Porter v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Company

Filing 67

DECISION AND ORDER denying Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration (Dkt. No. 66)consistent with this Decision and Order. Signed by Hon. Michael A. Telesca on 6/7/19. (JMC)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
________________________________
DOMINIQUE MARIE PORTER,
DECISION AND ORDER
No. 1:14-cv-00511

Plaintiff,
-vsSTATE FARM FIRE
& CASUALTY COMPANY,
Defendant.
________________________________
I.

Introduction
On June 6, 2019, the Court filed a Decision and Order adopting

in part and reversing in part the May 24, 2017, Report and
Recommendation
Judge

H.

(R&R)

Kenneth

issued

Schroeder,

Decision and Order”).1

by
Jr.

United

States

(hereinafter,

Docket No. 64.

the

Magistrate
“June

6th

In his R&R, Judge Schroeder

recommended that the Court grant Defendant’s motion for partial
summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claims for replacement cost, rental
income, and personal property coverage, and that the Court deny
Defendant’s motion for partial summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s
claim for debris cost removal.

See Docket No. 45 at 8.

The Court

adopted the portions of the R&R recommending that the Court grant
Defendant’s motion for partial summary judgment on Plaintiff’s
claims for replacement cost, rental income, and personal property
coverage, but reversed the R&R to the extent it denied Defendant’s
motion for partial summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claim for debris

1

As previously noted in my Decision and Order of June 6,
2019, this case was transferred to me by the Honorable Richard J.
Arcara on June 4, 2019.

cost removal.

The Court also dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint in

its entirety, based on the fact that the complaint, which alleges
that Plaintiff is entitled to reimbursement under the insurance
policy, is inconsistent with her sworn testimony.
Following the filing of the June 6th Decision and Order,
Plaintiff submitted a letter, requesting that the Court reconsider
its decision

based

on

the

existence

of

a

stipulation, which

provides that “the parties agreed . . . that the actual cash value
recoverable under the policy would be submitted to appraisal.”
Docket No. 66.
that the

Defendant submitted a letter response, contending

Court’s

June 6th

Decision

and

Order

dismissing

complaint in its entirety was proper.

Docket No. 65.2

following

Plaintiff’s

reasons,

the

Court

denies

the

For the

request

for

reconsideration.
II.

Discussion
“There are four basic grounds upon which a Rule 59(e) motion

may be granted.

First, the movant may demonstrate that the motion

is necessary to correct manifest errors of law or fact upon which
the judgment is based. . . . Second, the motion may be granted so
that the moving party may present newly discovered or previously
unavailable
necessary

evidence.

to

prevent

Third,
manifest

the

motion

injustice.

will

be

.

.

.

granted

if

Fourth,

a

Rule 59(e) motion may be justified by an intervening change in

2

The Court considered the letter request (Docket No. 66) as a motion for reconsideration
and the defendant’s letter in response (Docket No. 65) as the reply to that motion.

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controlling

law.”

11

Fed.

Prac.

&

Proc.

Civ.,

Grounds

for

Amendment or Alteration of Judgment, § 2810.1 (3d ed.) (footnotes
omitted).

“The

standard

for

granting

.

.

.

a

motion

[for

reconsideration] is strict, and reconsideration will generally be
denied unless the moving party can point to controlling decisions
or data that the court overlooked – matters, in other words, that
might reasonably be expected to alter the conclusion reached by the
court.” Shrader v. CSX Transp., 70 F.3d 255, 256 (2d Cir. 1995).
Plaintiff contends that reconsideration is warranted because
the Court’s decision to dismiss the complaint was a “mistake,” due
to the aforementioned stipulation for appraisal of damages. Docket
No. 66.

The Court disagrees.

stipulation.

The Court did not overlook the

The stipulation was filed on the docket (Docket

No. 39), and the Court was aware of its existence.

As argued by

Defendant in its response letter, the stipulation was merely an
effort to avoid the time and expense of a jury trial on the factual
issue of damages to the structure.

All coverage issues under the

policy continued to be reserved for this Court’s determination as
a matter of law, which the Court determined in the June 6th
Decision and Order.
As explained by the Court in the June 6th Decision and Order,
the Court may search the record on a motion for summary judgment.
The Court further notes that Defendant, in its first motion for
summary judgment, moved for dismissal of the entire complaint on
the basis that Plaintiff did not have an insurable interest in the

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254 Strauss Street property (hereinafter, “the property”).
Docket No. 12.

See

Although this motion was initially denied (see

Docket Nos. 19, 24), following the filing of Defendant’s motion for
partial summary judgment (Docket No. 36) and the issuance of the
R&R on that motion (Docket No. 45), the Court (Arcara, D.J.) issued
an Order, referencing its prior decision addressing Plaintiff’s
insurable interest in the property and “notif[ying] the parties
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f) that the Court will consider
summary judgment and partial summary judgment on that issue and on
other issues.”

See Docket No. 47.

The Court also ordered the

parties to submit additional briefing.

Id.

In other words, those

issues clearly were before the Court at the time it issued the June
6th Decision and Order.
In reaching its determination that Plaintiff’s complaint must
be dismissed, the Court carefully considered all of the evidence
submitted by the parties in support of and in opposition to summary
judgment, including Plaintiff’s deposition transcripts.

As the

Court made abundantly clear in the June 6th Decision and Order,
this evidence shows that Plaintiff purchased the property as an
accommodation for an individual named Tristan Spencer, who she
identified

as

her

sister

Mr. Spencer were scouting

Tina’s

boyfriend.

While

Tina

and

available properties, Plaintiff placed

bids on the properties for them.

Plaintiff paid the required $500

deposit on the Strauss Street property, but testified that Tina and

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Mr. Spencer “reimbursed me every dollar.
remainder balance.”

And then they paid the

Docket No. 36-5 at 9, 11-13.

Although the property was placed in Plaintiff’s name, she did
not

manage

or

have

any

interest

in

the

property.

Rather,

Mr. Spencer managed, maintained, and leased the property, made
renovations, and paid property taxes on the property.
20-23, 36.

Id. at 16,

Since Plaintiff’s name was listed as owner, she was

required to attend court at eviction proceedings, but Mr. Spencer
“handled everything,” pertaining to the eviction.

Id. at 25-26.

Plaintiff further testified that she had no authority to sell the
property,

and did

not

property.

receive

any

economic benefit

from the

Id. at 37.

With regard to the insurance policy on the property, Plaintiff
testified that she was not involved in obtaining the policy;
rather, Mr. Spencer obtained the policy providing Plaintiff’s
information as the owner and he paid the premiums on the policy.
Plaintiff knew nothing about the basic coverage of the policy
insuring the property and only learned of the policy limits when
she “started receiving letters after the property was burned down.”
Id. at 45-47.

As to her receiving any economic benefit from the

property, Plaintiff explained to the insurance agency salesman, “I
told Mike from State Farm I just - they say sign here, I just sign.
I don’t even read.
sign.”

I don’t even know what I be signing, I just

Id. at 37.

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At

a

second

deposition

on

January

28,

2016,

Plaintiff

testified that any money she would receive from State Farm “will go
straight to [Mr. Spencer] . . . [b]ecause it’s his property.”
Docket No. 36-11 at 29. Plaintiff further testified that, although
what remained of the property was demolished after the fire, she
was not aware who paid for the demolition costs.

Id. at 16-17.

The evidence shows that Plaintiff clearly and unequivocally
claimed no interest in the proceeds of the insurance policy as a
result of the fire damage to the property by stating that the
insurance proceeds belong to Mr. Spencer, and that she did not want
any proceeds paid out to her.

Docket No. 36-5 at 33-34, 38-39.

Plaintiff was emphatic that she wanted no financial benefit from
the policy, even though she is the named insured, by stating, “I
didn’t put any money in to the property, [and] I shouldn’t get
anything from it.”

Id. at 48.

It is also undisputed that Mr. Spencer used

Plaintiff’s

auction identification number to bid on the property. Although the
deed to the property lists Plaintiff as the owner (Docket Nos. 36-5
at 13-16, 36-6), she clearly explained that Mr. Spencer managed and
received any benefit from the property in all respects. She was at
best an accommodating owner benefitting Mr. Spencer for reasons
best known to them.
III. Conclusion
Based on the above-mentioned information, the Court denies
Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration (Docket No. 66).

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Plaintiff

has failed to articulate a valid basis upon which reconsideration
is warranted, and the June 6th Decision and Order dismissing the
complaint in its entirety stands.

ALL OF THE ABOVE IS SO ORDERED.
S/Michael A. Telesca
HONORABLE MICHAEL A. TELESCA
United States District Judge
DATED:

June 7, 2019
Rochester, New York

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