Kearney v. Colvin
Filing
21
DECISION AND ORDER denying 13 Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings; granting 16 Commissioner's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. Plaintiffs complaint is dismissed in its entirety with prejudice. The Clerk of the Court is directed to close this case. Signed by Hon. Michael A. Telesca on 11/2/18. (JMC)-CLERK TO FOLLOW UP-
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
____________________________________
KIMBERLY B. KEARNEY
Plaintiff,
1:16-cv-00652-MAT
DECISION AND ORDER
-v-
NANCY A. BERRYHILL,
Acting Commissioner OF Social Security,
Defendant.
____________________________________
INTRODUCTION
Kimberly B. Kearney (“Plaintiff”), represented by counsel,
brings this action under Title II of the Social Security Act (“the
Act”)
seeking
review
of
the
final
decision
of
the
Acting
Commissioner of Social Security (“the Commissioner” or “Defendant”)
denying her applications for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”).
The Court has jurisdiction over the matter pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g). Presently before the Court are the parties’ competing
motions for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the reasons set forth below,
Plaintiff’s motion is denied and Defendant’s motion is granted.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On
February
28,
2014,
Plaintiff
protectively
filed
an
application for DIB, alleging disability as of June 28, 2013, due
to posttraumatic stress disorder, arthritic knees, depression, and
obesity. Administrative Transcript (“T.”) 93-94. The claim was
initially
denied on
May
19,
2014. T. 109-15.
At
Plaintiff’s
request, a video hearing was conducted on May 12, 2016, in Kansas
City, Missouri by administrative law judge (“ALJ”) Michael A. Lehr,
with Plaintiff appearing via video conference with her attorney in
Buffalo, New York. A vocational expert (“VE”) also testified.
T. 65-92. The ALJ issued an unfavorable decision on May 23, 2016.
T. 23-42. Plaintiff appealed the decision to the Appeals Council
(“AC”), which denied Plaintiff’s request for review on August 2,
2016, making the ALJ’s decision the final determination of the
Commissioner. T. 1-6. This action followed.
THE ALJ’S DECISION
The
ALJ
applied
the
five-step
sequential
evaluation
promulgated by the Commissioner for adjudicating disability claims.
See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). Initially, the ALJ determined that
Plaintiff met the insured status requirements of the Act through
December 31, 2019. T. 28.
At step one of the sequential evaluation, the ALJ found that
Plaintiff had not engaged in ongoing substantial gainful activity
since June 28, 2013, the alleged onset date. He also found that
although Plaintiff had worked since the alleged onset date, the
activity,
for
the
most
part,
did
not
rise
to
the
level
of
had
the
substantial gainful activity. Id.
At
step
two,
the
ALJ
determined
that
Plaintiff
following “severe” impairments: obesity, osteoarthritis of the
bilateral
knees,
lumbar
pain,
posttraumatic
(“PTSD”), and depression. Id.
2
stress
disorder
At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s impairments did
not singularly or in combination meet or medically equal the
severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404,
Subpart P, Appendix 1. T. 29.
Before proceeding to step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff
retained the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform light
work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b), with the following
additional
limitations:
can
lift
and
carry
up
to
ten
pounds
frequently, and up to twenty pounds occasionally; can stand and/or
walk for about six hours out of an eight-hour workday; can sit for
about six hours out of an eight-hour workday; can only occasionally
climb ramps and stairs, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl;
should never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; no concentrated
exposure to temperature extremes, vibration, or work hazards;
limited to simple unskilled work with no contact with the general
public, and only occasional contact with supervisors and coworkers;
work should be self-paced and not work such as assembly line or
factory work. T. 32.
At
step
four,
the
ALJ
found
Plaintiff
was
capable
of
performing her past relevant work as a housekeeper/cleaner. T. 40.
In the alternative, at step five, the ALJ relied on the VE’s
testimony to find that there are unskilled jobs existing in the
national economy Plaintiff was able to perform, including the
representative occupations of garment sorter, mail clerk, and
3
marker. T. 41. The ALJ accordingly found that Plaintiff was not
disabled as defined in the Act. T. 42.
SCOPE OF REVIEW
A
district
court
may
set
aside
the
Commissioner’s
determination that a claimant is not disabled only if the factual
findings are not supported by “substantial evidence” or if the
decision is based on legal error. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); see also
Green-Younger v. Barnhart, 335 F.3d 99, 105-06 (2d Cir. 2003). The
district court must accept the Commissioner’s findings of fact,
provided that such findings are supported by “substantial evidence”
in the record. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (the Commissioner’s findings
“as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be
conclusive”). “Substantial evidence means ‘such relevant evidence
as
a
reasonable
mind
might
accept
as
adequate
to
support
a
conclusion.’” Shaw v. Chater, 221 F.3d 126, 131 (2d Cir. 2000)
(quotation
omitted).
The
reviewing
court
nevertheless
must
scrutinize the whole record and examine evidence that supports or
detracts from both sides. Tejada v. Apfel, 167 F.3d 770, 774
(2d Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). “The deferential standard of
review
for
substantial
evidence
does
not
apply
to
the
Commissioner’s conclusions of law.” Byam v. Barnhart, 336 F.3d 172,
179 (2d Cir. 2003) (citing Townley v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 109, 112
(2d Cir. 1984)).
4
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff contends that remand is warranted for the following
reasons: (1) the ALJ erred in substituting his own lay judgement
for that of all medical opinions of record; and (2) the ALJ erred
in failing to do a full and proper assessment of Plaintiff’s
“symptom intensity” as required under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 and
Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 16-3p. For the reasons discussed
below, the Court finds Plaintiff’s arguments without merit and
affirms the Commissioner’s final determination.
I.
Evaluation of the Medical Opinions of Record
As noted above, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to
appropriately evaluate the medical opinions of record and instead
relied on his own lay judgement. The Court has summarized these
opinions and the ALJ’s consideration thereof below.
A.
Opinion of Treating Psychiatrist Dr. Loida Reyes
On April 29, 2014, Plaintiff’s treating psychiatrist Dr. Reyes
completed
a
Mental
Impairment
Questionnaire
jointly
with
Plaintiff’s treating therapist, Nicole Hynes, LMHC. T. 415-18. In
the questionnaire, Dr. Reyes and LMHC Hynes noted Plaintiff’s
treatment was in the early stages, with a focus on building the
therapeutic relationship. T. 415. For clinical findings, they noted
Plaintiff was depressed with preoccupations and ruminations, poor
self image and esteem, and anxiety and depression. Id. In areas of
function limitations, Dr. Reyes and LMHC Hynes opined Plaintiff had
marked
limitations
with
activities
5
of
daily
living,
and
difficulties maintaining social functioning. T. 417. They further
opined Plaintiff
had
persistence,
pace,
or
moderate
with
limitations
no
known
with
repeated
concentration,
episodes
of
decompensation within a twelve month period. Id. Dr. Reyes and LMHC
Hynes also opined Plaintiff suffered from a residual disease
process that has resulted in such marginal adjustment that even a
minimal increase in mental demands or change in the environment
would be predicted to cause Plaintiff to decompensate. T. 418. They
opined Plaintiff would be absent from work more than four days per
month due to treatment or her impairments. Id. Finally, they noted
that Plaintiff has difficulty interacting and engaging with others
due to her heightened sensitivity to perceived ridicule. Id.
In his decision, the ALJ gave little weight to Dr. Reyes’
opinion because it was inconsistent with the actual findings
documented in the record, and generally not supported by the record
as a whole. T. 39. For instance, at a March 3, 2014 treatment
session, Dr. Reyes noted that despite showing a depressed and
anxious mood, Plaintiff was cooperative, with a full affect, clear
speech, and logical thought process. T. 34 referring to T. 303. The
ALJ further explained that Dr. Reyes’ opinion was unsupported by
the
objective
evidence
of
record,
including
findings
of
the
psychological consultative examiner, Dr. Butensky, and treatment
notes showing a Global Assessment of Functioning (“GAF”) of 65.1
1
The ALJ further noted that according to the fourth edition
of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, which
6
Id. The ALJ noted the GAF rating was consistent with the overall
evidence of record, including Plaintiff’s admission that medication
helps with her ability to engage in work activity. T. 39.
B.
On
Opinion of Consulting Psychologist Dr. Christine Ransom
April
17,
2014,
Dr.
Ransom examined
Plaintiff
for a
consultative psychological evaluation. T. 407-10. Dr. Ransom noted
Plaintiff rode the bus approximately five miles to the evaluation,
received her high school diploma in regular education, and has
worked in a housekeeping capacity up to twenty-eight hours per week
since September 2013. T. 407. Dr. Ransom noted Plaintiff reported
being depressed and anxious. Id. Plaintiff reported she wakes
frequently during the night, overeats, and has gained one hundred
pounds in the last six years. Id. Plaintiff reported crying spells,
irritability and low energy. T. 407-08. Dr. Ransom noted Plaintiff
had good concentration, but socially isolates, preferring to only
interact with immediate family and her dog. T. 408. Plaintiff
reported panic attacks when she leaves the house, especially when
she has to ride the bus or be in close proximity to people.
However, Plaintiff reported her panic attack symptoms do not
prevent her from fulfilling her job duties. Id.
is published periodically by the American Psychiatric Association,
a GAF score of 61-70 indicates some mild symptoms or some
difficulty in social, occupational, or school functioning, but
generally the individual is functioning pretty well, and has some
meaningful interpersonal relationships. T. 39.
7
On examination, Dr. Ransom noted Plaintiff was cooperative and
socially appropriate. She had adequate hygiene and grooming, and
appropriate eye contact. T. 408. Plaintiff’s speech was fluent and
intelligible; her quality of voice was clear, mildly dysphoric and
tense. Her thought processes were coherent and goal directed. Id.
Plaintiff’s attention and concentration were intact; her recent and
remote memory skills were also intact, with good insight and
judgement. T. 409.
In her source statement, Dr. Ransom opined Plaintiff showed no
evidence
of
difficulty
following
and
understanding
simple
directions and instructions, performing simple tasks independently,
maintaining
attention
and
concentration
for
simple
tasks,
maintaining a simple, regular schedule, and learning simple new
tasks. T.
409.
She
difficulty
performing
further
complex
opined
Plaintiff would
tasks,
relating
have
mild
adequately
with
others and appropriately dealing with stress due to mild PTSD, mild
major
depressive
disorder,
and
mild
panic
disorder
with
agoraphobia. Id.
In his decision, the ALJ gave great weight to Dr. Ransom’s
opinion, which he noted to be consistent with the record as a whole
and well-supported by the objective evidence of record. T. 38. He
further noted that Dr. Ransom provided detailed explanation of her
examination findings and that her opinion was well-supported by
mental health therapy notes showing a history of trauma, but
8
current relatively normal functioning and ability to engage in work
activity with psychotropic medication. Id.
C.
Opinion of State Agency Review Psychologist
Dr. C. Butensky
On May 14, 2014, State Agency psychologist Dr. Butensky
completed a Psychiatric Review Technique Form and Mental Residual
Functional Capacity assessment. T. 97-99; 101-03. After reviewing
the medical opinions of record, Dr. Butensky noted the totality of
evidence indicates Plaintiff has a mild to moderate psychiatric
impairment, though she had recently commenced treatment that was
expected to improve her function. T. 99. Dr. Butensky concluded
Plaintiff had mild restrictions in activities of daily living and
maintaining
concentration,
persistence
or
pace,
and
moderate
limitations in maintaining social functioning. T. 98. He also
opined Plaintiff has the capacity to perform simple and some
complex job tasks, with mild to moderate limitations in her ability
to sustain attention and concentration, adapt to changes in a
routine work setting, and interact appropriately with coworkers and
supervisors. Id.
The ALJ afforded Dr. Butensky’s opinion partial weight, noting
that
the
established
objective
that
evidence
received
Plaintiff’s
at
medically
the
hearing
determinable
level
mental
impairments cause more limitation in her ability to perform basic
work activities than Dr. Butensky opined. T. 38. For instance, at
the hearing, Plaintiff testified she does not like being around
9
men, prefers to be alone, and that being around more than one
person at a time makes her feel closed in. T. 33 referring to
T. 82.
D.
The ALJ’s Evaluation of the Medical Opinions of Record
was Proper and Well-Supported by Substantial Evidence
Plaintiff argues the ALJ’s evaluation of the opinions of
Dr. Reyes, Dr. Ransom, and Dr. Butensky was improper because he
effectively rejected all of the opinions, despite claiming to
afford them little weight, great weight, and partial weight,
respectively. Plaintiff further argues that the effective rejection
of all three opinions left the medical record void of an opinion to
support the RFC. Plaintiff also contends that in the absence of an
opinion, the ALJ impermissibly assumed the role of a psychiatrist
and medical expert. For the reasons set forth below, the Court
finds these arguments are without merit.
The Court notes the Second Circuit has repeatedly held that
although a treating physician’s medical opinion generally receives
deference, it is not afforded controlling weight when it is “not
consistent with other substantial evidence in the record, such as
the opinions of other medical experts.” Halloran v. Barnhart, 362
F.3d 28, 32 (2d Cir. 2004) (internal citations omitted); see also
20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2).
Here,
the
ALJ
found
Plaintiff’s
treating
psychiatrist
Dr. Reyes’ opinion inconsistent with the medical record as a whole
and generally unsupported by the record. T. 39. The Court finds no
10
error in this conclusion.
As discussed above, the ALJ supported
his decision to afford little weight to Dr. Reyes’ opinion with
specific
examples
from
the
record,
including
Dr.
Reyes’
own
treatment notes and the findings of Dr. Butensky. See Byrne v.
Berryhill, 284 F. Supp. 3d 250, 259 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (consultative
physicians’s opinion may constitute substantial evidence to afford
less than controlling weight to treating physician’s opinion);
Shaffer v. Colvin, No. 1:14-CV-00745 (MAT), 2015 WL 9307349, at *4
(W.D.N.Y.
physician’s
Dec.
21,
opinion
2015)
where
(ALJ
it
was
properly
rejected
inconsistent
with
treating
his
own
treatment notes). Accordingly, the Court finds the ALJ’s evaluation
of Dr. Reyes’ opinion to be well-supported.
To the extent Plaintiff argues the ALJ “effectively rejected”
the opinions of consultative examiner Dr. Ransom and State Agency
review psychologist, Dr. Butensky, and instead developed the RFC by
“acting as a psychiatrist and medical expert” the Court finds this
argument also lacks merit. When assessing a disability claim, an
ALJ is required to “weigh all of the evidence available to make an
RFC finding that [is] consistent with the record as a whole.” Matta
v. Astrue, 508 F. App’x 53, 56 (2d Cir. 2013). The ALJ’s RFC
finding need “not perfectly correspond with any of the opinions of
medical sources.” Id.; see also Rosa v. Callahan, 168 F.3d 72, 29
(2d Cir. 1999) (“the ALJ’s RFC finding need not track any one
medical opinion”); Breinin v. Colvin, No. 5:14-CV-01166(LEK TWD),
2015 WL 7749318, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 2015), report and
11
recommendation adopted, 2015 WL 7738047 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 2015)
(“It is the ALJ’s job to determine a claimant’s RFC, and not to
simply agree with a physician’s opinion.”).
Furthermore, where an ALJ makes an RFC assessment that is more
restrictive than the medical opinions of record, it is generally
not
a
basis
for
remand.
See
Castle
v.
Colvin,
No. 1:15-CV-00113(MAT), 2017 WL 3939362, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 8,
2017) (“the fact that the ALJ’s RFC assessment did not perfectly
match Dr. Balderman’s opinion, and was in fact more restrictive
than that opinion, is not grounds for remand”); Savage v. Comm'r of
Soc. Sec., No. 2:13-CV-85, 2014 WL 690250, at *7 (D. Vt. Feb. 24,
2014) (finding no harm to claimant where ALJ adopted an RFC
determination that was more restrictive than medical source’s
opinion).
The
ALJ
was
within
his
discretion
in
determining
that
Dr. Ransom’s opinion that Plaintiff would have mild limitations in
performing complex tasks, relating adequately with others, and
appropriately dealing with stress was consistent with the record as
a whole and well-supported by the objective evidence of record.
T. 38. However, he also found the medical record as a whole,
including
Plaintiff’s
hearing
testimony,
supported
a
more
restrictive RFC finding. Specifically, the ALJ found Plaintiff
should be limited to simple unskilled work that is self-paced, with
no contact with the general public, and only occasional contact
with supervisors and coworkers. T. 32. This finding comports with
12
several aspects of Dr. Butensky’s opinion, including the conclusion
that Plaintiff would have mild to moderate limitations in her
ability to sustain attention and concentration, adapt to changes in
a routine work setting, and interact appropriately with coworkers
and supervisors. See T. 98. It was not erroneous for the ALJ to
adopt various aspects of Dr. Ransom and Dr. Butensky’s opinions
while rejecting others, so long as he properly set forth his
reasons for doing so.
See Walker v. Colvin, 3:15-CV-465 (CFH),
2016 WL 4768806, at *10 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 2016) (“[A]n ALJ may
properly credit those portions of a consultative examiner’s opinion
which the ALJ finds supported by substantial evidence of record and
reject portions which are not so supported.”) (quotation omitted).
The ALJ explained that he had credited aspects of Plaintiff’s
testimony regarding her limitations, and so assessed a somewhat
more restrictive RFC than identified by the consultative examiners.
The Court finds no error in this determination by the ALJ. See
Torbicki v. Berryhill, No. 17-CV-386(MAT), 2018 WL 3751290, at *5
(W.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 2018) (“The ALJ’s decision to credit Plaintiff’s
claims that he had difficulties with sitting and standing and
include additional limitations in the RFC finding was permissible
and did not result in any harm to Plaintiff. Accordingly, it is not
a
basis
for
reversal
or
remand
of
the
Commissioner’s
final
determination.”).
For the reasons discussed above, the Court finds the RFC to be
supported by substantial medical evidence of record, including the
13
opinions of Dr. Ransom and Dr. Butensky. Plaintiff’s contention
that the RFC finding was unsupported and developed without a
medical
opinion
is
unsupported
by
the
record
as
a
whole.
Accordingly, remand for this reason is unwarranted.
II.
The ALJ’s Assessment of Plaintiff’s “Symptom Intensity” and
the Application of Social Security Ruling 16-3P
Plaintiff also argues the ALJ improperly assessed Plaintiff’s
“symptom intensity,” as required by 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 and SSR
16-3p. For the reasons set forth below, the Court disagrees.
SSR 16-3p, which became effective March 28, 2016, supersedes
SSR 96-7p, which was promulgated in 1996. See SSR 16-3P, 2016 WL
1119029, at *1; SSR 96-7P, 1996 WL 374186, at *1. On October 25,
2017, the SSA republished SSR 16-3p, detailing how to apply the
ruling as it relates to the applicable date. Specifically, the SSA
indicated that adjudicators should apply SSR 16-3p rather than SSR
96-7p when making a determination on or after March 28, 2016. See
SSR 16-3P, 2017 WL 5180304, at *1. As the ALJ’s decision was dated
May 23, 2016, SSR 16-3p applies here.
While SSR 96-7p placed a “stronger emphasis on the role of the
adjudicator”
statements
to
make
pertaining
a
to
credibility
their
finding
symptom(s)
of
and
a
claimant’s
its
functional
effects, the newer SSR 16-3p sets forth “a more holistic analysis
of the claimant’s symptoms, and ‘eliminates the use of the term
credibility’ from sub-regulation policy.” Acosta v. Colvin, No. 15CV-4051, 2016 WL 6952338 at *18 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2016) (quoting
14
SSR
16-3P,
2016
WL
1119029,
at
*1).
Under
SSR
16-3p,
when
evaluating a claimant’s symptom intensity, “[t]he ALJ must consider
the entire case record, including objective medical evidence, a
claimant’s
statements
about
the
intensity,
persistence,
and
limiting effects of symptoms, statements and information provided
by
medical
sources,
and
any
other
relevant
evidence
in
the
claimant’s record.” Vered v. Colvin, No. 14-CV-4590(KAM), 2017 WL
639245, at *15 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2017) (citing SSR 16-3P, 2016 WL
1119029, at *4-6). Furthermore, SSR 16-3p makes it clear that the
evaluation of a claimant’s subjective symptoms is not an evaluation
of the claimant’s character. SSR 16-3P, 2016 WL 1119029, at *1.
At the hearing, Plaintiff testified she cannot walk, sit, lay,
or sleep due to problems with her back. T. 77. She stated she is in
pain within twenty minutes of sitting or standing. Id. Plaintiff
also testified she has arthritis in her knees and legs, and that
losing weight has not reduced the pain. T. 78-79. Plaintiff stated
she did not know if she could lift ten pounds, but was able to lift
five pounds. T. 80. Plaintiff testified she does her own grocery
shopping and laundry, though she rests every few houses when she
walks to the laundromat, which is about ten minutes away from her
house. T. 82. She also prepares meals for herself in the microwave.
Id. Plaintiff testified she feels closed in and very nervous when
she’s around people and has panic attacks. T. 82-83.
After careful consideration of the evidence, the ALJ found
that
“Plaintiff’s
medically
determinable
15
impairments
could
reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms.” T. 35. He
further
found
that
Plaintiff’s
“statements
concerning
the
intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are
not
entirely
consistent
with
the
medical
evidence
and
other
evidence in the record....” Id. The ALJ provided significant detail
regarding
the basis
of
this
finding, noting
there
is
little
objective evidence of record to support the alleged severity of the
symptoms Plaintiff described at the hearing. Id. Specifically, the
ALJ
noted
no
physical
restrictions
have
been
recommended
by
Plaintiff’s treating doctor, and she has had no physical therapy,
pain management, epidural injection therapy, or use of a TENS unit
during the relevant time period. T. 35-36. Furthermore, imaging
studies failed to show any severe orthopedic abnormalities, while
numerous physical examinations have yielded grossly normal results
without evidence of any significant orthopedic findings. T. 36.
Regarding Plaintiff’s mental impairments, the ALJ noted Plaintiff
had been treated for depressive disorder and anxiety disorder, but
clinical observations indicate she is capable of performing fulltime work within the mental parameters of the RFC finding. T. 36.
The Court finds the ALJ appropriately considered Plaintiff’s
statements regarding the intensity of her symptoms, and assessed
those statements in light of the record evidence as a whole. To the
extent the ALJ may have improperly relied on SSR 96-7p when making
his determination, the Court finds that the ALJ’s evaluation of
Plaintiff’s subjective testimony nonetheless comported with the
16
standards
set
demonstrated
objective
forth
he
in
SSR
considered
medical
16-3p.
the
evidence,
Notably,
entire
case
Plaintiff’s
the
ALJ
record,
statements
clearly
including
about
the
intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of her symptoms, and
statements and information provided by the medical sources, as
required
by
SSR
Accordingly,
16-3p.
the
Court
See
Vered,
finds
any
2017
error
WL
639245,
at
pertaining
to
*15.
the
application of SSR 16-3p was harmless. See id. at *16 (despite
making
a
credibility
determination
that
SSR
16-3p
no
longer
permits, the ALJ’s evaluation of plaintiff’s subjective testimony
comported
with
SSR
16-3p
and
was
supported
by
substantial
evidence). The Court accordingly finds that remand is not warranted
on this basis.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion for judgment on
the pleadings (Docket No. 13) is denied and the Commissioner’s
motion for judgment on the pleadings (Docket No. 16) is granted.
Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed in its entirety with prejudice.
The Clerk of the Court is directed to close this case.
ALL OF THE ABOVE IS SO ORDERED.
S/Michael A. Telesca
_____________________________
HONORABLE MICHAEL A. TELESCA
United States District Judge
Dated:
November 2, 2018
Rochester, New York
17
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?