Walker v. Colvin
Filing
17
-CLERK TO FOLLOW UP- DECISION AND ORDER denying 7 Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings; granting 13 Commissioner's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings; and dismissing the Complaint in its entirety with prejudice. (Clerk to close case.) Signed by Hon. Michael A. Telesca on 12/21/15. (JMC)
4NITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
DONYLE T. WALKER o/b/o D.A.M.W.,
Plaintiff,
No. 1:14-CV-00707 (MAT)
DECISION AND ORDER
-vsCAROLYN W. COLVIN, ACTING
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
I.
Introduction
Represented by counsel, Donyle T. Walker (“plaintiff”) has
brought this action on behalf of her infant son (“D.A.M.W.”)
pursuant to Title XVI of the Social Security Act (“the Act”),
seeking review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social
Security (“the Commissioner”) denying plaintiff’s application for
Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”). This Court has jurisdiction
over the matter pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c). Presently
before the Court are the parties’ cross-motions for judgment on the
pleadings. For the reasons discussed below, the Commissioner’s
motion is granted.
II.
Procedural History
The record reveals that in March 2011, plaintiff filed an
application for SSI benefits on behalf of D.A.M.W. (d/o/b September
3, 1999), alleging disability as of March 30, 2011. Plaintiff’s
application was denied, and she requested a hearing, which was held
before administrative law judge David S. Lewandowski (“the ALJ”) on
October 22, 2012. The ALJ issued an unfavorable decision on March
4, 2013.
The Appeals Council denied review of that decision. This
timely action followed.
III. Summary of the Evidence
A.
Medical Records
The medical record indicates that D.A.M.W., who was in sixth
grade
during
the
2010-2011
school
year,
began
treating
with
psychiatrist Dr. Samson Adegbite in March 2011. At that time,
plaintiff reported that D.A.M.W. had a history of attention deficit
hyperactivity disorder (“ADHD”). Mental status examination (“MSE”)
was unremarkable. Dr. Adegbite started D.A.M.W. on prescription
medication for ADHD symptoms. In April 2011, plaintiff reported
that D.A.M.W. was “doing well on current medication, [with] no
side-effect of medication reported.” T. 224. MSE was unremarkable.
D.A.M.W. also treated with counselors at Child and Family
Services (“CFS”). Plaintiff reported that he had been suspended
from school several times for “violent behavior,” with the number
of incidents estimated at 75. T. 255. She reported that he
had
exhibited maladaptive social behaviors since pre-kindergarten. An
assessment
dated
January
2011
recorded
the
following
issues:
“[D.A.M.W.] gets into verbal[] and physical[] fights, [he is]
easily agitated, if someone hits him he explodes (pushes, punches
. . .), one minute happy next minute, fidget[s], blurts out
answers, talks during class, disrupts the class, talks back to
teacher, needs reminders to stay on task, easily distracted, does
not complete assignments, gets out of seat without permission.
2
Denies suicidal or homicidal thoughts. Feels picked on by peers.”
Id. Treating sources at CFS diagnosed D.A.M.W. with ADHD. In June
2011,
a
treatment
plan
identified
the
following
problems:
disciplinary issues at school, issues complying with rules at home,
problems
getting
along
with
others
socially,
and
medication
management. In June 2011, D.A.M.W. was discharged from treatment at
CFS due to logistical issues his mother had transporting him there;
he was transferred to treatment at Monsignor Carr Institute.
State agency consultant Dr. J. Meyer completed a childhood
disability
evaluation
form
in
June
2011.
Upon
review
of
the
evidence available to him, Dr. Meyer opined that D.A.M.W. had no
limitation in acquiring and using information, moving about and
manipulating objects, and health and physical well-being. He opined
that D.A.M.W. had less than marked limitations in the remaining
domains. He provided no explanation for his findings. The ALJ gave
his opinion only some weight, noting that it did not “sufficiently
consider
the
effect
of
the
claimant’s
social
and
behavioral
difficulties on the ability to learn and complete tasks.” T. 46.
At Monsignor Carr, D.A.M.W. continued to treat with Dr.
Adegbite. As of September 2011, his treatment involved therapy
every 90 days, which treatment would be discontinued “when [his]
bullying and oppositional behaviors [were] eliminated as reported
by
mother,”
when
his
anger
management
skills
“increased
significantly,” and when his “ability to focus has increased
significantly as reported by mother.” T. 289.
3
In September 2011, Dr. Adegbite noted that D.A.M.W. reported
feeling depressed on “more day[s] than not” but stated he did not
have suicidal ideation. Dr. Adegbite opined that his concentration
and attention span were “minimal” without medication; however,
D.A.M.W. was medicated at that time. T. 279. Dr. Adegbite noted a
current global assessment of functioning (“GAF”) score of 35-40,
with a past GAF of 45-50. See Am. Psych. Ass'n, Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders–Text Revision (“DSM–IV–TR”),
at 34 (4th ed., rev. 2000). On MSE in March 2012, D.A.M.W. exhibited
a
fair
concentration/attention
span,
euthymic
mood,
affect
appropriate to mood, fair judgment/insight, and adequate impulse
control. He was noted to be “doing well on current medication.” T.
281. In April 2012, it was once again noted that D.A.M.W. was doing
well on medication but his Aderall was decreased due to the side
effect of dizziness. MSE continued to be essentially unremarkable.
Dr. Adegbite noted a good prognosis with continued treatment and
therapy.
In May, June, and July 2012, D.A.M.W. reported no side effects
from medication. MSE during both of those months continued to be
essentially unremarkable. Dr. Adegbite also continued to note a
good prognosis with continued treatment. In August 2012, it was
noted that D.A.M.W.’s treatment sessions had been “lengthened as
requested” by his mother. T. 299.
In a medical statement completed by Dr. Adegbite in September
2012, he noted diagnoses of ADHD, mood disorder, not otherwise
4
specified
(“NOS”),
and
intermittent
explosive
disorder.
Dr.
Adegbite opined that D.A.M.W. had no limitation in caring for
himself; moderate limitation in acquiring and using information and
moving
about
and
manipulating
objects;
marked
limitation
in
interacting and relating with others; and extreme limitation in
attending
and
completing
tasks.
Dr.
Adegbite
commented
that
D.A.M.W. had “significant limitation” in attention, completing
tasks, and social interactions. T. 304.
On October 4, 2012, D.A.M.W. was admitted to Eastern Niagara
Hospital
after
threatening
to
kill
himself.
Treatment
notes
indicated that his mother “had to physically restrain him as he had
planned to obtain a knife from the kitchen.” T. 322. “This was in
response to mother setting limits on his [sic] due to his avoiding
school, a pattern that started at the end of the last school year
and seems to have started up again this school year.” Id. D.A.M.W.
reported that “his new stimulant medication did not seem to help
him focus very well and that . . . made it very difficult for him
to complete his work.” Id. He also reported side effects from his
medication including loss of appetite and insomnia.
Dr. Seth Dewey, who treated D.A.M.W. during his five-day stay
at
the
hospital,
opined
that
his
depressive
symptoms
were
associated with poor school performance and “seemed to reflect more
demoralization than a true major depressive illness.” Id. Dr. Dewey
“did not . . . elicit any history that clearly suggested any
psychotic symptoms,” and D.A.M.W. “did not present as obviously
5
suffering from a major depression, psychotic illness, or mania.”
Id. at 322-23. Dr. Dewey changed D.A.M.W.’s
that
he
had
experienced
problems
prescriptions, noting
adjusting
to
amphetamine
prescriptions in the past. On December 8, 2012, one day before
discharge, it was noted that D.A.M.W. was tolerating his new
medication
better
than
his
old
medication,
but
was
still
experiencing loss of appetite. MSE upon discharge was essentially
unremarkable.
Dr.
Dewey
noted
“resolution
of
his
suicidal
ideation.” T. 323.
Dr. Adegbite completed another statement on October 15, 2012,
opining that
D.A.M.W.
had no
limitation
in
moving
about
and
manipulating objects, but marked limitation in acquiring and using
information,
attending
and
completing
tasks,
interacting
and
relating with others, and caring for himself. Dr. Adegbite noted,
in reference to D.A.M.W.’s hospitalization, that he had become
“acutely psychotic threatening to kill himself and had to be
admitted to hospital inpatient care.” T. 318. Dr. Adegbite also
noted that D.A.M.W. treated with a social worker one to two times
per month for counseling, and treated monthly with Dr. Adegbite for
medication management.
After
prepared
the
by
ALJ’s
school
decision,
psychologist
plaintiff
Lindsey
submitted
Calabrese,
a
report
M.S.
That
report, dated April 2013, noted that D.A.M.W. was currently in
eighth
grade
general
education
classes
and
had
“significant
attendance problems.” T. 24. Teachers reported that D.A.M.W. scored
6
“average” in reading and writing but “extremely below average” in
math. Id. “He [had] very neat handwriting and perform[ed] well on
English tests.” Id. His disciplinary history over the last three
years was “notable for conduct endangering the health/safety of
others,
bullying,
disrespecting
an
adult,
and
chronic
insubordination.” Id. He had been absent 65 times and tardy six
times during the 2012-2013 school year.
During
Ms.
Calabrese’s
behavioral
assessment,
D.A.M.W.
“presented as polite and cooperative,” “willingly attended test
sessions and easily established rapport” with Calabrese, “was
prompt and careful in responding and remained focused on the tasks
presented,”
and
“appeared
to
put
forth
his
best
effort
and
generally persisted at tasks increased in difficulty, although he
gave up easily at times.” T. 24-25. His test results indicated a
full-scale IQ of 92, with a verbal comprehension index of 95, a
perceptual reasoning index of 98, and processing speed index of
100.
He
was
assessed
in
the
average
range
of
intellectual
functioning. Ms. Calabrese opined that D.A.M.W. presented with
“[c]linically elevated Internalizing Problems and School Problems,”
and based on his mother’s reports, presented with “[c]linically
elevated Externalizing Problems and Internalizing Problems.” T. 27.
B. Educational Records and Testimony
Educational records from the 2010-2011 school year recorded
numerous suspensions, both in and out of school, for various
disciplinary
incidents
involving
7
D.A.M.W.’s
aggression
toward
peers. For example, D.A.M.W. “scraped” another student with an
object, kicked other students under the table and refused to stop
when prompted by a teacher, pushed another student into the wall,
and wrote in pen on another student’s shirt. One teacher recorded
an in-school suspension in March 2011, noting that D.A.M.W. “[did]
NOT follow rules, [did] what he want[ed], ha[d] temper tantrums,
[did] not listen, disrupt[ed] everyone else, . . . [did] NO work or
reading,
day
after
day,
also
[made]
fun
of
other
students
(bullying)[.]” T. 180 (emphasis in original).
A teacher questionnaire was completed in June 2011 by four of
D.A.M.W.’s teachers and school nurse Sherif Szymanski, RN. At that
time, plaintiff had not exhibited an unusual degree of absenteeism.
In the domain of acquiring and using information, his teachers
assessed him as having a “very serious” problem in providing
organized oral explanations and adequate descriptions, “serious”
problems in understanding and participating in class discussions
and applying problem-solving skills, and an “obvious” problem
recalling
and
applying
previously-learned
material.
Several
“slight” problems were noted as well. In regard to this domain, a
teacher noted that he “struggle[d] with class discussions and
social interactions.” T. 166.
In the domain of attending and completing tasks, D.A.M.W. was
noted to have serious problems focusing long enough to finish
assigned activities or tasks and refocusing to task when necessary.
These problems were noted to occur on an hourly basis. He had
8
obvious problems carrying out multi-step instructions and working
at a reasonable pace/finishing on time. He was also noted to have
several slight problems. A teacher noted that these ratings were
“based on [teachers’] observations after the student began taking
medication. Prior to the medication, [he] struggled immensely with
all behaviors listed above.” T. 167 (emphasis in original).
In
the
domain
of
interacting
and
relating
with
others,
teachers opined that D.A.M.W. had very serious, hourly problems in
making
and
keeping
friends,
relating
experiences
and
telling
stories, and introducing and maintaining relevant and appropriate
topics of information. He had a serious, hourly problem in playing
cooperatively with other children, and an obvious, daily problem
using language appropriate to the situation and listener.
D.A.M.W. was not noted to have any serious problems in caring
for himself, although teachers noted that they were “concerned
about
his
lack
of
social
interaction
with
his
peers
and
teachers/adults in school.” T. 170. No problems were noted in the
remaining domains.
D.A.M.W. testified at his hearing that he did not get along
with teachers, his grades were “[h]orrible,” and when asked if
there was “anything [he] enjoy[ed] doing,” he testified, “[n]o.” T.
61. He testified he did not do his homework because he did not want
to and he did not do chores. Plaintiff’s mother testified that he
refused to do chores when he did not want to do them. She stated
that she “[had] been getting calls from all of his teachers saying
9
that he misses his assignments often, he refuses to do his work,
[and] he has been on lunch detention every day.” T. 67. She
testified that in early October, she confronted D.A.M.W. about
missing school, he “got frustrated” with her, “starting to throw
things at [her],” and then “said he wanted to kill himself,” at
which point she restrained him. T. 68. She also testified that the
new medication he received at the hospital was not working, and
that he had been prescribed new medication. She described an
incident in which she attempted to have D.A.M.W. eat dinner at the
table with her on a counselor’s suggestion, but he refused to do so
and “broke the legs off the chairs.” T. 72.
IV.
The ALJ’s Decision
The ALJ found, at the first step, that D.A.M.W. was a school-
age child at the time of the application and was an adolescent at
the time of the decision, see 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(g)(2)), who was
not engaged in substantial gainful activity. At the second step,
the ALJ found that D.A.M.W. suffered from the severe impairment of
attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (“ADHD”).
At the third step, the ALJ found that D.A.M.W. did not suffer
from an impairment or combination of impairments that met or
medically equaled the severity of one of the listed impairments in
20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 C.F.R. §§ 416.924,
416.925, 416.926). The ALJ found that plaintiff did not meet the
criteria of listing 112.11, reasoning that there was “no evidence
in the record of marked inattention, marked impulsiveness, and
10
marked hyperactivity.” T. 43. In coming to his decision, the ALJ
considered D.A.M.W.’s functioning in the six domains, and assessed
a marked limitation in interacting and relating with others; less
than
marked
limitations
in
acquiring
and
using
information,
attending and completing tasks, caring for himself, and health and
physical
well-being;
and
no
limitation
in
moving
about
and
manipulating objects.
V.
Discussion
To qualify as disabled under the Act, a child under the age of
eighteen must have “a medically determinable physical or mental
impairment,
which
results
in
marked
and
severe
functional
limitations, and which can be expected to result in death or which
has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of
not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(C)(I). The
plaintiff
must
substantial
show
gainful
that:
(1)
activity;
the
(2)
child
the
was
child
not
engaged
had
a
in
"severe"
impairment or combination of impairments; and (3) the child's
impairment(s) met, medically equaled, or functionally equaled the
severity of a listed impairment. 20 C.F.R. § 416.924. At the third
step, “[f]or a child's impairment to functionally equal a listed
impairment, the impairment must ‘result in “marked” limitations in
two domains of functioning or an “extreme” limitation in one
domain.’” Encarnacion ex rel. George v. Astrue, 586 F.3d 72, 75
(2d Cir. 2009) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 416 .926a(a)). A child's
11
limitations are evaluated in the context of the following six
domains of functioning:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
acquiring and using information;
attending and completing tasks;
interacting and relating with others;
moving about and manipulating objects;
caring for oneself; and
health and physical well-being.
20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(b)(1).
A
district
court
may
set
aside
the
Commissioner’s
determination that a claimant is not disabled only if the factual
findings are not supported by “substantial evidence” or if the
decision is based on legal error. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); see also
Green-Younger v. Barnhard, 335 F.3d 99, 105-06 (2d Cir. 2003).
“Substantial evidence means ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Shaw v.
Chater, 221 F.3d 126, 131 (2d Cir. 2000).
Plaintiff contends that (1) the ALJ failed to properly apply
the treating physician rule; (2) new evidence submitted to the
Appeals Council reasonably could have changed the ALJ’s decision;
and (3) plaintiff met the requirements of listing 112.11, which
defines ADHD.
A.
Application of the Treating Physician Rule
The treating physician rule provides that an ALJ must give
controlling weight to a treating physician’s opinion if that
opinion is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and
diagnostic techniques and not inconsistent with other substantial
12
evidence in the record. See Halloran v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 28, 32
(2d Cir. 2004); 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c)(2). However, “[w]hen other
substantial evidence in the record conflicts with the treating
physician's
opinion
.
.
.
that
opinion
will
not
be
deemed
controlling. And the less consistent that opinion is with the
record as a whole, the less weight it will be given.” Snell v.
Apfel, 177 F.3d 128, 133 (2d Cir. 1999) (citing 20 C.F.R. §
404.1527(d)(4)).
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in giving little weight to
Dr. Adegbite’s two treating opinions. The ALJ discussed those
opinions in the context of the entire record, reasoning:
Although he is a treating source, it is noted that Dr.
Adegbite’s opinions feature significant variations in the
degree of stated limitations, despite being issued only
one month apart from each other (September and October
2012). Moreover, the later issued opinion gives no reason
for the dramatic change in opined limitations. Although
the hospitalization for suicidal ideation occurred
between the dates of the two reports, this alone does not
sufficiently account for the increased level of opined
restriction in acquiring and using information, or the
decreased level of opined restriction in attending and
[completing] tasks. The claimant’s medications appear to
be working and there is no support for marked limitations
in caring for himself, as opined by Dr. Adegbite.
Furthermore, as noted above, the claimant was considered
to be in good condition upon discharge from the hospital,
and underwent a thoroughly normal mental status
evaluation. Additionally, Dr. Adegbite’s own treatment
notes indicate that the claimant does well in school and
is doing well with his medications.
T. 46 (citations omitted).
The ALJ’s reasons for rejecting Dr. Adegbite’s opinions were
sound and supported by substantial evidence in the record. Although
D.A.M.W. was hospitalized during the period between Dr. Adegbite’s
13
two opinions, that hospitalization, however, does not account for
the differences between the two opinions for the following reasons.
First, D.A.M.W. exhibited no psychotic illness, major depression,
or mania while hospitalized, and was assessed with normal mental
status upon discharge. Second, Dr. Adegbite’s opinion of D.A.M.W.’s
functioning did not simply worsen after D.A.M.W.’s hospitalization,
but inexplicably changed: for example, Dr. Adegbite found in his
second opinion that D.A.M.W. no longer exhibited any problems in
moving about and manipulating objects or in health and physical
well-being. As the ALJ described, Dr. Adegbite’s opinions were
internally inconsistent as well as inconsistent with his own
treatment notes, which indicated consistent normal mental status
examinations and a good prognosis with continued treatment and
medication. See Kirk v. Colvin, 2014 WL 2214138, *7 (W.D.N.Y. May
28, 2014) (“Inconsistencies between [the treating physician’s]
treatment notes and final opinions constitute ‘good reasons’ for
assigning her opinions non-controlling weight.”) (citing Campbell
v. Astrue, 2013 WL 1221931, *2 (W.D.N.Y. June 29, 2013) (stating an
ALJ may “properly discount” a treating physician's opinion if it is
inconsistent with “[her] own treatment notes”)).
Moreover, Dr. Adegbite’s opinions were also inconsistent with
the
opinions
of
D.A.M.W.’s
teachers,
which
the
ALJ
properly
accorded great weight. The teacher questionnaire indicated that
D.A.M.W. exhibited problems with attention and concentration, but
that those problems had improved with medication. Additionally, the
14
questionnaire emphasized social functional limitations, a domain in
which the ALJ found that D.A.M.W. had marked limitation. A review
of the record reveals that D.A.M.W. tested at average intelligence
in school and, when he attended, had decent grades. Upon review of
the entire record, it is apparent that D.A.M.W.’s limitations were
primarily social in nature, centering on bullying issues with peers
and refusal to follow the directives of teachers and his mother.
The Court thus concludes that the ALJ properly determined that most
of the academic issues reported by teachers were due to “social
difficulties
rather
than
to
intellectual
limitations,”
when
considered in the context of the entire record of D.A.M.W.’s
education and medical treatment. T. 45. Therefore, the record
evidence does not support the conclusion that D.A.M.W.’s medically
determinable impairment of ADHD “result[ed]” in the limitations
necessary
to
find
that
a
listing
was
functionally
equaled.
Encarnacion, 586 F.3d at 75 (emphasis added).
B.
New and Material Evidence
Plaintiff argues that the evaluation submitted by school
psychologist Calabrese should have been considered by the Appeals
Council as reasonably likely to change the ALJ’s decision with
regard to disability. As recounted above, that evaluation found
that D.A.M.W. had average intelligence, and actually reported
significantly favorable compliance with testing procedures upon
evaluation.
15
The Court does agree with plaintiff that the report relates to
the time period prior to the ALJ’s decision, contrary to the
Appeals Council’s finding that it was “about a later time.” See T.
2.
However,
in
order
to
establish
that
evidence
is
new
and
material, and thus warrants reconsideration of the Commissioner’s
decision, an appellant must show that the evidence was not only
absent from the record during the administrative process, but also
that the evidence is “both relevant to the claimant's condition
during the time period for which benefits were denied[,] and
probative.” Jones v. Sullivan, 949 F.2d 57, 60 (2d Cir. 1991)
(emphasis added) (quoting Tirado v. Bowen, 842 F.3d 595, 597 (2d
Cir. 1988) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
Ms. Calabrese’s report is not probative because it does not
significantly alter the analysis of D.A.M.W.’s impairments during
the relevant time period. For the most part, the report summarizes
plaintiff’s prior complaints about D.A.M.W.’s behavior and notes
his more recent problem of excessive absenteeism. However, the
report does not add any appreciable new information regarding
plaintiff’s
limitations
in
any
of
the
relevant
domains
of
functioning, nor is it particularly relevant to the consideration
of any listing. Because
the report “adds no new perspective to a
consideration of his condition during the relevant time period, the
evidence is [not] probative.” Reynolds ex rel. E.S.R. v. Colvin,
2015 WL 6126945, *5 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2015).
C.
Listing 112.11
16
Finally, plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in finding that
D.A.M.W. did not meet the criteria of listing 112.11, which defines
ADHD. That listing requires, as a threshold, that a claimant
demonstrate
“[m]edically
inattention,
marked
documented
impulsivity,
and
findings”
marked
of
marked
hyperactivity.
20
C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, § 112.11. As noted above, the ALJ
found that D.A.M.W. did not meet this listing because there was “no
evidence in the record of marked inattention, marked impulsiveness,
and marked hyperactivity.” T. 43. The Court agrees.
Numerous mental status examinations over D.A.M.W.’s treatment
history were unremarkable. In fact, when D.A.M.W. was properly
medicated for ADHD, not a single mental status examination noted a
significant
hyperactivity.
abnormality
Dr.
in
Adegbite
attention,
never
noted
impulsiveness,
or
hyperactivity,
and
repeatedly noted that D.A.M.W.’s impulse control was adequate and
his concentration and attention span were fair. School psychologist
Calabrese also noted persistent attention to and concentration on
tasks, as well as a quick establishment of proper rapport with Ms.
Calabrese, with no notation of hyperactivity. Therefore, the ALJ’s
consideration
of
this
listing
was
proper
and
supported
by
substantial evidence in the record.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff’s motion for judgment on
the pleadings (Doc. 7) is denied, and the Commissioner’s crossmotion (Doc. 13) is granted. The ALJ’s finding that D.A.M.W. was
17
not disabled during the relevant period is supported by substantial
evidence in the record, and accordingly, the complaint is dismissed
in its entirety with prejudice.
ALL OF THE ABOVE IS SO ORDERED.
S/Michael A. Telesca
HON. MICHAEL A. TELESCA
United States District Judge
Dated:
December 21, 2015
Rochester, New York.
18
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