White v. Berryhill
Filing
21
DECISION AND ORDER granting 12 Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings to the extent that the Commissioners decision is reversed, and the matter is remanded solely for calculation and payment of benefits; and denying 17 Government's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. (Clerk to close case.). Signed by Hon. Michael A. Telesca on 10/22/19. (JMC)-CLERK TO FOLLOW UP-
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
____________________________________
FRANKLIN C. WHITE, II,
Plaintiff,
1:17-cv-00498-MAT
DECISION AND ORDER
-vANDREW SAUL,1
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.
____________________________________
INTRODUCTION
Franklin C. White, II (“Plaintiff”), represented by counsel,
brings this action under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security
Act (“the Act”), seeking review of the final decision of the
Commissioner
of
Social
Security
(“the
Commissioner”
or
“Defendant”), denying his applications for Disability Insurance
Benefits (“DIB”) and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”).
No. 1.
Docket
The Court has jurisdiction over the matter pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
competing
motions
Presently before the Court are the parties’
for
judgment
on
the
pleadings
Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Nos. 12, 17, 19.
pursuant
to
See Docket
For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s
motion for judgment on the pleadings is granted, and Defendant’s
motion is denied. The Commissioner’s decision is reversed, and the
1
On June 17, 2019, Andrew Saul became the Commissioner of the Social
Security Administration (SSA). Accordingly, the case caption has been amended
to name Mr. Saul as the defendant.
matter is remanded to the Commissioner solely for the calculation
and payment of benefits.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On May 11, 2010, Plaintiff protectively filed
applications
for DIB and SSI, alleging disability as of April 1, 2002, due to a
visual impairment, broken neck, high blood pressure, and type II
diabetes.
Administrative Transcript (“T.”) 75-76, 80, 277, 282.
The claims were initially denied on July 9, 2010.
T. 80, 94-96.
At
conducted
Plaintiff’s
request,
a
video
hearing
was
on
January 27, 2011, by administrative law judge (“ALJ”) Kenneth Chu.
T. 61-74, 80.
2011.
The ALJ issued an unfavorable decision on March 7,
T. 77-86.
Plaintiff appealed the decision to the Appeals
Council, which granted his request for review on September 27,
2012, and remanded the case to the ALJ, directing him to further
evaluate treating source opinion evidence and obtain clarification
from the vocational expert.
T. 90-92.
On July 29, 2013, a subsequent video hearing was held before
ALJ Jerome Hornblass.
T. 8, 30-60.
decision on September 10, 2013.
The ALJ issued an unfavorable
T. 5-15.
Plaintiff appealed the
decision to the Appeals Council, which denied his request for
review on December 30, 2014.
T. 1-3.
Plaintiff appealed the decision to the United States District
Court for the Western District of New York.
T. 921-27.
On
August 27, 2015, the parties stipulated to remand the case to the
-2-
Commissioner for further administrative proceedings.
T. 950.
On
December 31, 2015, the Appeals Council issued a second order
remanding Plaintiff’s case to the ALJ, and directed him to consider
additional evidence, including further evaluation of the
treating
and non-treating source opinions of Drs. James Budny and Nikita
Dave.
T. 951-55.
On January 26, 2017, ALJ Stephen Cordovani held a third video
hearing. T. 833, 855-901. Plaintiff appeared with his attorney in
Jamestown, New York, and the ALJ presided over the hearing from
Buffalo, New York.
Id.
testified via telephone.
unfavorable decision.
An impartial vocational expert also
Id.
On April 3, 2017, the ALJ issued an
T. 830-47.
Plaintiff appealed the decision
directly to this Court.
THE ALJ’S DECISION
The
ALJ
applied
the
five-step
sequential
evaluation
promulgated by the Commissioner for adjudicating disability claims.
See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a).
The ALJ
initially found that Plaintiff met the insured status requirements
of the Act through December 31, 2004.
T. 836.
At step one of the
sequential evaluation, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged
in substantial gainful activity since April 1, 2002, the alleged
onset date.
At
step
Id.
two,
the
ALJ
determined
that
Plaintiff
had
the
following “severe” impairments: obesity; diabetes mellitus; status-
-3-
post multi-level neck fusion; right eye blindness; degenerative
disc
disease
low
back
at
L4-5;
bilateral
shoulder
rotator
cuff/labrum tears in 2016; and mild left eye diabetic retinopathy.
Id.
The
ALJ
also
determined
that
Plaintiff’s
medically
determinable impairment of diabetic peripheral neuropathy did not
cause significant work-related functional limitations and thus was
non-severe.
Id.
At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s impairments did
not singularly or in combination meet or medically equal the
severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404,
Subpart P, Appendix 1.
Id.
The ALJ specifically considered
Listings 1.02 (major dysfunction of joint due to any cause); 1.04
(disorders of the spine); 2.02 (loss of central visual acuity);
2.03 (contraction of the visual fields in the better eye); 2.04
(loss of visual efficiency); and 9.00 (endocrine).
T. 836-38.
Before proceeding to step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff
retained
the
residual
functional
capacity
(“RFC”)
to
perform
sedentary work, as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(a) and 20 C.F.R.
§ 416.967(a), except that he: “can lift up to 10 pounds; can sit
2 hours continuously, for a total of 6 hours per day; can stand
1 hour continuously and 4 hours total; can walk 1 hour continuously
and 4 hours total; can occasionally climb ramps and stairs; can
occasionally kneel, crouch, crawl; no climbing ladders, ropes or
scaffolds; no work at unprotected heights or around dangerous
-4-
moving mechanical machinery; occasional pushing and pulling; no
overhead work; no exposure to extreme heat, humidity or cold; no
work with vibratory tools; avoid concentrated exposure to fumes,
odors,
dusts,
irritants;
vision.”
no
gases,
work
poor
ventilation
requiring
depth
and
other
perception
or
respiratory
peripheral
T. 838.
At step four, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was unable to
perform any past relevant work.
T. 845.
At step five, the ALJ found that, considering Plaintiff’s age,
education, work experience, and RFC, there are jobs that exist in
significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could
perform, including
the
representative
occupations
of
document
preparer, telephone order clerk, and surveillance system monitor.
T. 845-46.
The ALJ accordingly found that Plaintiff was not
disabled as defined in the Act.
T. 846-47.
SCOPE OF REVIEW
A
district
court
may
set
aside
the
Commissioner’s
determination that a claimant is not disabled only if the factual
findings are not supported by “substantial evidence” or if the
decision is based on legal error.
42 U.S.C. § 405(g); see also
Green-Younger v. Barnhart, 335 F.3d 99, 105-06 (2d Cir. 2003). The
district court must accept the Commissioner’s findings of fact,
provided that such findings are supported by “substantial evidence”
in the record. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (the Commissioner’s findings
-5-
“as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be
conclusive”).
as
a
“Substantial evidence means ‘such relevant evidence
reasonable
conclusion.’”
(quotation
mind
might
accept
as
adequate
to
support
a
Shaw v. Chater, 221 F.3d 126, 131 (2d Cir. 2000)
omitted).
The
reviewing
court
nevertheless
must
scrutinize the whole record and examine evidence that supports or
detracts from both sides.
Tejada v. Apfel, 167 F.3d 770, 774
(2d Cir. 1998) (citation omitted).
review
for
substantial
“The deferential standard of
evidence
Commissioner’s conclusions of law.”
does
not
apply
to
the
Byam v. Barnhart, 336 F.3d
172, 179 (2d Cir. 2003) (citing Townley v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 109,
112 (2d Cir. 1984)).
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff contends that remand is warranted because the ALJ
did not properly evaluate medical opinion evidence offered by Donna
Miller, D.O., Corinne Krist, D.O., and Nikita Dave, M.D.
No. 12-1 at 18.
Docket
The Court finds that the ALJ erred by failing to
comply with the Appeals Council’s December 31, 2015 order directing
the ALJ to properly weigh and address the opinion of Dr. Dave.
Further, the ALJ did not properly assess the opinion of Plaintiff’s
treating physician, Dr. Krist.
explained
below,
the
case
is
Accordingly, for the reasons
reversed
and
remanded
to
the
Commissioner solely for the calculation and payment of benefits.
-6-
I.
The Appeals Council’s Directive
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to weigh Dr. Dave’s
opinion, despite the Appeals Council’s order directing him to do
so.
Docket No. 12-1 at 22.
Defendant responds that Dr. Dave is a
consultative examiner whose opinion is not entitled to controlling
weight and the ALJ properly considered his opinion. See Docket No.
17-1 at 24-25.
The regulations clearly state that an “administrative law
judge shall take any action that is ordered by the Appeals Council
and may take any additional action that is not inconsistent with
the Appeals Council’s remand order.”
(emphasis added).
in
an
Appeals
The failure of an ALJ to abide by the directives
Council
requiring remand.
20 C.F.R. § 404.977(b)
remand
order
constitutes
legal
error
Savino v. Astrue, No. 07–CV–4233 (DLI), 2009 WL
2045397, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. July 8, 2009) (citing Scott v. Barnhart,
592 F. Supp. 2d 360, 371 (W.D.N.Y. 2009) (“The ALJ’s failure to
comply with the Appeals Council’s order constitutes legal error,
and necessitates a remand.”) (citations omitted); Mann v. Chater,
No. 95 CIV. 2997(SS), 1997 WL 363592, at *1–2 (S.D.N.Y. June 30,
1997) (holding that the case must be remanded when the ALJ did not
follow the orders of the Appeals Council)).
On December 31, 2015, the Appeals Council issued an order
noting, in relevant part:
-7-
The hearing decision does not contain an adequate
evaluation of the treating and nontreating source opinion
of Drs. James Budny and Nikita Dave. Dr. Budny offered
an opinion that the claimant’s chronic pain syndrome
limited him to one or two hours of work in a sedentary
position. This opinion was the subject of a prior remand
order from the Appeals Council.
The hearing decision
finds this opinion is not entitled to great weight but
does not give adequate rationale with specific cites to
the record to support this assessment. Similarly, Dr.
Dave rendered an opinion of moderate to severe
limitations in a number of areas. This opinion was set
forth, but not weighed, particularly with regard to the
specific functional limitations set forth by the doctor.
Thus, further evaluation of these opinions is warranted.
T. 953-54 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
The
Appeals Council therefore directed the ALJ to “[g]ive further
consideration to the treating and nontreating source opinions
pursuant to the provisions of 20 C.F.R. 404.1527 and 416.927 and
Social Security Rulings 96-2p and 96-5p, and explain the weight
given to such evidence.
Specifically address each of the proposed
limitations from these doctors and the reasoning for adopting or
declining to adopt those limitations as part of the residual
functional capacity.”
T. 954 (emphasis added).
The written determination describes Dr. Dave’s June 22, 2010
consultative
Plaintiff
examination,
had
including
“moderate-severe
Dr.
Dave’s
limitations
opinion
for
that
repetitive
bending/twisting in the cervical spine, maintaining the position of
his head/neck for prolonged periods of time without head/neck
support,
activities
such
as
driving
that
involve
repetitive
turning/jarring, and the lifting/carrying, and pushing/pulling of
-8-
heavy objects. Additionally, it was reported that the claimant had
moderate limitations for repetitive bending/twisting through the
lumbar
spine,
prolonged
sitting/standing,
pushing, and pulling heavy objects.”
citations omitted); see also T.
lifting,
carrying,
See T. 839-40 (internal
470-75.
The ALJ’s assessment of
Dr. Dave’s opinion was as follows: “Dr. Miller’s opinion is also
generally
consistent
with
the
consultative examiner, Dr. Dave.”
somewhat
vaguer
opinion
of
T. 844.
The Court finds that this one-sentence analysis of Dr. Dave’s
opinion does not comply with the Appeals Council’s order that the
ALJ “explain the weight given to such opinion evidence,” and
“[s]pecifically address each of the proposed limitations . . . and
the
reasoning
limitations.”
for
T. 954.
adopting
or
declining
to
adopt
those
The ALJ did not explain the weight given to
Dr. Dave’s opinion, nor did he explain his reasoning for adopting
or failing to adopt specific limitations assessed by Dr. Dave. The
assessed RFC appears to conflict with at least some aspects of
Dr. Dave’s opinion, including Dr. Dave’s assessment that Plaintiff
has moderate-severe limitations for maintaining the position of his
head/neck for prolonged periods of time without head/neck support.
The ALJ’s failure to properly evaluate Dr. Dave’s opinion is
particularly troubling because the Appeals Council issued two
orders noting the ALJ’s failure to properly consider opinion
-9-
evidence.
See T. 91, 953-54.
Remand is required on this basis
alone.
II.
Evaluation of Opinion Evidence
Plaintiff next argues that the ALJ failed to explain why he
failed to adopt the opinions of consultative examiner Dr. Miller
and treating physician Dr. Krist relating to the functional effects
of Plaintiff’s bilateral shoulder pain and rotator cuff tear.
See
Docket No. 12-1 at 18.
The
treating
physician
rule
requires
an
ALJ
to
give
controlling weight to a treating physician’s opinion when that
opinion is “well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and
laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the
other
substantial
evidence
in
[the]
record.”
20
C.F.R.
§ 404.1527(c)(2); see also Green-Younger v. Barnhart, 335 F.3d 99,
106 (2d Cir. 2003).
to
a
treating
An ALJ may give less than controlling weight
physician’s
opinion
if
it
does
not
meet
this
standard, but must “comprehensively set forth [his or her] reasons
for
the
weight
assigned
to
a
treating
physician’s
opinion.”
Halloran v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 28, 33 (2d Cir. 2004); 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1527(c)(2) (“We will always give good reasons in our notice
of
determination
or
decision
for
the
weight
we
give
[the
claimant’s] treating source’s opinion.”).
The ALJ is required to
consider
relationship
“the
length
of
the
treatment
and
the
frequency of examination; the nature and extent of the treatment
-10-
relationship; the relevant evidence, particularly medical signs and
laboratory findings, supporting the opinion; the consistency of the
opinion with the record as a whole; and whether the physician is a
specialist in the area covering the particular medical issues” in
determining how much weight to afford a treating physician’s
opinion.
Burgess v. Astrue, 537 F.3d 117, 129 (2d Cir. 2008)
(quotation marks, alterations, and citations omitted); see also
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(1)-(6).
“The regulations also specify
that the Commissioner ‘will always give good reasons in [her]
notice of determination or decision for the weight [she] give[s]
[claimant’s] treating source’s opinion.’” Halloran, 362 F.3d at 32
(quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2)) (alterations in original).
As to the ALJ’s evaluation of opinions offered by consultative
examiners,
“[t]he
factors
for
considering
opinions
from
non-treating medical sources are the same as those for assessing
treating sources, with the consideration of whether the source
examined the claimant or not replacing the consideration of the
treatment
relationship
between
the
source
and
the
claimant.”
Andrew L. v. Berryhill, No. 6:17-CV-1107(DJS), 2019 WL 1081460, at
*4 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2019) (internal quotations and citation
omitted).
Dr. Miller completed a consultative examination of Plaintiff
on April 19, 2016.
T. 1097-1100.
Dr. Miller opined that Plaintiff
had moderate limitations for heavy lifting, bending, carrying,
-11-
reaching, pushing, and pulling, as well as with depth perception
and peripheral vision.
T. 1100.
Dr. Miller also completed a
medical source statement, in which she opined, in relevant part,
that Plaintiff could occasionally lift and carry up to ten pounds
due to neck and shoulder pain.
T. 1101.
On July 7, 2016, Dr. Krist, Plaintiff’s treating physician,
completed a medical source statement. T. 1470-75. Dr. Krist noted
that Plaintiff had three prior surgeries on his cervical spine, in
1991, 1996, and 1999.
T. 1475.
Dr. Krist opined, in relevant
part, that Plaintiff could occasionally lift and carry up to ten
pounds.
T. 1470.
With regard to the use of his right hand,
Dr. Krist found that Plaintiff could never perform any type of
reaching,
including
overhead
reaching,
or
handling;
could
occasionally finger and push/pull; and could frequently feel.
T. 1472.
With regard to the use of his left hand, Plaintiff could
never reach overhead; could occasionally perform all other types of
reaching, as well as handling, fingering, and pushing/pulling; and
could frequently feel.
Id.
Dr. Krist noted that Plaintiff was
right-hand dominant, and that her opinions regarding Plaintiff’s
use of his hands were supported by a February 2015 elbow injection,
as
well
as
sensation.
a
June
2016
“ortho
note,”
which
noted
decreased
Id.
At step two of the sequential analysis, the ALJ found that
Plaintiff’s bilateral shoulder rotator cuff/labrum tears in 2016
-12-
were “severe” impairments.
T. 836.
To address these impairments,
the RFC includes certain limitations, including that Plaintiff can
lift up to ten pounds, occasional pushing and pulling, and no
overhead work.
T. 838. Other than the limitation for “no overhead
work,” the RFC does not include the right and left hand limitations
assessed by Dr. Krist.
The ALJ gave “great weight” to the opinion of Dr. Miller, and
“partial weight” to the opinion of Dr. Krist.
T. 844.
While the
ALJ gave “great weight to most aspects of Dr. Krist’s opinion,” he
gave “little weight . . . to the opinion of Dr. Krist that claimant
can occasionally reach, [handle] and finger,” as “[s]uch opinion is
not fully supported by the treatment record or claimant’s activity
level.”
Id.
The ALJ’s weighing and discussion of Dr. Krist’s treating
source opinion is insufficient, particularly when viewed in light
of the treating physician rule.
The ALJ failed to explain why he
rejected Dr. Krist’s opinion that Plaintiff could never reach or
handle with his right hand.
Further, the ALJ did not adequately
explain why he failed to adopt Dr. Krist’s opinion that Plaintiff
could occasionally reach, handle and finger with his left hand, and
occasionally finger with his right hand.
Rather, the ALJ rejected
Dr. Krist’s opinion with the conclusory statement that the opinion
was not supported by the record or Plaintiff’s activity level.
This explanation does not comply with the treating physician rule
-13-
that the ALJ “comprehensively set forth [his or her] reasons for
the weight assigned to a treating physician’s opinion.”
362 F.3d at 33.
Dr.
Krist,
Halloran,
The above-mentioned limitations assessed by
particularly
Plaintiff’s
ability
to
reach
in
all
directions, involve the movement of Plaintiff’s shoulders is not
supoprted by record medical evidence. The ALJ’s failure to explain
why he found that Plaintiff could engage in all other forms of
reaching is at odds with his finding that Plaintiff’s bilateral
shoulder rotator cuff/labrum tears constituted severe impairments.
Without further explanation by the ALJ, the Court is unable to
properly evaluate whether the limitations in the RFC, particularly
as they relate to Plaintiff’s shoulder impairments, which are
supported by substantial evidence in the record.
Defendant
argues
that
the
ALJ’s
conclusion
regarding
Dr. Krist’s opinion and her assessment of Plaintiff’s shoulder
impairments was reasonable.
See Docket No. 17-1 at 22.
Defendant
points to the ALJ’s discussion of Plaintiff’s activities of daily
living, including that Plaintiff could drive, cook, grocery shop,
go to the casino, develop a car parts business, and that in 2010,
he enjoyed hunting and fishing.
Id. at 23.
However, the written
determination does not explain how these activities contradict
Dr. Krist’s assessment regarding Plaintiff’s shoulder limitations,
which the ALJ summarily rejected by stating that “[s]uch opinion is
not fully supported by the treatment record or claimant’s activity
-14-
level.”
See T. 844.
Further, any attempt by defense counsel to
correct this error is insufficient.
Defendant’s after-the-fact
explanation as to why the ALJ rejected Dr. Krist’s opinion cannot
serve as a substitute for the ALJ’s findings.
See Petersen v.
Astrue, 2 F. Supp. 3d 223, 234 (N.D.N.Y. 2012) (“this Court may not
create post-hoc rationalizations to explain the Commissioner’s
treatment of evidence when that treatment is not apparent from the
Commissioner’s decision itself.”) (internal quotations and citation
omitted); see also Marthe v. Colvin, No. 6:15-cv-06436(MAT), 2016
WL 3514126, at *8 (W.D.N.Y. June 28, 2016) (“The Commissioner has
attempted
to
justify
the
ALJ’s
application
of
the
treating
physician rule by offering new reasons, not considered by the ALJ
in rendering his decision. . . .
However, no such explicit
findings were made by the ALJ, and this Court is not permitted to
accept the Commissioner’s post-hoc rationalizations for the ALJ’s
determination.”).
Because the ALJ failed to properly assess
Dr. Krist’s opinions in accordance with the treating physician
rule, remand is required.
III. Remedy
“Sentence four of Section 405(g) provides district courts with
the authority to affirm, reverse, or modify a decision of the
Commissioner ‘with or without remanding the case for a rehearing.’”
Butts v. Barnhart, 388 F.3d 377, 385 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting
42 U.S.C. § 405(g)).
The standard for directing a remand for
-15-
calculation
of
benefits
is
met
when
the
record
persuasively
demonstrates the claimant’s disability, Parker v. Harris, 626 F.2d
225, 235 (2d Cir. 1980), and where there is no reason to conclude
that the additional evidence might support the Commissioner’s claim
that the claimant is not disabled, Butts, 388 F.3d at 385–86.
After reviewing the entire record, the Court finds that the
medical record has been developed fully for the relevant period.
Plaintiff has had three administrative hearings and the record
contains persuasive proof of Plaintiff’s shoulder impairment and
the limitations assessed by Dr. Krist. As summarized by the ALJ in
the written determination, Plaintiff complained of shoulder pain in
January 2016. T. 841. He received a left shoulder/elbow injection
in February 2016, and a MRI of the left shoulder dated February 2,
2016 demonstrated findings consistent with a partial tear of the
distal supraspinatus and mid infraspinatus tendons, as well as a
tear of the anterior inferior glenoid labrum.
Id.
An examination
in March 2016 was positive for pain, functional limitation, and
decreased range of motion in the right shoulder.
Id.
Plaintiff
continued receiving treatment for left shoulder pain in May 2016,
when
examinations
were
positive
for
pain.
Id.
Additional
therapeutic injections and physical therapy were prescribed.
Id.
Although Plaintiff reported some improvement following a left
shoulder biceps injection, he continued to have significant pain.
Id.
A May 26, 2016 right shoulder MRI showed a rotator cuff tear.
-16-
Id.
Despite objective medical evidence to the contrary, the ALJ
does not offer a satisfactory explanation as to why this evidence
does not support the arm limitations assessed by Dr. Krist.
At the January 26, 2017 administrative hearing, the vocational
expert testified that if the RFC were to limit Plaintiff to
“reaching in all directions to only occasional,” he “would not be
able to do . . . any other job in the national economy.”
93.
T. 892-
Further, the vocational expert testified that an RFC limiting
Plaintiff’s right arm/hand movement to never reaching or handling,
occasional fingering, and frequent feeling, and limiting his left
arm/hand movement to no overhead reaching, occasional reaching,
handing, fingering, and frequent feeling, there would be no work
available in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform.
T. 893.
The vocational expert testified that “the arm and hand
limitations . . . would be most prohibitive.”
T. 894.
Simply put,
had the ALJ adopted the opinions of Plaintiff’s treating physician
Dr. Krist as to Plaintiff’s arm and hand limitations, the ALJ would
have found Plaintiff to be disabled.
Remand for further administrative proceedings to correct the
above-discussed errors would serve no purpose.
Also, it is worthy
to note that this case has been pending since May 11, 2010.
As
noted above, the limitations assessed by Dr. Krist are wellsupported
by
the
record
and,
coupled
-17-
with
Plaintiff’s
other
limitations, would result in a finding of disabled. Remand for the
calculation of benefits is warranted.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion for judgment on
the pleadings (Docket No. 12) is granted to the extent that the
Commissioner’s decision is reversed, and the matter is remanded
solely for calculation and payment of benefits. The Commissioner’s
motion for judgment on the pleadings (Docket No. 17) is denied.
The Clerk of Court is directed to close this case.
ALL OF THE ABOVE IS SO ORDERED.
S/Michael A. Telesca
_____________________________
HONORABLE MICHAEL A. TELESCA
United States District Judge
Dated:
October 22, 2019
Rochester, New York
-18-
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?