Warren v. Mariner Finance, LLC et al
Filing
40
DECISION & ORDER denying 36 Motion for Reconsideration. Warren's claims under the FCRA and GBL § 349 will be dismissed unless he files an amended complaint within 30 days of the date of this decision and order remedying the deficie ncies outlined in this Court's prior decision and order dated August 12, 2020. See Docket Items 35 and 37. Warren also must inform the Court within 30 days of the date of this decision and order whether he would like to proceed with his motion to remand. SO ORDERED. Signed by Hon. Lawrence J. Vilardo on 9/25/2020. (RFI) (Chambers has mailed a copy of this decision and order to the pro se plaintiff).
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
DANIEL T. WARREN,
Plaintiff,
16-CV-221
DECISION & ORDER
v.
MARINER FINANCE, LLC,
Defendant.
On February 27, 2016, the plaintiff, Daniel T. Warren, filed a complaint in New
York State Supreme Court, Erie County, alleging that a loan issued by the defendant,
Mariner Finance, LLC (“Mariner”), 1 was usurious and therefore void. Docket Item 1-2.
Warren also alleged violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”) and New York
General Business Law (“GBL”) § 349. Docket Item 1-2. On March 15, 2016, Mariner
removed Warren’s complaint to this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Docket Item 1. 2 On
April 4, 2016, Warren amended his complaint. Docket Item 11.
On April 22, 2016, Mariner moved to dismiss the amended complaint for failure to
state a claim, Docket Item 19, and on June 20, 2016, Warren moved for partial
summary judgment, Docket Item 28. On August 12, 2020, this Court granted in part
and denied in part Mariner’s motion to dismiss and denied Warren’s motion for partial
1
Warren also alleged claims against two other defendants—credit reporting
agencies TransUnion LLC, and Equifax Information Services, LLC—but this Court
subsequently dismissed the claims against those defendants by stipulation of the
parties. Docket Items 24, 26, 32, and 33.
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This case originally was assigned to the Honorable John T. Curtin and
subsequently was transferred to the undersigned. See Docket Item 12.
summary judgment as moot. Docket Item 35. More specifically, the Court granted
Mariner’s motion to dismiss with respect to Warren’s usury claim but allowed Warren to
amend his complaint with respect to his claims under the FCRA and GBL § 349 within
45 days of the Court’s decision and order. See id. at 17.
Two days before the Court issued its decision and order on the motion to
dismiss, Warren moved to amend his complaint to remove his FCRA claim and to
remand this matter to state court. Docket Item 34. In light of its decision and order, the
Court ordered Warren to report within 45 days whether he would like to proceed with his
motion to remand or withdraw it. Docket Item 35.
On August 25, 2020, Warren moved for reconsideration of this Court’s decision
and order. Docket Item 36. The Court stayed Warren’s deadline for amending his
complaint and informing the Court whether he would proceed with his motion for
remand until 30 days after a decision on his motion for reconsideration. Docket Item 37.
On September 10, 2020, Mariner responded to Warren’s motion for reconsideration,
Docket Item 38, and on September 21, 2020, Warren replied, Docket Item 39.
For the reasons that follow, Warren’s motion for reconsideration is denied.
Warren shall amend his complaint and inform the Court whether he will proceed with his
motion for remand within 30 days of the date of this decision and order.
DISCUSSION
“A motion for reconsideration is an extraordinary request that is granted only in
rare circumstances, such as where the court failed to consider evidence or binding
authority.” Van Buskirk v. United Grp. of Companies, Inc., 935 F.3d 49, 54 (2d Cir.
2019). Thus, “reconsideration will generally be denied unless the moving party can
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point to controlling decisions or data that the court overlooked—matters, in other words,
that might reasonably be expected to alter the conclusion reached by the court.”
Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995).
Here, Warren argues that “[o]nce this Court came to the conclusion that [his
FCRA] cause of action failed to state a claim[,] it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to
even look at the causes of action premised solely on [s]tate law.” Docket Item 36-1 at 4.
Alternatively, he contends that even if Mariner “is correct that this Court has
supplemental jurisdiction over the First and Third causes of action and discretion to
remand, or not, it should exercise its discretion to decline to reach them.” Docket Item
39 at 3.
Federal district courts have jurisdiction over “civil actions arising under the
Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States,” including the FCRA. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331. Federal courts may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims
which are “so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they
form part of the same case or controversy.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
When a district court dismisses a federal claim that provided the basis for its
original jurisdiction, it has “the discretion to retain jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s
supplemental state law claims.” Nowak v. Ironworkers Local 6 Pension Fund, 81 F.3d
1182, 1191 (2d Cir. 1996); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (explaining that “district
courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim” if “the district
court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction” (emphasis added)).
In deciding whether to retain supplemental jurisdiction over state claims, a court should
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“consider factors such as judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.” Nowak,
81 F.3d at 1191.
Here, as Mariner observes, all of Warren’s “claims arise from the same facts,
Mariner’s extension of credit.” Docket Item 38 at 2. Thus, this Court finds that the state
law claims are “so related to [the FCRA claim] that they form part of the same case or
controversy.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
The Court further finds that it appropriately retained jurisdiction over Warren’s
state law claims. As an initial matter, the Court did not dismiss Warren’s federal claim
under the FCRA claim outright; it granted him leave to amend. See Docket Item 35 at
17 (ordering that “Warren may amend his complaint with respect to his claims under the
FCRA and GBL § 349” and “[i]f Warren does not amend his complaint within 45 days of
the date of this decision and order, the complaint will be dismissed without further order
of the Court” (emphasis added)). Given that the motion to dismiss had been pending for
over four years, it promoted both “convenience” and “fairness” to decide the issues all at
once, rather than delaying further to see whether Warren successfully amended his
FCRA claim. What is more, at the time Warren filed his motion to remand, this Court
had nearly finished drafting its decision and order on the motion to dismiss. It thus
promoted “judicial economy” to issue the decision and order rather than simply grant
Warren’s motion.
Moreover, “comity will not be unduly impacted by” this Court’s exercise of
supplemental jurisdiction. See Williams v. Dow Chem. Co., 326 F. Supp. 2d 443, 449
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (citing Nowak, 81 F.3d at 1191). Warren contends that “[i]t is beyond
dispute that [his usury claim] presents novel and complex issues of state law.” Docket
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Item 39 at 3. This Court disagrees. As it explained in its decision and order, several
courts and the New York State Department of Financial Services have interpreted the
relevant state laws in the same way as this Court, while “[t]he only authority Warren
cite[d] in support of his contrary position . . . is inapposite.” Docket Item 45 at 4-7.
For all those reasons, the Court denies Warren’s motion for reconsideration.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Warren’s motion for reconsideration, Docket Item 36,
is DENIED. Warren’s claims under the FCRA and GBL § 349 will be dismissed unless
he files an amended complaint within 30 days of the date of this decision and order
remedying the deficiencies outlined in this Court’s prior decision and order dated August
12, 2020. See Docket Items 35 and 37. Warren also must inform the Court within 30
days of the date of this decision and order whether he would like to proceed with his
motion to remand. 3
SO ORDERED.
Dated: September 25, 2020
Buffalo, New York
/s/ Lawrence J. Vilardo
LAWRENCE J. VILARDO
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
3
In his reply in support of his motion for reconsideration, Warren advised the
Court that he “simply cannot in good faith amend [his FCRA claim] to meet the standard
in this Court’s ruling.” Docket Item 39. If Warren amends his complaint with respect to
his GBL § 349 claim only, he is not precluded from arguing that claim should be
remanded. In other words, this Court’s decision that it properly decided the state law
issues in the motion to dismiss is without prejudice to Warren’s arguing that this Court
should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the GBL § 349 moving forward
if the FCRA claim is dismissed with prejudice but the GBL § 349 is allowed to proceed.
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