Mikulec v. Colvin

Filing 17

DECISION AND ORDER denying 9 Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings; granting 13 Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. Signed by Hon. Michael A. Telesca on 06/27/2017. (MEG)-CLERK TO FOLLOW UP-

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

PAUL KEVIN MIKULEC,
Plaintiff,
-vs-

No. 1:14-CV-01025 (MAT)
DECISION AND ORDER

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, ACTING
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.

I.

Introduction
Represented

by

counsel,

Paul

Kevin

Mikulec

(“plaintiff”)

brings this action pursuant to Title II of the Social Security Act
(“the

Act”),

seeking

review

of

the

final

decision

of

the

Commissioner of Social Security (“the Commissioner”) denying his
applications for disability insurance benefits (“DIB”). The Court
has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
Presently before the Court are the parties’ cross-motions for
judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. For the reasons discussed below, the
Commissioner’s motion is granted.
II.

Procedural History
The record reveals that in August 2011, plaintiff (d/o/b

September

29,

1977)

filed

an

application

for

DIB,

alleging

disability beginning March 4, 2011. After his application was
denied, plaintiff requested a hearing, which was held before
administrative law judge Donald McDougall (“the ALJ”) on April 8,
2013. The ALJ issued an unfavorable decision on June 20, 2013. The

Appeals Council denied review of that decision and this timely
action followed.
III. The ALJ’s Decision
Initially, the ALJ found that plaintiff satisfied the insured
status requirements of the Act through December 31, 2016. At step
one

of

the

five-step

sequential

evaluation,

see

20

C.F.R.

§ 404.1520, the ALJ found that plaintiff had not engaged in
substantial gainful activity since March 4, 2011, the alleged onset
date. At step two, the ALJ found that plaintiff suffered from the
severe impairments of morbid obesity, asthma, and lumbar spine
disorder. At step three, the ALJ found that plaintiff did not have
an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically
equaled a listed impairment.
Before proceeding to step four, the ALJ found that plaintiff
retained the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform light
work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b), “with the following
limitations: [he] must be able to change positions every half-hour;
[he] cannot be exposed to extremes of pulmonary irritants; [he] can
only occasionally climb, balance, kneel, stoop, crouch or crawl;
and, [he] can never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds.” T. 13-14.
At step four, the ALJ found that plaintiff was incapable of
performing past relevant work. At step five, the ALJ found that
considering plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and RFC,
there were jobs existing in significant numbers in the national

2

economy that he could perform. Accordingly, the ALJ found that
plaintiff was not disabled.
IV.

Discussion
A

district

court

may

set

aside

the Commissioner’s

determination that a claimant is not disabled only if the factual
findings are not supported by “substantial evidence” or if the
decision is based on legal error. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); see also
Green-Younger v. Barnhart, 335 F.3d 99, 105-06 (2d Cir. 2003).
“Substantial evidence means ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Shaw v.
Chater, 221 F.3d 126, 131 (2d Cir. 2000).
A.

Development of the Record

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to fully develop the
medical record. Specifically, plaintiff argues that because his
primary care physician, Dr. Sukhwinder Kodial, was referenced in
several treatment notes from other medical sources, the record was
necessarily incomplete because it did not contain any treatment
notes from Dr. Kodial. The record reveals, as plaintiff contends,
that Dr. Kodial was carbon-copied on a handful of notes in the
medical record. Plaintiff testified, and the record reflects, that
he treated primarily with Dr. George Haddad through approximately
July 2012, when he switched to Dr. Kodial for primary care.
Plaintiff testified that he saw both primary physicians primarily
for pain medication, and that he changed care to Dr. Kodial because
Dr. Haddad required him to come in monthly in order to renew a pain
3

medicine prescription, whereas Dr. Kodial did not require visits of
such frequency.
The Commissioner argues that the ALJ possessed a complete
medical history of plaintiff, and the Court agrees. The information
in

the

medical

plaintiff’s

record

conditions

provides
and

medical

a

longitudinal
care.

The

picture

medical

of

record

includes full treatment notes from neurosurgeon Dr. Elad Levy and
his nurse practitioner (“NP”) Laura Mason, treatment notes as well
as a medical opinion from primary care physician Dr. Haddad, and a
consulting examining opinion from state agency physician Dr. Donna
Miller. The only references to Dr. Kodial that appear in the record
are treatment notes either addressed to, or carbon-copied to, his
office. There is no indication in the record that these treatment
notes would shed any additional light on plaintiff’s conditions
than

already

revealed

by

the

complete

medical

record,

which

significantly included treatment notes from plaintiff’s primary
care physician, Dr. Haddad, for the bulk of the relevant time
period.
Accordingly, the Court finds that this record was complete
with “no obvious gaps,” and therefore the ALJ was “under no
obligation to seek additional information in advance of rejecting
[plaintiff’s] benefits claim.” Rosa v. Callahan, 168 F.3d 72, 79
n.5 (2d Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Even though
the ALJ has an affirmative obligation to develop the record, it is
the plaintiff’s burden to furnish such medical and other evidence

4

of disability as the Secretary may require.” Long v. Bowen, 1989 WL
83379, *4 (E.D.N.Y. July 17, 1989) (internal citations omitted).
Under these circumstances, the ALJ did not err in failing to obtain
treatment records from Dr. Kodial. See Lozama v. Colvin, 2016 WL
1259411, *4 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2016) (finding that ALJ did not err
in failing to obtain primary care physician’s records where “the
evidence of record was sufficiently complete for the ALJ to make an
informed decision”) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(d); Rosa, 168 F.3d
at 79 n.5)).
B.

Opinion of Nurse Practitioner

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in giving “great” weight
to an opinion from NP Mason, who was involved in plaintiff’s
treatment at Dr. Levy’s office. This “opinion” is contained within
an October 26, 2011 treatment note, which is signed by NP Mason,
but

not

by

Dr.

Levy.

In

the

note,

NP

Mason

recorded

that

plaintiff’s physical examination showed full strength in the lower
extremities, a normal gait, a healed incision from a prior back
surgery, and an ability to stand on tiptoes and heels. NP Mason
opined that plaintiff should be limited to “light duty with no
lifting

greater

than

25

[pounds]

and

no

excessive

bending,

twisting, turning, pushing, or pulling.” T. 319. She noted that
plaintiff was “anxious to return to work, . . . [and] [i]f there is
a

light

duty

position

that

would

be

perfect.”

Id.

The

note

indicates that she would see plaintiff back in Dr. Levy’s office in
six months.
5

Plaintiff points out that the ALJ mistakenly referred to this
opinion as being from Dr. Levy, but in fact the opinion came from
NP Mason and was not signed by Dr. Levy. Because of this mistake,
plaintiff contends, the ALJ erred in giving NP Mason’s opinion
great weight. In effect, plaintiff argues that the ALJ erroneously
applied the treating physician rule, see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c),
to NP Mason’s opinion.
Plaintiff’s argument is flawed for several reasons. First, the
ALJ gave only “great” – but not “controlling” – weight to NP
Mason’s opinion. Thus, NP Mason’s opinion was considered in the
ALJ’s overall decision and RFC finding, but did not control his
finding. Thus, the ALJ did not give undue deference to NP Mason’s
“other

source”

opinion,

see

20

C.F.R.

§

404.1513(d)(1),

by

mistakenly applying the treating physician rule to the opinion.
Second, although the ALJ erroneously ascribed the opinion to
Dr.

Levy,

he

gave

the

opinion

great

weight

because

it

was

“consistent with the objective evidence in the record.” T. 17. As
NP Mason was an “other source” under the regulations, it was
appropriate for the ALJ to consider her opinion and to assign it
great

weight

where

it

was

consistent

with

other

substantial

evidence of record, including treatment notes from Dr. Levy’s
office which indicated that plaintiff’s physical examinations were
relatively unremarkable and his condition was noted as improving
over time. See, e.g., T. 237, 249, 267, 306. Opinions from Drs.
Haddad and Miller were also consistent with NP Mason’s opinion. See

6

SSR 06–03p, 2006 WL 2329939, at *4 (noting that in weighing an
opinion from an “other source,” the ALJ should consider “[h]ow
consistent the opinion is with other evidence”); Brown v. Colvin,
2014 WL 1679761, *5 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2014) (“[A]s a nurse
practitioner and ‘other source’ opinion, the assessment by that
practitioner is entitled to some weight especially where there is
a treatment relationship with plaintiff[.]”).
Finally, Dr. Levy’s treatment records indicate that he and NP
Mason treated plaintiff jointly, and therefore the record makes
clear that NP Mason enjoyed an extensive treatment relationship
with plaintiff. See, e.g., Williams v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2016 WL
1271486, *7 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2016) (“It was proper for the ALJ to
give great weight to [the nurse practitioner’s] opinions because
even though she was not an acceptable medical source, she . . . had
an extensive history and relationship as [p]laintiff's primary
treatment provider.”) (citing SSR 06-03p (noting that factors to be
considered when evaluating the opinion of a source who is not an
acceptable medical source are the degree to which the source
presents relevant evidence to support her opinion and whether the
source has a specialty related to the claimant's impairment)).
Accordingly, the Court finds that the ALJ’s mistaken attribution of
NP Mason’s opinion to Dr. Levy was not significant. Moreover,
substantial evidence supported his decision to give the opinion
great weight.
C.

RFC Finding

7

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ’s RFC finding is unsupported
by substantial evidence, arguing specifically that the ALJ did not
have a basis for imposing the sit-stand option that “[plaintiff]
must be able to change positions every half-hour.” T. 13. As the
Commissioner points out, plaintiff’s brief appears to place him “in
the unusual position of arguing that the ALJ’s RFC determination
was erroneous because it took too narrow a view of [p]laintiff’s
functional capacity.” Doc. 13-1 at 16 (emphasis added). However,
plaintiff’s

argument

effectively

maintains

that

the

RFC

was

unsupported by substantial evidence even in the absence of a sitstand option, because the sit-stand option advocated by plaintiff
would

be

more

restrictive

and

thus

significantly

erode

the

occupational base of work.
The Court finds that substantial evidence supports the sitstand option incorporated into the ALJ’s RFC finding. First, the
medical opinions of record provided substantial evidence supporting
the

RFC.

As

noted

above,

NP

Mason’s

opinion

indicated

that

plaintiff was (at least at the time of her October 26, 2011
treatment note) restricted to light work “with no lifting greater
than 25 lbs and no excessive bending, twisting, turning, pushing,
or pulling.” T. 319. Dr. Miller’s consulting opinion as well as Dr.
Haddad’s treating opinion also supported a finding that plaintiff
could perform light work with the restrictions outlined by the ALJ.
Significantly, Dr. Haddad reported that plaintiff could sit for one
hour at a time, without interruption. Second, plaintiff himself
8

testified that he could sit for a period of 30 to 45 minutes before
needing to change positions. Accordingly, the Court finds that the
ALJ’s RFC finding, including the sit-stand option, was supported by
substantial evidence of record.
V.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff’s motion for judgment on

the pleadings (doc. 9) is denied and the Commissioner’s motion
(doc. 13) is granted. The ALJ’s finding that plaintiff was not
disabled is supported by substantial evidence in the record, and
accordingly, the complaint is dismissed in its entirety with
prejudice.

The Clerk of the Court is directed to close this case.

SO ORDERED.
S/Michael A. Telesca
HON. MICHAEL A. TELESCA
United States District Judge
Dated:

June 27, 2017
Rochester, New York.

9