Fisk v. Colvin

Filing 11

DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING Defendant's 9 Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings; DENYING Plaintiff's 4 Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings; DIRECTING the Clerk of Court to close this case. Signed by William M. Skretny, United States District Judge on 3/29/2017. (MEAL) - CLERK TO FOLLOW UP -

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
ANGELA D. FISK,
Plaintiff,
v.

DECISION AND ORDER
14-CV-931S

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.

1.

Plaintiff Angela D. Fisk challenges an Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”)

determination that she is not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act (“the
Act”). Plaintiff alleges that she has been disabled since August 1, 2010,1 due to bipolar
disorder, a learning disability, headaches, and sleep apnea. Plaintiff contends that her
impairments render her unable to work, and thus, she is entitled to disability benefits
under the Act.
2.

Plaintiff filed an application for disability benefits and supplemental

security income on March 11, 2011, which was denied on June 10, 2011. Plaintiff
thereafter requested a hearing before an ALJ. On February 11, 2013, ALJ Michael
Friedman conducted a video hearing at which Plaintiff appeared and testified. Plaintiff
was represented by counsel. At the time of the hearing, Plaintiff was 26 years old, with
a high school education, and no past relevant work experience. The ALJ considered
the case de novo, and on February 20, 2013, issued a written decision denying
Plaintiff’s application for benefits. The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for

1

On Plaintiff’s initial application for benefits, she alleged an onset date of October 1, 2009. At her hearing
before the ALJ, Plaintiff amended her onset date to August 1, 2010.

1

review on September 2, 2014. Plaintiff filed the current action on November 3, 2014,
challenging the Commissioner’s final decision.2
3.

On April 3, 2015, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Docket Nos. 4, 5). On
July 1, 2015, the Commissioner filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. (Docket
No. 9). Plaintiff filed a reply on July 23, 2015 (Docket No. 10), at which time this Court
took the matter under advisement without oral argument. For the following reasons,
Plaintiff’s motion is denied, and Defendant’s motion is granted.
4.

A court reviewing a denial of disability benefits may not determine de novo

whether an individual is disabled. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3); Wagner v.
Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 906 F.2d 856, 860 (2d Cir. 1990).

Rather, the

Commissioner’s determination will be reversed only if it is not supported by substantial
evidence or there has been a legal error. See Grey v. Heckler, 721 F.2d 41, 46 (2d Cir.
1983); Marcus v. Califano, 615 F.2d 23, 27 (2d Cir. 1979). Substantial evidence is that
which amounts to “more than a mere scintilla,” and it has been defined as “such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S. Ct. 1420, 1427, 28 L. Ed.
2d 842 (1971).

Where evidence is deemed susceptible to more than one rational

interpretation, the Commissioner’s conclusion must be upheld.

See Rutherford v.

Schweiker, 685 F.2d 60, 62 (2d Cir. 1982).
5.

“To determine on appeal whether an ALJ's findings are supported by

substantial evidence, a reviewing court considers the whole record, examining the

2

The ALJ’s February 20, 2013 decision became the Commissioner’s final decision in this case when the
Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review.

2

evidence from both sides, because an analysis of the substantiality of the evidence
must also include that which detracts from its weight.” Williams on Behalf of Williams v.
Bowen, 859 F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir. 1988). If supported by substantial evidence, the
Commissioner's finding must be sustained “even where substantial evidence may
support the plaintiff's position and despite that the court's independent analysis of the
evidence may differ from the [Commissioner’s].” Rosado v. Sullivan, 805 F. Supp. 147,
153 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).

In other words, this Court must afford the Commissioner's

determination considerable deference, and will not substitute “its own judgment for that
of the [Commissioner], even if it might justifiably have reached a different result upon a
de novo review.” Valente v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 733 F.2d 1037, 1041 (2d
Cir. 1984).
6.

The Commissioner has established a five-step sequential evaluation

process to determine whether an individual is disabled under the Act. See 20 C.F.R. §
§ 404.1520, 416.920. The United States Supreme Court recognized the validity of this
analysis in Bowen v. Yuckert, and it remains the proper approach for analyzing whether
a claimant is disabled. 482 U.S. 137, 140-42, 107 S. Ct. 2287, 2291, 96 L. Ed. 2d 119
(1987).
7.

The five-step process is detailed below:
First, the [Commissioner] considers whether the claimant is currently
engaged in substantial gainful activity. If he is not, the [Commissioner]
next considers whether the claimant has a “severe impairment” which
significantly limits his physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.
If the claimant suffers such an impairment, the third inquiry is whether,
based solely on medical evidence, the claimant has an impairment which
is listed in Appendix 1 of the regulations. If the claimant has such an
impairment, the [Commissioner] will consider him disabled without
considering vocational factors such as age, education, and work
experience; the [Commissioner] presumes that a claimant who is afflicted
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with a “listed” impairment is unable to perform substantial gainful activity.
Assuming the claimant does not have a listed impairment, the fourth
inquiry is whether, despite the claimant's severe impairment, he has the
residual functional capacity to perform his past work. Finally, if the
claimant is unable to perform his past work, the [Commissioner] then
determines whether there is other work which the claimant could perform.
Berry v. Schweiker, 675 F.2d 464, 467 (2d Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (quotations in
original); see also Rosa v. Callahan, 168 F.3d 72, 77 (2d Cir. 1999); 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520.
8.

Although the claimant has the burden of proof on the first four steps, the

Commissioner has the burden of proof on the fifth and final step. See Bowen, 482 U.S.
at 146 n.5; Ferraris v. Heckler, 728 F.2d 582, 584 (2d Cir. 1984). The final step is
divided into two parts.

First, the Commissioner must assess the claimant's job

qualifications by considering his physical ability, age, education, and work experience.
Second, the Commissioner must determine whether jobs exist in the national economy
that a person having the claimant's qualifications could perform.

See 42 U.S.C. §

423(d)(2)(A); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f); Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 460, 103 S.
Ct. 1952, 1954, 76 L. Ed. 2d 66 (1983).
9.

In this case, the ALJ made the following findings with regard to the five-

step process set forth above: (1) Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity
since August 1, 2010, the alleged onset date (R. at 22)3; (2) Plaintiff’s depressive
disorder is a severe impairment within the meaning of the Act (R. at 23); (3) Plaintiff
does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meet or medically
equal any of the impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (R. at
23); (4) Plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity to perform a full range of work
3

Citations to the underlying administrative record are designated as “R.”

4

at all exertional levels but with the nonexertional limitation of simple, routine, repetitive
type tasks involving only occasional contact with others (R. at 25); (5) Plaintiff could
perform jobs that exist in significant number in the national economy (R. at 27).
Considering Plaintiff’s status as a younger individual, with a high school education, no
transferable job skills due to lack of past relevant work, and a residual capacity with
non-exertional limitations, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was not under a disability as
defined by the Act at any time through the date of his decision, February 20, 2013. (R.
at 27).
10.

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred by (1) failing to follow the treating-

physician rule and failing to properly determine her residual functional capacity; (2)
failing to properly evaluate Plaintiff’s credibility; and (3) relying on the MedicalVocational Guidelines. Each argument will be discussed in turn.
11.

Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ erred by rejecting the opinions of

Plaintiff’s treating physician and instead substituting his own lay interpretation of the
clinical and diagnostic findings in the treatment notes.

The treating-physician rule

requires an ALJ to give controlling weight to a treating source's opinion on the issues of
the nature and severity of a claimant's impairments, if the opinion is well-supported by
medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not
inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in the record.

See 20 C.F.R. §§

404.1527(c)(2), 416.927(c)(2); Halloran v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 28, 32 (2d Cir. 2004). If
the ALJ does not give controlling weight to a treating source's opinion, he must apply
several factors to determine what weight to afford the opinion, which include:
(1) the length of the treatment relationship and the frequency
of examination; (2) the nature and extent of the treatment
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relationship; (3) the degree to which the medical source
supported his opinion; (4) the degree of consistency
between the opinion and the record as a whole; (5) whether
the opinion is given by a specialist; and (6) other evidence
which may be brought to the attention of the ALJ.
Morrillo v. Apfel, 150 F. Supp. 2d 540, 545-46 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). See 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1527(c), 416.927(c).
12.

The Commissioner must also provide a claimant with “good reasons” for

the lack of weight attributed to a treating physician's opinion. 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c)(2);
accord Schaal v. Apfel, 134 F.3d 496, 503-04 (2d Cir. 1998). But as this Court has
previously recognized, an ALJ “does not have to explicitly walk through these factors, so
long as the Court can ‘conclude that the ALJ applied the substance of the treating
physician rule . . . and provide[d] ‘good reasons’ for the weight [the ALJ] gives to the
treating source's opinion.’” Hall v. Colvin, 37 F. Supp. 3d 614, 625 (W.D.N.Y. 2014)
(quoting Halloran, 362 F.3d at 32); see Atwater v. Astrue, 512 F. App'x 67, 70 (2d Cir.
2013) (explaining that ALJ need not undertake a “slavish recitation of each and every
factor where the ALJ's reasoning and adherence to the regulation are clear”).
13.

Here, the ALJ reviewed the opinions and treatment records of Dr.

Chinyelu Ikeako, Plaintiff’s treating psychiatrist. (R. at 23-26). The ALJ gave “great
weight” to Dr. Ikeako’s treatment records, which the ALJ found “demonstrate that
[Plaintiff’s] symptoms have improved with treatment,” but gave “little weight” to Dr.
Ikeako’s January 18, 2013 opinion, which was that Plaintiff was moderately or markedly
limited in a variety of “mental activity” areas and experienced “episodes of deterioration
or decompensation” in work settings. (R. at 26, 290, 292-93, 295). The ALJ rejected
Dr.

Ikeako’s opinion,

which was

recorded

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on a

Non-Exertional

Impairment

Questionnaire, because it was not well-supported and was inconsistent with other
substantial evidence in the record, including Dr. Ikeako’s own treatment notes. (R. at
26). This conclusion is supported by substantial evidence in the record.
First, just five months before her January 18, 2013 opinion, Dr. Ikeako completed
a different form seeking her opinion concerning Plaintiff’s mental functioning. (R. at
271-73).

In this August 23, 2012 opinion, Dr. Ikeako found no mental functioning

deficiencies whatsoever, and noted simply that Plaintiff was diagnosed with bipolar
disorder and suffered from an unspecified thought disorder. (R. at 272).

Dr. Ikeako’s

January 18, 2013 opinion contains no explanation for the stark change from her August
23, 2012 opinion offered just months before.
Second, Dr. Ikeako’s treatment notes do not reflect moderate or marked
functional impairments, but rather, reflect steady improvement with treatment. Records
of five visits from July 25, 2012, through November 16, 2012, reflect that Plaintiff’s mood
and affect were improving, she was less agitated, and she was complying with
medications. (R. at 275-283). On September 17, 2012, Plaintiff’s thought process was
more linear and goal-directed and her concentration was improving. (R. at 277). On
November 16, 2012, Plaintiff’s mood and affect were neutral, her concentration was
good, and her judgment and insight were fair. (R. at 275). During this time, Plaintiff’s
Global Assessment Functioning (GAF) Score4 improved from 40 to 58, demonstrating
that Plaintiff’s functional difficulties improved from major to moderate. Thus, rather than
deteriorating between Dr. Ikeako’s August 23, 2012 and January 18, 2013 opinions, the
treatment records show that Plaintiff’s condition was actually improving.

4

A global assessment functioning score is a snapshot of an individual’s level of functioning at a particular
time.

7

Third, the treatment notes do not document any instances where Plaintiff
suffered episodes of deterioration or decompensation. (R. at 273-88).
Consequently, this Court finds that the ALJ’s consideration of Plaintiff’s treating
physician’s opinion was consistent with the treating-physician rule, and that his decision
to discount Dr. Ikeako’s opinion is supported by substantial evidence in the record.
14.

Plaintiff next contends that the ALJ’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”)

determination is not supported by substantial evidence. A plain reading of the ALJ’s
decision, however, reveals that the ALJ properly identified and discussed the evidence
that he considered in making his RFC determination. In particular, the ALJ found that
Plaintiff could perform a full range of work at all exertional levels, which is fully
supported by the lack of evidence that Plaintiff suffered any physical limitations. (R. at
24-26). The ALJ further found that Plaintiff has a non-exertional limitation: she is limited
to jobs involving simple, routine, repetitive type tasks involving only occasional contact
with others.

(R. at 25-26). This determination is supported by Plaintiff’s treatment

records and Plaintiff’s statements. (R. at 26). Finally, as noted above, this Court finds
that the ALJ properly discounted Dr. Ikeako’s opinion, which is the only one that could
support a more restricted RFC determination. Consequently, this argument fails.
15.

Plaintiff next argues that the ALJ failed to properly evaluate her credibility.

In particular, Plaintiff faults the ALJ for considering that her condition improved with
treatment, that her GAF scores reflected improvement, that her activities of daily living
were inconsistent with her claim of disability, and that she had a relatively modest work
record. None of these considerations form the sole basis of the credibility determination
and none amount to reversible error.

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16.

Credibility determinations are generally reserved to the Commissioner, not

the reviewing court. Aponte v. Sec’y of Health and Human Svcs., 728 F.2d 588, 591
(2d Cir. 1984) (holding that it is the job of the Commissioner and not the reviewing court
to make determinations on the credibility of witnesses); Carrol v. Sec’y of Health and
Human Svcs., 705 F.2d 638, 642 (2d Cir. 1982) (similar).

The ALJ is required to

evaluate the credibility of testimony or statements about the claimant's impairments
when there is conflicting evidence about the extent of pain, limitations of function, or
other symptoms alleged. See Paries v. Colvin, No. 5:11–CV–0478 (LEK/ATB), 2013
WL 4678352, at *9 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2013) (citing Snell, 177 F.3d at 135).
The Commissioner has established a two-step process to evaluate a claimant's
testimony regarding his or her symptoms:
First, the ALJ must consider whether the claimant has a
medically determinable impairment which could reasonably
be expected to produce the pain or symptoms alleged by the
claimant. Second, if the ALJ determines that the claimant is
impaired, he then must evaluate the intensity, persistence,
and limiting effects of the claimant's symptoms. If the
claimant's statements about his symptoms are not
substantiated by objective medical evidence, the ALJ must
make a finding as to the claimant's credibility.
Matejka v. Barnhart, 386 F. Supp. 2d 198, 205 (W.D.N.Y. 2005); see 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1529, 416.929.5 In evaluating an individual's symptoms,

5

The Social Security Administration has updated its guidance on evaluating symptoms in
disability claims. See SSR 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029 (effective March 16, 2016). The new ruling
eliminates the term “credibility” from the Administration's sub-regulatory policies to “clarify that subjective
symptom evaluation is not an examination of the individual's character” and it also aims to “more closely
follow our regulatory language regarding symptom evaluation.” Id. at *1. Accordingly, the
Commissioner will consider “all of the evidence in an individual’s record when they evaluate the intensity
and persistence of symptoms after they find that the individual has a medically determinable
impairment(s) that could reasonably be expected to produce those symptoms. Id. at *1-2. Moreover, the
now rescinded SSR 96-7p and SSR 16-3p are not patently inconsistent as a comparison of the two
reveals substantial consistency, both in the two-step process to be followed and in the factors to be
considered in determining the intensity and persistence of a party's symptoms. Compare SSR 16-3p with

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adjudicators will not assess an individual's overall character
or truthfulness in the manner typically used during an
adversarial court litigation. The focus of the evaluation of an
individual's symptoms should not be to determine whether
he or she is a truthful person. Rather, . . . adjudicators will
focus on whether the evidence establishes a medically
determinable impairment that could reasonably be expected
to produce the individual's symptoms and given the
adjudicator's evaluation of the individual's symptoms,
whether the intensity and persistence of the symptoms limit
the individual's ability to perform work-related activities . . .”
SSR, 16-3P at *10.
17.

“At the first step in the credibility analysis, ‘plaintiff's allegations need not

be substantiated by medical evidence, but simply consistent with it. The entire purpose
of section [ ] 404.1529 . . . is to provide a means for claimants to offer proof that is not
wholly demonstrable by medical evidence.” Hogan v. Astrue, 491 F. Supp. 2d 347, 353
(W.D.N.Y. 2007) (emphasis in the original) (internal citations omitted); see also 20
C.F.R. § 404.1529(c) (“Because symptoms, such as pain, are subjective and difficult to
quantify, any symptom-related functional limitations and restrictions . . . , which can be
reasonably accepted as consistent with the objective medical evidence and other
evidence, will be taken into account.”) “Only allegations beyond what is substantiated
by medical evidence are subjected to a credibility analysis. To require plaintiff to fully
substantiate [his] symptoms would be both an abrogation of the regulations and against
their stated purpose.” Hogan, 491 F. Supp. 2d at 353 (citing Castillo v. Apfel, No. 98
Civ. 0792, 1999 WL 147748, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 1999).
18.

If the ALJ determines that the claimant is impaired, he must then evaluate

the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of the claimant's symptoms.

If the

SSR 96-7p. Therefore, it is appropriate to evaluate Plaintiff's credibility in light of the new guidance the
Administration has provided.

10

claimant's statements about his symptoms are not substantiated by objective medical
evidence, the ALJ must make a finding as to the claimant's credibility. See Genier v.
Astrue, 606 F.3d 46, 49 (E.D.N.Y. 2010); see also Poupore v. Astrue, 566 F.3d 303,
307 (2d Cir. 2009) (finding that claimant's subjective complaints of pain were insufficient
to establish disability because they were unsupported by objective medical evidence).
“Genuine conflicts in the medical evidence are for the Commissioner to resolve,” Veino
v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 578, 588 (2d Cir. 2002), and the court “must show special
deference” to credibility determinations made by the ALJ, “who had the opportunity to
observe the witnesses' demeanor” while testifying. Yellow Freight Sys. Inc. v. Reich, 38
F.3d 76, 81 (2d Cir. 1994).
19.

If a claimant’s contentions are not supported by objective medical

evidence, the ALJ must then consider the following factors to make a determination
regarding the plaintiff's credibility: (1) the claimant's daily activities; (2) the location,
duration, frequency, and intensity of the pain; (3) precipitating and aggravating factors;
(4) the type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any medications taken to
alleviate the pain; (5) any treatment, other than medication, that the claimant has
received; (6) any other measures that the claimant employs to relieve the pain; and (7)
other factors concerning the claimant's functional limitations and restrictions as a result
of the pain. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3)(i)-(vii), 416.929(c)(3)(i)-(vii); SSR 16-3p,
at *7; Meadors v. Astrue, 370 F. App'x 179, 184 n.1 (2d Cir. 2010); see also Murphy v.
Barnhart, No. 00 Civ. 9621 (JSR)(FM), 2003 WL 470572, at *10–11 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 21,
2003) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)).

“An [ALJ] may properly reject [subjective

complaints] after weighing the objective medical evidence in the record, the claimant's

11

demeanor, and other indicia of credibility, but must set forth his or her reasons ‘with
sufficient specificity to enable us to decide whether the determination is supported by
substantial evidence.’“

Lewis v. Apfel, 62 F. Supp. 2d 648, 651 (N.D.N.Y. 1999)

(quoting Gallardo v. Apfel, Civ. No. 96–9435 (JSR), 1999 WL 185253, at *5 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 25, 1999)) (citations omitted).
20.

Here, at the first step of the credibility analysis, the ALJ found that

Plaintiff’s medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause
the alleged symptoms. (R. at 25.) But at the second step, the ALJ found that “the
claimant’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these
symptoms are not entirely credible, for the reasons explained in this decision.” (R. at
25.)
21.

Contrary to Plaintiff’s argument, the ALJ’s findings that Plaintiff benefitted

by relatively minimal treatment, that her condition improved, and that she was able to
perform many tasks of daily activity is fully supported by substantial evidence in the
record (as discussed above) and by Plaintiff’s ability to live on her own, complete
household chores, care for her pets, shop, travel alone, and interact with family and
friends. (R. at 26, 61, 62). Although Plaintiff contends that her daily activities were
insufficient evidence that she has the residual functional capacity to perform full-time
work, the ALJ is permitted to consider them. See 20 C.F.R. ' 404.1529(C)(3); SSR 967p; see Whipple v. Astrue, 479 Fed. App=x 367, 370-71 (2d Cir. 2012) (noting that under
20 C.F.R. ' 404.1529 the ALJ must consider all of the available evidence, including the
claimant=s own description of his daily activities).

12

Further, it was not error for the ALJ to consider Plaintiff’s modest earnings in
evaluating her credibility. The ALJ correctly noted that Plaintiff had modest earnings;
her work experience included positions as a cashier, cleaner, and factory worker at
$7.00-$7.75 per hour. (R. at 192). This work history is relevant to her credibility and, in
any event, does not entitle her to the presumption of credibility one with a good and long
work record enjoys. Rivera v. Schweiker, 717 F.2d 719, 725 (2d Cir. 1983) (citing
Singletary v. Sec=y of Health, Educ. and Welfare, 623 F.2d 217, 219 (2d Cir. 1980)).
The ALJ did not err by considering it.
Consequently, this Court finds no reversible error in the ALJ’s credibility
determination, which fell well within his discretion and was supported by substantial
evidence in the record.
22.

Plaintiff’s final argument is that the ALJ erred by relying solely on the

Medical-Vocational Guidelines, rather than call a vocational expert, since Plaintiff has
nonexertional limitations.
23.

An ALJ is required to obtain the testimony of a vocational expert only

where a claimant’s work capacity is significantly diminished by her nonexertional
limitations.

Bapp v. Bowen, 802 F. 2d 601, 603 (2d Cir. 1986) (emphasis added).

“Significantly diminished” has been defined by the Second Circuit to mean a loss of
work capacity that “so narrows a claimant’s possible range of work as to deprive him of
meaningful employment opportunity.”

Id.

Consequently, the “mere existence of a

nonexertional impairment does not automatically . . . preclude reliance on the
guidelines.” Id. at 603.

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24.

Here, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the RFC to perform a full range of

work at all exertional levels but with nonexertional limitations. (R. at 24-25). Plaintiff is
limited to jobs involving simple, routine, repetitive type tasks involving only occasional
contact with others. (R. at 25). The ALJ found that Plaintiff’s nonexertional limitations
had “little or no effect” on the occupational base of unskilled work at all exertional levels,
because Plaintiff had the RFC to perform the basic mental demands of competitive,
renumerative, unskilled work.

(R. at 27).

Thus, Plaintiff’s work capacity was not

significantly diminished by her nonexertional limitations. As discussed above, these
findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record. The ALJ’s reliance on the
Medical-Vocational Guidelines was therefore proper.
25.

Having reviewed the ALJ’s decision in light of Plaintiff’s arguments, this

Court finds no error in the ALJ’s determination.

The ALJ’s decision adequately

discussed the records of the treating physician and the weight assigned to those
records, as well as adequately assessed Plaintiff’s credibility. Further, vocational expert
testimony was not required, because Plaintiff’s non-exertional limitations do not
significantly diminish her ability to work.

Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the

Pleadings is therefore granted, and Plaintiff’s motion seeking the same relief is denied.

IT HEREBY IS ORDERED, that Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings (Docket No. 9) is GRANTED.
FURTHER, that Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Docket No. 4)
is DENIED.

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FURTHER, that the Clerk of Court is directed to close this case.
SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 29, 2017
Buffalo, New York
/s/William M. Skretny
WILLIAM M. SKRETNY
United States District Judge

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