Leible v. The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company
Filing
50
-CLERK TO FOLLOW UP-ORDER granting 39 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 32 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Hon. H. Kenneth Schroeder, Jr on 9/18/2015. Clerk of the Court is directed to take the necessary steps to close the case (KER)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
DAVID LEIBLE,
Plaintiff,
v.
13-CV-00047A(Sr)
THE GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER COMPANY
and
MATERIAL CONTROL INC.,
Defendants.
DECISION AND ORDER
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), the parties have consented to the
assignment of this case to the undersigned to conduct all further proceedings, including
the entry of final judgment. Dkt. #13.
Currently before the Court are defendants’ motions for summary judgment
on their affirmative defenses asserting lack of standing and judicial estoppel. Dkt. #32
& Dkt. #39. For the following reasons, the motions are granted.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff alleges that he sustained a personal injury on June 15, 2010 while
delivering materials to Goodyear Dunlop Tires North America, Ltd. (“Goodyear
Dunlop”), during the course of his employment with United Parcel Service. Dkt. #35,
¶ 2.1 Plaintiff received workers’ compensation payments following his injury. Dkt. #35,
¶¶ 29-31.
On May 12, 2011, plaintiff filed a voluntary petition for personal
bankruptcy pursuant to Chapter 7 of the United States Bankruptcy Code in the United
States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of New York. Dkt. #35, ¶ 15. Plaintiff
did not include a personal injury claim on his schedule of assets but testified at his
deposition that he believed that the bankruptcy court was “aware of the lawsuit.” Dkt.
#35, ¶¶ 18 & 27.
On October 20, 2011, the Bankruptcy Court entered an Order granting
plaintiff a discharge in bankruptcy. Dkt. #35, ¶ 21.
Plaintiff’s amended schedule of assets, dated November 1, 2011, does
not include a personal injury claim. Dkt. #35, ¶ 22.
A final decree was issued on February 27, 2012. Dkt. #35, ¶ 24. Plaintiff
avers that prior to this date, he advised his bankruptcy attorney that he was pursuing a
claim against Goodyear Dunlop for personal injury. Dkt. #38-1, ¶ 9. Plaintiff further
1
Dkt. #35 is defendants’ statement of undisputed material facts which were not
controverted by plaintiff. “When a party has moved for summary judgment . . . and has, in
accordance with local court rules, served a concise statement of the material facts as to which it
contends there exist no genuine issues to be tried, those facts will be deemed admitted unless
properly controverted by the nonmoving party.” See Glazer v. Formica Corp., 964 F.2d 149, 154
(2d Cir. 1992).
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avers that he did not know that he was required to list his personal injury claim on his
schedule of assets and that his bankruptcy attorney, although aware of his personal
injury claim, failed to instruct him to do so. Dkt. #38-1, ¶¶ 10-11.
On November 13, 2012, plaintiff commenced this action against Goodyear
Dunlop in New York State Supreme Court, County of Erie, alleging serious personal
injury as a result of the negligence of Goodyear Dunlop. Dkt. #1.
On January 14, 2013, Goodyear Dunlop removed the action to this Court
on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. Dkt. #1.
On April 11, 2014, the Court granted plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend
the complaint to join Material Control, Inc. (“MCI”), as a defendant. Dkt. #25. The
amended complaint alleges a contract between Goodyear Dunlop and MCI in which
MCI assumed responsibility for the maintenance of the loading docks where plaintiff
was injured. Dkt. #27.
DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers
to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A fact is "material" only if it has
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some effect on the outcome of the suit. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
248 (1986); see Catanzaro v. Weiden, 140 F.3d 91, 93 (2d Cir. 1998). A dispute
regarding a material fact is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; see Bryant v.
Maffucci, 923 F.2d 979 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 849 (1991). The district court
must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and must
draw all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor. Salamon v. Our Lady of Victory
Hosp., 514 F.3d 217, 226 (2d Cir. 2008).
Once the moving party has met its burden of ?demonstrating the absence
of a genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party must come forward with
enough evidence to support a jury verdict in its favor, and the motion will not be
defeated merely upon a
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