Refermat v. Lancaster Central School District

Filing 52

ORDER: The Defendant, Lancaster Central School District, has filed a notice of interlocutory appeal 51 from this Court's August 1, 2018 Decision and Order 50 . Pursuant to the findings set forth in the attached Order, the Court concludes that it does retain subject-matter jurisdiction over this case. Absent order of the Second Circuit, trial will commence, as scheduled, on May 7, 2019. SO ORDERED. Signed by Hon. Richard J. Arcara on 8/31/2018. (LAS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
_________________________________
MARY REFERMAT,
Plaintiff,
14-CV-0712-RJA-MJR
ORDER

v.
LANCASTER CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Defendant.
__________________________________

The Defendant, Lancaster Central School District, has filed a notice of interlocutory
appeal from this Court’s August 1, 2018 Decision and Order (Docket No. 50) that, as
relevant here, denied the District’s motion for summary judgment. At a conference on
August 27, 2018, the Court scheduled trial for May 2019.
Because “the filing of a notice of appeal is an event of jurisdictional significance,”
Griggs v. Provident Consumer Disc. Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982), and because a federal
court has “an independent obligation to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction
exists, even in the absence of a challenge from any party,” Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546
U.S. 500, 514 (2006), the Court sua sponte considers whether the District’s notice of
appeal divested the Court of subject-matter jurisdiction.
“A district court’s denial of summary judgment is ordinarily not an appealable ‘final
decision’ within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291,” and none of the limited exceptions to
the final-decision rule—such as the collateral-order doctrine—appears to be implicated
by the Court’s August 1, 2018 Decision and Order. Tolbert v. Queens College, 164 F.3d
132, 138 (2d Cir. 1999). See also Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2018 (2014) (“An
order denying a motion for summary judgment is generally not a final decision within the
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meaning of § 1291 and is thus generally not immediately appealable.”) The District’s
notice of appeal therefore appears to be premature.
Although the filing of a notice of appeal typically divests a district court of subjectmatter jurisdiction, see Griggs, 459 U.S. at 58, a premature notice of appeal does not do
so. See United States v. Rodgers, 101 F.3d 247, 251-52 (2d Cir. 1996). The Court
therefore concludes that, notwithstanding the District’s notice of interlocutory appeal, the
Court retains subject-matter jurisdiction over this case. Absent order of the Second
Circuit, trial will commence, as scheduled, on May 7, 2019.
SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 31, 2018
Buffalo, New York

_s/Richard J. Arcara_________
HONORABLE RICHARD J. ARCARA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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