Anderson v. Cameron et al

Filing 35

DECISION AND ORDER granting 10 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim; adopting Report and Recommendations re 27 Report and Recommendations. In addition, the Court sua sponte dismissed the claims against the non-moving defendants, for the reasons set forth in the Decision and Order. (The Clerk of Court is directed to close this case.) Signed by Hon. Michael A. Telesca on 5/23/17. (JMC)-CLERK TO FOLLOW UP-

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
GEORGE L. ANDERSON,
13-CV-578-MAT
DECISION AND ORDER

Plaintiff,
-vsJANE C. CAMERON, TERESA J.
MUCHA, JOE MARTENS, LANGDON
MARSH, THOMAS C. JORLING, and
HENRY G. WILLIAMS,
Defendants.

I.

Introduction
Pro se plaintiff George L. Anderson (“plaintiff”) commenced

the instant action on June 3, 2013, alleging that defendants
unlawfully prevented him from operating a “grandfathered” gravel
mining operation on his property in Chautauqua County, New York.
On August 21, 2013, the Court entered a Decision and Order in which
it granted plaintiff permission to proceed in forma pauperis and
instructed

him

to

September 23, 2013.

file

an

amended

Docket No. 4.

complaint

no

later

than

Plaintiff was informed that if

he failed to file an amended complaint, the Court would “proceed to
further

review

fully

the

complaint,

pursuant

to

28

U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B), against only those defendants named in the Caption
and Parties to Action . . . [s]ection[s] of the complaint.” Id.
at 8. Plaintiff failed to file an amended complaint, and the Court
subsequently ordered that the complaint be served.

Docket No. 8.

Defendants Jane C. Cameron (“Cameron”), Joe Martens (“Martens”),

and

Teresa

J.

Mucha

(“Mucha”)

(collectively

the

“moving

defendants”) filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
on March 27, 2014.

Docket No. 10.

The docket indicates that

defendants Thomas C. Jorling, Langdon Marsh, and Henry G. Williams
(collectively the “non-moving defendants”) were never served with
the with the summons and complaint.

Docket No. 9.

On January 4, 2017, United States Magistrate Judge H. Kenneth
Schroeder

issued

a

Report

and

Recommendation

(“R&R”)

(Docket

No. 27) recommending that the moving defendants’ motion to dismiss
be granted. For the reasons discussed below, the Court adopts the
findings set forth in the R&R and grants the motion to dismiss.

In

addition, the Court finds sua sponte pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915
that plaintiff has failed to state a claim as to Thomas C. Jorling,
Langdon Marsh, and Henry G. Williams.

As a result, the complaint

is dismissed in its entirety.
II.

Discussion
A.

Standard of Review

When specific objections are made to a magistrate judge’s
report and recommendation, the district judge makes a “de novo
determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed
findings or recommendations to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(C).

When only general objections are made to a

magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, the district judge
reviews it for clear error or manifest injustice. E.g., Brown v.
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Peters, 1997 WL 599355, at *2-3 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 1997), aff’d,
175 F.3d 1007 (2d Cir. 1999).

After conducting the appropriate

review, the district court may “accept, reject, or modify, in whole
or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate
judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C).
B.

Sua Sponte Dismissal of Plaintiff’s Claims Against the
Non-Moving Defendants

As a threshold matter, the Court notes that Judge Schroeder
limited his consideration to whether plaintiff had stated a claim
as to the moving defendants. Judge Schroeder apparently mistakenly
read the Court’s August 21, 2013 Decision and Order as dismissing
plaintiff’s claims against the non-moving defendants.
No. 27 at 4.

See Docket

However, review of the August 21, 2013 Decision and

Order shows that the Court reserved decision on the adequacy of the
claims against all the defendants listed in the caption, which
includes non-moving defendants Langdon Marsh, Thomas C. Jorling,
and Henry G. Williams.

See Docket No. 4 at 7.

The Court has

reviewed those claims and determines that sua sponte dismissal is
appropriate as to the non-moving defendants.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the Court shall dismiss
a case in which in forma pauperis status has been granted if, at
any time, the Court determines that the action (i) is frivolous or
malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is
immune from such relief.

Section 1915 “provide[s] an efficient
-3-

means

by

which

a

court

insufficient claims.”
2007).

can

screen

for

and

dismiss

legally

Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir.

“[S]ua sponte § 1915 . . . dismissal may occur and is in

some cases preferable after service of process and expansion of the
record.”

Anderson v. Coughlin, 700 F.2d 37, 41 (2d Cir. 1983).

In evaluating the complaint, the Court must accept as true all
of

the

factual

allegations

plaintiff’s favor.

and

must

draw

all

inferences

in

See Larkin v. Savage, 318 F.3d 138, 139

(2d Cir. 2003). Moreover, “a court is obliged to construe [pro se]
pleadings liberally, particularly when they allege civil rights
violations.”

McEachin v. McGuinnis, 357 F.3d 197, 200 (2d Cir.

2004). Nevertheless, even pleadings submitted pro se must meet the
notice requirements of Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.

Wynder v. McMahon, 360 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 2004).

Here, the complaint contains no factual allegations whatsoever
against non-moving defendants Langdon Marsh, Thomas C. Jorling, and
Henry

G.

Williams.

Indeed,

the

only

times

the

non-moving

defendants’ names appear are in the case caption and list of
parties. Moreover, plaintiff was given an opportunity to amend his
complaint pursuant to the Court’s August 21, 2013 Decision and
Order and failed to do so.

Under these circumstances, the Court

finds that sua sponte dismissal of the claims against non-moving
defendants Langdon Marsh, Thomas C. Jorling, and Henry G. Williams
is appropriate.
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B.

Plaintiff’s Objections to the R&R

Turning to plaintiff’s claims against the moving defendants,
plaintiff’s

objections

to

the

R&R

are

nothing

more

than

reiteration of the arguments considered by Judge Schroeder.

a

As a

result, the Court reviews the R&R for clear error, and finds none.
As discussed in detail in the R&R, the complaint contains no
factual allegations whatsoever regarding defendants Cameron and
Martens.

Because there is no supervisory liability in a case

brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and because plaintiff has failed to
identify any allegedly unlawful actions taken by Cameron and/or
Martens, dismissal of his claims against them is appropriate.
With respect to defendant Mucha, plaintiff alleges that she
violated his due process rights by ordering him to stop operating
his gravel operation under threat of fines and penalties.

As set

forth in the R&R, even assuming that plaintiff had a cognizable
property interest in continuing his gravel operation, he has failed
to allege facts from which a fact-finder could conclude that
defendant Mucha actually prevented him from doing so.

Moreover,

plaintiff’s own papers demonstrate that he has been afforded
extensive process, including having had his claims adjudicated by
no less than four state and federal courts, all of which decided
against him.
Plaintiff also has not stated claims for violation of the
Constitution’s

Takings

Clause

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or

Contracts

Clause.

As

Judge Schroeder explained, in order to state a claim based on the
Takings Clause, a plaintiff must allege that he sought compensation
via state procedures and was denied.
claim here.

Plaintiff has made no such

Plaintiff also has not alleged the existence of a

contract or a change in law that impaired that contract, as is
required to state a claim for violation of the Contracts Clause.
Finally, with respect to Plaintiff’s conspiracy claim, the
Court agrees with Judge Schroeder that plaintiff has failed to
allege any facts showing an agreement between defendant Mucha and
the administrative law judge.

Additionally, Mucha was acting in a

prosecutorial capacity when she allegedly initiated administrative
proceedings against plaintiff and is therefore entitled to immunity
from civil suit.
Having considered plaintiff’s objections, and for the reasons
set forth above, this Court finds no clear error or manifest
injustice in Judge Schroeder’s findings, as a whole, and therefore
adopts the R&R with respect to the claims against the moving
defendants.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth in Judge Schroeder’s thorough and
well-reasoned R&R, the undersigned adopts his conclusions. The R&R
(Docket No. 27) is hereby adopted, and the moving defendants’
motion to dismiss (Docket No. 10) is granted.

In addition, the

Court sua sponte dismissed the claims against the non-moving

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defendants, for the reasons set forth above. The Clerk of Court is
directed to close this case.
ALL OF THE ABOVE IS SO ORDERED.

S/Michael A. Telesca
___________________________
MICHAEL A. TELESCA
United States District Judge
Dated:

May 23, 2017
Rochester, New York

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