Buczek v. Tirone et al
Filing
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DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING the Defendants' 27 Motion to Dismiss; DENYING Plaintiff's 37 Motion for Leave to File Sur-Reply; DIRECTING the Clerk to terminate all other pending 32 38] 43 motions as moot; DIRECTING the Clerk of Court to this case. Signed by William M. Skretny, United States District Judge on 4/24/2016. (MEAL) Copy mailed to Plaintiff. - CLERK TO FOLLOW UP -
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
DEBORAH ANN BUCZEK,
Plaintiff,
v.
DECISION AND ORDER
15-CV-28S
GASPER A. TIRONE, ET AL.,
Defendants.
I. INTRODUCTION
Presently before this Court is a Motion to Dismiss pro se Plaintiff Deborah Ann
Buczek’s Amended Writ of Replevin filed by Defendants Gasper A. Tirone; Elaine E.
Tirone; the Gasper A. Tirone and Elaine E. Tirone Trust, dated February 9, 2011; and
Steven W. Wells (“the moving defendants”). (Docket No. 27.) The moving defendants
argue that dismissal is warranted because this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction
under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the claims are barred by res judicata, and,
alternatively, Buczek fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
For the following reasons, this Court will deny the moving defendants’ request to
dismiss this case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction but will grant their request for
dismissal under the doctrine of res judicata.
II. BACKGROUND
Cognizant of the distinct disadvantage that pro se litigants face, federal courts
routinely read their submissions liberally and interpret them to raise the strongest
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arguments that they suggest. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S.Ct. 594,
596, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972); Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir. 1994). Since
Buczek is proceeding pro se, this Court has considered her submissions and arguments
accordingly.
The operative pleading is Buczek’s Amended Writ of Replevin, which is a
rambling document replete with sovereign-citizen notations and arguments. This Court
has construed the Amended Writ of Replevin as an amended complaint and will refer to
it as such. (Docket No. 23.)
Stripping away the irrelevant portions of the amended complaint, which constitute
a considerable amount of material, Buczek asserts claims arising out of a foreclosure
action in state court. See Amended Complaint, Docket No. 15, p. 2, ¶ 2 (describing
Buczek’s claims as arising “in the State of New York Supreme Court County of Erie
Index No. 807348/2014”).
Buczek alleges that the moving defendants initiated state foreclosure
proceedings against her property at 6841 Erie Road, Derby, NY, in violation of New
York law. See Amended Complaint, p. 7, ¶ 5(B); p. 12, ¶ 7. She further alleges that the
moving defendants fraudulently caused the property to be sold by the state court
referee, and that they forged title instruments evidencing their ownership of the
property. See Amended Complaint, p. 14, ¶ 9; p. 16, ¶ 14.
Buczek challenges the state court proceedings as “a wrongful foreclosure” and
maintains that the foreclosure sale is “void and invalid.” See Amended Complaint, p.
16, ¶ 14. She complains that, in violation of her Due Process rights, she was denied
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proper notice and service of proceedings, and that the moving defendants lacked
standing to pursue foreclosure. See Amended Complaint, p. 16-17, ¶¶ 14-21.
On September 18, 2014, the state court granted summary judgment against
Buczek and dismissed all of her defenses to foreclosure. See Amended Complaint,
Exhibit D. In that decision, the state court ordered that the foreclosure action could
proceed, including the appointment of a referee and the preparation of an application for
Judgment of Foreclosure and Sale. See id.
Buczek filed the instant action on December 24, 2014. (Docket No. 1.)
The state court thereafter entered a Judgment of Foreclosure and Sale on
February 2, 2015. See Declaration of Kevin M. Kearney, Docket No. 27-2, Exhibit A.
Buczek filed a Notice of Appeal of that judgment on February 27, 2015.
Id.
The
Judgment of Foreclosure and Sale entered judgment against Buczek, authorized the
sale of the property, and directed the referee to take certain actions. See id.
Buczek now seeks to recover quiet title to 6841 Erie Road, possession of the
property, the assessed value of the property ($685,000), and $2,025,000 in punitive
damages. See Amended Complaint, p. 8, ¶ 5(H); p. 15, ¶ 13; p. 24, ¶ 36; pp. 25-26,
WHEREFORE clause.
III. DISCUSSION
The moving defendants argue that Buczek’s amended complaint must be
dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, because her claims are barred by the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine. They further argue that Buczek’s claims are barred by res
judicata. Alternatively, they argue that Buczek fails to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted.
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A.
Subject-matter Jurisdiction
The plaintiff, as the party seeking to invoke the court’s jurisdiction, bears the
burden of demonstrating proper subject-matter jurisdiction.
McNutt v. Gen. Motors
Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189, 56 S.Ct. 780, 785, 80 L.Ed. 1135 (1936); Scelsa
v. City Univ. of N.Y., 76 F.3d 37, 40 (2d Cir. 1996). In turn, a defendant may assert lack
of subject-matter jurisdiction as a defense under Rule 12(b)(1), which permits dismissal
of an action if the “district court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate
it.” Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000).
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine holds that federal district courts lack subjectmatter jurisdiction to review final decisions of state courts or to reverse or modify state
court judgments. See Rooker v. Fidelity Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68
L.Ed. 362 (1923); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476,
103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983).
The doctrine bars federal courts from
exercising “jurisdiction over cases that essentially amount to appeals of state court
judgments.” Vossbrinck v. Accredited Home Lenders, Inc., 773 F.3d 423, 426 (2d Cir.
2014). It is a narrow doctrine that applies only to federal lawsuits brought by “statecourt losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before
the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection
of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280,
284, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2005).
Four conditions must be met for the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to apply: “(1) the
federal-court plaintiff must have lost in state court; (2) the plaintiff must complain of
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injuries caused by a state-court judgment; (3) the plaintiff must invite district court
review and rejection of that judgment; and (4) the state-court judgment must have been
rendered before the district court proceedings commenced.” Davis v. JP Morgan Chase
Bank, NA, No. 14-CV-6263 (KMK), 2016 WL 1267800, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2016)
(citing Hoblock v. Albany Cty. Bd. of Elections, 422 F.3d 77, 85 (2d Cir. 2015)) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also Vossbrinck, 773 F.3d at 426. The first and fourth
conditions are procedural, the second and third are substantive. See Hoblock, 422 F.3d
at 85.
The moving defendants argue that all four Rooker-Feldman conditions are met:
Buczek lost in state court; Buczek complains of injuries caused by a state-court
judgment; Buczek invites this Court’s review and rejection of the state-court judgment;
and the state court granted summary judgment before Buczek initiated these
proceedings. See Davis, 2016 WL 1267800, at *5. The moving defendants are correct
on the first three points, but they are wrong on the fourth.
As to the fourth element, the moving defendants maintain that the RookerFeldman doctrine applies to interlocutory orders, particularly the state court’s decision
granting summary judgment in this case. That used to be true in the Second Circuit.
See, e.g., Campbell v. Greisberger, 80 F.3d 703, 707 (2d Cir. 1996) (“It cannot be the
meaning of Rooker-Feldman that, while the inferior courts are barred from reviewing
final decisions of state courts, they are free to review interlocutory orders.”)(emphasis in
original).
But the Second Circuit now recognizes that the United States Supreme
Court’s decision in Exxon Mobil abrogated that line of jurisprudence. See Green v.
Mattingly, 585 F.3d 97, 101 (2d Cir. 2009) (“Much of our prior case law, however, was
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abrogated by [Exxon Mobil].”); Hoblock, 422 F.3d at 85 (noting that Exxon Mobil
overturned the Second Circuit’s Rooker-Feldman standard); Best v. City of New York,
No. 12 Civ. 7874 (RJS)(SN), 2014 WL 163899, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2014) (noting
that “Exxon Mobil Corp. abrogated previous Court of Appeals’ decisions that applied the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine to interlocutory state-court orders”).
The Rooker-Feldman
doctrine now applies only to final state-court judgments. See Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S.
459, 463, 126 S.Ct. 1198, 163 L.Ed.2d 1059 (2006)(per curiam)(“lower federal courts
are precluded from exercising appellate jurisdiction over final state-court judgments”)
(emphasis added); Davis v. Baldwin, 594 Fed.Appx. 49, 50 (2d Cir. Feb. 25, 2015)
(holding that “the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply here because Davis does
not invite review and rejection of a ‘final state-court judgment’”) (citing Lance).
More importantly, however, the state-court judgment that Buczek complains
caused her injury is not, as the moving defendants contend, the state court’s decision
granting summary judgment, which preceded Buczek’s filing of this action.
That
decision merely permitted foreclosure to proceed; it did not cause the injury Buczek
seeks to remedy. See Ayyad-Ramallo v. Marine Terrace Assocs. LLC, No. 13-CV-7038
(PKC), 2014 WL 2993448, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. July 2, 2014) (rejecting argument that a ruling
on summary judgment caused the plaintiff’s injury because that ruling did not order that
the plaintiff be evicted).
Rather, it was the Judgment of Foreclosure and Sale authorizing the sale of the
property that caused Buczek’s alleged injury. That judgment post-dates the filing of this
federal action. Thus, what exists here is parallel state and federal litigation, which does
not trigger the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See McClellan v. Carland, 217 U.S. 268, 282,
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30 S.Ct. 501, 54 L.Ed. 762 (1910) (“the pendency of an action in the state court is no
bar to proceedings concerning the same matter in the Federal court having
jurisdiction”); Hoblock, 422 F.3d at 85 (“”Rooker-Feldman has no application to federalcourt suits proceeding in parallel with ongoing state-court litigation”).
The Rooker-
Feldman doctrine therefore does not apply. See Ayyad-Ramallo, 2014 WL 2993448, at
*3 (“Although many of the factors and considerations of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
are present here, Rooker-Feldman is inapposite for one simple reason: the state-court
judgment of eviction was not rendered before the district court proceedings
commenced.”).
For these reasons, this Court finds that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not
apply to divest this Court of subject-matter jurisdiction. The moving defendants’ motion
to dismiss on this basis is therefore denied.
B.
Res Judicata
“A federal court must give to a state-court judgment the same preclusive effect as
would be given that judgment under the law of the State in which the judgment was
rendered.” Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 81, 104 S.Ct.
892, 896, 79 L.Ed.2d 56 (1984). The doctrine of res judicata thus provides that “a final
judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating
issues that were or could have been raised in that action.” Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S.
90, 94, 101 S.Ct 411, 66 L. Ed. 2d 308 (1980). Res judicata protects against “the
expense and vexation attending multiple lawsuits, conserves judicial resources, and
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fosters reliance on judicial action by minimizing the possibility of inconsistent decisions.”
Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153-54, 99 S.Ct. 970, 59 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979).
The Second Circuit has recently explained the two components of res judicata:
The term res judicata, which means essentially that the
matter in controversy has already been adjudicated,
encompasses two significantly different doctrines: claim
preclusion and issue preclusion. See Taylor v. Sturgell, 553
U.S. 880, 892, 128 S.Ct. 2161, 171 L.Ed.2d 155 (2008).
Under claim preclusion, “a final judgment forecloses
successive litigation of the very same claim, whether or not
relitigation of the claim raises the same issues as the earlier
suit.” Id. (internal quotation mark omitted). The doctrine
precludes not only litigation of claims raised and adjudicated
in a prior litigation between the parties (and their privies), but
also of claims that might have been raised in the prior
litigation but were not. See St. Pierre v. Dyer, 208 F.3d 394,
399 (2d Cir. 2000). The doctrine of issue preclusion, in
contrast, “bars successive litigation of an issue of fact or law
actually litigated and resolved in a valid court determination
essential to the prior judgment, even if the issue recurs in the
context of a different claim.” Taylor, 553 U.S. at 892, 128
S.Ct. 2161 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Marcel Fashions Grp., Inc. v. Lucky Brand Dungarees, Inc., 779 F.3d 102, 108-09 (2d
Cir. 2015).
Under New York law, “[t]he doctrine of res judicata precludes a party from
litigating a claim where a judgment on the merits exists from a prior action between the
same parties involving the same subject matter.” In re Josey v. Goord, 9 N.Y.3d 386,
389, 849 N.Y.S.2d 497, 880 N.E.2d 18 (N.Y. 2007) (citation and quotation omitted).
New York applies a “transactional approach” to res judicata, meaning that “once a claim
is brought to a final conclusion, all other claims arising out of the same transaction or
series of transactions are barred, even if based upon different theories or if seeking a
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different remedy.” In re Hunter, 4 N.Y.3d 260, 269, 794 N.Y.S.2d 286, 827 N.E.2d 269
(N.Y. 2005)(citation and quotation omitted).
Res judicata applies where (1) there is a previous judgment on the merits, (2) the
previous action involved the party (or a party in privity) against whom res judicata is
invoked, and (3) the claims involved were or could have been raised in the previous
action. See People ex rel. Spitzer v. Applied Card Sys., Inc., 11 N.Y.3d 105, 122, 863
N.Y.S.2d 615, 894 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 2008); Niles v. Wilshire Inv. Grp., LLC, 859 F. Supp.
2d 308, 338 (E.D.N.Y. 2012).
Here, the final Judgment of Foreclosure and Sale is a previous judgment on the
merits; Buczek was indisputably a party to the state foreclosure action; and all of the
claims and arguments Buczek asserts were or could have been raised in the
foreclosure proceedings.
Each of Buczek’s claims and allegations in the amended
complaint attack the foreclosure proceedings. Even Buczek’s fraud claims go to the
underlying basis for foreclosure. See, e.g., Amended Complaint, p. 14, ¶ 9; p. 16, ¶ 14.
Buczek’s claims are therefore barred by res judicata and must be dismissed. See Long
Is. Sav. Bank v. Mihalios, 269 A.D.2d 502, 503, 704 N.Y.S.2d 483 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000)
(“A judgment of foreclosure and sale entered against a defendant is final as to all
questions at issue between the parties, and concludes all matters of defense which
were or might have been litigated in the foreclosure action.”). 1
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Because this Court finds that Buczek’s claims are barred by res judicata, it need not reach the moving
defendants’ arguments that Buczek fails to state claims on which relief can be granted.
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IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court finds that Buczek’s claims are barred by the
doctrine of res judicata. The moving defendants’ motion to dismiss will therefore be
granted. 2
V. ORDERS
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED, that the moving defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
(Docket No. 27) is GRANTED.
FURTHER, that Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Sur-Reply (Docket No. 37) is
DENIED, this Court finding no further briefing necessary.
FURTHER, that in light of the dismissal of this case, the Clerk is directed to
terminate all other pending motions as moot (Docket Nos. 32, 38, 43).
FURTHER, that the Clerk of Court shall CLOSE this case.
SO ORDERED.
Dated:
April 24, 2016
Buffalo, New York
/s/William M. Skretny
WILLIAM M. SKRETNY
United States District Judge
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Because Buczek’s claims are barred by res judicata, she cannot sustain them against any defendant.
This case will therefore be dismissed in its entirety.
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