McCray v. The City of Albany New York, et al

Filing 160

ORDER denying 159 Plaintiff's Motion to Reopen Discovery. SO ORDERED. Signed by Hon. Hugh B. Scott on 10/1/2020. Copy of order and NEF mailed to Plaintiff. (MFM)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
TERENCE SANDY McCRAY,
Plaintiff,

13-CV-949 (HBS)
ORDER

v.
THE CITY OF ALBANY, NEW YORK, et al.,
Defendants.

This matter has been referred to the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A)-(C).
Dkt. No. 31. Self-represented plaintiff Terence Sandy McCray has filed a motion to reopen
discovery. Dkt. No. 159. Defendants did not respond. The Court need not order further briefing,
however, because McCray’s motion is without merit, and is therefore DENIED. 1
This Court has discretion to extend discovery deadlines “upon a showing of good cause.”
Williams v. Fischer, No. 13-CV-118, 2015 WL 3522431, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. June 4, 2015). “Factors for
determining good cause and the diligence of the moving party include 1) the imminence of trial; 2)
whether the request is opposed; 3) whether the moving party foresaw the need for additional
discovery, in light of the discovery deadline set by the court; 4) prejudice to the non-moving party;
and 5) whether further discovery is likely to lead to relevant evidence.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted). In addition, the movant’s delay in seeking relief may be considered. See, e.g., Gotlin v.
Lederman, No. 04-CV-3736, 2007 WL 1429431, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. May 7, 2007) (“[A] finding of good
cause depends on the diligence of the moving party.”); NAS Elecs., Inc. v. Transtech Elecs. PTE Ltd.,

McCray’s motion is addressed to District Judge Richard J. Arcara. See Dkt. No. 159 at 1. Since McCray’s motion
addresses a non-dispositive discovery matter within the scope of the referral order, this Court resolves it in the first
instance.

1

262 F. Supp. 2d 134, 151-52 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (denying motion to reopen discovery where plaintiffs
could have sought relief earlier but instead “let the time pass by without filing any motion for a
discovery extension”).
In this case, McCray’s motion comes more than twenty months after summary judgment
motions were resolved, and more than three years after he raised the arguments he now repeats in
his present motion. See Dkt. Nos. 140, 156. McCray offers no excuse for his clearly late filing.
Furthermore, that delay only heightens the prejudice redounding to Defendants should discovery be
reopened: the case is more than eight years old, dispositive motions have been resolved, and the
remaining issues are now fixed. Thus, reopening discovery would “increase the already-substantial
litigation costs[] and further delay resolution of this litigation.” Bakalar v. Vavra, 851 F. Supp. 2d 489,
494 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
For these reasons, the Court denies McCray’s motion to reopen discovery (Dkt. No. 159).
SO ORDERED.

/s/Hugh B. Scott

DATED: October 1, 2020

Hon. Hugh B. Scott
United States Magistrate Judge

2