Siyah Monsoori v. Commissioner of Social Security
Filing
18
DECISION AND ORDER granting 13 Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings to the extent that this matter is remanded to the Commissioner for further administrative proceedings consistent with this Decision and Order; denying 15 Commissioner's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. (Clerk to close case.). Signed by Hon. Michael A. Telesca on 6/4/19. (JMC)-CLERK TO FOLLOW UP-
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
____________________________________
SAMAN K. SIYAH MONSOORI
Plaintiff,
1:17-cv-01161-MAT
DECISION AND ORDER
-vCOMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
__________________________________________
INTRODUCTION
Saman K. Siyah Monsoori (“Plaintiff”), represented by counsel,
brings this action under Title XVI of the Social Security Act (“the
Act”),
seeking
Commissioner
review
of
of
Social
the
final
Security
decision
(“the
of
the
Acting
Commissioner”
or
“Defendant”), denying his application for supplemental security
income (“SSI”). The Court has jurisdiction over the matter pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c). Presently before the Court are the parties’
competing
motions
for
judgment
on
the
pleadings
pursuant
to
Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the reasons
set forth below, Plaintiff’s motion is granted to the extent that
the
matter
is
remanded
to
the
Commissioner
for
further
administrative proceedings consistent with this Decision and Order.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On October 1, 2014, Plaintiff protectively filed for SSI,
alleging disability
beginning
October
1,
2014.
Administrative
Transcript (“T.”) 74-75. The claim was initially denied on February
12, 2015, and Plaintiff timely requested a hearing. T. 87-112. On
April 17, 2017, a hearing was conducted in Albany, New York by
administrative law judge (“ALJ”) John Farrell. T.30-73. Plaintiff
appeared with his attorney and testified with the assistance of a
translator. An impartial vocational expert (“VE”) also testified
via telephone.
The ALJ issued an unfavorable decision on May 26, 2017. T. 5274. Plaintiff timely requested review of the ALJ’s decision by the
Appeals Council. On September 8, 2017, the Appeals Council denied
Plaintiff’s request for review, making the ALJ’s decision the final
decision
of
the
Commissioner.
T.
1-5.
Plaintiff
then
timely
commenced this action.
THE ALJ’S DECISION
The
ALJ
applied
the
five-step
sequential
evaluation
promulgated by the Commissioner for adjudicating disability claims.
See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a). T. 14.
At step one of the sequential evaluation, the ALJ found that
Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since his
application date of October 1, 2014. T.15.
At step two, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff suffered from
the
“severe”
impairments
of
lumbar
disc
herniation,
anxiety
disorder, major depressive disorder, posttraumatic stress disorder
(“PTSD”), and panic disorder. Id. The ALJ also determined that
Plaintiff’s
medically
determinable
impairments
of
asthma,
hypertension, and irritable bowel syndrome were non-severe and
2
created no significant work-related functional limitations. T. 1560.
At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff does not have an
impairment or combination of impairments that meet or medically
equal an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P,
Appendix 1. T. 16. The ALJ stated that he was considering Listings
1.00 (Musculoskeletal Systems), 12.04 (Depressive, Bipolar, and
Related
Disorders),
12.06
(Anxiety
and
Obsessive-Compulsive
Disorders, and 12.15 (Trauma and Stressor-Related Disorders) in
making this determination.
Before proceeding to step four, the ALJ assessed Plaintiff as
having the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform medium
work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 416.967(c), with the following
additional limitations: can occasionally balance, kneel, crouch,
crawl, stoop, and climb; has no ability to speak or understand
English; can perform simple, routine tasks; and can frequently
interact with the public and coworkers. T. 17-18.
At step four, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had no past
relevant work. T. 23. At step five, the ALJ relied on the VE’s
testimony to find that, taking into account Plaintiff’s age,
education, work experience, and RFC, there are jobs that exist in
significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff can
perform, including the representative occupations of hand packager,
3
box bender, and production helper. T. 23-24. The ALJ accordingly
found that Plaintiff is not disabled as defined in the Act. T. 24.
SCOPE OF REVIEW
A
district
court
may
set
aside
the
Commissioner’s
determination that a claimant is not disabled only if the factual
findings are not supported by “substantial evidence” or if the
decision is based on legal error. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); see also
Green-Younger v. Barnhart, 335 F.3d 99, 105-06 (2d Cir. 2003). The
district court must accept the Commissioner’s findings of fact,
provided that such findings are supported by “substantial evidence”
in the record. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (the Commissioner’s findings
“as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be
conclusive”). “Substantial evidence means ‘such relevant evidence
as
a
reasonable
mind
might
accept
as
adequate
to
support
a
conclusion.’” Shaw v. Chater, 221 F.3d 126, 131 (2d Cir. 2000)
(quotation
omitted).
The
reviewing
court
nevertheless
must
scrutinize the whole record and examine evidence that supports or
detracts from both sides. Tejada v. Apfel, 167 F.3d 770, 774
(2d Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). “The deferential standard of
review
for
substantial
evidence
does
not
apply
to
the
Commissioner’s conclusions of law.” Byam v. Barnhart, 336 F.3d 172,
179 (2d Cir. 2003) (citing Townley v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 109, 112
(2d Cir. 1984)).
4
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff contends that remand of this matter is warranted
because: (1) the ALJ failed to properly evaluate Listing 1.04(A) at
step three; (2) the ALJ erred in substituting his own “medical”
judgment for that of a physician; and (3) the ALJ failed to develop
the record. For the reasons discussed below, the Court finds the
ALJ failed to provide adequate analysis for his finding that
Plaintiff’s lumbar disc herniation did not meet or equal Listing
1.04(A). Accordingly, the Court finds that remand of this matter
for further administrative proceedings is required.
I.
Failure to Properly Consider Medical Listing 1.04(A)
A.
Medical Evidence Pertaining to Listing 1.04(A)
Plaintiff reported that he was seriously injured in a car
bombing and shooting in his home country of Iraq in 2008. One of
his sons was killed in the attack. Following the attack, he had
surgeries in Iran and Iraq for his injuries. Since the attack, he
has suffered from PTSD, chronic back pain and headaches. Plaintiff
moved to Buffalo in June 2014, and established medical treatment
shortly thereafter at Jericho Road Community Health Center. T. 27677.
On
February
9,
2015,
a
musculoskeletal
examination
of
Plaintiff’s spine showed a limited range of motion with pain and a
positive straight leg raising test on the left side. T. 265.
Plaintiff was seen again for his back pain on March 10, 2015, where
5
he exhibited a limited range of motion and was referred to a
specialist. T. 261-62. On March 27, 2015, Plaintiff walked with a
stumbling
and
uncoordinated
gait.
He
had
tenderness
of
the
paraspinal muscles bilaterally and decreased muscle tone on the
left side. He had tenderness of the left L2, L3, L4 and L5
paravertebral facet area. T. 258. Plaintiff continued to be treated
at Jericho Road Community Health Center for his neck, back and leg
pain, as well as other medical issues, throughout 2015 and 2016.
See T. 228-78.
On December 22, 2016, Plaintiff was admitted to the emergency
room with complaints of chronic lower back pain. Upon examination,
Plaintiff exhibited pain with palpation. A straight leg raising
test was positive on the left side at ten degrees. T. 301-03.
Radiology reports showed mild wedging at T11 and T12, mild disc
space
narrowing
arthrosis,
at
L5/S1,
straightening
mild
lumbar
generalized
lordosis,
posterior
and
facet
transitional
lumbosacral anatomy. T. 303.
Plaintiff was referred to orthopedic surgeon Dr. Christopher
Hamill,
who
first
examined
him
on
January
24,
2017.
Upon
examination, Plaintiff had an absent left Achilles reflex, foot
drop on the left, and reduced strength in the extensor hallucis
longus (EHL) muscle and anterior tibial tendon. T. 343.
An MRI of the lumbar spine taken on February 24, 2017 showed
loss of normal T2 hyperintensity within the L4-5 intervertebral
6
discs
consistent
with
disc
desiccation
and
mild
disc
space
narrowing at L4-5. A left paracentral disc herniation was present
at L5-S1, with extruded disc material extending into the left
lateral recess, abutting and compressing the exiting L5 nerve root.
T. 339. On March 15, 2017, Plaintiff discussed the findings of the
MRI with Dr. Hamill, who noted the disc herniation on the left side
at L4-5 and reported a positive straight leg raising test on the
left side. After going over the options with Dr. Hamill, Plaintiff
expressed he would like to move forward with an L4-5 discectomy.
T. 346-47.
In his decision, the ALJ noted the February 2017 MRI findings
and physical exams showing an absent left Achilles reflex, left
foot drop and decreased strength at the left lower extremity, as
well
as
Dr.
Hamill’s
suggestion
of
an
L4-5
discectomy
and
intermittent straight leg raises. T. 19-20. Nevertheless, the ALJ
determined there were “no objective findings sufficient to meet
[the applicable] Listings” and further found that Plaintiff was
capable of a limited range of medium work. T. 16-17.
Plaintiff argues that although the ALJ provided a summary of
the medical record in his decision, he failed to properly weigh all
of the evidence of record and provide a detailed explanation of his
findings. For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds the ALJ
failed to address ambiguities in the record that specifically
7
relate
to
Listing
1.04(A)
and
further
erred
by
failing
to
demonstrate he actually considered Listing 1.04(A).
B.
Ambiguities in the Record Require Remand for Proper
Consideration of Listing 1.04(A)
“The Social Security regulations list certain impairments, any
of which is sufficient, at step three, to create an irrebuttable
presumption of disability.” DeChirico v. Callahan, 134 F.3d 1177,
1180 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d)).
“The regulations also provide for a finding of such a disability
per se if an individual has an impairment that is ‘equal to’ a
listed impairment.” Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d) (“If you
have an impairment(s) which ... is listed in appendix 1 or is equal
to a listed impairment(s), we will find you disabled without
considering your age, education, and work experience.”)) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(d).
The claimant bears the burden at step three to prove he or she
meets the requirements necessary to meet or equal the Listings.
Nonetheless, the ALJ is required to explain why a claimant failed
to meet or equal the Listings “[w]here the claimant’s symptoms as
described by the medical evidence appear to match those described
in the Listings.” Rockwood v. Astrue, 614 F. Supp.2d 252, 273
(N.D.N.Y. 2009) (citation omitted). Notably, it is the ALJ’s
responsibility to “build an accurate and logical bridge from the
evidence to [his or her] conclusion to enable a meaningful review.”
Hamedallah
ex
rel.
E.B.
v.
Astrue,
8
876
F.
Supp.2d
133,
142
(N.D.N.Y.
2012). “While
the
ALJ
may
ultimately
find
that
[a
considered listing] do[es] not apply to Plaintiff, he must still
provide some analysis of Plaintiff’s symptoms and medical evidence
in the context of the Listing criteria.” Critoph v. Berryhill,
No. 1:16-CV-00417(MAT), 2017 WL 4324688, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 28,
2017) (quoting Peach v. Colvin, No. 15-CV-104S, 2016 WL 2956230, at
*4 (W.D.N.Y. May 23, 2016)). Failure to do so may warrant remand.
See, e.g., Torres v. Colvin, No. 14-CV-479S, 2015 WL 4604000, at *4
(W.D.N.Y. July 30, 2015) (remanding where “the record evidence
suggests
that
Plaintiff’s
symptoms
could
meet
the
Listing
requirements in 1.04(A)” but the ALJ’s “only reference to it is a
recitation of the standard”); Cherico v. Colvin, No. 12 Civ.
5734(MHD), 2014 WL 3939036, at *28 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 2014) (holding
that an ALJ merely stating that he or she had considered the
requirements of a listing was “patently inadequate to substitute
for specific findings in view of the fact that plaintiff has at
least a colorable case for application of listing 1.04(A)” and that
where there is record support for each of the necessary symptoms,
the ALJ was required to address that evidence, and his failure to
specifically do so was error that would justify a remand).
While the ALJ found Plaintiff’s lumbar disc herniation was a
severe impairment at step two, (T. 15), at step three he stated
that there were no objective findings sufficient to meet the
criteria in the applicable sections of Listing § 1.00. T. 16. Other
9
than providing a selective summary of the evidence later in the
decision, the ALJ failed to provide any specific rationale showing
that the medical evidence of record does not meeting Listing
1.04(A). Moreover,
it
is impossible
to
know whether
the
ALJ
specifically considered Listing 1.04(A), given the ALJ referenced
only
the
general
Listing
of
1.00,
which
encompasses
all
musculoskeletal systems. Furthermore, the Court’s review of the
record reveals there is evidence suggesting Plaintiff may in fact
meet the Listing and accordingly, a more thorough analysis and
explanation was required. Cherico, 2014 WL 3939036, at *28.
To meet Listing 1.04(A), a claimant must show proof of the
following conditions:
1.
A disorder of the spine, including but not limited
to
“herniated
arachnoiditis,
degenerative
nucleus
spinal
disc
pulposus,
stenosis,
disease,
spinal
osteoarthritis,
facet
arthritis,
vertebral fracture,” and
2.
“Compromise
of
nerve root (including
the
cauda
equina) or the spinal cord,” and
3.
“Evidence of nerve root compression characterized
by neuro-anatomic distribution of pain, limitation
of motion of the spine, motor loss (atrophy with
associated muscle weakness or muscle weakness),”
and
10
4.
“Sensory
or
reflex
loss,”
and
if
there
is
involvement of the lower back,
5.
“Positive straight-leg raising test” in both the
sitting and supine position.
The
Social
Security
Administration
(“SSA”)
has
provided
further guidance regarding the assessment of Listing 1.04(A) in the
form of an Acquiescence Ruling (“AR”) issued in 2015. See AR 151(4), Radford v. Colvin: Standard for Meeting the Listing for
Disorders of the Spine with Evidence of Nerve Root Compression,
80 F.R. 57418-02 (2015), 2015 WL 5564523(F.R.). While these rulings
do not carry the full force of law, the Supreme Court has held that
an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations is entitled to
substantial deference. See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462-63
(1997). In its AR, the SSA specified that all of the requirements
of Listing 1.04(A) must be simultaneously present on examination
and continue, or be expected to continue, for at least 12 months,
in order for a disorder of the spine to meet the Listing at step
three. F.R. 57418-02, at *57420. In other words, “when the listing
criteria are scattered over time, wax and wane, or are present on
one examination but absent on another, the individual’s nerve root
compression would not rise to the level of severity required by
listing 1.04A.” Id.
While the Court notes that the AR was issued in response to
the Fourth Circuit’s holding in Radford v. Colvin, 734 F.3d 288
11
(4th Cir. 2013), that plaintiff could meet Listing 1.04(A) even
though
his
present, the
relevant
Second
symptoms
Circuit
were
has
not
not
always
made
a
simultaneously
similar
holding.
Accordingly, this Court will accord the policy position set forth
in AR 15-1(4) substantial deference. See Smith v. Colvin, No. 2:15CV-00107-AA, 2016 WL 8711697, at *3-4 (D. Or. Feb. 5, 2016)
(according substantial deference to AR 15-1(4)); Atkins v. Colvin,
No. 15-1168-JWL, 2016 WL 2989393, at *10-12 (D. Kan. May 24, 2016)
(applying the policy position set forth in AR 15-1(4) rather than
the Fourth’s Circuit’s holding in Radford).
Where, as here, a claimant alleges that he meets Listing
1.04(A) based on a lower back injury, disorder, or condition, he
must meet all five criteria included in that listing. Pursuant to
AR 15-1(4), the claimant must also demonstrate that all five
criteria were met simultaneously and for the necessary duration.
Furthermore, there must be evidence that straight-leg raising tests
were positive in both the sitting and supine positions.
Consultative examiners typically assess all of the components
necessary to meet Listing 1.04(A), namely, distribution of pain,
limited range of motion, motor loss, reflex or sensory loss, and
straight leg raising tests, in addition to reviewing or ordering
diagnostic testing, if appropriate, which would show the compromise
of a nerve root or evidence of nerve root compression. Notably,
there is no physical consultative examination in the record.
12
However, Plaintiff’s medical records appear to contain references
to all of the separate components necessary to meet the Listing,
over the course of approximately three months, between December 22,
2016 and
February
24,
2017.
See, e.g.,
T.
301-03
(Plaintiff
reported decreased movement in his lower extremity with severe,
chronic
pain
that
worsened
with
movement
of
the
left
lower
extremity and ambulation; an exam revealed pain with palpation to
left lower paraspinal muscles and a positive straight leg raising
test on the left side.); T. 342 (Plaintiff reported pain in his
lower back and left leg was at a nine on a scale of one to ten;
Plaintiff reported weakness in his left foot; an exam revealed a
foot drop on his left side and diminished strength in the EHL
tendon
and
the
anterior
tibial
tendon.);
T.
339
(An
MRI
of
Plaintiff’s lumbar spine revealed left paracentral disk herniation
with extruded disk material extending to the left lateral recess,
abutting and compressing the exiting 5 nerve root, with mild
bilateral neural foraminal narrowing.).
Here, the record evidence suggests that Plaintiff’s symptoms
could meet the requirements in Listing 1.04(A). However, the ALJ
did not refer to the Listing specifically; therefore the Court
cannot
determine
Furthermore,
it
whether
is
not
the
the
ALJ
properly
function
of
the
considered
Court
or
it.
the
Commissioner’s counsel to weigh the medical evidence of record to
determine whether Listing 1.04(A) was indeed met. See Schaal v.
13
Apfel, 134 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1998) (“It is not our function to
determine
de
novo
whether
plaintiff
is
disabled.”)
(internal
quotation marks omitted); Abramaitys v. Berryhill, No. 1:16-cv00660(MAT), 2017 WL 4456700, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 2017) (“it is
not the function of this Court to weigh the medical evidence and
determine if plaintiff meets the listing requirements. It is the
Commissioner’s function to make that determination and, in this
case, the
ALJ
failed
to
do
so
in
a
manner
that
allows
for
meaningful review.”).
The Commissioner argues that there was no error, because
Plaintiff had the burden of proving his back impairment met or
equaled
the
requirements
of
Listing
1.04(A),
but
failed
to
establish that he satisfied all of the required medical criteria.
Specifically, the Commissioner argues that the findings that could
satisfy some of the criteria in Listing 1.04(A) were scattered over
time and were not all present for more than one year, as required
to meet the Listing. Therefore, the Commissioner suggests, any
error by the ALJ at step three was harmless. The Court disagrees.
As a threshold matter, the regulations and the Commissioner’s
AR
do
not
require
that the durational
requirement
of
twelve
consecutive months have already taken place, as the Commissioner
implies in her argument. Instead, they “must have lasted or must be
expected to last for a continuous period of at least 12 months.”
20 C.F.R. § 416.909; see also F.R. 57418-02, at *57420. Plaintiff’s
14
treatment records demonstrate ongoing back issues from the time he
initiated medical treatment in Buffalo in 2014 through March 2017,
one month prior to his hearing. It is evident from the record that
Plaintiff’s treatment is ongoing, as he indicated to Dr. Hamill in
March 2017 that he would like to move forward with surgery. T. 34647. Furthermore, as discussed above, the ALJ failed to make any
specific findings or reference to the requirements of Listing
1.04(A),
including
requirement.
whether
Accordingly,
the
Plaintiff
Court
met
finds
the
no
durational
merit
to
the
Commissioner’s post hoc rationale on the matter.
Insofar
as
the
Commissioner
argues
Plaintiff
failed
to
demonstrate he met the simultaneous requirement and the straight
leg raising test position requirement of the Listing, the Court
finds these are ambiguities in the record that necessitate remand.
As discussed above, the record demonstrates Plaintiff had been
receiving treatment for ongoing back issues from his primary care
office
since
2014.
However,
Plaintiff
was
not
referred
to
Dr. Hamill until early 2017 after he was admitted to the emergency
room for severe back pain, and it is unclear from the record
whether Plaintiff’s other treating sources ever simultaneously
tested all of the physical conditions required to meet Listing
1.04(A). And a physical consultative examination, which would have
tested all of the necessary physical conditions, was never ordered
or administered. Furthermore, the treatment records that indicate
15
Plaintiff had positive straight leg raising tests fail to state
whether the tests were administered in both the sitting and supine
positions, as required by the Listing.
As
part
of
their
regulatory
obligation
to
develop
the
administrative record fully, ALJs generally must seek clarification
where there is a significant ambiguity or inconsistency in the
record. See e.g., Rolon v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 994 F. Supp.2d 496,
504 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“A perceived internal inconsistency about a
critical finding is a ‘conflict or ambiguity’ which requires the
ALJ to further develop the record by ‘seek[ing] additional evidence
or clarification’ from the treating physician.”) (quoting 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1512(e)(1), 416.912(e)(1)1 (eff. until Mar. 26, 2017)).
“Since an ALJ’s duty to seek clarification applies only to a
conflict or ambiguity that must be resolved to make the disability
determination, minor or irrelevant inconsistencies do not require
an ALJ to act upon the duty to further develop the record.” Id. at
505.
Plaintiff has made at least a colorable case that he meets the
requirements of Listing 1.04(A) and thus, the ambiguities noted
above
are
critical
to
a
finding
of
disability.
Because
clarification of the record is needed on these points, the Court
1
These subsections were omitted from the new versions of the
regulations effective March 27, 2017; the new versions of
Sections 404.1512 and 416.912 do not contain this language. The
former versions of these regulations apply to Plaintiff’s claim.
16
will remand this matter for further administrative proceedings. See
Torres, 2015 WL 4604000, at *4; Rowe v. Berryhill, No. 1:17-cv00208-MAT,
2018
WL
4233702,
at
*3
(W.D.N.Y.
Sept.
6,
2018)
(remanding where ALJ failed at step three to discuss Plaintiff’s
medical records as they pertained to Listing 1.04(A), preventing
the
Court
from
performing
a
meaningful
review);
Morales
v.
Berryhill, No. 6:17-cv-06836-MAT, 2019 WL 1076088, at *4 (W.D.N.Y.
Mar. 7, 2019) (remanding for proper evaluation of Listing 1.04(A),
including re-contacting plaintiff’s treating sources to determine
the position or positions of straight leg raising tests). On
remand, the ALJ shall perform a proper evaluation of the medical
evidence as it pertains to Listing 1.04(A), including re-contacting
Plaintiff’s medical providers who reported positive straight leg
raising tests to determine the position or positions in which they
were performed. A consultative examination should also be ordered
to determine if all five components of Listing 1.04(A) were met
simultaneously and have, or are expected to meet the durational
requirement of twelve months.
II.
Failure to Develop the Record
Plaintiff also argues the ALJ failed to properly develop the
record
when
he
made
no
attempt
after
the
hearing
to
obtain
treatment notes from Plaintiff’s mental health providers at Lake
Shore Behavioral Health, despite being alerted by Plaintiff’s
attorney at the hearing that Lake Shore Behavioral Health had
17
failed to provide the requested records. Notably, the record
indicates Plaintiff had been treated at Lake Shore Behavioral
Health bi-weekly for his PTSD, adjustment disorder with mixed
anxiety, and traumatic brain injury diagnoses since July 2014.
T. 207.
The error at step three, discussed above, is a sufficient
basis for reversal of the Commissioner’s decision and remand for
further proceedings. Accordingly, the Court need not fully address
Plaintiff’s argument regarding the ALJ’s failure to develop the
record. However, the Court recognizes that the treatment records
from Lake Shore Behavioral Health may provide substantial evidence
regarding Plaintiff’s mental limitations, and thus, on remand, the
ALJ is further instructed to subpoena the treatment records from
Lake Shore Behavioral Health.
III. Plaintiff’s Remaining Argument
Plaintiff further argues that the ALJ erred in substituting
his own “medical” judgment for that of a physician. Because the ALJ
will need to perform a new sequential evaluation on remand, the
Court
need
not
address
Plaintiff’s
remaining
argument,
which
concerns later steps in the evaluation.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion for judgment on
the pleadings (Doc. 13) is granted to the extent that this matter
is
remanded
to
the
Commissioner
18
for
further
administrative
proceedings
consistent
Commissioner’s
opposing
with
motion
this
Decision
for
judgment
and
on
Order.
the
The
pleadings
(Doc. 15) is denied. The Clerk of Court is directed to close this
case.
ALL OF THE ABOVE IS SO ORDERED.
S/Michael A. Telesca
_____________________________
HONORABLE MICHAEL A. TELESCA
United States District Judge
Dated:
June 4, 2019
Rochester, New York
19
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?