Colon v. Commissioner of Social Security
Filing
16
DECISION & ORDER The Commissioner's motion for judgment on the pleadings 13 is granted. Colon's motion for judgment on the pleadings 9 is denied, and Colon's complaint 1 is dismissed with prejudice. Signed by Hon. Marian W. Payson on 9/5/2019. (KAH)-CLERK TO FOLLOW UP-
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
_______________________________________
LIZVETTE COLON,
DECISION & ORDER
Plaintiff,
18-CV-340P
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
_______________________________________
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Plaintiff Lizvette Colon (“Colon”) brings this action pursuant to Section 205(g) of
the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review of a final decision of the
Commissioner of Social Security (the “Commissioner”) denying her application for Disability
Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”). Pursuant to the
Standing Order of the United States District Court for the Western District of New York
regarding Social Security cases dated June 1, 2018, this case has been reassigned to, and the
parties have consented to the disposition of this case by, the undersigned. (Docket ## 6, 15).
Currently before the Court are the parties’ motions for judgment on the pleadings
pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Docket ## 9, 13). For the
reasons set forth below, this Court finds that the decision of the Commissioner is supported by
substantial evidence in the record and is in accordance with applicable legal standards.
Accordingly, the Commissioner’s motion for judgment on the pleadings is granted, and Colon’s
motion for judgment on the pleadings is denied.
DISCUSSION
I.
Standard of Review
This Court’s scope of review is limited to whether the Commissioner’s
determination is supported by substantial evidence in the record and whether the Commissioner
applied the correct legal standards. See Butts v. Barnhart, 388 F.3d 377, 384 (2d Cir. 2004)
(“[i]n reviewing a final decision of the Commissioner, a district court must determine whether
the correct legal standards were applied and whether substantial evidence supports the
decision”), reh’g granted in part and denied in part, 416 F.3d 101 (2d Cir. 2005); see also
Schaal v. Apfel, 134 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1998) (“it is not our function to determine de novo
whether plaintiff is disabled[;] . . . [r]ather, we must determine whether the Commissioner’s
conclusions are supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole or are based on an
erroneous legal standard”) (internal citation and quotation omitted). Pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g), a district court reviewing the Commissioner’s determination to deny disability benefits
is directed to accept the Commissioner’s findings of fact unless they are not supported by
“substantial evidence.” See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“[t]he findings of the Commissioner . . . as to
any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive”). Substantial evidence is
defined as “more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401
(1971) (internal quotation omitted).
To determine whether substantial evidence exists in the record, the court must
consider the record as a whole, examining the evidence submitted by both sides, “because an
analysis of the substantiality of the evidence must also include that which detracts from its
weight.” Williams ex rel. Williams v. Bowen, 859 F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir. 1988). To the extent
2
they are supported by substantial evidence, the Commissioner’s findings of fact must be
sustained “even where substantial evidence may support the claimant’s position and despite the
fact that the [c]ourt, had it heard the evidence de novo, might have found otherwise.” Matejka v.
Barnhart, 386 F. Supp. 2d 198, 204 (W.D.N.Y. 2005) (citing Rutherford v. Schweiker, 685 F.2d
60, 62 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1212 (1983)).
A person is disabled for the purposes of SSI and disability benefits if he or she is
unable “to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable
physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or
can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C.
§§ 423(d)(1)(A) & 1382c(a)(3)(A). In assessing whether a claimant is disabled, the ALJ must
employ a five-step sequential analysis. See Berry v. Schweiker, 675 F.2d 464, 467 (2d Cir. 1982)
(per curiam). The five steps are:
(1)
whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial
gainful activity;
(2)
if not, whether the claimant has any “severe impairment”
that “significantly limits [the claimant’s] physical or mental
ability to do basic work activities”;
(3)
if so, whether any of the claimant’s severe impairments
meets or equals one of the impairments listed in Appendix
1 of Subpart P of Part 404 of the relevant regulations (the
“Listings”);
(4)
if not, whether despite the claimant’s severe impairments,
the claimant retains the residual functional capacity
[(“RFC”)] to perform his or her past work; and
(5)
if not, whether the claimant retains the [RFC] to perform
any other work that exists in significant numbers in the
national economy.
3
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v) & 416.920(a)(4)(i)-(v); Berry v. Schweiker, 675 F.2d at 467.
“The claimant bears the burden of proving his or her case at steps one through four[;] . . . [a]t
step five the burden shifts to the Commissioner to ‘show there is other gainful work in the
national economy [which] the claimant could perform.’” Butts v. Barnhart, 388 F.3d at 383
(quoting Balsamo v. Chater, 142 F.3d 75, 80 (2d Cir. 1998)).
II.
Colon’s Contentions
Colon contends that the ALJ’s determination that she is not disabled is not
supported by substantial evidence and is the product of legal error. (Docket ## 9-1, 14). First,
Colon challenges the ALJ’s RFC assessment on the grounds that the ALJ failed to properly
account for Colon’s limitations interacting with men. (Docket ## 9-1 at 11-14; 14 at 1-4).
Second, Colon argues that the ALJ’s credibility analysis was flawed. (Docket ## 9-1 at 14-18;
14 at 4-5).
The Commissioner maintains that the ALJ’s RFC assessment properly accounted
for limitations associated with Colon’s severe impairments of post-traumatic stress disorder
(“PTSD”) and anxiety. (Docket # 13-1 at 10-13). The Commissioner further contends that the
ALJ properly evaluated Colon’s credibility. (Id. at 13-16).
III.
Analysis
A.
The ALJ’s RFC Assessment
I turn first to Colon’s argument that the ALJ’s RFC assessment improperly failed
to account for limitations Colon had being around and interacting with men. (Docket ## 9-1 at
4
11-14; 14 at 1-4).1 Specifically, Colon maintains that the record, especially its references to her
“incredibly tumultuous childhood,” “makes it clear that [her] PTSD manifest[s] in difficulties
being with or around men” and that the ALJ “needed to properly accommodate these limitations
– or properly explain why he did not.” (Docket # 9-1 at 11). I find that remand is not warranted
on this basis.
An individual’s RFC is her “maximum remaining ability to do sustained work
activities in an ordinary work setting on a continuing basis.” Melville v. Apfel, 198 F.3d 45, 52
(2d Cir.1999) (quoting SSR 96–8p, 1996 WL 374184, *2 (1996)). In making an RFC
assessment, the ALJ should consider “a claimant’s physical abilities, mental abilities,
symptomology, including pain and other limitations which could interfere with work activities
on a regular and continuing basis.” Pardee v. Astrue, 631 F. Supp. 2d 200, 221 (N.D.N.Y. 2009)
(citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)). “To determine RFC, the ALJ must consider all the relevant
evidence, including medical opinions and facts, physical and mental abilities, non-severe
impairments, and [p]laintiff’s subjective evidence of symptoms.” Stanton v. Astrue, 2009 WL
1940539, *9 (N.D.N.Y. 2009) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(b)-(e)), aff’d, 370 F. App’x 231 (2d
Cir. 2010) (summary order). An ALJ should also consider “all medical opinions received
regarding the claimant.” See Spielberg v. Barnhart, 367 F. Supp. 2d 276, 281 (E.D.N.Y. 2005)
(citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)2).
At steps two and three of the sequential analysis, the ALJ found, in relevant part,
that Colon had the severe impairments of anxiety disorder, major depressive disorder, and PTSD,
1
Colon does not argue that the ALJ erred in assessing her physical limitations, and thus the Court does not
address that portion of the ALJ’s RFC assessment.
2
This regulation applies to claims filed before March 27, 2017. For claims filed on or after March 27,
2017, the rules in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c apply.
5
but that none of those impairments, alone or in combination, met or medically equaled an
impairment identified in the Listings. (Tr. 22).3 The ALJ further determined that Colon had the
RFC to perform light work, but limited Colon to, among other things, “simple, routine, repetitive
work at a specific vocational preparation of 1 or 2” and “occasional contact with supervisors,
co-workers, and the public.” (Tr. 24).
In reaching this determination, the ALJ gave “great weight” to the opinion of
Janine Ippolito (“Ippolito”), PsyD, who performed a consultative psychiatric evaluation of Colon
on January 10, 2014, and discussed Ippolito’s evaluation at length in his decision. (Tr. 25-26,
327-31). At the time of the evaluation, Colon expressed her belief that she could not work “due
to anxiety, depression, and pain issues.” (Tr. 327). She also reported that for the preceding five
months she had been receiving monthly or semimonthly counseling for her depression and
anxiety. (Id.).
Colon told Ippolito that she experienced dysphoric moods and crying spells and
had “struggled with depression throughout most of her life.” (Tr. 328). In terms of anxiety
symptoms, Colon reported “excessive apprehension, worry, and nervousness,” and Ippolito noted
that Colon was “restless throughout the evaluation and shook her leg constantly.” (Id.). Colon
reported that she got “overwhelmed easily and ha[d] low stress tolerance.” (Id.). Colon also
stated that she had “experienced some traumatic events in the past,” that her “mother [had]
mistreated her as a child and that she [had been] ‘sold to men’ sexually,” and that she had been
“placed in foster care as a result of this treatment.” (Id.). Colon reported that she experienced
panic attacks, but “had difficulty noting the frequency with which she experience[d] panic
attacks.” (Id.).
3
References to page numbers in the Administrative Transcript (Docket # 8) utilize the internal
Bates-stamped pagination assigned by the parties.
6
Upon examination, Dr. Ippolito noted that Colon was “cooperative” and her
“manner of relating, social skills, and overall presentation were adequate.” (Tr. 329). She
maintained appropriate eye contact, spoke fluently, exhibited coherent and goal-directed thought
processes with no evidence of hallucinations, delusions, or paranoia, and was alert and oriented.
(Id.). However, Colon also appeared tense and restless and displayed a dysthymic mood and
anxious affect, which impaired her attention, concentration, and memory skills. (Id.). Ippolito
opined that Colon’s insight was “fair to poor” and her judgment was “fair.” (Tr. 330).
Colon told Ippolito that she was “able to do cooking, cleaning, laundry,
showering, bathing, and dressing independently” and that her daughter’s father “usually c[ame]
over and d[id] grocery shopping.” (Id.). Colon preferred not to shop or drive, due to her anxiety.
(Id.). Ippolito opined that Colon “d[id] not appear to have any significant deficits in adaptive
functioning at this time.” (Id.).
Ippolito diagnosed Colon with generalized anxiety disorder with panic attacks and
persistent depressive disorder, among other physical limitations. (Id.). In Ippolito’s opinion,
Colon was moderately limited in her ability to relate adequately with others and appropriately
deal with stress, “due to her current emotional distress.” (Id.). In Ippolito’s view, although these
limitations were consistent with psychiatric problems, they did “not appear to be significant
enough to interfere with [Colon’s] ability to function on a daily basis.” (Id.).
The ALJ afforded “some weight” to the opinion of non-examining state agency
consultant L. Hoffman (“Hoffman”), who reviewed the record evidence on January 23, 2014.4
4
The ALJ afforded “little weight” to the opinion of Colon’s “Care Coordinator” at Evergreen Health
Services that she “is unable to work at this time due to her physical and mental health conditions” (Tr. 27). The
ALJ reasoned that the one-paragraph opinion was “conclusory in nature and did not give specific functional
capabilities or limitations.” (Tr. 28). Colon does not challenge the ALJ’s determination to give the opinion “little
weight.”
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(Tr. 116-27). As the ALJ noted, Hoffman opined that Colon could perform simple work tasks
and “while her ability to deal with co-workers and the public would be somewhat reduced, it
would be adequate to handle brief and superficial contact.” (Tr. 26, 122). Hoffman further
stated that Colon’s “ability to tolerate and respond appropriately to supervision would be
reduced, but adequate to handle ordinary levels of supervision in the customary work setting.”
(Id.).
Ippolito’s opinion, which Hoffman reviewed, summarized Colon’s reports of
significant mistreatment during her childhood, including abusive interactions with men. (See
Tr. 118, 328). Both Ippolito and Hoffman opined that Colon had limitations in her ability to
interact with supervisors, co-workers, and the public, although neither of their opinions – nor any
other opinion of record – addressed specific limitations relating to interactions with men. The
ALJ was entitled to rely upon these opinions – as well as Colon’s documented improvement in
her anxiety symptoms during periods of treatment with medication and therapy (Tr. 290-91, 336,
339, 354, 355, 399, 423, 424-25), which the ALJ also noted (Tr. 24-26) – in reaching his
disability determination. See Baszto v. Astrue, 700 F. Supp. 2d 242, 249 (N.D.N.Y. 2010) (“[i]t
is well settled that an ALJ is entitled to rely upon the opinions of both examining and
non-examining State agency medical consultants[] since such consultants are deemed to be
qualified experts in the field of social security disability”).
Colon herself did not identify difficulties interacting with men as an impediment
to work in her disability applications (see Tr. 116, 128) or reference those difficulties during her
hearing before the ALJ (see generally Tr. 81-115). At the hearing, Colon testified about issues
dealing with people in general, rather than with men specifically. (See Tr. 97 (“I don’t have a
problem walking but it’s like I don’t like to walk outside[;] [l]ike I – I don’t want to really be
8
around too many people”); Tr. 99 (“I’ve always had difficulty interacting with others because
I’m pretty much a loner”); accord Tr. 62 (Colon noted in her “Adult Function Report” that she
was “a loner” and “stay[ed] home most of the time [because she] fe[lt] nervous or anxious
around a lot of people”)).5 In addition, Colon reported in her application that she did not have
problems getting along with bosses or others in positions of authority, although she had left her
prior job after almost ten years because “they made fun of her conditions.” (Tr. 64; see also
Tr. 357 (“[s]he stated to [therapist] that she recently ‘got sick’ after working at the same job for
10 years[;] [s]he stated that she was surrounded by males who often made fun of her and
sexually harassed her on the job”)). Colon’s statements are consistent with the social functioning
limitations opined by Ippolito and Hoffman, which the ALJ accounted for by limiting Colon to
occasional contact with supervisors, co-workers, and the public. (Tr. 24).
Certainly, Colon correctly notes that her medical records include references to
anxiety and fears related to interacting with and being around men. (See Tr. 350, 357, 386, 424).
More often, the records reveal reported “major stressors” and anxieties concerning homelessness,
work stress and the eventual loss of her long-held employment, her stressful relationships with
her mother and sister, and worries about her daughter. (See, e.g., Tr. 296, 302, 358). Indeed,
notwithstanding her initial reservations about working with a male therapist, Colon decided to
“give it a shot” and developed an ongoing treating relationship with the therapist. (See Tr. 357,
354-57). On this record, I cannot conclude that the ALJ erred by not explicitly addressing
5
The fact that no opinion of record specifically limited Colon’s interactions with men, and that Colon
neither referenced this limitation in her disability applications nor at the hearing, distinguishes this case from
Jacquelyn H. v. Berryhill, 2018 WL 4102851 (W.D. Va. 2018), on which Colon relies (Docket # 9-1 at 12). See
Jacquelyn H. v. Berryhill, 2018 WL 4102851 at *8 (“[t]he ALJ provided no other reasoning to support his decision
to disregard [claimant’s] testimony about her difficulty working around men, her consistent statements to providers
in her treatment records with regard to her discomfort around men, her problems with [PTSD] and panic attacks, and
the findings of both the consultative and reviewing physicians that [claimant] has a moderate to marked impairment
with social functioning and particularly faced difficulty working with men”), report and recommendation adopted
by, 2018 WL 4101525 (W.D. Va. 2018).
9
Colon’s difficulties with men, particularly in the absence of evidence that her mental health
providers or the consultative examiner identified that issue as an obstacle to full-time
employment that would not otherwise be addressed by her broader social limitations. See Brault
v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm’r, 683 F.3d 443, 448 (2d Cir. 2012) (“[a]n ALJ does not have to state
on the record every reason justifying a decision[,] . . . [and] [a]n ALJ’s failure to cite specific
evidence does not indicate that such evidence was not considered”) (citation and quotation
omitted).
Based upon my review of the RFC assessment and the record evidence, I am
satisfied that the ALJ’s determination is supported by substantial evidence and that remand is not
warranted because of the ALJ’s failure to reference issues, or include in the RFC specific
limitations, relating to Colon’s ability to interact with men. See, e.g., Warren v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., 2016 WL 7223338, *6 (N.D.N.Y.) (“[p]laintiff cites to evidence in the record which he
maintains provides substantial evidence to support a finding of deficits in adaptive functioning[;]
. . . [h]owever, under the substantial evidence standard of review, it is not enough for [p]laintiff
to merely disagree with the ALJ’s weighing of the evidence or to argue that the evidence in the
record could support her position[;] [p]laintiff must show that no reasonable factfinder could
have reached the ALJ’s conclusions based on the evidence in record”) (citations omitted), report
and recommendation adopted by, 2016 WL 7238947 (N.D.N.Y. 2016); Avant v. Colvin, 2016
WL 5799080, *3 (W.D.N.Y. 2016) (“as the Second Circuit has explained, ‘whether there is
substantial evidence supporting the claimant’s view is not the question[;] rather, the [c]ourt must
decide whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision”) (alterations omitted) (quoting
Bonet ex rel. T.B. v. Colvin, 523 F. App’x 58, 59 (2d Cir. 2013) (summary order)).
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B.
The ALJ’s Credibility Assessment
I turn next to Colon’s contention that the ALJ’s credibility analysis is flawed
because he failed to sufficiently explain why he discounted Colon’s subjective complaints
associated with her mental health limitations. (Docket ## 9-1 at 14-18; 14 at 4-5). For the
reasons explained below, Colon’s credibility challenge is without merit.
An ALJ’s credibility assessment should reflect a two-step analysis. Robins v.
Astrue, 2011 WL 2446371, *4 (E.D.N.Y. 2011). First, the ALJ must determine whether the
evidence reflects that the claimant has a medically determinable impairment or impairments that
could produce the relevant symptom. Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529). Next, the ALJ must
evaluate “the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of the symptom, which requires a
credibility assessment based on the entire case record.” Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)).
The relevant factors for the ALJ to weigh include:
(1) the claimant’s daily activities; (2) the location, duration,
frequency and intensity of the claimant’s pain or other symptoms;
(3) precipitating and aggravating factors; (4) the type, dosage,
effectiveness, and side effects of any medication the claimant takes
or has taken to alleviate [her] pain or other symptoms;
(5) treatment, other than medication, the claimant receives or has
received for relief of [her] pain or other symptoms; (6) any
measures the claimant uses or has used to relieve [her] pain or
other symptoms; and (7) other factors concerning the claimant’s
functional limitations and restrictions due to pain or other
symptoms.
Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3)(i)-(vii)). Furthermore, “an evaluation of a claimant’s
credibility is entitled to great deference if it is supported by substantial evidence.” Matejka v.
Barnhart, 386 F. Supp. 2d at 205; accord Hall v. Berryhill, 2018 WL 6011167, *4 (W.D.N.Y.
2018) (“[i]t is the function of the ALJ, not the court, to assess the credibility of witnesses”)
(citing Tankisi v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 521 F. App’x 29, 35 (2d Cir. 2013) (summary order)).
11
Here, the ALJ found that Colon’s medically determinable impairments could
reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms, but ultimately concluded that her
statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms were not
entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record. (Tr. 25). In
reaching this conclusion, the ALJ specifically noted that he “duly considered [Colon’s] own
reports and allegations” and “granted the greatest possible deference to [Colon’s] complaints of
pain and mental difficulties.” (Tr. 28). According to the ALJ, “while the record document[ed]
diagnoses of mental impairments, the overwhelming weight of the evidence, including clinical
findings and stable treatment, acknowledged activities of daily living, and the opinion of an
examining medical source, d[id] not support greater mental limitations [than those] established in
the determined [RFC].” (Tr. 29). The ALJ also noted that “the record document[ed] that
[Colon] was feeling better and handle[d] anxiety better since starting medication treatment.”
(Id.).
I disagree with Colon that the ALJ’s credibility analysis was “too conclusory to
stand.” (Docket # 9-1 at 14). First, the ALJ referenced and explained records throughout his
decision showing that the symptoms of Colon’s mental health impairments generally improved
with medication. (See, e.g., Tr. 24 (referencing Tr. 91 (Colon’s disability hearing testimony
during which she stated that Depakote “does work for [her] mood altering chemical
imbalance”)); Tr. 25 (citing Tr. 290-91 (December 2013 treatment note in which Mary Lou
George (“George”), LCSW, noted that medication helped Colon’s “mood and anxiety,” that
Colon “has used deep breathing to assist in getting through times of panic and fearfulness,” and
that Colon’s anxiety and depression were “improving”); id. (citing Tr. 336-38 (January 2014
treatment note in which George noted that Colon “report[ed] good progress in dealing with her
12
anxiety and depression since the last visit[, and] . . . continues to have occasional panic attacks,
but generally manages them rather well”)); Tr. 26 (citing Tr. 424-25 (March 2016 treatment note
at which time Colon reported to Joan Canzoneri, NP, that she had “improvement with mood
lability with the start of Depakote,” that her mood had been “feeling stable overall,” and that she
was “feeling more even and able to handle issues better”))). In assessing credibility, the ALJ
was permitted to consider Colon’s reports of improvement with medication. See, e.g., Elliott v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2018 WL 4539579, *7 (W.D.N.Y. 2018) (“[t]hroughout his decision, the
ALJ noted instances where [claimant] demonstrated improvement and had normal test results,
and in his credibility analysis he found that [claimant’s] impairments seem ‘well controlled with
treatment’ and that ‘[claimant] has shown significant improvement in her condition’”[;] . . .
[b]ecause the ALJ was entitled to consider [claimant’s] medication, treatment, and other
measures taken to relieve symptoms . . . and he supported his findings with substantial evidence,
the [c]ourt finds that the ALJ did not err when he discounted her credibility based on her
improved condition”) (citations omitted).
The ALJ also considered the effect that Colon’s mental health impairments had on
her activities of daily living. As noted above, the ALJ referenced Colon’s “mental health
comprehensive behavioral health assessment,” which O’Brien completed at Horizon in October
2014. (Tr. 26, 358). In that assessment, Colon noted that she was living with her sister and her
sister’s children and “fe[lt] like she [was] ‘running a day care’ because she need[ed] to babysit
her nieces and nephews.” (Tr. 26, 364). Colon “denied any issues or concerns with completing
her [activities of daily living].” (Id.). The ALJ also identified the activities of daily living that
Colon stated she could perform (Tr. 25) – another consideration that an ALJ may properly weigh
in making his or her credibility evaluation. See Herrington v. Berryhill, 2019 WL 1091385, *7
13
(D. Conn. 2019) (“it is beyond cavil that activities of daily living are an appropriate factor for an
ALJ to consider when assessing a claimant’s credibility”) (collecting cases).
In light of these articulated considerations, as well as the ALJ’s explicit reliance
on Ippolito’s evaluation (Tr. 29), the basis for the ALJ’s credibility determination is evident. See
Brylski v. Astrue, 2012 WL 1038622, *3 (W.D.N.Y. 2012) (“the ALJ was not required to discuss
every credibility factor individually where, as here, the decision is sufficient to allow this [c]ourt
to determine the basis for the ALJ’s credibility determination”). Because I find that the ALJ’s
credibility determination is supported by substantial evidence, remand is thus not warranted on
this basis.
CONCLUSION
After a careful review of the entire record, this Court finds that the
Commissioner’s denial of DIB and SSI was based on substantial evidence and was not erroneous
as a matter of law. Accordingly, the ALJ’s decision is affirmed. For the reasons stated above,
the Commissioner’s motion for judgment on the pleadings (Docket # 13) is GRANTED.
Colon’s motion for judgment on the pleadings (Docket # 9) is DENIED, and Colon’s complaint
(Docket # 1) is dismissed with prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/Marian W. Payson
MARIAN W. PAYSON
United States Magistrate Judge
Dated: Rochester, New York
September 5, 2019
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