Page v. Colvin
Filing
15
DECISION AND ORDER granting 9 Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings; denying 11 Commissioner's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. The case is remanded solely for the calculation and payment of benefits. (Clerk to close this case.) Signed by Hon. Michael A. Telesca on 5/23/18. (JMC)-CLERK TO FOLLOW UP-
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
____________________________________
REGINA M. PAGE,
Plaintiff,
1:16-CV-0044(MAT)
DECISION AND ORDER
-v-
NANCY A. BERRYHILL,
Acting Commissioner OF Social Security1,
Defendant.
____________________________________
INTRODUCTION
Regina M. Page (“Plaintiff”), represented by counsel, brings
this action under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act
(“the Act”), seeking review of the final decision of the Acting
Commissioner
of
Social
Security
(“the
Commissioner”
or
“Defendant”), denying her applications for Disability Insurance
Benefits (“DIB”) and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”). The
Court has jurisdiction over the matter pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§§ 405(g), 1383(c).
competing
motions
Presently before the Court are the parties’
for
judgment
on
the
pleadings
pursuant
Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
to
For the
reasons set forth below, the Commissioner’s decision is reversed,
Plaintiff’s motion is granted to the extent that the matter is
remanded
solely
for
calculation
payment
of
benefits,
and
Defendant’s motion is denied.
1
Nancy A. Berryhill replaced Carolyn W. Colvin as Acting Commissioner of
Social Security on January 23, 2017. The Clerk of the Court is instructed to
amend the caption of this case pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d)
to reflect the substitution of Acting Commissioner Berryhill as the defendant in
this matter.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On January 25, 2013, Plaintiff protectively filed for DIB and
SSI, alleging disability beginning January 1, 2012. Administrative
Transcript (“T.”) 149-58. The claim was initially denied on March
26, 2013, and Plaintiff timely requested a hearing.
T. 85-95. A
hearing was conducted via video conference on August 5, 2014, in
Falls Church, Virginia by administrative law judge (“ALJ”) Mary
Withum. T. 27-58. Plaintiff appeared via video conference with her
attorney and testified. An impartial vocational expert (“VE”) also
testified.
The ALJ issued an unfavorable decision on October 27, 2014.
T. 9-26.
Plaintiff requested review of the ALJ’s decision by the
Appeals’ Council.
T. 6-8.
The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s
request for review on December 14, 2015, making the ALJ’s decision
the final decision of the Commissioner.
T. 1-5. Plaintiff then
timely commenced this action.
THE ALJ’S DECISION
The
ALJ
applied
the
five-step
sequential
evaluation
promulgated by the Commissioner for adjudicating disability claims.
See
20
C.F.R.
evaluation,
the
§
404.1520(a).
ALJ
found
At
that
step
one
Plaintiff
of
had
the
not
sequential
engaged
in
substantial gainful activity since the application date. T. 14.
At
step
following
disease
two,
“severe”
(“COPD”),
the
ALJ
determined
impairments:
fibromyalgia,
2
that
chronic
Plaintiff
obstructive
osteoarthritis,
had
the
pulmonary
anxiety
and
depression. Id. At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not
have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or
medically equals an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404,
Subpart P, Appendix 1.
The ALJ specifically considered Listings
12.04 and 12.06. T. 15.
Before proceeding to step four, the ALJ assessed Plaintiff as
having the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform light
work as defined in 20 C.F.R. 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b), with the
following additional limitations: no climbing ladders, ropes and
scaffolds; occasional climbing of ramps and stairs; occasional
stooping,
crouching,
kneeling,
and
crawling;
no
concentrated
exposure to extreme cold and heat; no exposure to unprotected
heights; able to perform simple, routine and repetitive tasks
performed in a work environment free of fast-paced production
requirements, involving occasional decision making and occasional
work place changes; and only occasional interaction with the
public, co-workers and supervisors. T. 16.
At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was unable to
perform any of her past relevant work. T. 21. At step five, the ALJ
relied
on
the
VE’s
testimony
to
determine
that
a
person
of
Plaintiff’s age, and with her education, work experience, and RFC,
could perform the requirements of the following representative jobs
that exist in significant numbers in the national economy: Bench
assembler (Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”) No. 706.684022, unskilled, SVP 2, light exertional level); Inspector (DOT
No. 762.687-014, unskilled, SVP 2, light exertional level); and
3
Sorter (DOT No. 789.687-034, unskilled, SVP 2, light exertional
level). T. 22. The ALJ accordingly found that Plaintiff had not
been
under
a
disability,
as
defined
in
the
Act,
since
the
application date. Id.
SCOPE OF REVIEW
A
district
court
may
set
aside
the
Commissioner’s
determination that a claimant is not disabled only if the factual
findings are not supported by “substantial evidence” or if the
decision is based on legal error.
42 U.S.C. § 405(g); see also
Green-Younger v. Barnhart, 335 F.3d 99, 105-06 (2d Cir. 2003). The
district court must accept the Commissioner’s findings of fact,
provided that such findings are supported by “substantial evidence”
in the record. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (the Commissioner’s findings
“as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be
conclusive”). “Substantial evidence means ‘such relevant evidence
as
a
reasonable
mind
might
accept
as
adequate
to
support
a
conclusion.’” Shaw v. Chater, 221 F.3d 126, 131 (2d Cir. 2000)
(quotation
omitted).
The
reviewing
court
nevertheless
must
scrutinize the whole record and examine evidence that supports or
detracts from both sides. Tejada v. Apfel, 167 F.3d 770, 774
(2d Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). “The deferential standard of
review
for
substantial
evidence
Commissioner’s conclusions of law.”
does
not
apply
to
the
Byam v. Barnhart, 336 F.3d
172, 179 (2d Cir. 2003) (citing Townley v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 109,
112 (2d Cir. 1984)).
4
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff contends that remand for calculation and payment of
benefits is warranted for the following reasons: (1) the ALJ erred
in
failing
to
properly
evaluate
the
opinions
of
consulting
psychologist Dr. Yu-Ying Lin and consulting physician Dr. Karl
Eurenius, which both supported some level of disability;
(2) the
ALJ did not properly evaluate and failed to give good reasons for
rejecting
treating physician
Dr.
George
Stefanos’
disability-
supporting opinion; and (3) the ALJ erred in relying on an RFC
assessment
unskilled
that
work,
conflicts
as
well
with
as
the
in
basic
relying
on
mental
VE
demands
testimony
of
that
conflicts with SSA regulatory definitions.
For
the
reasons
discussed
below,
the
Court
agrees
with
Plaintiff that, under the applicable regulations, the ALJ was
required to afford controlling weight to Dr. Stefanos’ opinion.
Moreover, because the medical evidence of record, including both
Dr.
Lin
and
Dr.
Eurenius’
opinions,
compels
a
finding
of
disability, remand of this matter solely for calculation and
payment of benefits is warranted.
I.
Evaluation of Dr. Stefanos’ Opinion
Under the Commissioner’s regulations in place at the time the
ALJ
issued
generally
her
decision,
entitled
to
a
treating
“controlling
physician’s
weight”
opinion
when
it
is
is
“well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory
diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other
substantial
evidence
in
[the]
5
case
record.”
20
C.F.R.
§ 404.1527(c)(2); see also Green-Younger, 335 F.3d at 106. An ALJ
may give less than controlling weight to a treating physician’s
opinion
if
it
does
not
meet
this
standard,
but
must
“comprehensively set forth [his or her] reasons for the weight
assigned to a treating physician’s opinion.” Halloran v. Barnhart,
362 F.3d 28, 33 (2d Cir. 2004); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)
(“We will always give good reasons in our notice of determination
or decision for the weight we give [the claimant’s] treating
source’s opinion.”).
The ALJ is required to consider “the length
of the treatment relationship and the frequency of examination; the
nature and extent of the treatment relationship; the relevant
evidence,
particularly medical
signs and
laboratory
findings,
supporting the opinion; the consistency of the opinion with the
record as a whole; and whether the physician is a specialist in the
area covering the particular medical issues” in determining how
much weight to afford a treating physician’s opinion. Burgess v.
Astrue,
537
F.3d
alterations,
and
117,
129
citations
(2d
Cir.
omitted);
2008)
see
(quotation
also
20
marks,
C.F.R.
§§ 404.1527(c)(1)-(6). However, the ALJ need not expressly discuss
each of these factors, so long as his “reasoning and adherence to
the regulation are clear.”
Atwater v. Astrue, 512 F. App’x 67, 70
(2d Cir. 2013) (citing Halloran, 362 F.3d at 31–32).
In
this
case,
Plaintiff’s
primary
care
physician,
Dr. Stefanos, completed a New York State Disability Determination
Medical Source Opinion Questionnaire on February 12, 2013. T. 263-
6
67. Dr. Stefanos reported he had been treating Plaintiff since 1997
and Plaintiff’s treating diagnoses at the time were depression,
fibromyalgio,
COPD,
and
tobacco
abuse.
T.
263.
Dr.
Stefanos
reported Plaintiff suffered from coughing, wheezing, low selfesteem and guilt, which, he opined, would be life-long conditions.
T. 263-64. Regarding work-related physical activities, Dr. Stefanos
opined Plaintiff is limited to occasionally (up to 1/3 of a work
day) lifting and carrying up to five pounds, standing or walking
for less than two hours per day (the lowest option available on the
form), sitting for less than six hours per day (the lowest option
available on the form), pushing and/or pulling no more than five
pounds with her upper extremities, and that her severe depression
and anxiety, and emphysema were conditions significant to her
recovery. T. 266-67.
In her decision, the ALJ assigned “little probative weight” to
Dr. Stefanos’ opinion. T. 20. The ALJ stated the opinion provided
no reference to any positive musculoskeletal findings and had no
medical examination findings to support the limitations noted. Id.
Furthermore,
the
ALJ
found
that
Dr.
Stefanos’
opinion
was
inconsistent with the Plaintiff’s consultative internal examination
and there was no treating evidence of a medical specialist, such as
a rheumatologist, to support the opinion. Id.
The ALJ’s reasons for discounting Dr. Stefanos’ opinion are
conclusory and unsupported by the record. The ALJ’s observation
that
there
were
no
positive
musculoskeletal
findings
in
Dr. Stefanos’ progress notes indicates the ALJ was assuming that
7
Dr.
Stefanos’
limitations
were
based
on
musculoskeletal
impairments. However, Dr. Stefanos made no such assertion in his
source statement. Rather, the limitations he opined to (i.e.
walking less than two hours per day, and carrying, pushing, and
pulling no more than five pounds at a time) could reasonably be
attributed to Plaintiff’s diagnoses of COPD and emphysema. During
the relevant period and consistent with Dr. Stefanos’ source
opinion,
his
treatment
notes
report
wheezing
upon
physical
examination on June 6, 2012 (T. 319), and dyspnea and wheezing on
September 6, 2012 (T. 307), February 12, 2013 (T. 294), and May 22,
2013
(T.
405).
The
ALJ’s
failure
to
consider
the
impact
of
Plaintiff’s well-documented respiratory conditions on Dr. Stefanos’
opinion was error, and constituted a substitution of the ALJ’s own
lay opinion for competent medical evidence.
The ALJ’s conclusion that the record contained no evidence of
a medical specialist to support Dr. Stefanos’ opinion is also in
error. Dr. Stefanos’ March 18, 2013 treatment notes indicate he had
recommended a consultation with a pulmonologist. T. 402. Plaintiff
underwent pulmonary function tests on August 14, 2013 which showed
the presence of moderate obstructive lung disease and her diffusing
capacity was rated as severely reduced. T. 417. On September 25,
2013, Plaintiff was examined by Dr. Jennifer Stalica of Unity
Pulmonary, who reported back to Dr. Stefanos that Plaintiff noted
she is able to walk one flight of stairs but is winded and must
rest at the top of each flight, it is difficult for her to carry
heavy objects, such as laundry and grocery bags, and occasionally
8
will walk less than a mile. Plaintiff reported a productive morning
cough and wheezing at times. She also reported low back pain and
several musculoskeletal complaints. Id. These reports, while made
after Dr. Stefanos’ source opinion, corroborate the limitations he
included in his opinion.
The ALJ’s decision includes reference to
Dr. Stalica’s pulmonary evaluation (see T. 18.), yet, as noted
above, the ALJ stated there was no treating evidence of a medical
specialist to support Dr. Stefanos’ opinion. This inconsistency in
the decision again indicates the ALJ assumed Dr. Stefanos only
based the limitations in his opinion on musculoskeletal issues.
The
Dr.
ALJ
also
Stefanos’
consultative
failed
opinion
exam.
As
to
was
support
her
inconsistent
discussed
further
conclusion
that
with
Plaintiff’s
below,
consultative
examiner Dr. Eurenius concluded that Plaintiff had several serious
limitations. The ALJ failed to take these findings into account,
instead stating that “the physical findings during the consultative
internal examination were within normal limits.” T. 20. This is an
inaccurate summary of Dr. Eurenius’ examination, during which
Plaintiff’s blood pressure was high, rotation of her neck to the
right caused her shoulder pain, elevation of her right shoulder
caused pain in her shoulder and neck, and she had tenderness in her
top left shoulder joint. T. 359-60.
For all the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that the ALJ
failed
to
articulate
good
reasons
for
affording
less
than
controlling weight to Dr. Stefanos’ opinion. Dr. Stefanos’ opinion
was consistent with the medical evidence of record and his own
9
long-standing treatment of Plaintiff. The applicable regulations
required the ALJ to afford it controlling weight, and the ALJ erred
in not doing so.
II.
Evaluation of Consultative Opinions
Plaintiff contends that, in addition to improperly weighing
Dr. Stefanos’ opinion, the ALJ failed to appropriately consider and
weigh
the
opinions
of
consultative
examiners
Dr.
Lin
and
Dr. Eurenius. The Court agrees.
“[W]here the ALJ fails to give controlling weight to opinions
from plaintiff’s treating sources, the [Commissioner’s r]egulations
require an ALJ to explain the weight given to the opinions of state
agency medical consultants.” Stytzer v. Astrue, No. 1:07-CV-811
NAM/DEP,
Moreover,
2010
WL
where
3907771,
the
ALJ
at
*7
rejects
(N.D.N.Y.
the
Sept.
opinion
of
30,
a
2010).
treating
physician, the opinion of the consultative examiner “takes on
particular significance.” Dioguardi v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 445 F.
Supp.2d 288, 295 (W.D.N.Y. 2006). “When the medial source statement
of
the
consultative
examiner
conflicts
with
the
ALJ’s
RFC
assessment, the plaintiff is entitled to an express recognition
from the Commissioner of the existence of a favorable medical
source statement and, if the ALJ declined to accept it, the reasons
for not doing so.” Stytzer, 2010 WL 390771 at *7.
Here, Plaintiff was examined by consultative psychologist
Dr. Lin and consultative physician Dr. Eurenius. Both of these
examining
medical
sources
opined
Plaintiff
had
significant
limitations as a result of her impairments. As discussed below, the
10
ALJ discredited the opinions of both consultative examiners, based
on her own lay opinion and the opinion of the non-examining
psychological consultant (see T. 16, referring to T. 61-84), which
the Court finds to be in error.
A. Consulting Psychologist Dr. Yu-Ying Lin
The ALJ committed error when she discredited the opinion of
consulting psychologist Dr. Lin, based on her lay assessment of
Plaintiff’s mental health symptoms. Plaintiff was examined by state
agency consulting psychologist Dr. Lin on March 1, 2013. In her
report, Dr. Lin noted Plaintiff had circumstantial and tangential
thoughts
processes,
dysphoric
affect
and
dysthymic
mood,
and
impaired attention, concentration, and memory. T. 354. Dr. Lin
opined
Plaintiff’s
insight
and
judgment
were
fair
and
her
intellectual functioning appeared to be below average. Plaintiff’s
medical condition could make daily functions such as cooking,
cleaning, laundry, and shopping difficult at times. T. 355. In her
source statement, Dr. Lin opined Plaintiff could not maintain
attention and concentration. At times, she is unable to maintain a
regular schedule or make appropriate decisions. She is unable to
appropriately deal with stress and her difficulties are caused by
stress-related problems and a lack of motivation. Dr. Lin opined
that
the
results
consistent
with
of
Plaintiff’s
psychiatric
examination
problems
which
appeared
may
to
be
significantly
interfere with her ability to function on a daily basis. Id.
Dr.
Lin
diagnosed
Plaintiff
with
11
major
depressive
disorder,
moderate, and generalized anxiety disorder. Id. She recommended
psychiatric intervention, individual psychological therapy, medical
evaluation,
and
vocational
training.
Finally,
Dr.
Lin
gave
Plaintiff the prognosis of fair to guarded. T. 356.
In her decision, the ALJ assigned “some weight” to the mental
health limitations identified by Dr. Lin, reasoning that “the
routine
and
conservative
treatment
and
normal
mental
status
examinations during the follow[up] visits with Dr. Stefanos do not
support the finding that [Plaintiff] would not be able to perform
activities within a schedule.” The ALJ further reasoned that
although Plaintiff has moderate limitations in her ability to
maintain attention and concentration, Plaintiff’s mental health
symptoms were not so severe as to preclude her from performing some
work within her RFC. T. 19-20. This reasoning erroneous. “Neither
a reviewing judge nor the Commissioner is permitted to substitute
his own expertise or view of the medical proof for ... competent
medical opinion.” Burgess v. Astrue, 537 F.3d 117, 131 (2d Cir.
2008) (internal citation and quotation omitted). Furthermore, an
ALJ may not rely on her own lay opinion to conclude a claimant “has
not generally received the type of medical treatment one would
expect from a totally disabled individual.” Davis-Payne v. Colvin,
No. 1:15-CV-00379 (MAT), 2018 WL 300110, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 5,
2018) (citing Blakes ex rel. Wolfe v. Barnhart, 331 F.3d 565,570
(7th Cir. 2003)).
12
In this case, Dr. Stefanos’ treatment notes include reference
to Plaintiff’s ongoing issues with depression and anxiety. On
February 12, 2013, Dr. Stefanos noted Plaintiff’s examination
revealed anxiety, depressed thinking and disorganized thinking.
Dr.
Stefanos
recommended
Plaintiff
receive
a
psychiatry
consultation. He discontinued her prescription of Zoloft (50 mg
tablet once a day) and wrote a new prescription for Xanax (1 mg
tablet
once
a
day).
T.
290-294.
At
a
May
2013
appointment,
Dr. Stefanos diagnosed Plaintiff with anxiety. T. 405. In July
2013,
Dr.
revealed
Stefanos
anxiety
conclusion
that
again
and
these
noted
depressed
that
Plaintiff’s
thinking.
findings
do
not
T.
410.
support
examination
The
ALJ’s
Dr.
Lin’s
professional assessment of Plaintiff’s abilities is not supported
by competent medical evidence. Accordingly, the Court finds that
the ALJ erred in evaluating Dr. Lin’s opinion and failed to
identify appropriate reasons for disregarding the portions of this
opinion that were favorable to Plaintiff.
Additionally, the ALJ found that Dr. Lin's opinion that
Plaintiff was unable to appropriately deal with stress, could not
maintain attention and concentration, and at times would be unable
to maintain a regular schedule or make appropriate decisions was
inconsistent
with
the
opinion
of
non-examining
psychological
consultant Dr. R. Nobel. Dr. Nobel opined Plaintiff would have
moderate limitations in her ability to understand, remember and
carry
out
detailed
instructions,
maintain
attention
and
concentration for extended periods, and maintain and perform within
13
a schedule. T. 80. The ALJ adopted nearly all of Dr. Nobel’s
limitations, while disregarding Dr. Lin’s opinion. T. 19-20. The
Court finds this was an error. The Commissioner’s regulations
naturally give preference to the opinions of examining doctors over
non-examining doctors. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1). (“Generally,
we give more weight to the opinion of the source who has examined
you than to the opinion of a source who has not examined you.”). A
face-to-face exam of a patient is more reliable than an opinion
based only the review of a “cold” medical record. Valazquez v.
Barnhart, 518 F.Supp.2d 520, 524 (W.D.N.Y. 2007). Moreover, the
inherent
subjectivity
of
a
psychiatric
diagnosis
requires
a
personal evaluation of the patient’s credibility and affect. See
Westphal v. Eastman Kodak Co., No. 05-CV-6120, 2006 WL 1720380 *4,
*5 (W.D.N.Y. 2006). Here, where Dr. Lin's opinion was supported by
her thorough examination and was consistent with the other medical
evidence of record, the ALJ's reliance on a non-examining source
was inappropriate. The ALJ’s discounting of Dr. Lin’s consultative
opinion was erroneous and unsupported by substantial evidence.
B. Consulting Physician Dr. Karl Eurenius
The
ALJ
also
erred
in
the
weighing
of
Dr.
Eurenius’
consultative opinion. In particular, the ALJ’s determination that
Dr.
Eurenius’
use
of
the
terms
“mildly”
and
“moderately
to
markedly” rendered his opinion vague and ambiguous for the purposes
of determining an RFC was inappropriate, given Dr. Eurenius’
14
detailed
musculoskeletal
examination
notes
included
with
his
medical source statement.
Dr. Eurenius examined Plaintiff on March 1, 2013. T. 358-61.
Upon examination, Plaintiff noted pain in the right posterior
shoulder when fully rotating her neck to the right. Plaintiff had
full range of motion of her shoulders, elbows, forearms, and wrists
bilaterally, but elevation of the right shoulder caused her pain in
the top of the right shoulder and in the posterior right neck.
T. 360. After fully examining Plaintiff, Dr. Eurenius determined
her prognosis was stable. He diagnosed Plaintiff with emphysema,
allergic asthma, pain of the right shoulder and right neck, and
mental health issues. T. 361. In his source statement, he opined
that Plaintiff was mildly limited in lifting and carrying with her
right arm due to right shoulder pain; she was moderately to
markedly limited in exertional activities such as walking and
climbing and repetitive activities due to shortness of breath
secondary to COPD. T. 361.
An ALJ is required to appropriately explain the weight given
to a consultative examiner’s opinion.
See Reider v. Colvin,
No. 15-CV-6157P, 2016 WL 5334436, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2016).
In this case, the ALJ failed to do so.
First, the ALJ erroneously
stated that Dr. Eurenius’ physical findings were completely normal,
when in fact he observed musculoskeletal issues upon examination.
Second, the ALJ stated that Dr. Eurenius’ use of the phrases
“mildly” and “moderately to markedly” were impermissibly vague.
However, the “the mere use of phrases such as ‘moderate’ or ‘mild’
15
does not render a doctor’s opinion vague or non-substantial for
purposes of an ALJ’s RFC determination.”
Dutcher v. Colvin,
No. 1:12-CV-1662 GLS, 2014 WL 295776, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 27,
2014).
Instead,
the
determinative
question
is
whether
the
conclusions were supported by examination results and the record as
a whole. Id. Here, Dr. Eurenius’ conclusions were consistent with
his physical examination and the medical evidence of record, and
the ALJ improperly concluded that his opinion was unduly vague.
Accordingly, the Court finds that there was no legitimate reason
for the ALJ to discount the limitations identified by Dr. Eurenius.
III. Remedy
Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the district court has the power to
affirm, modify, or reverse the ALJ’s decision with or without
remanding for a rehearing.
Remand solely for calculation and
payment of benefits is appropriate where the record persuasively
demonstrates the claimant’s disability, Parker v. Harris, 626 F.2d
225, 235 (2d Cir. 1980), and there is no reason to conclude that
additional evidence exists that might support the Commissioner’s
claim that the claimant is not disabled, Butts v. Barnhart, 388
F.3d 377, 385–86 (2d Cir. 2004).
For the reasons set forth above, the Court finds that the
ALJ’s decision to give less than controlling weight to the opinion
of
Plaintiff’s
treating
physician,
Dr.
Stefanos
was
legally
erroneous and unsupported by substantial evidence. Likewise, the
ALJ’s
discounting
of
Dr.
Lin
and
16
Dr.
Eurenius’
consultative
opinions
was
legally
erroneous
and
not
based
on
substantial
evidence. Dr. Lin opined Plaintiff is unable to maintain a regular
schedule or make appropriate decisions due to her psychiatric
problems.
T.
355.
At
the
hearing,
the
VE
testified
that
an
individual who could not maintain a regular schedule would be
unable to sustain any competitive work. T. 57.
Had the ALJ given
proper weight to these medical opinions, a finding of disability
would have necessarily followed. Finally, the record in this case
is complete, and further development cannot reasonably be expected
to support a finding that Plaintiff is not disabled. Accordingly,
the Court finds that remand solely for the calculation and payment
of benefits is warranted.
CONCLUSION
For
the
foregoing
reasons,
the
Court
finds
that
the
Commissioner’s decision was legally erroneous and is not supported
by substantial evidence. It therefore is reversed. Accordingly,
Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings (Docket No. 12) is
denied, and Plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the pleadings
(Docket No. 9) is granted, and the case is remanded solely for the
calculation and payment of benefits. The Clerk of Court is directed
to close this case.
ALL OF THE ABOVE IS SO ORDERED.
S/Michael A. Telesca
_____________________________
MICHAEL A. TELESCA
United States District Judge
Dated:
May 23, 2018
Rochester, New York
17
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