER denying 19 defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. Defendant's motion for dismissal of the state law claims of plaintiffs for lack of supplemental jurisdiction is also denied. Signed by Hon. Richard J. Arcara on 8/6/2013. (JMB)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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ANAND KATTU, PATRICIA KING,
MEGHAN MIAN, and ROMESH PATEL
individually and on behalf of all others
similarly -situated,
Plaintiffs,
DECISION AND ORDER
12-CV-54-A
v.
METRO PETROLEUM, INC.,
Defendant.
44444444444444444444444444444444444
This action seeks unpaid overtime wages under the Fair Labor Standards
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., and New York Labor Law § 650 et seq., and is within
the Court’s federal-question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Plaintiffs
Anand Kattu, Patricia King, Meghan Mian, and Romesh Patel are former
employees of defendant Metro Petroleum, Inc., an operator of convenience stores,
who allege that they, and others who are similarly situated, are entitled to unpaid
overtime wages, liquidated damages, interest, attorney fees, and declaratory relief.
Defendant Metro Petroleum has moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on the ground that the bulk of
plaintiffs’ federal-law claims are barred by the statute of limitations, and that the
Court should not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any remaining state-law
claims. Despite the strict pleading standards of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), plaintiffs are not
required to plead facts in a complaint to rebut a potential statute of limitations
defense, an affirmative defense that is waived by a defendant if it is not alleged in
an answer. See DeJesus v. HF Management Services, LLC, Dkt. No. 12-4565,
slip op. at 18 n.7 (2d Cir. Aug. 5, 2013); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c)(1); Litton Indus., Inc.,
v. Lehman Bros. Kuhn Koed Inc., 967 F.2d 742, 751-52 (2d Cir. 1992). Although
plaintiffs’ federal claims may later be shown to be barred by a statute of limitations
in whole or in part, defendant’s motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss the
complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted is denied.
DISCUSSION
The Rule 12(b)(6) Standard. When deciding a motion to dismiss a
complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “a court must accept as true
all of the allegations contained in a complaint.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009). “While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint,
they must be supported by factual allegations.” Id. at 679. When evaluating the
factual allegations of a complaint, a court is required to draw “all reasonable
inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Pension Ben. Guar. Corp. ex rel. St. Vincent
Catholic Med. Centers Ret. Plan v. Morgan Stanley Inv. Mgmt. Inc., 712 F.3d 705,
730 (2d Cir. 2013).
In order “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible of its
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face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility
when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable.” Id. “[O]nly a complaint that
states a plausible claim to relief survives a motion to dismiss.” Id. at 679.
To determine “whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief . . . [is] a
context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense.” Id. A complaint must allege “more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678.
Elements of an FLSA Overtime-Wage Claim. The Fair Labor Standards
Act (“FLSA”) provides that
no employer shall employ any of his employees . . . for a
workweek longer than forty hours unless such employee
receives compensation for his employment in excess of the
hours above specified at a rate not less than one and onehalf times the regular rate at which he is employed.
29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). An FLSA collective action overtime-wage claim has four
elements: First, there must be “an employee-employer relationship” between
plaintiff and defendant. Zhong v. August August Corp., 498 F.Supp.2d 625, 628
(S.D.N.Y. 2007); 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). Second, the FLSA applies only to
“employees whose work involved some kind of interstate activity.” Zhong, 498
F.Supp.2d at 628. Third, the complaint must allege the number of hours worked
and the amount of unpaid wages. Zhong, 498 F.Supp.2d at 628; see also DeJesus
v. HF Management Services, LLC, Dkt. No. 12-4565, slip op. (2d Cir. Aug. 5,
3
2013). Fourth, if a plaintiff brings a collective action on behalf of others who are
similarly situated, “the complaint should indicate who those other employees are,
and allege facts that would entitle them to relief.” Id.; 29 U.S.C. § 216(b); see also
Peck v. Hillside Children’s Center, 915 F.Supp.2d 435, 437 (W.D.N.Y. 2013) (citing
Zhong, with a two-elements formulation of a valid FLSA overtime-wage claim).
Facts. Accepting the factual allegations of plaintiffs Kattu, King, Mian, and
Patel in the complaint as true, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, defendant Metro
Petroleum is a corporation organized and incorporated under the laws of New York
State which operates several convenience stores across New York State, including
one in Buffalo, New York, that sell gasoline, lottery tickets, groceries, and cash
checks.
Plaintiffs Kattu, King, Mian, and Patel were all previously employed by
defendant Metro Petroleum and worked at the store in Buffalo, New York.
Throughout their employment with defendant, plaintiffs worked different hours, at
different hourly wages, and for different periods of time. However, all plaintiffs
routinely worked in excess of forty hours per workweek and never received
overtime wages from defendant for all the overtime hours they worked.
Based on the wages of each plaintiff, and the number of overtime hours
each worked, each plaintiff was underpaid by a different amount. Plaintiff Kattu
was underpaid by approximately $78,962 annually over the approximate ten-year
period of his employment. Plaintiff King was underpaid by approximately $4,000
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during her eight-month period of employment by defendant. Plaintiff Mian was
underpaid by approximately $14,000 during her period of employment by
defendant. Plaintiff Patel, who worked 12- to 14-hour days, six days a week, was
underpaid by at least $11,000, and by as much as $15,000, during his employment
with defendant.
Plaintiffs Kattu, King, Mian, and Patel commenced this action by filing their
complaint on January 20, 2012. Dkt. No. 1.1 Although plaintiffs’ total monetary
claims for compensation, liquidated damages, and interest are not specifically set
forth in the complaint, it appears that they exceed $3 million. See Dkt. No. 8-1.
The FLSA Claim in the Complaint. In order to survive defendant Metro
Petroleum’s motion to dismiss, plaintiffs’ complaint must allege facts sufficient to
support the four elements of a collective FLSA overtime-wage claim. Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(b)(6). Plaintiffs have specifically alleged facts to establish that defendant
Metro Petroleum was “an ‘employer’ and an ‘enterprise engaged in commerce or
in the production of goods for commerce,” satisfying the first two elements of a
FLSA overtime-wage claim. Dkt. No. 1, ¶¶ 3–7. Plaintiffs have also fairly
1
Since the complaint was docketed, there was a Clerk’s Entry of Default, Dkt. No. 7, a
Motion for a Default Judgment, Dkt. No. 8, which was delayed because of potential counsel
conflict-of-interest issues, see Minute Entry July 13, 2012, and by negotiations among the
parties, see Dkt. Nos. 10-14, which were followed by a Motion to Set Aside the Default, Dkt. No.
14, and, eventually, a Stipulation, Dkt. No. 17, to set aside the entry of default and withdrawing
the Motion for Default Judgment. Counsel and proposed substitute counsel for defendant
Metro Petroleum are directed to attend to Text Order 26, entered July 1, 2013, regarding an
unresolved substitution-of-counsel issue by no later than August 20, 2013, so that the action
may proceed without unnecessary delay.
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specifically alleged the number of hours that each plaintiff worked, and the amount
of unpaid overtime compensation that each plaintiff is owed. Dkt. No. 1, ¶¶ 12–27.
These allegations satisfy the third element of a FLSA overtime-wage claim. See
Zhong v. August August Corp., 498 F.Supp. 2d 625, 628 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). Finally,
plaintiffs have alleged generally that there are other persons similarly situated to
plaintiffs, who were also employed by defendant Metro Petroleum in similar
positions, who worked overtime, but were not paid overtime wages. These
allegations are sufficient to satisfy the fourth element of a FLSA collective overtimewage claim. Dkt. No. 1, ¶¶ 28–30.2 For these reasons, plaintiffs’ complaint alleges
the elements necessary to state an overtime-wage claim upon which relief can be
granted under the FLSA.
Statute of Limitations. Under the FLSA, when a party fails to file an action
to recover unpaid overtime compensation “within two years after the cause of
action accrued,” the opposing party can interpose a statute of limitations
affirmative defense. 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). “[A] cause of action arising out of a willful
violation [of the requirement to pay overtime compensation] may be begun within
three years after the cause of action accrued.” 29 U.S.C. § 255(a).
Defendant Metro Petroleum argues that most of plaintiffs’ 29 U.S.C. § 207
2
While plaintiffs assert they are representatives of a collective and a class action, they
have not yet been required to file a motion for conditional certification and notice pursuant to 29
U.S.C. § 216(b), or for certification of a class pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. The Court does not address whether a collective or class action is appropriate.
See Peck v. Hillside Children’s Center, 915 F. Supp.2d 435, 438-39 (W.D.N.Y. 2013).
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overtime-wage claims should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) because
plaintiffs’ claims are time barred by either the two- or the three-year statute of
limitations period applicable under the FLSA. Defendant stresses that the
complaint shows that only plaintiffs Kattu and Patel, and possibly plaintiff King,
were employed by defendant beyond January 20, 2009, which is the latest possible
bar date three years prior to the filing of the complaint on January 20, 2012. Dkt.
No. 19-3, p. 4.
In response to defendant Metro Petroleum’s motion to dismiss, plaintiffs
argue that the statute of limitations in this case should be equitably tolled to the first
time plaintiffs were not paid overtime. Dkt. No. 23, p. 4.3 Defendant Metro
Petroleum, in reply, asserts that plaintiffs’ equitable tolling argument is unsupported
by facts alleged in the complaint. Defendant also argues plaintiffs can present no
further facts in support of their argument because the Rule 12(b)(6) standard
requires evaluation of the claim be limited to the factual allegations in their
complaint. Dkt. No. 24, pp. 2–3.
It is well established that “[c]omplaints need not anticipate, or attempt to
plead around, potential affirmative defenses.” High Falls Brewing Co., LLC v.
3
In claiming equitable tolling, plaintiffs raise two arguments in their Memorandum of
Law in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss that were not supported by factual
allegations in plaintiffs’ complaint. First, plaintiffs assert that they acted diligently throughout the
course of their employment, but defendant Metro Petroleum prevented them from knowing their
rights under the Fair Labor Standards Act. Dkt. No. 23, p. 4. Second, plaintiffs assert that
defendant failed to post a required notice advising plaintiffs of their rights under the Fair Labor
Standards Act. Dkt. No. 23, p. 6.
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Boston Beer Corp., 852 F.Supp. 2d 306, 310 (W.D.N.Y. 2011). As an affirmative
defense, a statute of limitations defense must be alleged by a defendant in a
pleading or it is deemed waived. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c)(1); Litton Indus., Inc., v.
Lehman Bros. Kuhn Koed Inc., 967 F.2d 742, 751-52 (2d Cir. 1992) (“A claim that
a statute of limitations bars a suit is an affirmative defense, and, as such, it is
waived if not raised in the answer to the complaint.” Id.); see United States v.
Landau, 155 F.3d 93, 107 (2d Cir. 1998) (statute of limitations defense waived
when only raised in a motion for summary judgment). Accordingly, “a statute of
limitations is an affirmative defense that need not be addressed in the complaint,”
and plaintiffs are not required to allege facts in their complaint to rebut a potential
statute of limitations affirmative defense that might be waived. E.E.O.C. v. Elmer
W. Davis, Inc., No. 07-CV-6434 (CJS), 2008 WL 4415177 *6 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 24,
2008).
Requiring plaintiffs to allege in a complaint facts sufficient to overcome a
statute of limitations affirmative defense would shift the burden to raise and prove
the affirmative defense from defendants, as the burden is allocated and imposed
by Rule 8(c)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to plaintiffs. The standards
of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) require the plaintiffs to plead a plausible, well-founded
cause of action, but do not justify shifting the burden of raising the defense from the
defendant to plaintiffs in contravention of Rule 8(c)(1). See DeJesus v. HF
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Management Services, LLC, Dkt. No. 12-4565, slip op. at 18 n.7 (2d Cir. Aug. 5,
2013).
Determining a statute of limitations defense ordinarily “requires a
consideration of the merit of both parties’ claims and defenses.” Addison v.
Reitman Blacktop, Inc., 283 F.R.D. 74, 83 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (quotations omitted).
Because the defense requires consideration on the merits, it is heavily fact
dependent, which makes a statute of limitations “[d]ismissal under Rule 12(b)(6)
. . . irregular.” E.E.O.C., 2008 WL 4415177 *6 (citing U.S. v. Northern Trust Co.,
372 F.3d 886, 888 (7th Cir.2004)). Ordinarily, dismissal of a claim at the complaint
stage based on a statute of limitations affirmative defense “is appropriate only if a
complaint clearly shows the claim is out of time.” Harris v. City of New York, 186
F.3d 243, 250 (2d Cir. 1999).
As plaintiffs stress, a statute of limitations affirmative defense, if not waived,
may be equitably tolled “to avoid inequitable circumstances.” Johnson v. Nyack
Hosp., 86 F.3d 8, 12 (2d Cir.1996); Santos v. Dist. Council of New York City &
Vicinity of United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., AFL-CIO, 619 F.2d 963,
967 (2d Cir.1980). Equitable tolling “extend[s] the statute of limitations beyond the
time of expiration.” Johnson, 86 F.3d at 12. “Ordinarily, equitable tolling is an
issue determined on a motion for summary judgment or at the time of trial since it is
heavily fact dependent”. Kai Yan Lai v. Wai Mon Leung, No. CV 11-3561 (SJ)
(MDG), 2012 WL 4472155 at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2012) (Report and
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Recommendation adopted by Kai Yan Lai v. Wai Mon Leung, NO. 11-CV-3561 SJ
MDG, 2012 WL 4472143 (E.D.N.Y. Sep 26, 2012)) .
In this action, some of plaintiffs’ claims may have accrued before the two- or
three-year statute of limitations bar date, but plaintiffs sufficiently raise equitable
tolling in response to defendant Metro Petroleum’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss
to avoid the dismissal of their claims for failure to state a claim. In light of plaintiff’s
response to the motion to dismiss, it is not clear from the complaint that any of
plaintiffs’ claims are time-barred. On the other hand, undisputed facts may later
justify a motion for summary judgment to significantly narrow the issues for trial. At
this juncture, the Court will not shift the burden of pleading and proving facts that
underlie the potential statute of limitations defense, a defense that is waived if not
alleged in an answer, from defendant to plaintiffs. See In re South African Aparteid
Litigation, 617 F.Supp.2d 228, 287 n. 368 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)).4 Defendant’s motion
to dismiss plaintiffs’ FLSA overtime-wage claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted is therefore denied.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the motion of defendant Metro Petroleum, Inc. to
dismiss the complaint of plaintiffs Anand Kattu, Patricia King, Meghan Mian, and
Romesh Patel pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for
4
Defendant’s contentions that plaintiffs’ equitable tolling arguments are invalid as a
matter of law are insufficient to prompt the Court sua sponte to exercise its discretion to convert
defendant’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss to a motion for partial summary judgment under
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
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failure to state a Fair Labor Standards Act overtime-wage claim under 29 U.S.C. §
207 is denied. In light of this ruling, defendant’s motion for dismissal of the statelaw claims of plaintiffs for lack of supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1367 is also denied.
Upon random assignment by the Clerk of the Court, the action is referred to
Magistrate Judge Hon. Leslie G. Foschio. The Magistrate Judge is hereby
designated to act in this case as follows: Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and
(B), all pre-trial matters in this case are referred to the above-named United States
Magistrate Judge, including but not limited to: (1) conduct of a scheduling
conference and entry of a scheduling order pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 16; (2)
hearing and disposition of all non-dispositive motions or applications; (3)
supervision of discovery; and, (4) supervision of all procedural matters involving
the aforementioned or involving the preparation of the case or any matter therein
for consideration by the District Judge. The Magistrate Judge shall also hear and
report upon dispositive motions for the consideration of the District Judge pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and (C). All motions or applications shall be filed with
the Clerk and made returnable before the Magistrate Judge.
The parties are encouraged to consider the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)
governing consent to either partial or complete disposition of the case, including
trial if necessary, by the Magistrate Judge. Consent forms are available from the
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office of the Magistrate Judge or the office of the Clerk of Court.
SO ORDERED.
s/ Richard J. Arcara
HONORABLE RICHARD J. ARCARA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
DATED: August 6, 2013
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