Lasalle v. Colvin
Filing
14
-CLERK TO FOLLOW UP---DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING the Commissioner's 11 MOTION for Judgment on the Pleadings and DENYING Plaintiff's 9 MOTION for Judgment on the Pleadings. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of the Commissioner and to close this case. Signed by Hon. John T. Curtin on 2/3/2016. (JEC)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
ANGELA MICHELLE LASALLE,
Plaintiff,
-vs-
14-CV-872-JTC
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Acting Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.
APPEARANCES:
LAW OFFICES OF KENNETH HILLER (ELIZABETH HAUNGS,
ESQ., of Counsel), Amherst, New York, for Plaintiff.
WILLIAM J. HOCHUL, JR., United States Attorney (FERGUS
KAISER, Special Assistant United States Attorney, of Counsel),
Buffalo, New York, for Defendant.
This matter has been transferred to the undersigned for all further proceedings, by
order of United States District Judge William M. Skretny dated October 8, 2015 (Item 13).
Plaintiff Angela Lasalle initiated this action on October 20, 2014, pursuant to the
Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“the Act”), for judicial review of the final
determination of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying plaintiff’s
application for Disability Income Benefits (“DIB”) and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”)
benefits under Titles II and XVI of the Act. Plaintiff has moved for judgment on the
pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (see Item 9) and
the Commissioner has cross-moved for the same relief (Item 11). For the following
reasons, plaintiff’s motion is denied and defendant’s motion is granted.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff was born on October 29, 1981 (Tr. 171).1 She filed applications for DIB
and SSI on July 11, 2011, alleging disability due to depression, anxiety, back and neck
pain, and hearing impairment with an onset date of August 1, 2007 (Tr. 190). The claims
were denied administratively on November 4, 2011 (see Tr. 102-113). Plaintiff requested
a hearing, which was held on December 14, 2012, before Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”)
Donald T. McDougall (Tr. 29-86). Plaintiff appeared and testified at the hearing, and was
represented by counsel. Additionally, the ALJ took the testimony of a Vocational Expert
(“VE”).
On January 17, 2013, ALJ McDougall issued a decision finding that plaintiff was not
disabled within the meaning of the Act (Tr. 11-23). Following the sequential evaluation
process outlined in the Social Security Administration regulations (see 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520, 416.920), the ALJ found that plaintiff had the following “severe” impairments:
anxiety disorder, depression, mild arthritis of the back, bilateral hearing impairment, and
mild right carpal tunnel syndrome (Tr. 13). The ALJ found that the evidence in the record
regarding plaintiff’s symptoms and functional limitations did not support a finding that these
impairments, considered singly or in combination, met or medically equaled the criteria of
any impairment listed at 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (the “Listings”) (Tr. 1315).
The ALJ discussed the evidence in the record regarding plaintiff’s medically
1
Parenthetical numeric references preceded by “Tr.” are to pages of the administrative transcript
filed by the Commissioner at the time of entry of notice of appearance in this action (Item 7).
2
determinable impairments–including treatment notes and consultative evaluations, along
with plaintiff’s hearing testimony and statements about the limiting effects of her
impairments–and determined that plaintiff had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to
perform light work2 with the following limitations: plaintiff must be able to change from
sitting to standing positions at least every half-hour; she should not use her right hand
more than 20 minutes at a time; she must not balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, crawl, or
climb; plaintiff may not climb ropes, ladders, and scaffolds; she must avoid extreme cold
temperatures, wetness, and humidity; she can work in a low-stress position, performing
simple, routine tasks; plaintiff cannot handle money or work around the general public; she
can have only occasional contact with co-workers or supervisors; she instructions should
be received face-to-face with no requirement for hearing soft tones and no loud noises;
plaintiff must be able to use hand sanitizer every 20 minutes (Tr. 15). Considering
plaintiff’s age (25 years at the alleged onset date), limited education (some high school),
work experience (inability to perform past relevant work), and RFC, and relying on the
testimony of a VE, the ALJ determined that jobs exist in significant numbers in the national
economy that plaintiff can perform and that she has not been under a disability from the
onset date to the date of the decision (Tr. 22-23).
The ALJ’s decision became the final decision of the Commissioner when the
Appeals Council denied plaintiff's request for review (Tr. 1-5), and this action followed.
In her motion for judgment on the pleadings, plaintiff contends that the
2
“Light work” involves lifting no more than 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently, “a
good deal of walking or standing,” or sitting with some pushing or pulling of arm or leg controls. 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1567(b), 416.967(b).
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Commissioner’s determination should be reversed because the ALJ erred in his
assessment of plaintiff’s credibility See Item 9-1. The government contends that the
Commissioner’s determination should be affirmed because the ALJ’s decision was made
in accordance with the pertinent legal standards and is based on substantial evidence in
the record. See Item 11-1.
DISCUSSION
I.
Scope of Judicial Review
The Social Security Act provides that, upon district court review of the
Commissioner‘s decision, “[t]he findings of the Commissioner … as to any fact, if
supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive ….”
42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
Substantial evidence is defined as evidence which “a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.” Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229
(1938), quoted in Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); see also Tejada v.
Apfel, 167 F.3d 770, 773-74 (2d Cir. 1999). The substantial evidence test applies not only
to findings on basic evidentiary facts, but also to inferences and conclusions drawn from
the facts. Giannasca v. Astrue, 2011 WL 4445141, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2011) (citing
Rodriguez v. Califano, 431 F. Supp. 421, 423 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)).
Under these standards, the scope of judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision
is limited, and the reviewing court may not try the case de novo or substitute its findings
for those of the Commissioner. Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401; see also Cage v. Comm'r of
Soc. Servs., 692 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 2012). The court’s inquiry is “whether the record,
read as a whole, yields such evidence as would allow a reasonable mind to accept the
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conclusions reached” by the Commissioner. Sample v. Schweiker, 694 F.2d 639, 642 (9th
Cir. 1982), quoted in Hart v. Colvin, 2014 WL 916747, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 10, 2014).
However, “[b]efore the insulation of the substantial evidence test comes into play,
it must first be determined that the facts of a particular case have been evaluated in the
light of correct legal standards.” Klofta v. Mathews, 418 F. Supp. 1139, 1411 (E.D.Wis.
1976), quoted in Sharbaugh v. Apfel, 2000 WL 575632, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2000);
Nunez v. Astrue, 2013 WL 3753421, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. July 17, 2013) (citing Tejada, 167 F.3d
at 773). “Failure to apply the correct legal standard constitutes reversible error, including,
in certain circumstances, failure to adhere to the applicable regulations.” Kohler v. Astrue,
546 F.3d 260, 265 (2d Cir. 2008) (citations omitted).
Thus, the Commissioner’s
determination cannot be upheld when it is based on an erroneous view of the law, or
misapplication of the regulations, that disregards highly probative evidence. See Grey v.
Heckler, 721 F.2d 41, 44 (2d Cir. 1983); see also Johnson v. Bowen, 817 F.2d 983, 985
(2d Cir. 1987) (“Failure to apply the correct legal standards is grounds for reversal.”),
quoted in McKinzie v. Astrue, 2010 WL 276740, at *6 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 2010).
If the Commissioner's findings are free of legal error and supported by substantial
evidence, the court must uphold the decision. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“The findings of the
Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall
be conclusive, and where a claim has been denied … the court shall review only the
question of conformity with [the] regulations ….”); see Kohler, 546 F.3d at 265. “Where the
Commissioner's decision rests on adequate findings supported by evidence having rational
probative force, [the court] will not substitute [its] judgment for that of the Commissioner.”
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Veino v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 578, 586 (2d Cir. 2002). Even where there is substantial
evidence in the record weighing against the Commissioner's findings, the determination will
not be disturbed so long as substantial evidence also supports it. See Marquez v. Colvin,
2013 WL 5568718, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 2013) (citing DeChirico v. Callahan, 134 F.3d
1177, 1182 (2d Cir. 1998) (upholding the Commissioner's decision where there was
substantial evidence for both sides)).
In addition, it is the function of the Commissioner, not the reviewing court, “to
resolve evidentiary conflicts and to appraise the credibility of witnesses, including claimant.”
Carroll v. Sec'y of Health and Human Services, 705 F.2d 638, 642 (2d Cir. 1983); cf.
Cichocki v. Astrue, 534 F. App’x 71, 75 (2d Cir. Sept. 5, 2013). “Genuine conflicts in the
medical evidence are for the Commissioner to resolve,” Veino, 312 F.3d at 588, and the
court “must show special deference” to credibility determinations made by the ALJ, “who
had the opportunity to observe the witnesses’ demeanor” while testifying. Yellow Freight
Sys. Inc. v. Reich, 38 F.3d 76, 81 (2d Cir. 1994).
II.
Standards for Determining Eligibility for Disability Benefits
To be eligible for DIB and SSI benefits under the Social Security Act, plaintiff must
present proof sufficient to show that she suffers from a medically determinable physical or
mental impairment “which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be
expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months …,” 42 U.S.C.
§ 423(d)(1)(A), and is “of such severity that [s]he is not only unable to do h[er] previous
work but cannot, considering h[er] age, education, and work experience, engage in any
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other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy ….” 42 U.S.C.
§ 423(d)(2)(A); see also 20 C.F.R. § 416.905(a). As indicated above, the regulations set
forth a five-step process to be followed when a disability claim comes before an ALJ for
evaluation of the claimant's eligibility for benefits. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920.
First, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant is presently engaged in substantial
gainful activity. If the claimant is not, the ALJ must decide if the claimant has a “severe”
impairment, which is an impairment or combination of impairments that has lasted (or may
be expected to last) for a continuous period of at least 12 months which “significantly limits
[the claimant's] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities ….” 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c); see also §§ 404.1509, 416.909 (duration requirement). If the
claimant's impairment is severe and of qualifying duration, the ALJ then determines
whether it meets or equals the criteria of an impairment found in the Listings. If the
impairment meets or equals a listed impairment, the claimant will be found to be disabled.
If the claimant does not have a listed impairment, the fourth step requires the ALJ to
determine if, notwithstanding the impairment, the claimant has the residual functional
capacity to perform his or her past relevant work. If the claimant has the RFC to perform
his or her past relevant work, the claimant will be found to be not disabled, and the
sequential evaluation process comes to an end. Finally, if the claimant is not capable of
performing the past relevant work, the fifth step requires that the ALJ determine whether
the claimant is capable of performing any work which exists in the national economy,
considering the claimant's age, education, past work experience, and RFC. See Curry v.
Apfel, 209 F.3d 117, 122 (2d Cir. 2000); Lynch v. Astrue, 2008 WL 3413899, at *2
(W.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 2008).
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The claimant bears the burden of proof with respect to the first four steps of the
analysis. If the claimant meets this burden, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show
that there exists work in the national economy that the claimant can perform. Lynch, 2008
WL 3413899, at *3 (citing Rosa v. Callahan, 168 F.3d 72, 77 (2d Cir. 1999)). “In the
ordinary case, the Commissioner meets h[er] burden at the fifth step by resorting to the
applicable medical vocational guidelines (the grids), … [which] take into account the
claimant's residual functional capacity in conjunction with the claimant's age, education,
and work experience.” Rosa, 168 F.3d at 78 (internal quotation marks, alterations and
citations omitted). If, however, a claimant has non-exertional limitations (which are not
accounted for in the grids) that “significantly limit the range of work permitted by his
exertional limitations then the grids obviously will not accurately determine disability
status ….” Bapp v. Bowen, 802 F.2d 601, 605 (2d Cir. 1986) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). In such cases, “the Commissioner must ‘introduce the testimony of a
vocational expert (or other similar evidence) that jobs exist in the national economy which
claimant can obtain and perform.’ ” Rosa, 168 F.3d at 78 (quoting Bapp, 802 F.2d at 603).
Where the record supports a finding that the claimant’s non-exertional limitations would
have little or no effect on the occupational base of unskilled work, the ALJ may properly
rely on the Grids as a framework for decisionmaking, without consulting with a vocational
expert, to satisfy the Commissioner's burden at the final step of the sequential evaluation.
Cornell v. Colvin, 2014 WL 1572342, at *9 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 18, 2014) (citing Zabala v.
Astrue, 595 F.3d 402, 410–11 (2d Cir. 2010); Bapp, 802 F.2d at 605-06).
8
III.
The ALJ’s Disability Determination
In this case, ALJ McDougall determined at step one of the sequential evaluation that
plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since August 1, 2007, the alleged
onset date (Tr. 13). At step two, the ALJ determined that plaintiff’s impairments - anxiety
disorder, depression, arthritis, hearing impairment, and carpal tunnel syndrome - are
“severe” as that term is defined in the regulations because they impose significant workrelated functional limitations, but that plaintiff’s impairments did not meet or medically equal
the severity of a listed impairment (Tr. 14-15). Additionally, the ALJ considered plaintiff’s
mental impairments according to the “special technique” set forth in 20 C.F.R. §§ 40.1520a
and 416.920a and found that plaintiff’s depression and anxiety caused mild limitations in
her activities of daily living, moderate difficulties in social functioning, mild limitations in
concentration, persistence or pace, and that she had experienced no episodes of
decompensation (Tr. 14). The ALJ then found that plaintiff had the RFC for light work, with
various non-exertional limitations, including a sit/stand option, restrictions for certain
postural activities, pulmonary irritants, contact with the general public, and other limitations
related to her anxiety and hearing impairment (Tr. 15). In making this determination, the
ALJ discussed plaintiff’s hearing testimony and statements in the record regarding her
symptoms, along with the objective medical evidence contained in the treatment records
and reports obtained from consultative examiners (Tr. 15-21).
Based upon his
consideration of this evidence, the ALJ found that plaintiff’s allegations regarding the
limiting effects of her symptoms were “disproportionate to the objective medical evidence”
(Tr. 17). He gave great weight to the opinions of the consultative examiners, and noted
plaintiff’s “inconsistent and sporadic treatment” (Tr. 21).
9
Upon determining that plaintiff was unable to perform her past relevant work as a
fast food worker, at the final step of the sequential evaluation the ALJ found that plaintiff
was capable of making a successful adjustment to other work that exists in substantial
numbers in the national economy, considering her age, education, work experience, and
RFC (Tr. 22-23). The ALJ relied on the testimony of a VE, Joe Pierson, who testified that
plaintiff would be able to perform the requirements of representative occupations such as
mail clerk, photocopy machine operator, and table worker. Id. Accordingly, the ALJ found
that plaintiff was not under a disability within the meaning of the Act at any time from the
alleged onset date through the date of the decision (Tr. 23).
IV.
Plaintiff’s Motion
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to fully and properly assess her credibility, as
required under the Social Security regulations and rulings. The general rule in this regard
is that the ALJ is required to evaluate the credibility of testimony or statements about the
claimant's impairments when there is conflicting evidence about the extent of pain,
limitations of function, or other symptoms alleged. See Paries v. Colvin, 2013 WL 4678352,
at *9 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2013) (citing Snell v. Apfel, 177 F.3d 128, 135 (2d Cir. 1999)). The
Commissioner has established a two-step process to evaluate a claimant's testimony
regarding his or her symptoms:
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First, the ALJ must consider whether the claimant has a medically
determinable impairment which could reasonably be expected to produce the
pain or symptoms alleged by the claimant. Second, if the ALJ determines
that the claimant is impaired, he then must evaluate the intensity,
persistence, and limiting effects of the claimant's symptoms. If the claimant's
statements about his symptoms are not substantiated by objective medical
evidence, the ALJ must make a finding as to the claimant's credibility.
Matejka v. Barnhart, 386 F. Supp. 2d 198, 205 (W.D.N.Y. 2005), quoted in Hogan v.
Astrue, 491 F. Supp. 2d 347, 352 (W.D.N.Y. 2007); see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529, 416.929.
The Regulations outline the following factors to be considered by the ALJ in conducting the
credibility inquiry: (1) the claimant's daily activities; (2) the location, duration, frequency,
and intensity of the pain; (3) precipitating and aggravating factors; (4) the type, dosage,
effectiveness, and side effects of any medications taken to alleviate the pain; (5) any
treatment, other than medication, that the claimant has received; (6) any other measures
that the claimant employs to relieve the pain; and (7) other factors concerning the
claimant's functional limitations and restrictions as a result of the pain. 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1529(c)(3)(i)–(vii), 416.929(c)(3)(i)–(vii); see Meadors v. Astrue, 370 F. App'x 179, 184
n. 1 (2d Cir. 2010). The Commissioner's policy interpretation ruling on this process
provides the following further guidance:
The finding on the credibility of the individual's statements cannot be based
on an intangible or intuitive notion about an individual's credibility. The
reasons for the credibility finding must be grounded in the evidence and
articulated in the determination or decision. It is not sufficient to make a
conclusory statement that “the individual's allegations have been considered”
or that “the allegations are (or are not) credible.” It is also not enough for the
adjudicator simply to recite the factors that are described in the regulations
for evaluating symptoms. The determination or decision must contain specific
reasons for the finding on credibility, supported by the evidence in the case
record, and must be sufficiently specific to make clear to the individual and
to any subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to the
individual's statements and the reasons for that weight.
11
SSR 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186, at *4 (S.S.A. July 2, 1996).
In this case, the court's review of the ALJ's determination in light of the record as a
whole reveals that the ALJ's credibility assessment was performed in accordance with this
guidance. The ALJ noted plaintiff's testimony about the limiting effects of her anxiety and
depression, including her fear of germs and disease (Tr. 34-35), her fear of undercooking
meat and “poisoning” her family (Tr. 42 ), and her excessive hand-washing and use of
hand sanitizers (Tr. 45). Plaintiff testified that she feels “safe” and “comfortable” in her own
home, but feels stressed when she leaves her home without her husband or mother (Tr.
63). The ALJ also noted plaintiff’s complaints of pain. She stated that she cannot stand
or sit for long periods and must change positions frequently (Tr. 38, 41).
The ALJ then discussed the objective medical evidence indicating plaintiff’s “lack
of significant, sustained mental health treatment, [and] minimal or negative diagnostic test
results” (Tr. 17). A consultative physical examination of the plaintiff in 2010 revealed full
spinal flexion and full range of motion in all extremities (Tr. 271) and no limitations on her
ability to lift, carry, stand, sit, or walk (Tr. 272). A 2011 examination by the same examiner,
found only mild limitations for repetitive heavy lifting, bending, reaching, pushing, and
pulling (Tr. 451). A neurological examination in 2011 indicated a cervical strain for which
plaintiff was prescribed a course of physical therapy (Tr. 482). X-rays taken in July 2011
showed an unremarkable thoracic spine and mild degenerative disc space narrowing at
T12 - L1 (Tr. 436-37). Nerve conduction studies in 2012 revealed only mild right carpal
tunnel syndrome (Tr. 501).
Plaintiff underwent two consultative psychiatric examinations. In 2010, Dr. Sandra
Jensen diagnosed generalized anxiety disorder, panic disorder with agoraphobia, and
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obsessive-compulsive disorder (“OCD”) (Tr. 276). She found that plaintiff’s difficulties were
largely caused by OCD and recommended “intensive outpatient psychotherapy to rid
herself of her anxiety disorder, which could also help with her panic disorder, agoraphobia
and obsessive-compulsive disorder.” (Tr. 276). Nonetheless, Dr. Jensen found that
plaintiff’s psychiatric problems “would not greatly interfere with the claimant’s ability to
function on a daily basis.” Id. In 2011, Dr. Susan Santarpia found plaintiff able to follow
and understand simple instructions, perform simple tasks independently, maintain attention
and concentration, maintain a regular schedule, learn new tasks, perform complex tasks,
and make appropriate decisions (Tr. 446). Dr. Santarpia found plaintiff only mildly impaired
in her ability to relate adequately with others and deal with stress. She recommended
individual psychotherapy and vocational training and rehabilitation. Id.
In February 2012, plaintiff commenced mental health treatment at Community
Concern Mental Health Clinic (“CCMHC”).
She was evaluated by Dr. D. Gupta, a
psychiatrist, on May 1, 2012, who diagnosed major depression (Tr. 505). At the time,
plaintiff reported trials of several medications in the past, but stated that she was taking no
medication (Tr. 504). Dr. Gupta prescribed Zoloft and Trileptal (Tr. 505). Plaintiff saw a
social worker on several occasions, but frequently cancelled or failed to appear for her
appointments (Tr. 510-11). Treatment notes indicate that, although plaintiff was prescribed
Zoloft, she did not start the medication for fear of weight gain (Tr. 511-12). In August 2012,
plaintiff’s case was closed after she failed to appear for counseling sessions in July and
August 2012, failed to respond to telephone messages, and failed to respond to a letter
from the clinic (Tr. 511-12).
The ALJ concluded that plaintiff’s record of “inconsistent and sporadic treatment”
13
did not support her allegations of total disability (Tr. 21). SSR 96-7p provides that an
individual’s allegations of disability may be less credible if the level or frequency of
treatment is inconsistent with the level of complaints. However,
the adjudicator must not draw any inferences about an individual's symptoms
and their functional effects from a failure to seek or pursue regular medical
treatment without first considering any explanations that the individual may
provide, or other information in the case record, that may explain infrequent
or irregular medical visits or failure to seek medical treatment.
SSR 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186, at *7 (S.S.A. July 2, 1996).
Here, plaintiff contends that it was error for the ALJ to draw a negative inference
from her sporadic mental health treatment, suggesting that her mental impairments
contributed to her noncompliance. However, the ALJ was permitted to consider plaintiff's
noncompliance with treatment as a factor weighing against her credibility. See Weed
Covey v. Colvin, 96 F.Supp.3d 14, 33 (W.D.N.Y. 2015); Jackson v. Barnhart, 2008 WL
1848624, *11 (W.D.N.Y. April 23, 2008) (failure to follow a recommended course of
treatment weighs against a claimant's credibility); 20 C.F.R. 416.930(b) (“If you do not
follow the prescribed treatment without a good reason, we will not find you disabled”). The
fact that the ALJ did not explicitly reference plaintiff’s possible explanations for her failure
to pursue treatment does not mean that they were not considered. See See Greene v.
Colvin, 936 F.Supp.2d 216, 226 (W.D.N.Y.2013) (ALJ's failure to cite specific evidence
does not indicate that it was not considered). The ALJ questioned plaintiff at length about
the reasons she felt she could not work and heard her testimony regarding her fear of
germs, anxiety about her children, and inability to leave her home without her husband or
mother. The record reflects that plaintiff was referred to a mental health clinic by her
primary physician, but did not follow through with treatment. In contrast, the record
14
indicates that plaintiff was fully capable of making and keeping appointments with other
medical providers during the same time period (Tr. 525-35). There is nothing in the record
to suggest that plaintiff’s mental impairments prevented her from following through with
treatment. Accordingly, the ALJ's finding that plaintiff's credibility was diminished by her
failure to regularly attend treatment sessions was supported by the record.
Plaintiff further argues that the ALJ drew an improper inference with regard to
plaintiff’s status as a stay-at-home mother. Having reviewed the hearing transcript and the
administrative decision, the court notes that plaintiff repeatedly expressed her desire to
stay at home where she is in control of her surroundings (Tr. 62, 63). The ALJ made no
value judgment with regard to her status as a stay-at-home mother. He merely stated
plaintiff’s preference as reflected in her testimony and found that the record did not support
her allegations of total disability.
In the court's view, the ALJ’s credibility finding is sufficiently grounded in the
evidence and specific enough to make clear to plaintiff, to this court, and to any
subsequent reviewers the weight the ALJ gave to plaintiff's statements about the limiting
effects of her symptoms, and the reasons for that weight. As such, and upon review of the
record as a whole, the court finds that the ALJ's credibility assessment in this case
complies with the requirements of the Act, the implementing regulations and SSA rulings,
and the weight of controlling Second Circuit authority. Accordingly, plaintiff is not entitled
to reversal or remand on this ground.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court finds that the ALJ's decision is based on correct
15
legal standards and supported by substantial evidence, and the Commissioner's
determination must therefore be upheld. Therefore, plaintiff's motion for judgment on the
pleadings (Item 9) is denied, the defendant’s cross motion (Item 11) is granted, and the
case is dismissed.
The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment in favor of the Commissioner,
and to close the case.
So ordered.
______\s\ John T. Curtin____
JOHN T. CURTIN
United States District Judge
Dated: February 3, 2016
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