Parks v. Buffalo City School District
Filing
8
DECISION AND ORDER IT HEREBY IS ORDERED, that the Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 4) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, consistent with the foregoing decision. FURTHER, that Defendant shall file an answer within 14 days of the entry date of this decision consistent with Rule 12 (a)(4)(A). SO ORDERED.Signed by William M. Skretny, United States District Judge on 4/30/2020. (JCM)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
CHRISTINA PARKS,
Plaintiff,
v.
DECISION AND ORDER
17-CV-631S
BUFFALO CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Defendant.
I. INTRODUCTION
In this action, Plaintiff Christina Parks, an African-American female, alleges that
her employer, Defendant Buffalo City School District (“the District”), discriminated and
retaliated against her based on her race, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”); the New York Human Rights Law (“NY
HRL”), N.Y. Exec. Law § 296; the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (b); and the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment through 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Presently before this Court is the District’s motion to dismiss Parks’s complaint
under Rule 12 (b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted.
(Docket No. 4.)
For the following reasons, the
District’s motion is granted in part and denied in part.
II. BACKGROUND
The following facts, drawn from Parks=s complaint and the exhibits attached
thereto, are accepted as true for purposes of adjudicating the District’s motion to dismiss.
See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 572, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929
(2007) (“[A] judge ruling on a defendant's motion to dismiss a complaint must accept as
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true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
Parks began working for the District in its Transportation Department in 1984 as a
data control clerk. (Complaint, Docket No. 1, ¶ 8.) The District thereafter promoted her
from civil-service-eligible lists to computer operator in 1989, computer programmer in
1990, systems analyst (grade 18) in 1999, and systems analyst (grade 19) in 2015. (Id.
¶¶ 9, 50.) But shortly after Parks’s promotion to systems analyst in 1999, the District
stopped promoting her or hiring her for more advanced positions in favor of hiring
Caucasian employees who often had less experience and less seniority. (Id. ¶¶ 10-11,
78.)
For example, when Parks moved laterally in September 2002 to replace the retiring
Guy Latona, a Caucasian male who had been the computer systems engineer coordinator
(grade 21), the District downgraded Latona’s vacated position to systems analyst (grade
18). (Id. ¶¶ 12-14, 20.) In 2007, the District denied Parks’s request for a promotion to
data base administrator. (Id. ¶ 16.) In August 2010, the District promoted two of Parks’s
systems analyst colleagues, both Caucasian, to system administrators (grade 20), but did
not similarly promote Parks. (Id. ¶¶ 19, 31.) In 2011, James Kane, Chief of Staff, failed
to act on Parks’s request for a promotion and for additional training. (Id. ¶¶ 35, 75.) In
January 2013, Parks applied for a systems administrator position but received no
response. (Id. ¶ 40.) In June 2013, Parks applied for a senior systems administrator
position, but did not receive the position after Paul Bonvissuto, an individual below Parks
on the system-administrator list, was hired instead. (Id. ¶¶ 40, 67, 68.) In September
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2015, Parks emailed the Director of Transportation a request to be promoted, but he
ignored her request. (Id. ¶¶ 47, 48.)
Parks also complains of harassment and disparate treatment over the years. For
example, Parks’s predecessor, Latona, had the assistance of a data control clerk and
multiple computer programmers, but Parks did not. (Id. at ¶ 26.) Latona also had a job
title and pay grade that “allowed him to do his job with recognition and the protection of
IT,” but Parks did not. (Id. ¶ 31.) Parks’s co-workers (Karen Carnevale and Cheryl
Kennedy) installed monitoring software on her computer to track her daily activities, and
on an occasion during the summer of 2013, Parks’s supervisor, Mary Ann O’Neil, sat
directly behind her for a day to monitor what she was doing. (Id. ¶¶ 23, 41.) Also,
beginning in June 2013, the District stripped Parks of her overtime opportunities, resulting
in the loss of thousands of dollars per year. (Id. ¶¶ 37, 38.) On an occasion in August
2015, Parks’s supervisor, Robin Craddock, reprimanded her for not completing a task that
Parks was previously told was “no rush.” (Id. ¶ 49.)
Parks maintains that she also experienced a diminution in her position. In 2004,
the Transportation Department computer network that Parks controlled was incorporated
into the Buffalo Public Schools network but remained under Parks’s “total and sole control
and administration.” (Id. ¶ 12.) But in 2010, someone from the IT department physically
removed one of the Transportation Department servers that Parks controlled to prevent
Parks from claiming an upgrade or promotion, and Parks was forced by threat of
insubordination to explain how the removed server worked. (Id. ¶ 22.) Other of Parks’s
tasks were permanently removed and given to management personnel. (Id. ¶ 24.) In
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February 2012, Marta Clark from the Human Resources Department required Parks to
prove her responsibilities by comparing her actual job tasks with the systems
administrator job description, which Parks alleges was an impossible task. (Id. ¶¶ 28,
29.) Beginning in November 2013 through March 2014, Parks’s access to servers and
data bases was removed and she was forced to ask her subordinate, Carnevale, for
permission to access the resources she needed to complete her work. (Id. ¶¶ 30, 46.)
By 2014, Parks’s workload had been “reduced to almost none,” with only one weekly task
and one monthly task, and Parks was no longer included in technology meetings with
vendors or management. (Id. ¶¶ 42-45.)
Parks further claims that management positioned her to fail. (Id. ¶ 25.) For
example, in early 2014, Parks could not connect to the necessary computer drives to
access reports she needed to complete her work, which caused her to be unable to set
up schools and terminals to access necessary data. (Id. ¶ 27.) Parks also alleges that
Carnevale would change procedures without telling her, which resulted in Parks making
mistakes when she had to “process jobs and run production” in Carnevale’s absence.
(Id. ¶ 33.)
Parks alleges that this situation created severe challenges, stress, and
anxiety, but Kane, the Chief of Staff, would not resolve the issues. (Id. ¶ 34.)
Parks alleges that other African-American District employees experienced similar
discrimination based on race. (Id. ¶ 57.) Larry Smith, a laborer, was continuously and
publicly harassed; Tilden Brown, a truck driver, was harassed and “railroaded;” Carson
Scales, the head bus driver, had his position eliminated and was replaced by three male,
non-African-American routing specialists.
(Id. ¶¶ 57-60, 66, 69.)
4
Lamont Perry,
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operations communications coordinator, had the majority of his tasks reassigned to his
Caucasian co-workers who had less seniority and were less skilled. (Id. ¶¶ 57, 61.)
Perry’s requests for promotion were also ignored. (Id. ¶¶ 61, 62.)
In January 2015, Parks filed a grievance with her union concerning her lack of
promotions.
(Id. ¶ 70.)
The grievance was settled in July 2016, when Parks was
promoted to senior systems analyst (grade 21), which was permanently certified in
December 2016, two weeks before her retirement. (Id. ¶ 70, 77.) In the interim, on May
31, 2016, with Parks only six months from a full-service retirement at age 55, her systems
analyst position was cut from the budget. (Id. ¶¶ 51, 52.) Parks was told that her
department would be reduced “to a one-person shop,” and that person would be
Carnevale, a Caucasian female with less seniority. (Id. ¶¶ 53, 56.) In July 2016, Parks
obtained a “placeholder” position in Buffalo City Hall that allowed her to complete her
years of service and obtain a full retirement. (Id. ¶¶ 54, 55.) Then, as mentioned above,
Parks was promoted to senior systems analyst in December 2016 as a result of her
grievance. (Id. ¶ 70.) She retired two weeks later. (Id.)
Before her retirement, Parks filed an official complaint with the District’s Human
Resources Department on April 28, 2016, but the complaint went uninvestigated. (Id. ¶¶
71, 72.) Parks also advised the District’s Human Resources Department that she had
contacted the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“the EEOC”). (Id. ¶ 73.)
On June 20, 2016, Parks filed complaints with the EEOC. (Id. ¶ 73 and Exhibit 1.) She
was issued a Right to Sue Letter on April 13, 2017, and filed her complaint in this action
on July 10, 2017. (Id., Exhibit 2.)
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III. DISCUSSION
Parks asserts discrimination and retaliation claims in each of four causes of action.
She alleges that the District engaged in a pattern and practice of discrimination in the
form of disparate treatment based on race and retaliated against her for having engaged
in protected activity, in violation of Title VII (First Cause of Action 1), § 296 of the NY HRL
(Second Cause of Action), 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (b) through 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Third Cause
of Action), and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment through 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (Fourth Cause of Action). (Complaint, ¶¶ 80-85, 86-90, 91-95, 96-100.)
The District seeks dismissal of each cause of action for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted, or, in the alternative, dismissal of all claims falling outside the
applicable statutes of limitations periods. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 (b)(6).
A.
Rule 12 (b)(6)
Rule 12 (b)(6) allows dismissal of a complaint for Afailure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted.@ Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 (b)(6). In addition, if it appears from the
face of the complaint that a cause of action has not been brought within the applicable
statute of limitations period, the defense of limitations “may be raised in a pre-answer
motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 (b)(6).” Santos v. Dist. Council of New York City,
619 F.2d 963, 967 n.4 (2d Cir. 1980); see also Ghartley v. St. John’s Queens Hosp., 869
F.2d 160, 162 (2d Cir. 1989).
Federal pleading standards are generally not stringent: Rule 8 requires only a short
and plain statement of a claim. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 (a)(2). But the plain statement must
1 Parks seeks punitive damages on her Title VII claim. (Complaint, ¶ 85.)
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Apossess enough heft to show that the pleader is entitled to relief.@ Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 557. When determining whether a complaint states a claim, the court must construe
it liberally, accept all factual allegations as true, and draw all reasonable inferences in the
plaintiff=s favor. See ATSI Commc’ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 98 (2d Cir.
2007).
Legal conclusions, however, are not afforded the same presumption of
truthfulness. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d
868 (2009) (Athe tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in
a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions@).
ATo survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to >state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.=@ Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
Labels, conclusions, or Aa formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.@ Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
Facial plausibility exists when the facts alleged allow for a reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct charged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The plausibility
standard is not, however, a probability requirement: the well-pleaded allegations in the
complaint need only nudge the claim Aacross the line from conceivable to plausible.@
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
A two-pronged approach is thus used to examine the sufficiency of a complaint.
This examination is context specific and requires that the court draw on its judicial
experience and common sense. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. First, statements that are
not entitled to the presumption of truth, such as conclusory allegations, labels, and legal
conclusions, are identified and stripped away.
7
See id.
Second, well-pleaded, non-
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conclusory factual allegations are presumed true and examined to determine whether
they Aplausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.@ Id. AWhere the well-pleaded facts
do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct,@ the
complaint fails to state a claim. Id.
In considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12 (b)(6), “a district court must limit
itself to facts stated in the complaint or in documents attached to the complaint as exhibits
or incorporated in the complaint by reference.” Kramer v. Time Warner, Inc., 937 F.2d
767, 773 (2d Cir. 1991); see also Blue Tree Hotels Inv. (Can.), Ltd. v. Starwood Hotels &
Resorts Worldwide, Inc., 369 F.3d 212, 217 (2d Cir. 2004). “[W]here a document is not
incorporated by reference, the court may nevertheless consider it where the complaint
relies heavily upon its terms and effect,” thereby rendering the document “integral to the
complaint.”
Mangiafico v. Blumenthal, 471 F.3d 391, 398 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing
Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152–53 (2d Cir. 2002)). But even where
a document is “integral” to the complaint, it cannot serve as the basis for dismissal unless
there is no dispute as to its authenticity, accuracy, and relevance. See Faulkner v. Beer,
463 F.3d 130, 134 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal citations omitted).
B.
The District’s Motion to Dismiss
1.
Statutes of Limitations
“Title VII requires that individuals aggrieved by acts of discrimination file a charge
with the EEOC within 180 or, in states like New York that have local administrative
mechanisms for pursuing discrimination claims, 300 days ‘after the alleged unlawful
employment practice occurred.’” Vega v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., 801 F.3d
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72, 78-79 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (e)(1)); Duplan v. City of New York,
888 F.3d 612, 621-22 (2d Cir. 2018). The United States Supreme Court has instructed
that “employment practice” in this context refers to “a discrete act or single ‘occurrence’,”
and that an employment practice occurs on the day it happens. Nat’l R.R. Passenger
Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 110-11, 122 S. Ct. 2061, 153 L. Ed. 2d 106 (2002).
Therefore, “discrete discriminatory acts are not actionable if time barred, even when they
are related to acts alleged in timely filed charges.” Id. at 113. Accordingly, “[a] party . .
. must file a charge within either 180 or 300 days of the date of the act or lose the ability
to recover for it.” Id.
The statute of limitations for discrimination claims brought under the NY HRL is
three years. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214 (2); Murphy v. Am. Home Prod. Corp., 448 N.E.2d
86, 93 (N.Y. 1983). The statute of limitations for claims brought under the Civil Rights
Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (b), is four years because, as a federal statute enacted
after December 1, 1990, § 1981 (b) is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1658, not the personal
injury statute of limitations of the forum state. See Jones v. R./R. Donnelley & Sons Co.,
541 U.S. 369, 382-83, 124 S. Ct. 1836, 158 L. Ed. 2d 645 (2004); Morales v. County of
Suffolk, 952 F. Supp. 2d 433, 436 (E.D.N.Y. 2013). The statute of limitations for a § 1983
claim is “that which the State provides for personal-injury torts,” which in New York is
three years. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387, 127 S. Ct. 1091, 166 L. Ed. 2d 973
(2007); see Berman v. Perez, No. 17-CV-2757 (JGK), 2018 WL 565269, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.
Jan. 24, 2018) (citing Hogan v. Fischer, 738 F.3d 509, 517 (2d Cir. 2013), in turn citing
N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214); see also Vega, 801 F.3d at 79 (“a plaintiff asserting a claim of
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discrimination under § 1983 must file suit within three years of the adverse employment
action”).
Here, Parks lodged her complaints with the EEOC on June 20, 2016, and
thereafter timely filed this action on July 10, 2017. 2
(Docket No. 1, Exhibit 1.)
Consequently, her timely Title VII claims are those arising on or after August 25, 2015
(300 days before June 20, 2016); her timely NY HRL and § 1983 claims are those arising
on or after July 10, 2014 (three years before July 10, 2017); and her timely § 1981 (b)
claims are those arising on or after July 10, 2013 (four years before July 10, 2017). The
District’s motion to dismiss all other claims on statute of limitations grounds will therefore
be granted.
2.
Parks’s Title VII and NY HRL claims
a.
Parks’s Title VII and NY HRL discrimination claims are
adequately pleaded.
Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge
any individual, or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (a)(1).
Similarly, the NY HRL provides that it shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for an
employer “to refuse to hire or employ or to bar or to discharge from employment [an]
individual or to discriminate against [an] individual in compensation or in terms, conditions
or privileges of employment” on account of race. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296 (1)(a). Both
2 Parks had 90 days from the date of her April 13, 2017 Right to Sue Letter (Docket No. 1, Exhibit 2) to
file suit. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (f)(1).
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statutes are governed by the standards applicable to Title VII discrimination claims. See
Deveaux v. Skechers USA, Inc., 19cv9734 (DLC), 2020 WL 1812741, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.
9, 2020) (“Discrimination claims brought under the NYSHRL are ‘analytically identical’ to
Title VII claims.”) (quoting Lenzi v. Systemax, Inc., 944 F.3d 97, 107 n.7 (2d Cir. 2019)).
At the pleading stage, of course, a plaintiff has no burden to demonstrate,
establish, show, or prove her Title VII claim; she carries only the minimal burden of
plausibly “alleging facts that directly show discrimination or facts that indirectly show
discrimination by giving rise to a plausible inference of discrimination.” See Vega, 801
F.3d at 87. That is, a plaintiff need not initially establish discrimination or allege facts
concerning each element of the three-part, burden-shifting framework set out in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973)
that will ultimately govern the claim. See Littlejohn v. City of New York, 795 F.3d 297,
306, 311 (2d Cir. 2015); Vega, 801 F.3d at 82-84 (“[O]ur decision in Littlejohn makes clear
that a plaintiff is not required to plead a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas, at
least as the test was originally formulated, to defeat a motion to dismiss.”).
To state a Title VII discrimination claim under Iqbal and Twombly, a plaintiff must
plausibly allege that “(1) the employer took adverse action against him and (2) his race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor in the employment decision.”
Vega, 801 F.3d at 87; Doe v. Columbia Univ., 831 F.3d 46, 55 (2d Cir. 2016); Williams v.
N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 458 F.3d 67, 71 (2d Cir. 2006). More expansively, the Second
Circuit has described the pleading obligation as follows: “[A]bsent direct evidence of
discrimination, what must be plausibly supported by facts alleged in the complaint is that
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the plaintiff is a member of a protected class, was qualified, suffered an adverse
employment action, and has at least minimal support for the proposition that the employer
was motivated by discriminatory intent.” Littlejohn, 795 F.3d at 311.
The Second Circuit defines an adverse employment action as a “materially
adverse change” in the terms and conditions of an individual’s employment. Sanders v.
New York City Human Res. Admin., 361 F.3d 749, 755 (2d Cir. 2004); Galabya v. New
York City Bd. of Educ., 202 F.3d 636, 640 (2d Cir. 2000).
To be materially adverse a change in working conditions must
be more disruptive than a mere inconvenience or an alteration
of job responsibilities. A materially adverse change might be
indicated by a termination of employment, a demotion
evidenced by a decrease in wage or salary, a less
distinguished title, a material loss of benefits, significantly
diminished material responsibilities, or other indices unique to
a particular situation.
Galabya, 202 F.3d at 640 (quotations, citations, and alterations omitted); see also
Sanders, 361 F.3d at 755. Discrimination can be inferred from “the more favorable
treatment of employees not in the protected group; or the sequence of events leading to
the plaintiff’s discharge,” Leibowitz v. Cornell Univ., 584 F.3d 487, 502 (2d Cir. 2009), or
“when an employer replaces a terminated or demoted employee with an individual outside
the employee’s protected class,” Littlejohn, 795 F.3d at 312-13 (collecting cases).
The District argues that Parks fails to state a claim because she did not suffer an
adverse employment action and her allegations are too general. This Court’s reading of
the complaint reveals otherwise. Parks alleges that she is an African-American female;
that the District took away her overtime opportunities; that the District eliminated her
position in favor of retaining Carnevale, a Caucasian female with less seniority, and then
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promoted Carnevale instead of her; and that the District did not subject her Caucasian
co-workers to the same treatment. (Complaint, ¶¶ 6, 37, 38, 51, 53, 56.) The District
largely ignores these allegations, but they are certainly sufficient to support Parks’s Title
VII claim at this stage. This Court therefore finds that the allegations in Parks’s complaint
are minimally sufficient to state a Title VII race-discrimination claim. See, e.g., Littlejohn,
795 F.3d at 313 (“The fact that a plaintiff was replaced by someone outside the protected
class will ordinarily suffice for the required inference of discrimination at the initial prima
facie stage of the Title VII analysis, including at the pleading stage.”). The District’s
motion to dismiss Parks’s Title VII and NY HRL discrimination claims is therefore denied.
b.
Parks’s Title VII and NY HRL retaliation claims are adequately
pleaded.
Title VII makes it unlawful “for an employer to discriminate against any of his
employees . . . because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment
practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or
participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this
subchapter.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (a). Similarly, the NY HRL makes it unlawful for “any
employer, labor organization or employment agency to discharge, expel or otherwise
discriminate against any person because he or she has opposed any practices forbidden
under this article or because he or she has filed a complaint, testified or assisted in any
proceeding under this article.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296 (f). Both statutes are governed by
the standards applicable to Title VII retaliation claims. See Rivera v. Rochester Genesee
Reg’l Trans. Auth., 743 F.3d 11, 25 n. 8 (2d Cir. 2014) (“Retaliation claims under the [NY
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HRL] are generally governed by the same standards as federal claims under Title VII.”).
To state a retaliation claim under Title VII, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that “(1)
defendants discriminated—or took an adverse employment action—against him, (2)
‘because’ he has opposed any unlawful employment practice.” Vega, 801 F.3d at 90.
Broken down, a plaintiff must plausibly allege (1) that she engaged in protected activity;
(2) her employer was aware that she engaged in protected activity; (3) she suffered an
adverse employment action; and (4) there was a causal connection between the
protected activity and the adverse employment action. See Dickens v. Hudson Sheraton
Corp., LLC, 167 F. Supp. 3d 499, 522 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).
The concept of “adverse employment action” is broader for Title VII retaliation
claims than for Title VII discrimination claims and encompasses any action that “could
well dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.”
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 57, 126 S Ct. 2405, 165 L. Ed.
2d 345 (2006); Rivera, 743 F.3d at 25. And unlike a Title VII discrimination claim, a Title
VII retaliation claim requires “but-for” causation: “the plaintiff must plausibly allege that
the retaliation was a ‘but-for’ cause of the employer’s adverse action.” See Univ. of Tex.
Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, __ U.S. __133 S. Ct. 2517, 2533, 186 L. Ed. 2d 503 (2013);
Kwan v. Andalex Grp. LLC, 737 F.3d 834, 846 (2d Cir. 2013) (“‘[B]ut-for’ causation does
not require proof that retaliation was the only cause of the employer’s action, but only that
the adverse action would not have occurred in the absence of the retaliatory motive.”).
In this regard, “a retaliatory purpose can be shown indirectly by timing: protected activity
followed closely in time by adverse employment action.” Vega, 801 F.3d at 89; Kwan,
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737 F.3d at 845 (“the but-for causation standard does not alter the plaintiff’s ability to
demonstrate causation . . . through temporal proximity”).
Examining Parks’s complaint, she alleges that she opposed the District’s
employment practices by filing a union grievance in January 2015 that remained pending
during the statute of limitations period; by filing a complaint directly with the District’s
Human Resources Department on April 28, 2016; and by notifying the District in April
2016 that she had also complained to the EEOC. (Complaint, ¶¶ 70-73.) Parks further
alleges that the District eliminated her position and promoted her subordinate instead of
her on May 31, 2016, just one month after she complained to the District’s Human
Resources Department and notified it that she had contacted the EEOC. (Id. ¶¶ 51, 53,
71, 73.) The District offers no specific reason why these allegations are insufficient to
state a claim. Given the District’s clear notice of Parks’s protected activity and the
temporal proximity between that activity and the alleged adverse employment action, this
Court finds that these allegations adequately state retaliation claims under Title VII. The
District’s motion to dismiss these claims is therefore denied.
3.
Parks’s § 1981 (b) and Equal Protection claims
Section 1981, provides, in pertinent part, that “[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction
of the United States shall have the same right in every State . . . and Territory to make
and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit
of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white
citizens . . . .”
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (a).
This “includes the making, performance,
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modification, and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges,
terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship.” 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (b).
In the employment-discrimination context, § 1981 prohibits discrimination and
retaliation “with respect to the enjoyment of benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of
a contractual relationship, such as employment.” Patterson v. County of Oneida, N.Y.,
375 F.3d 206, 224 (2d Cir. 2004); CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442, 457,
128 S. Ct. 1951, 170 L. Ed. 2d 864 (2008) (finding that § 1981 encompasses retaliation
claims); see also Hawkins v. 1115 Legal Serv. Care, 163 F.3d 684, 693 (2d Cir. 1998).
The pleading standards for § 1981 (b) discrimination and retaliation claims are the same
as for Title VII claims of the same sort. 3 See Bowman v. N.Y. State Hous. & Cmty.
Renewal, 18 Civ. 11596 (ER), 2020 WL 1233701, at *5-6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 2020); Lewis
v. Roosevelt Island Operating Corp., 246 F. Supp. 3d 979, 990 n. 6 (S.D.N.Y. 2017)
(collecting cases).
“The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . is essentially a
direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” City of Cleburne,
Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439, 105 S. Ct. 3249, 87 L. Ed. 2d 313 (1985).
It is implicated, inter alia, “when the government makes class-based decisions in the
employment context, treating distinct groups of individuals categorically differently.”
3 The United States Supreme Court recently held, however, that for § 1981 claims, a plaintiff must plausibly
allege but-for causation: that but-for his or her race, he or she would not have suffered the loss of a legally
protected right. See Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l Assoc. of African American-Owned Media, __ U.S. __, 140 S.
Ct. 1009, 1019, __ L. Ed. 2d __ (2020) (“To prevail [on a § 1981 claim], a plaintiff must initially plead and
ultimately prove that, but for race, it would not have suffered the loss of a legally protected right.”). Title
VII discrimination claims, by contrast, require only that discrimination be a “motivating factor” in the
employer’s adverse action. See Vega, 801 F.3d at 87.
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Engquist v. Oregon Dep’t of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 607, 128 S. Ct. 2146, 170 L. Ed. 2d
975 (2008).
A plaintiff claiming protected-class-based discrimination in public employment or
retaliation in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment may bring suit under 42 U.S.C. §
1983. See Naumovski v. Norris, 934 F.3d 200, 211 (2d Cir. 2019); Vega, 801 F.3d at
82. The same pleading standards applicable to Title VII discrimination and retaliation
claims apply, as do the § 1983 pleading requirements: “(1) the violation of a right secured
by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and (2) the alleged deprivation was
committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Vega, 801 F.3d at 87-88
(quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Feingold v. New York, 366 F.3d 138,
159 (2d Cir. 2004) (an “equal protection claim parallels [a plaintiff’s] Title VII claim”);
O’Hara v. Bd. of Coop. Educ. Servs., S. Westchester, No. 18-CV-8502 (KMK), 2020 WL
1244474, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2020); Rogers v. Roosevelt Union Free Sch. Dist., No.
09-CV-3862, 2012 WL 6163130, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2012).
The complaint must plausibly plead that the defendant acted with “discriminatory
intent,” and that intent must ultimately have been a “but-for” cause of the adverse
employment action. See James v. John Jay Coll., 19cv644 (DLC), 2020 WL 1911211,
at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 20, 2020) (quoting Naumovski, 934 F.3d at 214); see also Oliver v.
N.Y. State Police, 1:19-cv-233 (BKS/DJS), 2020 WL 1849484, at *8 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 13,
2020) (“To plead causation, the plaintiff must plausibly allege that the retaliation was the
“but for” cause of the employer’s adverse action, i.e., that ‘the adverse action would not
have occurred in the absence of the retaliatory motive.’”) (quoting Vega, 801 F.3d at 9017
Case 1:17-cv-00631-WMS Document 8 Filed 04/30/20 Page 18 of 20
91, in turn quoting Kwan, 737 F.3d at 846). “Dismissal is appropriate where a causal
connection is not alleged or reasonably inferred from the complaint.” Id.
But even assuming a properly pleaded claim, municipalities and municipal entities
such as school districts may be held liable under §§ 1981 and 1983 only if they are
personally involved in the alleged deprivation. See Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491
U.S. 701, 735-36, 109 S., Ct. 2702, 105 L. Ed. 2d 598 (1989); Monell v. Dep’t of Soc.
Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 689, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1978); Back v. Hastings On
Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 127 (2d Cir. 2004).
Municipal liability
therefore cannot be premised solely on a respondeat superior theory; it must be based
on constitutional deprivations caused by an officially promulgated, or de facto,
governmental “custom” or “policy[.]” Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480,
106 S. Ct. 1292, 1298, 89 L. Ed. 2d 452 (1986).
Section 1983 thus imposes liability on
a municipality only when its official custom or policy causes an employee to violate an
individual’s constitutional rights.
See Monell, 436 U.S. 658 at 691.
The existence of such a policy or custom can be demonstrated in several ways,
including: (1) showing an officially promulgated and endorsed municipal policy, Monell,
436 U.S. at 658; (2) showing that actions taken by officials with final policymaking
authority caused a constitutional violation, Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 480–81; (3) showing
that municipal decisionmaking evidences “deliberate indifference” to the rights of those
with whom municipal employees come in contact, including failure to remedy an otherwise
constitutional policy so deficient that policymakers knew or should have known with a high
degree of certainty that constitutional violations could result, City of Oklahoma City v.
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Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 819, 105 S. Ct. 2427, 2434, 85 L. Ed. 2d 791 (1985), or failure to
train employees when training is necessary to prevent the violation of federal rights, City
of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388, 109 S. Ct. 1197, 1204, 103 L. Ed. 2d 412 (1989).
A plaintiff need not identify an express rule or regulation; it is sufficient if he shows “that
a discriminatory practice of municipal officials was so ‘persistent or widespread’ as to
constitute ‘a custom or usage with the force of law,’ or that a discriminatory practice of
subordinate employees was ‘so manifest as to imply the constructive acquiescence of
senior policy-making officials.’” Patterson, 375 F.3d at 226 (quoting Sorlucco v. New
York City Police Dep’t, 971 F.2d 864, 870-71 (2d Cir. 1992)).
The District first argues that Parks’s § 1981 and Equal Protection claims must be
dismissed because the District is not a “person” under § 1983.
This is incorrect.
“Municipalities and other local government bodies, including school districts, are
considered ‘persons’ within the meaning of § 1983.” Back, 365 F.3d at 128 (citing Jett,
491 U.S. at 735-36; Monell, 436 U.S. at 689); Frank v. Sachem Sch. Dist., 84 F. Supp.
3d 172, 193 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (“Significantly, school districts, such as Sachem, are
considered to be local governments and are subject to the same standards of liability as
local governments under Monell.”).
The District’s other argument is that dismissal of these claims is required because
the complaint fails to identify the policy, practice, or custom that allegedly caused the
denial of Parks’s rights. This Court disagrees. Parks alleges that the District engaged
in a persistent pattern and practice of favoring Caucasian employees over AfricanAmerican employees, including promoting Caucasian employees with less experience
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and seniority over African-American employees. She alleges various examples of the
allegedly widespread discriminatory practice, including the discrimination that she
allegedly suffered. At this stage, these allegations are minimally sufficient to defeat the
District’s motion to dismiss under the standards for municipal liability set forth above.
See Patterson, 375 F.3d at 226.
The District’s motion to dismiss these claims is
therefore denied.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the District’s motion to dismiss Parks’s complaint is
granted in part and denied in part. The District’s motion to dismiss those claims falling
outside the applicable statute of limitations is granted, but the motion is otherwise denied.
The District will have 14 days from the entry date of this decision to file an answer
consistent with Rule 12 (a)(4)(A).
V. ORDERS
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED, that the Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 4) is GRANTED
in part and DENIED in part, consistent with the foregoing decision.
FURTHER, that Defendant shall file an answer within 14 days of the entry date of
this decision consistent with Rule 12 (a)(4)(A).
SO ORDERED.
Dated:
April 30, 2020
Buffalo, New York
s/William M. Skretny
WILLIAM M. SKRETNY
United States District Judge
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