Quinn v. Carter

Filing 7

DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING Defendant's 3 Motion to Dismiss; DIRECTING the Clerk of the Clerk of the Court to close this case. Signed by William M. Skretny, United States District Judge on 5/10/2018. (MEAL) - CLERK TO FOLLOW UP -

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
ANDREA A. QUINN,
Plaintiff,
v.

DECISION AND ORDER
17-CV-1287S

KEVIN M. CARTER,
Family Court Judge, Erie County, State of New York,
Defendant.

I.

INTRODUCTION

In this civil rights action brought under 42 U.S.C. ' 1983, plaintiff Andrea A. Quinn
alleges that Defendant Kevin M. Carter, a sitting family court judge, violated her due
process rights by demonstrating undue prejudice against her in a child-custody
proceeding.
Presently before this Court is Judge Carter’s motion to dismiss Quinn’s complaint
in its entirety under Rule 12 (b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

(Docket No. 3.)

With briefing fully

completed and oral argument deemed unnecessary, this Court will grant Judge Carter’s
motion and dismiss Quinn’s complaint.
II.

BACKGROUND

The following facts, drawn from Quinn’s complaint, are assumed true for purposes
of assessing the motion to dismiss.

See ATSI Commc=ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493

F.3d 87, 98 (2d Cir. 2007).
Quinn was a litigant in child-custody proceedings before Judge Carter, during
which Judge Carter showed overt bias toward her son’s father and undue prejudice

against her. (Complaint, Docket No. 1, ¶¶ 6, 8.)
Quinn first appeared before Judge Carter in August 2013, at which time she
discovered that Judge Carter had ruled against her in an ex parte proceeding and had
held her in default.

(Id. at ¶ 8.)

Quinn next appeared before Judge Carter for a hearing of some sort on October
22, 2013.

(Id. at ¶ 9.) While Quinn was on the witness stand, Judge Carter “went on a

rampage” and questioned the intelligence of her female attorney and stated that the
attorney was trying to run things “as they all do.”

(Id.)

In addition, Judge Carter

changed “recommendations and rulings” that he had made in August and warned Quinn
that if she challenged his previous ex parte order, he would make things worse for her.
(Id.)
Quinn next appeared in March 2014, after she filed a petition and order to show
cause concerning her child’s father transporting him without a car seat.

(Id. at ¶ 10.)

Rather than address the safety issue concerning the car seat, which Judge Carter
disbelieved, Judge Carter threatened Quinn with 15 days’ jail and restricted her visits with
her son to weekends only for nine weeks.

(Id. at ¶¶ 10, 18.)

Judge Carter also

commented that “Oh, your son’s father had to pay an attorney, but you have an attorney
paid by the Erie County taxpayers,” which Quinn maintains is evidence of insensitivity
toward mothers. (Id. at ¶ 18.)
Based on these allegations, 1 Quinn asserts two causes of action.

First, she

1 Quinn’s complaint also contains allegations pertaining to Judge Carter’s conduct in other cases that she
says demonstrates the differential treatment he affords male and female litigants. (Complaint, ¶¶ 12, 13,
17, 19, 20, 21.) Because these allegations do not involve Quinn, they are not recounted here.

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seeks damages for Judge Carter’s denial of her due process rights.

(Id. at ¶¶ 6-10.)

Second, she seeks the issuance of a temporary restraining order enjoining Judge Carter
from “unconstitutional acts and actions” and from hearing any petitions filed by Quinn.
(Id. at ¶ 23.)
Plaintiff instituted this action on December 11, 2017, by filing a complaint in the
United States District Court for the Western District of New York.

(Docket No. 1.)

Judge Carter filed the instant Motion to Dismiss on January 19, 2018.

(Docket No. 3.)

Plaintiff responded in opposition on February 1, 2018.

Judge Carter filed a reply on

February 5, 2018.
III.

DISCUSSION

Judge Carter asserts five grounds for dismissal of Quinn’s complaint: (1) the claims
are barred by the applicable statute of limitations; (2) the claims are barred by judicial
immunity; (3) the claims are barred by the domestic-relations exception to subject-matter
jurisdiction; (4) the Younger abstention doctrine prohibits the exercise of jurisdiction; and
(5) the Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits the exercise of jurisdiction.

Because this

Court easily finds that Quinn’s claims fall outside the statute of limitations and are barred
by judicial immunity, it need not address the remaining grounds for dismissal.
A.

Rule 12 (b)(6) Standard
Rule 12 (b)(6) allows dismissal of a complaint for Afailure to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted.@

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 (b)(6). Federal pleading standards are

generally not stringent: Rule 8 requires only a short and plain statement of a claim.

Fed.

R. Civ. P. 8 (a)(2). But the plain statement must Apossess enough heft to show that the
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pleader is entitled to relief.@

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557, 127 S. Ct.

1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007).
When determining whether a complaint states a claim, the court must construe it
liberally, accept all factual allegations as true, and draw all reasonable inferences in the
plaintiff=s favor.

ATSI Commc=ns, 493 F.3d at 98.

afforded the same presumption of truthfulness.

Legal conclusions, however, are not
See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,

678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009) (Athe tenet that a court must accept as
true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions@).
ATo survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to >state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.=@
at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).

Iqbal, 556 U.S.

Labels, conclusions, or Aa formulaic

recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.@ Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
Facial plausibility exists when the facts alleged allow for a reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct charged.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The plausibility

standard is not, however, a probability requirement: the pleading must show, not merely
allege, that the pleader is entitled to relief.

Id. at 1950; Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 (a)(2). Well-

pleaded allegations in the complaint must nudge the claim Aacross the line from
conceivable to plausible.@ Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
A two-pronged approach is thus used to examine the sufficiency of a complaint,
which includes Aany documents that are either incorporated into the complaint by
reference or attached to the complaint as exhibits.@

Blue Tree Hotels Inv. (Can.), Ltd. v.

Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc., 369 F.3d 212, 217 (2d Cir. 2004). This
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examination is context specific and requires that the court draw on its judicial experience
and common sense.

See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.

First, statements that are not entitled

to the presumption of truth, such as conclusory allegations, labels, and legal conclusions,
are identified and stripped away.

See id.

Second, well-pleaded, non-conclusory

factual allegations are presumed true and examined to determine whether they Aplausibly
give rise to an entitlement to relief.@

Id.

AWhere the well-pleaded facts do not permit

the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct,@ the complaint fails to state
a claim. Id.
If it appears from the face of the complaint that a cause of action has not been
brought within the applicable statute of limitations period, the defense of limitations “may
be raised in a pre-answer motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 (b)(6).”

Santos v. Dist.

Council of New York City, 619 F.2d 963, 967 n.4 (2d Cir. 1980); Ghartley v. St. John’s
Queens Hosp., 869 F.2d 160, 162 (2d Cir. 1989).
B.

Statute of Limitations
The statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim is “that which the State provides for

personal-injury torts.” Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387, 127 S. Ct. 1091, 166 L. Ed.
2d 973 (2007).

In New York, that statute of limitations is three years.

See Berman v.

Perez, No. 17-CV-2757 (JGK), 2018 WL 565269, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 2018) (citing
Hogan v. Fischer, 738 F.3d 509, 517 (2d Cir. 2013), in turn citing N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214).
Quinn filed her complaint on December 11, 2017.

(Docket No. 1.)

Consequently, any claims pre-dating December 11, 2014 are time-barred. The latest
incident involving Judge Carter that Quinn alleges in her complaint took place in March
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2014, which falls outside the 3-year limitations period.

(Complaint, ¶ 18.)

Consequently, Quinn’s complaint must be dismissed on statute of limitations grounds. 2
Even if timely, however, absolute judicial immunity bars Quinn’s claims.
C.

Absolute Judicial Immunity
A>[I]t is a general principle of the highest importance to the proper administration of

justice that a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to act
upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself.=@
Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9-10, 112 S. Ct. 286, 287, 116 L. Ed. 2d 9 (1991) (quoting
Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 13 Wall. 335, 20 L. Ed. 646 (1872)).

Thus, A[judicial]

immunity applies even when the judge is accused of acting maliciously and corruptly.@
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 419 n.12, 96 S. Ct. 984, 990, 47 L. Ed. 2d 128 (1976)
(citing Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554, 87 S. Ct. 1213, 1218, 18 L. Ed. 2d 288 (1967));
see also Stump v. Sparkman, 534 U.S. 349, 356-57, 98 S. Ct. 1099, 55 L. Ed. 2d 331
(1978) (immunity is not lost where judge acted in error, maliciously or in excess of his
authority).

Judges performing judicial acts are therefore entitled to absolute immunity,

which, like other forms of official immunity, is immunity from suit, not just from the ultimate
assessment of damages.

Mitchell v. Forsythe, 472 U.S. 511, 526, 105 S. Ct. 2806,

2815, 86 L. Ed. 2d 411 (1985).

Absolute judicial immunity shields judges from all civil

2 As part of her opposition to Judge Carter’s motion, Quinn filed a 5-page affidavit in which she discusses
further acts by Judge Carter that would fall within the applicable statute of limitations period. Courts
generally do not, however, consider new factual assertions in an affidavit submitted in opposition to a motion
to dismiss, and this Court finds no reason to do so here, where Quinn is represented by counsel. See
Faulkner v. Beer, 463 F.3d 130, 134 n. 1 (2d Cir. 2006.). This affidavit is therefore excluded from
consideration. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 (d). And as noted, even if timely, Quinn’s claims are barred by the
doctrine of absolute judicial immunity.

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suits for damages, including suits under § 1983.

See Turner v. Boyle, 116 F. Supp. 3d

58, 81-82 (D.Conn. 2015).
There are only two circumstances in which judicial immunity can be overcome: (1)
a judge is not immune from liability for actions taken outside his or her judicial capacity;
and (2) a judge is not immune from actions that, although judicial in nature, are taken in
the complete absence of jurisdiction.

Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11-12 (citations omitted).

And absolute judicial immunity not only bars civil suits for damages, but extends
to bar claims for injunctive relief as well.

Under 1996 amendments to § 1983, injunctive

relief is unavailable against judges for actions taken in their judicial capacity “unless a
declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.”

Montero v.

Travis, 171 F.3d 757, 761 (2d Cir. 1999).
Here, accepting the allegations in the complaint as true, each of the actions Judge
Carter is alleged to have taken occurred within his judicial capacity while presiding over
Quinn’s child-custody proceedings.

There are no allegations that Judge Carter acted

outside of his judicial capacity or acted in the complete absence of jurisdiction.

Further,

there are no allegations that Judge Carter acted in violation of a declaratory decree or
that declaratory relief was unavailable.
judicial immunity.

Judge Carter is therefore entitled to absolute

Quinn’s complaint is therefore dismissed on that ground.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, this Court finds that Quinn’s claims are barred by the 3year statute of limitations, and, in any event, are barred because Judge Carter is clearly
entitled to absolute judicial immunity.

Judge Carter’s motion to dismiss is therefore
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granted.
V.

ORDERS

IT HEREBY IS ORDERED, that Defendant=s Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 3) is
GRANTED.
FURTHER, that the Clerk of Court is directed to CLOSE this case.
SO ORDERED.

Dated:

May 10, 2018
Buffalo, New York
/s/William M. Skretny
WILLIAM M. SKRETNY
United States District Judge

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