Webb v. Colvin
Filing
27
-CLERK TO FOLLOW UP---DECISION AND ORDER granting Defendant's 21 MOTION for Judgment on the Pleadings and denying Plaintiff's 13 MOTION for Judgment on the Pleadings. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of the Commissioner. Signed by Hon. John T. Curtin on 7/9/2014. (JEC)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
SHEILA DENISE WEBB,
Plaintiff,
-vs-
13-CV-326-JTC
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Acting Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.
APPEARANCES:
LAW OFFICES OF KENNETH HILLER (JAYA ANN SHURTLIFF,
ESQ., of Counsel), Amherst, New York, for Plaintiff.
WILLIAM J. HOCHUL, JR., United States Attorney (MARY K.
ROACH, Assistant United States Attorney, of Counsel), Buffalo, New
York, for Defendant.
This matter has been transferred to the undersigned for all further proceedings, by
order of Chief United States District Judge William M. Skretny dated April 16, 2014. Item
26.
Plaintiff Sheila Denise Webb initiated this action on April 2, 2013, pursuant to the
Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“the Act”), to review the final determination of the
Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying plaintiff’s application for Social
Security Disability Insurance (“SSDI”) and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) benefits,
as provided for in Titles II and XVI of the Act. Both parties have moved for judgment on
the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Items
13, 21. For the following reasons, plaintiff’s motion is denied, and the Commissioner’s
motion is granted.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff was born on September 12, 1959 (Tr. 208).1 She filed an application for
both SSDI and SSI benefits in March 2009, alleging disability due to overall body pain,
anxiety, and depression, with an onset date of January 1, 2007 (Tr. 193-97). The
applications were denied administratively (Tr. 129-148), and plaintiff requested a hearing
which took place by video conference before Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Stanley K.
Chin on March 31, 2011 (Tr. 83-112). Plaintiff testified, and was represented at the
hearing by attorney Melissa Pezzino. Vocational expert (“VE”) James R. Newton testified
by teleconference.
In a decision issued on April 29, 2011, ALJ Chin found that plaintiff was not disabled
within the meaning of the Act (Tr. 28-40). Following the sequential process for evaluating
disability claims outlined in the Social Security Regulations at 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a), the
ALJ determined that plaintiff’s mental and physical impairments (including bipolar disorder,
adjustment disorder, substance abuse, bilateral hand and foot pain, and status post right
shoulder injury), while “severe,” did not meet or equal the severity of an impairment listed
at 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (the “Listings”). The ALJ found no matching
section of the Listings under which to assess the relative severity of plaintiff’s physical
impairments, and found that plaintiff’s mental impairments, considered singly and in
combination, did not meet or medically equal the criteria of Listing 12.04 (Affective
Disorders) (Tr. 33-34). The ALJ found that the evidence in the record, including plaintiff’s
testimony and statements regarding the limiting effect of her symptoms and the reports and
1
Parenthetical numeric references preceded by “Tr.” are to pages of the administrative transcript
filed by the Commissioner as part of the answer in this action (Item 7).
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opinions of consultative and treating medical sources, demonstrated that plaintiff had the
residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform “light work”2 limited to lifting up to 20 pounds
occasionally, and up to 10 pounds frequently; standing/walking about 6 hours and sitting
for 6 hours in an 8-hour day, with normal breaks; performing simple, routine, and repetitive
tasks in a work environment free of fast-paced production requirements; and involving only
simple work-related decisions and routine workplace changes (Tr. 35). Considering her
age, education, work experience, and RFC, and based in part upon the VE’s testimony, the
ALJ determined that although plaintiff was unable to return to any of her past relevant
work, there were jobs in significant numbers in the national economy that she could
perform (Tr. 39).
The Appeals Council denied review on February 5, 2013, making the ALJ’s decision
the final decision of the Commissioner (Tr. 1-4). This action followed.
In her motion for judgment on the pleadings, plaintiff seeks reversal of the
Commissioner’s determination and remand for further proceedings, based on the grounds
that the ALJ did not adequately consider the impact of plaintiff’s speech impediment; failed
to properly assess plaintiff’s mental RFC; and improperly accorded “great weight” to the
2
As defined in the Regulations:
Light work involves lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or
carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds. Even though the weight lifted may be very
little, a job is in this category when it requires a good deal of walking or standing, or when
it involves sitting most of the time with some pushing and pulling of arm or leg controls.
To be considered capable of performing a full or wide range of light work, you must have
the ability to do substantially all of these activities. If someone can do light work, we
determine that he or she can also do sedentary work, unless there are additional limiting
factors such as loss of fine dexterity or inability to sit for long periods of time.
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b), 416.967(b).
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vague opinion of Robert Hill, Ph.D., the psychiatric consultative examiner.
These
contentions are addressed in the discussion that follows.
DISCUSSION
I.
Scope of Judicial Review
The Social Security Act provides that, upon district court review of the
Commissioner‘s decision, “[t]he findings of the Commissioner . . . as to any fact, if
supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
Substantial evidence is defined as evidence which “a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.” Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229
(1938), quoted in Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); see also Tejada v.
Apfel, 167 F.3d 770, 773-74 (2d Cir. 1999). The substantial evidence test applies not only
to findings on basic evidentiary facts, but also to inferences and conclusions drawn from
the facts. Giannasca v. Astrue, 2011 WL 4445141, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2011) (citing
Rodriguez v. Califano, 431 F. Supp. 421, 423 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)).
Under these standards, the scope of judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision
is limited, and the reviewing court may not try the case de novo or substitute its findings
for those of the Commissioner. Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401; see also Cage v. Comm'r of
Soc. Servs., 692 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 2012). The court’s inquiry is “whether the record,
read as a whole, yields such evidence as would allow a reasonable mind to accept the
conclusions reached” by the Commissioner. Sample v. Schweiker, 694 F.2d 639, 642 (9th
Cir. 1982), quoted in Winkelsas v. Apfel, 2000 WL 575513, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. February 14,
2000).
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However, “[b]efore the insulation of the substantial evidence test comes into play,
it must first be determined that the facts of a particular case have been evaluated in the
light of correct legal standards.” Klofta v. Mathews, 418 F. Supp. 1139, 1411 (E.D.Wis.
1976), quoted in Sharbaugh v. Apfel, 2000 WL 575632, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. March 20, 2000);
Nunez v. Astrue, 2013 WL 3753421, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. July 17, 2013) (citing Tejada, 167 F.3d
at 773). “Failure to apply the correct legal standard constitutes reversible error, including,
in certain circumstances, failure to adhere to the applicable regulations.” Kohler v. Astrue,
546 F.3d 260, 265 (2d Cir. 2008) (citations omitted).
Thus, the Commissioner’s
determination cannot be upheld when it is based on an erroneous view of the law, or
misapplication of the Regulations, that disregards highly probative evidence. See Grey v.
Heckler, 721 F.2d 41, 44 (2d Cir. 1983); see also Johnson v. Bowen, 817 F.2d 983, 985
(2d Cir. 1987) (“Failure to apply the correct legal standards is grounds for reversal.”),
quoted in McKinzie v. Astrue, 2010 WL 276740, at *6 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 2010).
If the Commissioner's findings are free of legal error and supported by substantial
evidence, the court must uphold the decision. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“The findings of the
Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall
be conclusive, and where a claim has been denied ... the court shall review only the
question of conformity with [the] regulations….”); see Kohler, 546 F.3d at 265. “Where the
Commissioner's decision rests on adequate findings supported by evidence having rational
probative force, [the court] will not substitute [its] judgment for that of the Commissioner.”
Veino v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 578, 586 (2d Cir. 2002). Even where there is substantial
evidence in the record weighing against the Commissioner's findings, the determination will
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not be disturbed so long as substantial evidence also supports it. See Marquez v. Colvin,
2013 WL 5568718, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 2013) (citing DeChirico v. Callahan, 134 F.3d
1177, 1182 (2d Cir. 1998) (upholding the Commissioner's decision where there was
substantial evidence for both sides)).
In addition, it is the function of the Commissioner, not the reviewing court, “to
resolve evidentiary conflicts and to appraise the credibility of witnesses, including claimant.”
Carroll v. Sec'y of Health and Human Services, 705 F.2d 638, 642 (2d Cir. 1983); cf.
Cichocki v. Astrue, 534 F. App’x 71, 75 (2d Cir. Sept. 5, 2013). “Genuine conflicts in the
medical evidence are for the Commissioner to resolve,” Veino, 312 F.3d at 588, and the
court “must show special deference” to credibility determinations made by the ALJ, “who
had the opportunity to observe the witnesses’ demeanor” while testifying. Yellow Freight
Sys. Inc. v. Reich, 38 F.3d 76, 81 (2d Cir.1994).
II.
Standards for Determining Eligibility for Disability Benefits
To be eligible for SSDI or SSI benefits under the Social Security Act, plaintiff must
present proof sufficient to show that she suffers from a medically determinable physical or
mental impairment “which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be
expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months ...,” 42 U.S.C.
§ 423(d)(1)(A), and is “of such severity that [s]he is not only unable to do h[er] previous
work but cannot, considering h[er] age, education, and work experience, engage in any
other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy ....” 42 U.S.C.
§ 423(d)(2)(A); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1505(a) (SSDI), 416.905(a) (SSI). As indicated
above, the Regulations set forth a five-step process to be followed when a disability claim
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comes before an ALJ for evaluation of the claimant's eligibility for benefits. See 20
C.F.R.§§ 404.1520, 416.920. First, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant is
presently engaged in substantial gainful activity. If the claimant is not, the ALJ must decide
if the claimant has a “severe” impairment, which is an impairment or combination of
impairments that has lasted (or may be expected to last) for a continuous period of at least
12 months which “significantly limits [the claimant's] physical or mental ability to do basic
work activities....” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c); see also §§ 404.1509, 416.909
(duration requirement). If the claimant's impairment is severe and of qualifying duration,
the ALJ then determines whether it meets or equals the criteria of an impairment found in
the Listings. If the impairment meets or equals a listed impairment, the claimant will be
found to be disabled. If the claimant does not have a listed impairment, the fourth step
requires the ALJ to determine if, notwithstanding the impairment, the claimant has the
residual functional capacity to perform his or her past relevant work. Finally, if the claimant
is not capable of performing the past relevant work, the fifth step requires that the ALJ
determine whether the claimant is capable of performing any work which exists in the
national economy, considering the claimant's age, education, past work experience, and
RFC. See Curry v. Apfel, 209 F.3d 117, 122 (2d Cir. 2000); Lynch v. Astrue, 2008 WL
3413899, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 2008).
The claimant bears the burden of proof with respect to the first four steps of the
analysis. If the claimant meets this burden, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show
that there exists work in the national economy that the claimant can perform. Lynch, 2008
WL 3413899, at *3 (citing Rosa v. Callahan, 168 F.3d 72, 77 (2d Cir. 1999)). “In the
ordinary case, the Commissioner meets h[er] burden at the fifth step by resorting to the
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applicable medical vocational guidelines (the grids), … [which] take into account the
claimant's residual functional capacity in conjunction with the claimant's age, education,
and work experience.” Rosa, 168 F.3d at 78 (internal quotation marks, alterations and
citations omitted). If, however, a claimant has non-exertional limitations (which are not
accounted for in the grids) that “significantly limit the range of work permitted by h[er]
exertional limitations then the grids obviously will not accurately determine disability
status ….” Bapp v. Bowen, 802 F.2d 601, 605 (2d Cir. 1986) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). In such cases, “the Commissioner must ‘introduce the testimony of a
vocational expert (or other similar evidence) that jobs exist in the national economy which
claimant can obtain and perform.’ ” Rosa, 168 F.3d at 78 (quoting Bapp, 802 F.2d at 603).
III.
The ALJ’s Disability Determination
In this case, ALJ Chin found at step one of the sequential evaluation that plaintiff
had not engaged in substantial gainful employment activity since January 1, 2007, the
alleged onset date (Tr. 33). At step two, as indicated above, the ALJ found the evidence
in the record sufficient to establish that plaintiff’s mental and physical impairments were
“severe” within the meaning of the Regulations (id.).
At step three, the ALJ determined that plaintiff’s mental impairments, considered
singly and in combination, did not meet or medically equal the criteria of Listing 12.04,
dealing with Affective Disorders (Tr. 34-35). To satisfy the criteria of this Listing, the
claimant must show (among other things) that his or her mental impairment results in at
least two of the following:
1.
Marked restriction of activities of daily living;
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2.
Marked difficulties in maintaining social functioning;
3.
Deficiencies of concentration, persistence or pace resulting in
frequent failure to complete tasks in a timely manner (in work settings
or elsewhere);
4.
Repeated episodes of deterioration or decompensation in work or
work-like settings which cause the individual to withdraw from that
situation or to experience exacerbation of signs and symptoms (which
may include deterioration of adaptive behaviors).
20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, § 12.04(B) (Paragraph “B” criteria). A claimant can
also satisfy the criteria of this Listing by presenting a medically documented history of a
chronic affective disorder of at least two years’ duration, and one of the following:
1)
Repeated episodes of decompensation, each of extended duration;
2)
A residual disease process resulting in such marginal adjustment that
even a minimal increase in mental demands or change in the
environment would cause the individual to decompensate;
3)
History of one or more years’ inability to function outside a highly
supportive living arrangement.
20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, § 12.04(C) (Paragraph “C” criteria).
With regard to the Paragraph “B” criteria, ALJ Chin found that plaintiff had mild
restriction in the activities of daily living; moderate difficulties in maintaining social
functioning; moderate deficiencies of concentration, persistence or pace; and no episodes
of decompensation of extended duration (Tr. 34-35). The ALJ found no evidence to
establish the presence of any of the Paragraph “C” criteria (id.). Accordingly, the ALJ
determined that plaintiff’s mental impairments did not meet or equal the severity of Listing
12.04.
As discussed, the ALJ then determined that plaintiff had the RFC for light work with
certain exertional and nonexertional limitations (Tr. 35). In making this assessment, the
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ALJ noted plaintiff’s allegations of disabling body pain, depression, and anxiety, and that
plaintiff’s medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause
these symptoms. However, the ALJ determined that the evidence in the record did not
support plaintiff’s allegations with respect to the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects
of her mental impairments. The ALJ accorded “great weight” to the opinion of Dr. Hill, a
psychologist who conducted a consultative psychiatric examination of plaintiff in October
2009 and found her to be capable of performing “simple work” despite difficulties caused
by symptoms of anxiety, depression, lack of motivation, or “substance abuse, should she
relapse” (Tr. 37). The ALJ also relied on the VE’s testimony that an individual of plaintiff’s
age with similar education, work experience, and RFC would be able to make a successful
adjustment to work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy (Tr. 38-39).
Using the grids as a framework for decisionmaking, the ALJ found that plaintiff was not
disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act (Tr. 39-40).
IV.
Plaintiff’s Motion
Plaintiff contends that the Commissioner’s determination should be reversed, and
the case remanded for further consideration, because the ALJ did not adequately consider
the impact of plaintiff’s “significant stutter” as either a severe or non-severe impairment at
step two of the sequential evaluation. Item 13-1, p. 8. As this court has recognized, a
severe speech impediment can be “a real impairment that limits claimant's employment
opportunities to the rare job which requires no regular, responsive communication.”
Antonetti v. Barnhart, 399 F. Supp. 2d 199, 202 (W.D.N.Y. 2005) (quoting Jones v.
Barnhart, 335 F.3d 697, 701 (8th Cir. 2003)). However, any claimed error at step two of
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the analysis in this case must be considered harmless, since the ALJ found other severe
mental and physical impairments (i.e., bipolar disorder, adjustment disorder, substance
abuse, bilateral hand and foot pain, and status post right shoulder injury), and considered
the combined effect of these impairments, “so that [plaintiff]’s claim proceeded through the
sequential evaluation process.” Stanton v. Astrue, 370 F. App'x 231, 233 n. 1 (2d Cir.
2010); see also Kemp v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 2011 WL 3876526, at *8 (N.D.N.Y. Aug.11,
2011), Report and Recommendation adopted by, 2011 WL 3876419 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 31,
2011).
Citing Antonetti, plaintiff also contends that the failure to consider the impact of
plaintiff’s stutter adversely affected the ALJ’s assessment of Listing severity at step three,
as well as his assessment of RFC at step four. In Antonetti, the ALJ determined that the
claimant’s speech impediment and mild mental retardation were “severe” within the
meaning of the Regulations, but did not satisfy the criteria for the Mental Retardation
Listing at 12.05(B) (requiring an IQ score of 59 or less) or 12.05(C) (requiring an IQ score
of 60 through 70 and “a physical or other mental impairment imposing an additional and
significant work-related limitation of function”). The court noted that, in light of evidence
indicating the claimant scored “as low as 41” on IQ testing, the ALJ’s finding of a severe
speech impediment “[i]mplicitly” satisfied the Listing criteria, and the court remanded the
case for reconsideration and further development of the record. Id. at 202.
By contrast, in this case the ALJ’s analysis at step three of the evaluation process
was focused on the criteria for Listing12.04 (Affective Disorders), and the court’s review
of the medical evidence indicates little support for plaintiff’s argument that a consideration
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of the impact of her stutter in combination with her other impairments would have altered
the ALJ’s analysis in any way. For example, medical records indicate that plaintiff was
treated at Erie County Medical Center (“ECMC”) in February and March 2010 for
behavioral changes associated with her antidepressant medication (Zoloft). On mental
status examination, her speech displayed normal rate, rhythm, and volume, and was
coherent, spontaneous, and fluent, with an occasional “stress-related” stutter (Tr. 385).
Similarly, treatment records from Horizon Health Services indicate that upon initial
psychiatric assessment in March 2010, plaintiff reported stuttering as a symptom of her
recent initiation on Zoloft, but on mental status examination her speech was noted to be
“clear and coherent” (Tr. 470). On follow-up evaluation in September 2010, plaintiff
reported that “she is getting better, there is no crying or tearfulness, no stuttering …” (Tr.
462), and on February 2001, her speech was reported as “mostly clear other than one
episode of stuttering and one of speaking to herself under her breath” (Tr. 468).
In addition, in finding that plaintiff had moderate difficulties in concentration,
persistence or pace under § 12.04(B)(3), ALJ Chin referred to Horizon treatment records
indicating that plaintiff “repeats questions under her breath as if to let the question ‘sink in’
before answering” (see Tr. 34), and noted that during the hearing, plaintiff spoke at times
“with what appeared to be a significant stutter” and “testified that stuttering usually occurs
throughout the day, every day” (Tr. 36). Based on these references, and in light of the
scant medical evidence of a speech impediment having more than a minimal effect on
plaintiff’s physical or mental ability to do basic work activities as discussed above, see 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1521(a), 416.921(a) (“An impairment or combination of impairments is not
severe if it does not significantly limit your physical or mental ability to do basic work
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activities.”), any error assessed to the ALJ’s failure to consider the impact of plaintiff’s
stutter at step three of the sequential analysis, or to incorporate any limitations from the
stutter into his assessment of plaintiff’s RFC, must be considered harmless.
Finally, plaintiff claims that the ALJ otherwise failed to properly assess plaintiff’s
mental RFC. In this regard, the Regulations provide as a general matter that:
When we assess your mental abilities, we first assess the nature and extent
of your mental limitations and restrictions and then determine your residual
functional capacity for work activity on a regular and continuing basis. A
limited ability to carry out certain mental activities, such as limitations in
understanding, remembering, and carrying out instructions, and in
responding appropriately to supervision, coworkers, and work pressures in
a work setting, may reduce your ability to do past work and other work.
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(c), 416.945(c). The Social Security Administration Rulings provide
further guidance for adjudicators to follow in making the mental RFC determination. For
example, SSR 96-8p discusses the requirements for assessment of mental RFC at steps
four and five of the sequential evaluation process “by itemizing various functions contained
in the broad categories found in paragraphs B and C of the adult mental disorders listings
in 12.00 of the Listing of Impairments, and summarized on the PRTF [Psychiatric Review
Technique Form].” SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *4 (S.S.A. 1996). “Work-related
mental activities generally required by competitive, remunerative work include the abilities
to: understand, carry out, and remember instructions; use judgment in making work-related
decisions; respond appropriately to supervision, co-workers and work situations; and deal
with changes in a routine work setting.” Id. at *6.
Upon review of the ALJ’s RFC assessment in this case, the court finds adequate
compliance with this guidance. The ALJ’s decision reflects a comprehensive evaluation
of plaintiff’s limitations in terms of the criteria for Listing 12.04, and her ability to perform
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work-related mental activities despite these limitations. As indicated, the ALJ assigned
“great weight” to the findings and opinions of Dr. Hill, who found plaintiff to be cooperative
with an adequate manner of relating; her appearance was appropriate; her speech was
fluent and clear; her thought process was coherent and goal directed, with no evidence of
hallucinations, delusions, or paranoia; her affect was full range and appropriate in speech
and thought content, and “somewhat dysphoric” (Tr. 305); her mood was “somewhat
dysthymic to neutral and pleasant” (id); her sensorium was clear; she was oriented to
person, place and time; her attention, concentration, and memory skills were all intact; her
cognitive functioning was in the low average range; and insight and judgment were “fair to
good” (id.). In Dr. Hill’s opinion, plaintiff was able to follow simple instructions; perform
“some simple tasks independently under supervision” (Tr. 306); maintain “some attention
and concentration” (id.); maintain a regular schedule; make “some appropriate decisions”
(id.); relate generally adequately with others; and deal with “some stress” (id.).
Plaintiff claims that the weight accorded to Dr. Hill’s opinion was improper because
the opinion is excessively vague. However, considered in its entirety, the information
contained in Dr. Hill’s report reflects a comprehensive evaluation of plaintiff’s psychiatric,
medical, and substance abuse history; her current mental functioning; and the results of
a complete mental status examination.
Read in the context of this evaluation, the
limitations expressed by Dr. Hill in his medical source statement are sufficiently clear to
provide a basis for strong deference to his opinions on plaintiff’s ability to carry out workrelated activities. As discussed, the ALJ’s determination that plaintiff has the mental RFC
for light work with certain exertional and nonexertional limitations was based on a thorough
examination of the evidence in the record as a whole, including the information in Dr. Hill’s
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consultative examination report and opinion, the medical records from Horizon and ECMC,
and plaintiff’s testimony and statements of record regarding her activities of daily living.
Based on this analysis, the court finds that the ALJ’s evaluation of the facts in this
case was performed in light of the correct legal standards, and his decision is supported
by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the Commissioner’s determination must be upheld.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the pleadings (Item 13)
is denied, the Commissioner’s motion for judgment on the pleadings (Item 21) is granted,
and the case is dismissed.
The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment in favor of the Commissioner,
and to close the case.
So ordered.
\s\ John T. Curtin
JOHN T. CURTIN
United States District Judge
Dated:
July 9, 2014
p:\pending\2013\13-326.ssa.july2.2014
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