Dale v. Biegasiewicz et al
Filing
37
ORDER GRANTING 27 Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment; the action is DISMISSED. The Clerk of Court is directed to close the file. Signed by Hon. Leslie G. Foschio on 10/21/2020. (TAH)-CLERK TO FOLLOW UP-
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
______________________________________
DAVID DALE,
DECISION
and
ORDER
Plaintiff,
v.
DEPUTY SIMON BIEGASIEWICZ,
DEPUTY JOSEPH RACZYNSKI, and
DEPUTY WARREN LUICK,
17-CV-01211F
(consent)
Defendants.
______________________________________
APPEARANCES:
THE LAW OFFICES OF MATTHEW A. ALBERT
Attorneys for Plaintiff
MATTHEW A. ALBERT, of Counsel
2166 Church Road
Darien Center, New York 14040
and
GRIFFIN DAVIS DAULT, of Counsel
388 Evans Street
Williamsville, New York 14221
MICHAEL A. SIRAGUSA
ERIE COUNTY ATTORNEY
Attorney for Defendants
JEREMY C. TOTH
Second Assistant County Attorney, of Counsel
ERIE COUNTY ATTORNEY’S OFFICE
95 Franklin Street
Room 1634
Buffalo, New York 14202
JURISDICTION
On June 4, 2018, the parties to this action consented pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(c) to proceed before the undersigned. (Dkt. 17). The matter is presently before
the court on Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Dkt. 27), filed May 8, 2019.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff David Dale (“Plaintiff”), commenced this action on November 24, 2017,
alleging against Defendants, including Erie County Sheriff Deputies Simon
Biegasiewicz, Joseph Raczynski, and Warren Luick (together, “Defendants”), two claims
for relief originating with a traffic stop on March 5, 2015, including for unreasonable
seizure, false arrest, and false imprisonment in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments, Complaint ¶¶ 42-59 (“First Claim”), and malicious prosecution in violation
of the Fourth and Sixth Amendments, id. ¶¶ 60-77 (“Second Claim”). Plaintiff seeks for
relief compensatory and punitive damages, as well as an award of attorney fees. Id. ¶¶
78-80. Defendants filed an answer on January 18, 2018 (Dkt. 8). Discovery concluded
on November 18, 2018 (Dkt. 22).
On May 8, 2019, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment (Dkt. 27),
supported by the attached Supporting Declaration of Second Assistant County Attorney
Jeremey C. Toth (Dkt. 27-1) (“Toth Declaration”), Movants’ Statement of Material Facts
Pursuant to Local Rule 56 (Dkt. 27-2) (“Defendants’ Statement of Facts”), exhibits A
through G (Dkts. 27-3 through 27-9) (“Defendants’ Exh(s). __”), and Defendants’
Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 27-10)
(“Defendants’ Memorandum”). On July 8, 2019, Plaintiff filed the Memorandum of Law
in Opposition to Defendants’ Summary Judgment Motion Requesting the Dismissal of
All Causes of Action Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Dkt.
33) (“Plaintiff’s Response”), attaching Plaintiff’s Response to Defendants’ Statement of
Undisputed Facts Pursuant to FRCP 56(a)(2) (Dkt. 33-1) (“Plaintiff’s Statement of
Facts”), exhibits (Dkts. 33-2 through 33-5), and the Declaration of Matthew A. Albert,
2
Esq. (Dkt. 33-6) (“Albert Declaration”). On July 22, 2019, Defendants filed on July 22,
2019, the Reply Declaration of Second Assistant County Attorney Jeremy C. Toth in
Further Support of Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 34), attaching the
Reply Memorandum in Further Support of Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment
(Dkt. 34-1) (“Defendants’ Reply”). Oral argument was deemed unnecessary.
Based on the following, Defendants’ motion is GRANTED.
FACTS
At 5:30 in the evening of March 5, 2015, Plaintiff David Dale (“Plaintiff” or “Dale”)
was traveling in the southbound lane of Bowen Road in the Town of Elma, New York
(“Elma”), when he passed a slow-moving vehicle towing a trailer, then continued driving
along Bowen Road for another mile, turning right into a gas station located at the
northwest corner of the intersection of Bowen Road and Jamison Road. Plaintiff did not
stop for gas, but exited the gas station by turning into the westbound lane of Jamison
Road, when Plaintiff noticed an Erie County Sheriff vehicle enter the gas station from
Bowen Road, with its overhead lights flashing but without its siren sounding. The
sheriff’s vehicle was driven by Defendant Erie County Deputy Sheriff Simon
Biegasiewicz (“Biegasiewicz”) who traveled through the gas station’s parking lot, exiting
onto Jamison Road behind Plaintiff’s vehicle which Biegasiewicz pulled over.
Biegasiewicz issued Plaintiff four citations for violations of New York Vehicle and Traffic
Law (“N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law”), §§ 1128(a) (unsafely moving from lane), 1144(a) (failure
to yield the right of way to an emergency vehicle), 1180(d) (failure to comply with posted
maximum speed limits), and 1225 (avoiding intersection or traffic-control device) (“the
3
traffic citations”). Plaintiff pleaded “not guilty” by mail, requesting a supporting
deposition from Biegasiewicz pursuant to New York Criminal Procedure Law (“N.Y.
Crim. Pro. Law”) § 100.25[2].
On May 5, 2015, Plaintiff appeared in Elma Town Court before Elma Town
Justice Joseph A. Sakowski (“Justice Sakowski”), on the traffic citations. Because
Biegasiewicz did not provide the requested supporting deposition, Justice Sakowski
dismissed the traffic citations. Upon being advised the traffic citations were dismissed
for failure to submit the requested supporting deposition, Biegasiewicz re-issued the
traffic citations (“the re-issued traffic citations”), mailing them to Plaintiff. On June 11,
2015, Plaintiff again appeared in Elma Town Court before Justice Sakowski on the reissued citations, which Justice Sakowski dismissed because Biegasiewicz failed to
personally serve Plaintiff with them as required by N.Y. Crim. Pro. Law § 100.25[2].
Biegasiewicz was in court when the re-issued traffic citations were dismissed, and
before Plaintiff left the courtroom, Biegasiewicz attempted to re-issue the traffic citations
(“third set of traffic citations”), which Biegasiewicz intended to personally serve on
Plaintiff in the courtroom, but Plaintiff refused to accept the citations and began walking
toward the exit. Plaintiff maintains Biegasiewicz attempted to block Plaintiff’s egress
from the courtroom, but Plaintiff managed to exit and walked outside toward his vehicle
with Biegasiewicz following on foot, yelling at Plaintiff and waving his arms in a manner
Plaintiff perceived as “wild” and indicating Biegasiewicz was “unhinged.” Complaint
¶ 24. Upon reaching his vehicle, Plaintiff drove away without accepting the third set of
traffic citations from Biegasiewicz. Because Biegasiewicz’s patrol vehicle was not in
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close proximity, being parked in a lot behind the Elma Town Court, Biegasiewicz was
unable to pursue Plaintiff at that time.
Biegasiewicz maintains that after Plaintiff drove away from Elma Town Court on
June 11, 2015, Biegasiewicz notified the sheriff’s office’s dispatch he was proceeding
toward his patrol vehicle and intended to follow Plaintiff. Defendants’ Statement of
Facts ¶ 10. Upon entering his patrol vehicle, Biegasiewicz drove to the address he had
for Plaintiff, i.e., 805 Fillmore Avenue in the City of Buffalo, New York (“the Buffalo
address”), but upon reaching the Buffalo address, observed the presence of neither
Plaintiff nor his vehicle at what appeared to Biegasiewicz to be an abandoned building.
Id. ¶ 11. Biegasiewicz accessed a database, located another address for Plaintiff in
Lancaster, New York (“the Lancaster address”), and drove to the Lancaster address
where he observed Plaintiff’s vehicle outside and Plaintiff inside the house. Id. ¶ 12.
Biegasiewicz knocked several times on the door to the house, stating he wanted to
issue the summonses, but no one answered the door. Id. Plaintiff explains that he and
his wife maintain separate residences, Complaint ¶¶ 3-4, 33, and disputes that
Biegasiewicz was ever at the Lancaster address on June 11, 2015. Plaintiff’s
Statement of Facts ¶¶ 11-12.
After Plaintiff left the Elma Town Court on June 11, 2015, Biegasiewicz
telephoned Plaintiff’s wife, leaving a message on an answering machine instructing
Plaintiff to surrender himself for service of the third set of traffic citations or Plaintiff
would be subject to warrant for his arrest. Plaintiff maintains the message was very
upsetting to Plaintiff’s wife and son and, out of concern for his safety and based on the
threatened arrest by Biegasiewicz whom Plaintiff considered “obviously malicious and
5
spiteful,” Complaint ¶ 26, Plaintiff contacted the Erie County Sheriff’s Department Office
of Professional Standards (“OPS”) where Plaintiff spoke with Defendant Erie County
Sheriff Sergeant Warren J. Luick (“Luick”), and inquired how to pursue a complaint
regarding Biegasiewicz’s “threatening actions and strange behavior.” Id. ¶ 26. Luick
responded it was his belief Plaintiff was attempting to avoid answering the traffic
citations, advising Plaintiff that Luick had already spoken with Biegasiewicz and did not
believe Biegasiewicz had done anything wrong. When Plaintiff indicated he was willing
to retrieve the third set of traffic citations from the OPS so as to avoid another
confrontation with Biegasiewicz, Luick advised that was not allowed and that Plaintiff
should contact Biegasiewicz to arrange for personal service. Luick further advised
Plaintiff could file a complaint regarding Biegasiewicz, but that if he did, Luick would
prosecute Plaintiff for perjury based on making false statements.
On June 12, 2015, Plaintiff telephoned the Elma Town Court to inquire whether a
warrant for his arrest had been issued, but Plaintiff was not able to confirm the
existence of any such warrant. Plaintiff then arranged to be served with the third set of
traffic citations that afternoon by Biegasiewicz at Elma Town Court with his then
attorney, Paul Labaki, Esq. (“Labacki”), and another sheriff’s deputy present. Upon
arriving at Elma Town Court, Plaintiff was met by Biegasiewicz and Defendant Deputy
Sheriff Joseph Raczynski (“Raczynski”). Biegasiewicz told Plaintiff he was under arrest,
and made Labacki wait outside while Plaintiff was escorted by Biegasiewicz and
Raczynski to another room where they questioned Plaintiff outside Labicki’s presence.
During this questioning, Plaintiff provided as his address the Buffalo address listed on
his driver’s license, but Biegasiewicz, who never requested Plaintiff’s driver’s license,
6
maintained the Buffalo address is for an abandoned house and accused Plaintiff of
misrepresenting his address. Plaintiff was charged in a criminal complaint with
obstructing governmental administration (“OGA”) (“OGA Complaint”), 1 in violation of
New York Penal Law § 195.05, a class A misdemeanor. According to the OGA
Complaint, it was the events of June 11, 2015 that prompted Biegasiewicz to charge
Plaintiff with OGA, specifically, Plaintiff’s leaving the courtroom on June 11, 2015,
proceeding to the parking lot, refusing Biegasiewicz’s repeated verbal requests that
Plaintiff stop and provide his driver’s license for preparation of the third set of traffic
citations, entering his vehicle and driving away. OGA Complaint at 1. Plaintiff was then
handcuffed and made to wait in Elma Town Court courtroom to be arraigned once a
Town Justice arrived. After several hours, Plaintiff was arraigned before Elma Town
Justice Robert Pierce (“Justice Pierce”), but Plaintiff was never provided a copy of the
arrest warrant. Justice Pierce inquired as to Plaintiff’s legal address, eventually
changing the address on the third set of traffic citations from the Lancaster address to
the Buffalo address in accordance with Plaintiff’s assertion and setting bail for Plaintiff at
$ 250. Biegasiewicz escorted Plaintiff outside the courthouse to his vehicle where
Plaintiff retrieved his wallet and the bail money. After posting the bail, Plaintiff was
released.
On March 14, 2016, Justice Pierce dismissed the OGA Complaint. On August
22, 2016, Justice Sakowski dismissed the third set of traffic citations. Plaintiff’s two
claims are based on the events surrounding his June 12, 2015 arrest on the OGA
1
Dkt. 33-4.
7
charge, and the prosecution of Plaintiff on the third set of traffic citations as well as on
the OGA charge, all of which eventually were dismissed.
DISCUSSION
1.
Summary Judgment
Summary judgment of a claim or defense will be granted when a moving party
demonstrates that there are no genuine issues as to any material fact and that a moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) and (b); Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 250-51 (1986); Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P., 321 F.3d 292, 300 (2d Cir.
2003). The court is required to construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party, Collazo v. Pagano, 656 F.3d 131, 134 (2d Cir. 2011), and summary
judgment may not be granted based on a credibility assessment. See Reyes v. Lincoln
Automotive Financial Services, 861 F.3d 51, 55 (2d Cir. 2017) (“Adverse parties
commonly advance conflicting versions of the events throughout a course of litigation.
In such instances on summary judgment, the court is required to resolve all ambiguities
and draw all permissible factual inferences in favor of the party against whom summary
judgment is sought.” (citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted)). The party
moving for summary judgment bears the burden of establishing the nonexistence of any
genuine issue of material fact and if there is any evidence in the record based upon any
source from which a reasonable inference in the non-moving party's favor may be
drawn, a moving party cannot obtain a summary judgment. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322;
see Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48 (“summary judgment will not lie if the dispute about a
material fact is "genuine," that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could
8
return a verdict for the nonmoving party”). “A fact is material if it ‘might affect the
outcome of the suit under governing law.’” Roe v. City of Waterbury, 542 F.3d 31, 35
(2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248).
“[T]he evidentiary burdens that the respective parties will bear at trial guide
district courts in their determination of summary judgment motions.” Brady v. Town of
Colchester, 863 F.2d 205, 211 (2d Cir. 1988)). A defendant is entitled to summary
judgment where “‘the plaintiff has failed to come forth with evidence sufficient to permit
a reasonable juror to return a verdict in his or her favor on’” an essential element of a
claim on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof. In re Omnicom Group, Inc., Sec.
Litig., 597 F.3d 501, 509 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Burke v. Jacoby, 981 F.2d 1372, 1379
(2d Cir. 1992)). Once a party moving for summary judgment has made a properly
supported showing of the absence of any genuine issue as to all material facts, the
nonmoving party must, to defeat summary judgment, come forward with evidence that
would be sufficient to support a jury verdict in its favor. Goenaga v. March of Dimes
Birth Defects Foundation, 51 F.3d 14, 18 (2d Cir. 1995). “[F]actual issues created solely
by an affidavit crafted to oppose a summary judgment motion are not ‘genuine’ issues
for trial.” Hayes v. New York City Dept. of Corrections, 84 F.3d 614, 619 (2d Cir. 1996).
“An issue of fact is genuine and material if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury
could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Cross Commerce Media, Inc. v.
Collective, Inc., 841 F.3d 155, 162 (2d Cir. 2016) (citing SCR Joint Venture L.P. v.
Warshawsky, 559 F.3d 133,137 (2d Cir. 2009)).
In the instant case, Defendants argue in support of summary judgment that
probable cause is a complete defense to Plaintiff’s First Claim for unreasonable seizure,
9
false arrest, and false imprisonment, Defendants’ Memorandum at 4-8, as well as to
Plaintiff’s Second Claim for malicious prosecution, id. at 9-11, that Defendants
Raczynski and Luick were not personally involved in prosecuting Plaintiff on the OGA
charge, id. at 9, and, alternatively, Defendants are qualifiedly immune from liability on
both claims. Id. at 11-13. In opposition, Plaintiff argues that opposing deposition
testimonies of Plaintiff and Biegasiewicz establish disputed issues of fact as to whether
Biegasiewicz acted with the requisite probable cause in issuing the third set of traffic
citations on June 11, 2015, Plaintiff’s Response at 3-8, there are issues regarding
whether Biegasiewicz was, as a matter of law, performing an official function in issuing
the third set of traffic citations on June 11, 201, id. at 8-10, because of facial
deficiencies in the third set of traffic citations, Biegasiewicz could not have been
performing an official function in serving them, id. at 11-13, all three Defendants either
initiated or furthered the malicious prosecution of Plaintiff, id. at 13-14, and Defendants
are not entitled to qualified immunity because their actions were objectively
unreasonable. Id. at 14-16. In further support of summary judgment, Defendants argue
no evidence supports Plaintiff’s assertion that Biegasiewicz is not credible, Defendants’
Reply at 4-5, comments made by Biegasiewicz and Raczynski in arresting Plaintiff
cannot constitute any constitutional violation or preclude qualified immunity, id. at 5-6,
and the federal cases on which Plaintiff relies in opposing summary judgment are
largely irrelevant to the issues before the court on the instant motion. Id. at 6-7.
2.
42 U.S.C. § 1983
Preliminarily, Plaintiff asserts claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“§ 1983”),
which permits imposing civil liability upon persons who, acting under color of state law,
10
deprive an individual of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws of the United States. Patterson v. County of Oneida, New York, 375 F.3d 206, 225
(2d Cir. 2004) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Section 1983, however, “‘is not itself a
source of substantive rights.’” Id. (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n. 3
(1979)). Rather, § 1983 “merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights
elsewhere conferred’ . . . .” Id. To succeed on a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must establish
the challenged conduct “(1) was attributable to a person acting under color of state law,
and (2) deprived the plaintiff of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution
or laws of the United States.” Whalen v. County of Fulton, 126 F.3d 400, 405 (2d Cir.
1997). Further, it is basic that liability under § 1983 requires a defendant’s personal
involvement in the alleged deprivation of a federal right. See Warren v. Pataki, 823
F.3d 125, 136 (2d Cir. 2016) (“To establish a section 1983 claim, ‘a plaintiff must
establish a given defendant’s personal involvement in the claimed violation in order to
hold that defendant liable in his individual capacity.’” (quoting Patterson, 375 F.3d at
229)).
The elements of a § 1983 claim, as stated, include (1) the deprivation of a federal
constitutional or statutory right, and (2) by a person acting under color of state law.
Velez v. Levy, 401 F.3d 75, 84 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635,
640 (1980)). Thus, “[t]he first step in any such claim is to identify the specific
constitutional right allegedly infringed.” Id. (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394
(1989); and Baker, 443 U.S. at 140). In the instant case, Plaintiff alleges that he was
subjected to deprivations of his federal constitutional rights under the Fourth, Sixth, and
Fourteenth Amendments.
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Insofar as Plaintiff asserts the Fourteenth Amendment as a basis for his First
Claim alleging unreasonable seizure, false arrest, and false imprisonment, such claims
are predicated on the Fourth Amendment. Significantly, the Supreme Court has held
that where a particular amendment “provides an explicit textual source of constitutional
protection” against particular government behavior, “that Amendment, not the more
generalized notion of substantive due process, must be the guide for analyzing these
claims.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s First
Claim is not recognized under the Fourteenth Amendment, but only under the Fourth
Amendment and the court addresses it as such.
Both of Plaintiff’s claims are predicated on the events of June 11, 2015 when,
after Justice Sakowski dismissed the re-issued traffic citations for improper service,
Defendant Biegasiewicz attempted to detain Plaintiff at the Elma Town Court to again
re-issue the citations, intending to then personally serve them on Plaintiff, but Plaintiff
left, eventually returning the next day to accept personal service of the third set of traffic
citations at the Elma Town Court. In his First Claim, Plaintiff alleges he was subjected
to unreasonable seizure, false arrest, and false imprisonment in connection with the
events of June 12, 2015, when Plaintiff surrendered for service of the third set of traffic
citations, but Defendants Biegasiewicz and Raczynski arrested Plaintiff in connection
with the OGA charge. 2 Complaint ¶¶ 42-59. In his Second Claim, Plaintiff maintains
the prosecution of Plaintiff on the OGA charge was not based on probable cause and
such lack of probable cause gives rise to the requisite inference of malice, a required
element for a malicious prosecution claim. Id. ¶¶ 60-77.
2
The First Claim is not asserted against Defendant Luick.
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3.
Probable Cause
“Claims for false arrest or malicious prosecution, brought under § 1983 to
vindicate the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable
seizures, are ‘substantially the same’ as claims for false arrest or malicious prosecution
under state law.” Jocks v. Tavernier, 316 F.3d 128, 134 (2d Cir. 2003) (citing Weyant v.
Okst, 101 F.3d 845, 852 (2d Cir.1996) (false arrest); and Conway v. Vill. of Mount Kisco,
750 F.2d 205, 214 (2d Cir.1984) (malicious prosecution)). Also, “[i]n New York, the tort
of false arrest is synonymous with that of false imprisonment.” Posr v. Doherty, 944
F.2d 91, 96 (2d Cir. 1991) (citing Jacques v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 285 N.E.2d 871,
875 (N.Y. 1972)). Moreover, to be meritorious, both Plaintiff's § 1983 claims for false
arrest and malicious prosecution require the absence of probable cause. See Maye v.
New York, 517 Fed.Appx. 56, 58 (2d Cir. 2013) (holding where an arrest is supported by
probable cause, there can be no cause of action for unlawful imprisonment); Gonzalez
v. City of Schenectady, 728 F.3d 149, 155 (2d Cir. 2013) (“‘The existence of probable
cause to arrest constitutes justification and is a complete defense to an action for false
arrest, whether that action is brought under state law or under § 1983.’” (quoting
Weyant, 101 F.3d at 852)), and Savino v. City of New York, 331 F.3d 63, 72 (2d Cir.
2003) (“the existence of probable cause is a complete defense to a claim of malicious
prosecution....”); Manganiello v. City of New York, 612 F.3d 149, 161–62 (2d Cir.2010)
(probable cause is a complete defense to malicious prosecution claim in violation of
New York common law and § 1983). In the instant case, the undisputed facts establish
Plaintiff’s arrest and prosecution on the OGA Complaint were supported by probable
cause.
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In particular, “[p]robable cause is established ‘when the arresting officer has
knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information sufficient to warrant a person of
reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been committed by the person to be
arrested.’” Singer v. Fulton County Sheriff, 63 F.3d 110, 119 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting
O'Neill v. Town of Babylon, 986 F.2d 646, 650 (2d Cir.1993)). “[P]robable cause can
exist even where it is based on mistaken information, so long as the arresting officer
acted reasonably and in good faith in relying on that information.” Bernard v. United
States, 25 F.3d 98, 102 (2d Cir.1994) (citing Colon v. City of New York, 455 N.E.2d
1248 (N.Y.1983)). “Once a police officer has a reasonable basis for believing there is
probable cause, he is not required to explore and eliminate every theoretically plausible
claim of innocence before making an arrest.” Curly v. Village of Suffern, 268 F.3d 65,
70 (2d Cir. 2001). Further, that the plaintiff was ultimately acquitted after trial does not
negate the existence of probable cause because “the standard for probable cause is
lower than that for conviction.” United States v. Delossantos, 536 F.3d 155, 161 (2d Cir.
2008) (citing cases). “The collective knowledge doctrine provides that, for the purpose
of determining whether an arresting officer had probable cause to arrest, ‘where law
enforcement authorities are cooperating in an investigation, ... the knowledge of one is
presumed shared by all.’” Savino v. City of New York, 331 F.3d 63, 74 (2d Cir. 2003)
(quoting Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 772 n. 5 (1983)). In the instant case,
probable cause supports Plaintiff’s arrest and prosecution on the OGA Complaint.
In particular, “[a] person is liable for obstruction of governmental administration
when ‘he intentionally obstructs, impairs or perverts the administration of law or other
governmental function or prevents or attempts to prevent a public servant from
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performing an official function, by means of intimidation, physical force or interference,
or by means of any independently unlawful act.’” Ekukpe v. Santiago, __ Fed.Appx. __,
2020 WL 4743501, at *2 (2d Cir. Aug. 17, 2020) (quoting N.Y. Penal Law § 195.05).
The elements for an obstruction of governmental administration charge include (1) a
public servant performing an official function; (2) the individual prevents or attempts to
prevent the performance of the official function by interfering with it; and (3) the
interference is intentional. Kass v. City of New York, 864 F.3d 200, 207 (2d Cir. 2017).
Plaintiff does not dispute the third element, but maintains there are questions of fact as
to whether Biegasiewicz was performing an official function in attempting to issue and
serve him with the third set of traffic citations on June 11, 2015, Plaintiff’s Response at
5-7, 8-9, as well as whether Plaintiff leaving the courthouse and driving away interfered
with such action. Id. at 7-8. Here, there is no question Biegasiewicz, was performing
an official function in attempting to issue and serve Plaintiff with a third set of traffic
citations, and that Plaintiff’s physically exiting the courtroom and driving off in his vehicle
in violation of a law enforcement officer’s direction to submit to authority can satisfy the
interference element.
In particular, although the initial traffic citations were rendered a legal nullity
based on Biegasiewicz’s failure to timely provide the supporting deposition in response
to Plaintiff’s request, Biegasiewicz had authority to re-issue the traffic citations, contrary
to Plaintiff’s argument, Plaintiff’s Response at 8-9, because Justice Sakowski’s
dismissal of the initial traffic citations based on Biegasiewicz’s failure to provide the
supporting deposition in response to Plaintiff’s request did not bar reprosecution on the
same charges. See People v. Nuccio, 575 N.E.2d 111, 113 (N.Y. 1991) (“Nuccio”)
15
(dismissal of simplified information for legal insufficiency, specifically, failure to supply
supporting deposition, did not bar reprosecution for the same charges). People v.
Aucello, 558 N.Y.S.2d 436 (Sup.Ct. 1990), on which Plaintiff relies for the proposition
that New York law does not permit re-filing a simplified instrument after its dismissal
based on a law enforcement officer’s failure to timely supply a supporting deposition
because the court would be divested of its jurisdiction, is not controlling here because it
is from a lower court and pre-dates Nuccio. Nor is there any legal authority prohibiting
Biegasiewicz from attempting to re-issue the traffic citations a second time, and even
assuming, arguendo, the third set of traffic citations were, as Plaintiff maintains,
Plaintiff’s Response at 10-13, facially insufficient, such facial insufficiency does not
mean Biegasiewicz was not performing an official function in issuing them. On this
issue, Plaintiff points to no supporting New York caselaw indicating Biegasiewicz’s
conduct in reissuing the traffic citations was acting outside his authority, and the court’s
research reveals none. Furthermore, insofar as Plaintiff alleges Biegasiewicz was in
court on June 11, 2015, dressed in his Sheriff Deputy uniform, yet “while off duty,”
Complaint ¶ 23, such assertion is directly contradicted by Biegasiewicz’s sworn
testimony that he was on duty when he attempted to serve Plaintiff with the third set of
traffic citations, Dkt. 33-2 at 21, an assertion Plaintiff does not directly dispute, but
merely maintains he does not know whether Biegasiewicz was then on duty. Plaintiff’s
Statement of Facts ¶ 10. The record does not indicate Plaintiff attempted but failed to
obtain any information from Defendants such as official sheriff personnel work logs or
records indicating whether Biegasiewicz was on duty at that time. Accordingly, there is
16
no material issue of fact that Biegasiewicz was on duty when he attempted to serve
Plaintiff on June 11, 2015 with the third set of citations.
The second element of the OGA charge requires the individual prevent or
attempt to prevent the performance of the official function by interfering with it. Kass,
864 F.3d at 209. Although this element requires some “physical” aspect and cannot
consist solely of verbal statements, id., “an officer may consider both works and deeds
in determining whether the individual’s conduct is sufficiently obstructive to justify an
arrest.” Id. (citing cases). Significantly, “[s]uch interference can consist of
‘inappropriate and disruptive conduct at the scene of the performance of an official
function even if there is no physical force involved.’” Id., 864 F.3d at 209-10. Even
“minimal interference set in motion to frustrate police activity” has been found to
constitute obstructing governmental administration. Id. at 210 (citing cases). “‘[M]erely
approaching the police, or speaking during the course of a police action, or disregarding
police instructions will support a conviction.’” Antic v. City of New York, 273 F.Supp.3d
445, 453 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (quoting Rasmussen v. City of New York, 766 F.Supp.2d 399,
403 (E.D.N.Y. 2011)). The second element for a charge of OGA was thus satisfied
when Plaintiff, after Justice Sakowski dismissed the re-issued traffic citations for
improper service on June 11, 2015, ignored Biegasiewicz’s repeated requests that
Plaintiff accept service of the third set of traffic citations, and instead walked out of the
courtroom followed by Biegasiewicz, entered his vehicle, and drove away. Kass, 864
F.3d at 209-10.
Accordingly, Biegasiewicz had probable cause to charge Plaintiff with OGA
based on Plaintiff’s conduct on June 11, 2015 after Justice Sakowski dismissed the re-
17
issued traffic citations and Biegasiewicz attempted to serve Plaintiff with the third set of
traffic citations. This probable cause is, under the collective knowledge doctrine, shared
by Raczynski and defeats Plaintiff’s First Claim for false arrest against both Defendants.
Significantly, Plaintiff presents no evidence to demonstrate the existence of a material
issue of fact on this element.
Further, the existence of probable cause for Plaintiff’s arrest on the OGA
Complaint also defeats Plaintiff’s Second Claim for malicious prosecution against all
Defendants. In particular, the presence of probable cause at the time of an arrest will
not defeat a malicious prosecution claim where evidence later surfaces that eliminates
such probable cause, and the defendant fails to make a further inquiry when a
reasonable person would have done so. Lowth v. Town of Cheektowaga, 82 F.3d 563,
571 (2d Cir. 1996) (citing cases). “In order for the probable cause to dissipate, the
groundless nature of the charges must be made apparent by the discovery of some
intervening fact.” Id. In the instant case, Plaintiff fails to point to any intervening fact
eroding the probable cause that supported the OGA Complaint, and which is thus fatal
to Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim.
Accordingly, summary judgment is GRANTED on both the First and Second
Claims. 3
3 Because probable cause defeats both Plaintiff’s claims for false arrest and malicious prosecution, the
court does not reach Defendants’ alternative arguments that Defendants Luick and Raczynski were not
personally involved in the events giving rise to the malicious prosecution claim, Defendants’
Memorandum at 9, or that Defendants are qualifiedly immune from liability on both claims based on
arguable probable cause. Id. at 11-12.
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Defendants’ motion (Dkt. 27), is GRANTED; the action is
DISMISSED. The Clerk of Court is directed to close the file.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Leslie G. Foschio
______________________________________
LESLIE G. FOSCHIO
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
DATED:
October 21st, 2020
Buffalo, New York
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