Buczek v. Setrus LLC et al

Filing 7

DECISION AND ORDER DENYING Plaintiff's 4 Motion for Reconsideration. Signed by William M. Skretny, United States District Judge on 5/12/2017. (MEAL) Copy mailed to Plaintiff.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
DEBORAH ANN BUCZEK,
Plaintiff,
v.

DECISION AND ORDER
16-CV-268S

SETRUS LLC, ET AL.,
Defendants.
1.

Plaintiff Deborah Ann Buczek filed this pro se action1 on April 4, 2016,

alleging that defendants violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692,
et seq., and the New York Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 601,
during the course of a state foreclosure action filed by Defendant HSBC N.A. USA.
2.

On March 20, 2017, this Court screened Buczek’s complaint consistent with

the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B) and determined that she failed to properly
state claims under both statutes. (Docket No. 3.) But rather than dismiss Buczek’s federal
claims, this Court granted her leave to file an amended complaint to afford her the
opportunity to properly state claims under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. (Docket
No. 3.) This Court denied leave to amend as to claims under the New York Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act, because that statute contains no private right of action. See
Graham v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc., 156 F. Supp. 3d 491, 515 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).
3.

On April 10, 2017, Buczek filed a Motion for Reconsideration, or in the

alternative, for an Extension of Time to file her amended complaint. (Docket No. 4.)

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Buczek’s pro se status entitles her submissions to broad consideration. Because of the distinct
disadvantage that pro se litigants face, federal courts routinely read their submissions liberally, and
interpret them to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,
520, 92 S. Ct. 594, 596, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972); Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir. 1994). This
Court has considered Buczek’s submissions accordingly.

Buczek thereafter filed a supplemental motion to extend time (Docket No. 5), which this
Court granted (Docket No. 6), thereby leaving only Buczek’s request for reconsideration
pending for resolution. By requesting reconsideration, Buczek presumably objects to the
dismissal of her state claims, yet she offers no authority establishing a private right of
action under the governing statute. Her motion must therefore be denied.
4.

A district judge may modify pre-trial rulings and interlocutory orders at any

time prior to final judgment. See In re United States, 733 F.2d 10, 13 (2d Cir. 1984).
Reconsideration of a prior decision is generally justified in any one of the following three
circumstances: (1) an intervening change in controlling law; (2) new evidence; or (3) the
need to correct a clear error of law or to prevent manifest injustice. See Virgin Atl. Airways,
Ltd. v. Nat’l Mediation Bd., 956 F.2d 1245, 1255 (2d Cir.1992); see also Amerisure Ins. Co.
v. Laserage Tech. Corp., No. 96-CV-6313, 1998 WL 310750, *1 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 12, 1998)
(citing United States v. Adegbite, 877 F.2d 174, 178 (2d Cir. 1989)).
5.

The decision whether to grant or deny a motion to reconsider lies in this

Court’s discretion. See McCarthy v. Manson, 714 F.2d 234, 237 (2d Cir. 1983). Parties
bringing motions to reconsider “should evaluate whether what may seem to be a clear error
of law is in fact simply a point of disagreement between the Court and the litigant.” Duane
v. Spaulding and Rogers Mfg. Inc., No. 92-CV-305, 1994 WL 494651, *1 (N.D.N.Y. Aug.
10, 1994) (quoting McDowell Oil Serv. v. Interstate Fire and Cas., 817 F. Supp. 538, 541
(M.D.Pa. 1993)). Motions for reconsideration are not to be used as a means to reargue
matters already disposed of by prior rulings or to put forward additional arguments that
could have been raised before the decision. See Duane, 1994 WL 494651 at *1. After all,
a “motion for reconsideration is not a device intended to give an unhappy litigant one
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additional chance to sway the judge.” Nossek v. Bd. of Ed. of Duanesburg Cent. Sch.
Dist., No. 94-CV-219, 1994 WL 688298, *1 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 10, 1994).
6.

Upon consideration of Buczek’s Motion for Reconsideration, this Court is not

convinced that its March 20, 2017 Decision and Order must be revisited. Buczek has not
persuasively alleged any of the three circumstances under which reconsideration may be
warranted. See Virgin Atl. Airways, 956 F.2d at 1255. Instead, she simply reargues and
reiterates her baseless positions and continues to extol irrelevant theories.

These

arguments have already been raised and rejected.
7.

Buczek is obviously dissatisfied with this Court’s decision. But use of a

motion to reconsider as a vehicle to reargue a case is improper. See Nossek, 1994 WL
688298 at *1; United States v. Chiochvili, 103 F. Supp. 2d 526, 530-31 (N.D.N.Y. 2000)
(reargument is not a proper basis for a motion to reconsider); Schonberger, 742 F. Supp.
at 119 (“the provision for reargument is not designed to allow wasteful repetition of
arguments already briefed, considered and decided”). Accordingly, reconsideration is
denied.
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED, that Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration (Docket No.
4) is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 12, 2017
Buffalo, New York
/s/William M. Skretny
WILLIAM M. SKRETNY
United States District Judge

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