Chiles v. Colvin
Filing
24
ORDER granting 18 Motion for Attorney Fees. Signed by Hon. Michael A. Telesca on 1/16/20. (JMC)-CLERK TO FOLLOW UP-
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
TANESHIA Y. CHILES,
Plaintiff,
DECISION AND ORDER
1:14-CV-00943-MAT
-vsANDREW SAUL,1
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.
________________________________________
I.
Introduction
Plaintiff has filed a Motion for Attorney’s Fees, seeking the
amount of $10,324.75, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b).
No. 18.
Docket
Defendant has filed a response, indicating that he does
not oppose Plaintiff’s request.
Docket No. 21.
fully submitted and ready for decision.
The matter is now
Docket No. 23.
For the
reasons discussed below, Plaintiff’s motion is granted.
II.
Background
On June 23, 2017, this Court reversed the decision of the
Commissioner of Social Security denying Plaintiff’s application for
Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) and Supplemental Security
Income (“SSI”), and remanded the matter for further proceedings.
See Docket No. 15.
On August 31, 2017, the Court signed a
1
On June 17, 2019, Andrew Saul became the Commissioner of Social Security.
Accordingly, his name is substituted for the originally-named defendant in this
action. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d).
stipulation entered into by the parties, whereby Plaintiff was
awarded $6,530.00 pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act
(“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412, in full satisfaction of her claim
pursuant to the EAJA, for her attorney’s services performed in
connection with this action.
Docket No. 17.
Subsequently, on July 3, 2019, Plaintiff received a Notice of
Award from the Social Security Administration indicating that she
was being awarded $55,699.00 in past due SSI benefits. Docket Nos.
18-2 at ¶ 10 & 18-4.
Pursuant
to
the
fee
agreement
signed
by
Plaintiff,
her
attorney is entitled to 25 percent of her past due benefits.
Docket No. 18-2 at ¶ 6.
Based on the above-referenced award of
benefits, the amount due to Plaintiff’s attorney pursuant to the
fee agreement would be $13,924.75.
See id. at ¶ 19.
However,
Plaintiff’s attorney has requested a fee of only $10,325.75.
at ¶ 2.
Id.
Plaintiff’s attorney has already received the sum of
$6,540.00, pursuant to the above-mentioned EAJA application and
stipulation,
and
he
states
that
he
will
refund
Plaintiff once the instant request is granted.
this
fee
to
Id. at ¶ 18.
Plaintiff’s attorney has submitted the award notice (Docket No. 184), the fee agreement (Docket No. 18-3), and his time records to
date (Docket Nos. 18-5 & 18-7).
III. Discussion
Title 42, Section 406(b) provides as follows:
-2-
Whenever a court renders a judgment favorable to a
claimant under this subchapter who was represented before
the court by an attorney, the court may determine and
allow as part of its judgment a reasonable fee for such
representation, not in excess of 25 percent of the total
of the past-due benefits to which the claimant is
entitled by reason of such judgment[.]
42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(l)(A).
“When a contingent fee has been agreed to by the parties, the
district court must determine whether the fee is reasonable[,]”
“giv[ing] due deference to the intent of the parties” while “not
blindly approv[ing] every fee request made pursuant to a contingent
agreement.”
Wells v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 367, 372 (2d Cir. 1990).
Mathematical calculations are not required, but the district court
should determine whether the contingency percentage is within the
25 percent cap. Id. In addition, it should consider “whether there
has been fraud
or
overreaching
in
making
the
agreement”
and
“whether the requested amount is so large as to be a windfall to
the attorney.”
Id. (citations omitted).
Here, based on the total award of benefits ($55,699.00), the
amount due to Plaintiff’s attorney pursuant to the fee agreement
would be $13,924.75.
Plaintiff’s attorney has requested a reduced
fee of $10,324.75, which represents 18.53% of the total past-due
benefits awarded.
See Docket No. 18-2 at 4.
Therefore, the
revised contingency percentage is less than the 25 percent cap
authorized by § 406(b).
-3-
Given that Plaintiff’s attorney has requested a reduced fee
amount, the Court concludes that there is no evidence of fraud or
overreaching.
The Court also finds that the amount requested does
not appear to be so large as to be a windfall to the attorney.
See
Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 808 (2002); see also Docket
No. 18-7. Plaintiff’s counsel began working on Plaintiff’s case in
May 2013, after the administrative law judge denied her claim for
benefits.
See Docket No. 18-2 at ¶ 7.
He has spent 36.1 hours
preparing Plaintiff’s case before the federal district court, see
Docket No. 18-7, which yields an hourly fee of $286 (see Docket
Nos.
18-1
at
circumstances.
5
&
As
21
at
4),
explained
and
above,
is
reasonable
Plaintiff’s
under
the
counsel
was
successful in securing benefits for Plaintiff.
Plaintiff’s counsel has requested, separate and apart from the
instant request for fees, $10,000 for work he performed at the
administrative level, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(a).
See Docket
No. 18-2 at ¶¶ 12-13. The $10,000 Plaintiff’s counsel requests for
his work done at the administrative level pursuant to § 406(a),
combined with the $10,324.75 he requests pursuant to § 406(b),
totals $20,324.75, and is more than 25 percent of Plaintiff’s past
due benefits.
On this point, Defendant cites to Culbertson v.
Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 517 (2019), a Supreme Court case in which the
Court held that the 25 percent fee cap applies only to fees under
§ 406(b).
See Docket No. 21 at 5; see also Culbertson, 139 S. Ct.
-4-
at 519 (“Because § 406(b) by its terms imposes a 25% cap on fees
only for representation before a court, and § 406(a) has separate
caps on fees for representation before the agency, we hold that the
statute does not impose a 25% cap on aggregate fees.”).
In other
words, while the fee an attorney seeks pursuant to § 406(b) may not
exceed
25
percent
of
a
plaintiff’s
past
due
benefits,
the
attorney’s fee in the aggregate (which includes the award the
attorney seeks pursuant to § 406(a)), is not capped at 25 percent.
Accordingly, the aggregate fee that Plaintiff’s counsel seeks in
this case is proper under Culbertson.
Defendant,
however,
points
to
the
language
contained
in
Plaintiff’s fee agreement, which provides that 25 percent is the
most an attorney can receive under the agreement.
See Docket
No. 21 at 6 (“The recent decision in Culbertson . . . is a separate
point from Plaintiff’s actual fee agreement with her attorney.”).
Plaintiff’s counsel responds that his fee request is proper under
Culbertson, and explains that Plaintiff signed two separate fee
agreements - one for her federal court case, and another for her
administrative case.
See Docket No. 22 at 1-2.
The Court has reviewed both of the fee agreements signed by
Plaintiff (Docket Nos. 18-3, 22-1).
Defendant
governing
counsel’s
representation of Plaintiff in federal district court.
See Docket
No.
18-3
refers
(titled
is
the
“Fee
fee
The fee agreement to which
agreement
Contract
-5-
-
Federal
District
Court”).
Plaintiff signed a separate fee agreement for her representation
before the Social Security Administration. See Docket No. 22-1 (“I
employ
[counsel]
to
represent
me
before
the
Social
Security
Administration (SSA) in my Social Security Disability (SSD) case,
Supplemental
Security
Income
(SSI)
case,
or
agreement contains its own 25 percent fee cap.
both.”).
Id.
This
Accordingly,
it would seem that the aggregate fee, which exceeds 25 percent of
Plaintiff’s past due benefits, would not violate the district court
fee agreement, because that fee agreement applies only to fees
awarded pursuant to § 406(b).
However, the Court notes that the district court fee agreement
contains the following language: “In no case will the fee that
comes out of the back benefits paid on my account be greater than
25% of back benefits (including the fee paid for work on my case
before the Social Security Administration).”
(emphasis
added).
This
language
arguably
Docket No. 18-3 at 1
implies
that
the
25 percent cap applies to the combined fee under § 406(a) and
§ 406(b), and makes application of the 25 percent cap provided in
the district court fee agreement unclear.
The Court need not and
does not resolve this issue because, as noted by Plaintiff’s
counsel, he must return $6,530.00 of the fee award to Plaintiff.
See Docket No. 22 at 2.
This reduces the amount paid to counsel
pursuant to § 406(b) to $3,794.75.
Therefore, the total fee paid
to counsel under both § 406(a) and § 406(b) would be $13,794.75,
-6-
and is less than $13,917.25, or 25 percent of Plaintiff’s past due
benefits. See also Stein v. Commissioner, No. 15-CV-6753-FPG, 2019
WL 4409337, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2019) (“the § 406(a) fees
that counsel may receive are purely speculative because the SSA has
not ruled on his petition yet.
To adjust counsel’s § 406(b) fee in
light of § 406(a) fees that he might obtain could result in an
overall fee award that is much lower than the 25% cap.”).
IV.
Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, the Court grants Plaintiff’s
Motion for Attorney’s Fees (Docket No. 18).
Plaintiff is awarded
attorney’s fees in the amount of $10,324.75, which represents 18.53
percent of the total past due benefits awarded to Plaintiff.
Commissioner is directed to release these funds.
The
Upon receipt of
the § 406(b) fee, Plaintiff’s counsel shall return to Plaintiff the
previously-received $6,530.00 in attorney’s fees paid pursuant to
the EAJA.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
S/Michael A. Telesca
______________________________
HONORABLE MICHAEL A. TELESCA
United States District Judge
DATED:
January 16, 2020
Rochester, New York
-7-
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