Hochstine v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 18

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER that Plaintiff's 8 Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is DENIED; that the Commissioner's 13 Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is GRANTED; and that Plaintiff's Complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Signed by Hon. Donald D. Bush on 10/23/2019. (KLH)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
CHRISTIEE ANNE HOCHSTINE,
Plaintiff,
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.

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Case # 1:18-cv-699-DB
MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER

INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Christiee A. Hochstine (“Plaintiff”) brings this action pursuant to the Social
Security Act (the “Act”), seeking review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social
Security (the “Commissioner”) that denied her application for supplemental security income
(“SSI”) under Title XVI of the Act. See ECF No. 1. The Court has jurisdiction over this action
under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c), and the parties consented to proceed before the undersigned,
in accordance with a standing order (see ECF. No. 16).
Both parties moved for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(c). See ECF Nos. 8, 13. Plaintiff also filed a reply. See ECF No. 14. For the reasons
set forth below, Plaintiff’s motion (ECF No. 8) is DENIED, and the Commissioner’s motion (ECF
No. 13) is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
On July 27, 2011, Plaintiff protectively filed a Title XVI application for a period of
disability and SSI, alleging disability beginning October 15, 2010 (the disability onset date), due
to: “Mental health, depression, anxiety.” Transcript (“Tr.”) 109). Plaintiff’s application was denied
initially on October 28, 2011, after which she requested an administrative hearing. Plaintiff
appeared and testified at an administrative hearing on March 7, 2013. Tr. 26-41, 49-54, 55. In a

decision dated March 25, 2013, Administrative Law Judge Michael Friedman found that Plaintiff
was not “disabled” within the meaning of the Social Security Act. Tr. 13-22. After the Appeals
Council denied review, Plaintiff filed a civil action, and on October 27, 2016, this Court remanded
the matter to the Commissioner for further administrative proceedings. Tr. 1-6, 511. Thereafter,
another hearing was held on February 6, 2018, before Administrative Law Judge Melissa Lin Jones
(the “ALJ”) in Buffalo, New York. Plaintiff was represented by Kelly Laga, an attorney, who
appeared on behalf of Plaintiff at the hearing, as she waived her right to testify. Dawn Blythe, an
impartial vocational expert (“VE”), also appeared and testified at the hearing. The ALJ issued an
unfavorable decision on March 21, 2018, finding that Plaintiff was not “disabled.” Tr. 451-66.
Plaintiff did not file written exceptions to the ALJ’s decision, and the Appeals Council did not
assume jurisdiction. The ALJ’s decision thus became the “final decision” of the Commissioner
subject to judicial review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
LEGAL STANDARD
I.

District Court Review
“In reviewing a final decision of the SSA, this Court is limited to determining whether the

SSA’s conclusions were supported by substantial evidence in the record and were based on a
correct legal standard.” Talavera v. Astrue, 697 F.3d 145, 151 (2d Cir. 2012) (citing 42 U.S.C. §
405(g)) (other citation omitted). The Act holds that the Commissioner’s decision is “conclusive”
if it is supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). “Substantial evidence means more
than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.” Moran v. Astrue, 569 F.3d 108, 112 (2d Cir. 2009) (citations
omitted). It is not the Court’s function to “determine de novo whether [the claimant] is disabled.”
Schaal v. Apfel, 134 F. 3d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1990).

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II.

The Sequential Evaluation Process
An ALJ must follow a five-step sequential evaluation to determine whether a claimant is

disabled within the meaning of the Act. See Parker v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 470-71
(1986). At step one, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful
work activity. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b). If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, the ALJ
proceeds to step two and determines whether the claimant has an impairment, or combination of
impairments, that is “severe” within the meaning of the Act, meaning that it imposes significant
restrictions on the claimant’s ability to perform basic work activities. Id. § 404.1520(c). If the
claimant does not have a severe impairment or combination of impairments meeting the durational
requirements, the analysis concludes with a finding of “not disabled.” If the claimant does, the
ALJ continues to step three.
At step three, the ALJ examines whether a claimant’s impairment meets or medically
equals the criteria of a listed impairment in Appendix 1 of Subpart P of Regulation No. 4 (the
“Listings”). Id. § 404.1520(d). If the impairment meets or medically equals the criteria of a Listing
and meets the durational requirement, the claimant is disabled. Id. § 404.1509. If not, the ALJ
determines the claimant’s residual functional capacity, which is the ability to perform physical or
mental work activities on a sustained basis notwithstanding limitations for the collective
impairments. See id. § 404.1520(e)-(f).
The ALJ then proceeds to step four and determines whether the claimant’s RFC permits
him or her to perform the requirements of his or her past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f).
If the claimant can perform such requirements, then he or she is not disabled. Id. If he or she
cannot, the analysis proceeds to the fifth and final step, wherein the burden shifts to the
Commissioner to show that the claimant is not disabled. Id. § 404.1520(g). To do so, the

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Commissioner must present evidence to demonstrate that the claimant “retains a residual
functional capacity to perform alternative substantial gainful work which exists in the national
economy” in light of his or her age, education, and work experience. See Rosa v. Callahan, 168
F.3d 72, 77 (2d Cir. 1999) (quotation marks omitted); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(c).
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE’S FINDINGS
The ALJ analyzed Plaintiff’s claim for benefits under the process described above and
made the following findings in her March 21, 2018 decision:
1. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since July 27, 2011, the
application date (20 CFR 416.971 et seq.);
2. The claimant has the following severe impairments: asthma, major depressive disorder and
generalized anxiety disorder (20 CFR 416.920(c));
3. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or
medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart
P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 416.920(11), 416.925 and 416.926);
4. The claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform a full range of work at all
exertional levels but with the following non-exertional limitations: The claimant can
perform simple, routine and repetitive tasks, not at a production rate pace. The claimant
can have occasional interaction with supervisors and rare (meaning less than occasional
but not never) interaction with the co-workers and the public. The claimant must avoid
exposure to dusts, fumes, odors, gases and other pulmonary irritants;
5. No finding is made regarding the claimant’s past relevant work (20 CPR 416.960(h)); 1
6. The claimant was born on December 25, 1983 and was 27 years old, which is defined as a
younger individual age 18-49, on the date the application was filed (20 CFR 416.963);
7. The claimant has at least a high school education and is able to communicate in English
(20 CFR 416.964);
8. Transferability of job skills is not an issue in this case because the claimant's past relevant
work is unskilled (20 CFR 416.968);

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As explained by the Commissioner, because the evidence related to Plaintiff’s past relevant work is insufficient to
make an appropriate and well-informed finding at step 4, the regulations provide that adjudicators may proceed
immediately to step 5. See Tr. 464 (citing 20 CFR 416.920(h); 77 Federal Register 43492, Expedited Vocational
Assessment under the Sequential Evaluation Process).

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9. Considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, and residual functional
capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that the
claimant can perform (20 CFR 416.969 and 416.969(a));
10. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, since
July 27, 2011, the date the application was filed (20 CFR 416.920(g)).
Tr. 451-66.
Accordingly, the ALJ determined that, based on the application for supplemental security
income protectively filed on July 27, 2011, Plaintiff is not disabled under section 1614(a)(3)(A)
of the Act. Id. at 466.
ANALYSIS
Plaintiff alleges three points of error. First, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly
substituted her own lay judgment in assessing Plaintiff’s RFC, and therefore, the RFC was not
supported by substantial evidence. See ECF No. 8-1 at 25-26. Next, Plaintiff argues the ALJ
violated SSR 85-15 because she failed to adequately evaluate the effect of Plaintiff’s ability to
tolerate work stress. See id. at 27-28. Finally, Plaintiff claims that “the ALJ impermissibl[y]
assumed that to be disabled means that one must be completely shut off from society, socialization,
and the pursuit of important goals” and “should be expected to vegetate in a dark room and be
excluded from all form of human contact.” Id. at 28-29 (citing Smith v. Califano, 637 F.2d 968 (3d
Cir.1981)). The Commissioner responds that: (1) substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s
conclusion that Plaintiff’s medical impairments did not preclude her from all work (see ECF No.
13-1 at 21-23); (2) the ALJ appropriately considered and weighed the medical opinion evidence
(id. at 24-29); and (3) the ALJ fully complied with SSR 85-15 by including restrictions in
Plaintiff’s RFC to offset any workplace-related stressors and demands that might have caused
difficulty due to her mental impairments (id. at 29-31).

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A Commissioner’s determination that a claimant is not disabled will be set aside when the
factual findings are not supported by “substantial evidence.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); see also Shaw v.
Chater, 221 F.3d 126, 131 (2d Cir.2000). Substantial evidence has been interpreted to mean “such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. The
Court may also set aside the Commissioner’s decision when it is based upon legal error. Rosa, 168
F.3d at 77.
I.

Medical Evidence and Other Substantial Evidence Supports the ALJ’s RFC Finding.
Plaintiff alleges she is unable to work because of her mental impairments, and that despite

complying with her treatment recommendations and prescribed medications, she continued to
experience depression and anxiety symptoms that interfered with her ability to function. Tr. 30,
34-38. Upon review of the record, the Court finds that the ALJ thoroughly and carefully analyzed
the medical evidence and the other evidence of record, and the ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff was
not as limited as she alleged is supported by substantial evidence. Tr. 461. The ALJ specifically
discussed the order of remand from this Court directing the Commissioner take further action
needed to comply with the administrative record, including proper evaluation of the Plaintiff’s
symptoms and mental limitations. Tr. 454. The thorough and careful analysis of the ALJ complied
with this Court’s directive.
The ALJ acknowledged that Plaintiff had a long history of psychiatric problems, including
an inpatient stay in 2007 for self-harming behaviors, but in reviewing the objective evidence, the
ALJ concluded that Plaintiff’s statements concerning the alleged intensity, persistence, and
limiting effects of her symptoms were not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other
evidence of record. Tr. 460-61. “When determining a claimant’s RFC, the ALJ . . . is not required

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to accept the claimant’s subjective complaints without question . . . .” Genier v. Astrue, 606 F.3d
46, 49 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal citations omitted)); Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 16-3p. 2
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in giving little or partial weight to the medical opinions
concerning her mental impairments, and therefore, remand is required because the ALJ improperly
substituted her own lay judgment in assessing Plaintiff’s RFC. See ECF No. 8-1 at 1, 25-26.
Specifically, Plaintiff takes issue with the fact that the ALJ assessed an RFC that was less
restrictive than any of the medical opinions. Id. at 26. The only opinion Plaintiff discusses in any
detail in her brief is the opinion of Sandra Jensen, Ph.D. (“Dr. Jensen”), who conducted a
consultative psychiatric evaluation on October 3, 2011. Tr. 308-11. However, the ALJ’s decision
indicates that she also considered the opinions of state agency psychological consultant J.
Echevarria, M.D. (“Dr. Echevarria”), and psychiatric nurse practitioner Walter Warriner (“NP
Warriner’) 3 with respect to Plaintiff’s mental limitations and the ALJ’s ultimate RFC finding.
Upon review of the entire record, the Court finds that the ALJ explained the weights given to each
of these opinions, and her assessments were supported by substantial evidence.
First, the ALJ accorded partial weight to Dr. Jensen’s opinion that Plaintiff had mild to
moderate impairments making appropriate decisions, relating adequately with others, and dealing
appropriately with stress, but no limitations in simple tasks, performing complex tasks with
supervision, or maintaining attention, concentration, and a regular schedule. Tr. 311, 462. In
weighing that opinion, the ALJ recognized that Dr. Jensen was an acceptable medical source with

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As noted by the Commissioner, effective March 16, 2016, SSR 96-7p was superseded by SSR 16-3p. See 81 F.R.
14166-72 (March 16, 2016), as republished at 82 F.R. 49462-68 to clarify applicability date (Oct. 25, 2017). Social
Security Ruling 16-3p eliminated the use of the term “credibility” from the agency’s sub-regulatory policy, and
“clarif[ied] that subjective symptom evaluation is not an examination of an individual’s character.” Id. The relevant
regulations, however, remain unchanged.
3
The Court notes that, in an apparent misreading of Mr. Warriner’s handwritten name on the Medical Source
Statement – Mental (“MSSM”) form, the ALJ’s decision refers to “Walker Warriher, PMHNP-BC” as opposed to
“Walter Warriner, PMHNP-BC.” Tr. 463 (citing Tr. 1328, 1350).

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program knowledge and a specialty in psychology who had personally examined Plaintiff. Tr. 462.
However, the ALJ noted that Dr. Jensen based her opinion upon one examination. Id. The ALJ
also observed that Dr. Jensen’s opinion was internally inconsistent as she suggested some
moderate limitations but concluded that Plaintiff’s psychiatric issues would not interfere with her
ability to function on a daily basis, especially when properly medicated. Tr. 311, 462-63. Although
the ALJ found that the totality of the record did not support the degree of limitation Plaintiff
alleged, the ALJ concluded that the evidence showed that Plaintiff continued to have mental
limitations warranting greater restrictions than Dr. Jensen opined. Tr. 463. Thus, the ALJ accorded
greater weight to the portion of Dr. Jensen’s opinion suggesting moderate difficulties because it
was supported by the longitudinal evidence and little weight to the portion of the opinion
suggesting that Plaintiff’s anxiety and depression were not severe and did not interfere with her
ability to work. Tr. 310-11, 462-63. The ALJ therefore accorded partial weight to Dr. Jensen’s
opinion, stating that it supported a finding that Plaintiff was “not disabled.” Tr. 463 (citing Tr. 31011).
A medical source statement or formal medical opinion is not necessarily required for an
ALJ to make an RFC determination. This is particularly true where the consultative examiner’s
opinion is inconsistent with the medical evidence. See Pellam v. Astrue, 508 F. App'x 87, 89-90
(2d Cir. 2013) (upholding ALJ’s RFC determination where the ALJ relied on physician’s findings
and treatment notes). Further, “[t]here is no requirement that the agency accept the opinion of a
consultative examiner concerning a claimant's limitations.” Id. at 90. Therefore, even if the ALJ
did not credit all of Dr. Jensen’s findings, the opinion largely supported the ALJ’s assessment of
Plaintiff’s RFC. Id.; see also Dennis v. Berryhill, No. 6:16-CV-6750-MAT, 2018 WL 488942, at
*6 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 2018) (consultative psychological examiner’s opinion to which the ALJ

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accorded some weight “also provides substantial evidence for the ALJ’s RFC finding.”). Although
the ALJ afforded Dr. Jensen’s opinion partial weight, the Court finds that the ALJ’s RFC
assessment is largely consistent with Dr. Jensen’s opinion. See Pellam, 508 F. App'x at 90 (ALJ
was not required to supplement the record with medical source statement where ALJ rejected the
consultative examiner’s opinion, but ultimately accounted in the RFC for most of the limitations
assessed by the examiner). Accordingly, the Court finds no error in the ALJ’s assignment of partial
weight to Dr. Jensen’s opinion.
The ALJ next weighed the opinion of Dr. Echevarria, who reviewed Plaintiff’s file in
October 2011 and concluded that her mental impairments were non-severe. Tr. 316-29, 463. The
regulations provide that ALJs are to consider state agency consultants’ opinions because “our
Federal or State agency medical or psychological consultants are highly qualified and experts in
Social Security disability evaluation.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.913a(b)(1); see also 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(e);
SSR 17-2p (Federal or State agency medical or psychological consultants “are highly qualified
medical sources who are also experts in the evaluation of medical issues in disability claims under
the Act.”). Although the ALJ ultimately accorded Dr. Echevarria’s opinion little weight because
evidence subsequent to Dr. Echevarria’s file review showed that Plaintiff’s mental impairments
imposed work-related limitations, the ALJ appropriately considered that opinion in formulating
her RFC and in concluding that Plaintiff was capable of a reduced range of work despite her mental
impairments. Tr. 316-29, 463. Thus, the ALJ’s mental RFC assessment actually provided greater
restrictions than those contained in Dr. Echevarria’s opinion, and thus was more favorable to
Plaintiff. See Gonzalez v. Colvin, No. 1:15-CV-00767(MAT), 2018 WL 1040250, at *5 (W.D.N.Y.
Feb. 24, 2018). And while medical opinions provide important insights regarding a claimant’s
functioning, it is ultimately the ALJ’s task to formulate an RFC assessment based on the record as

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a whole. Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2), 416.927(d)(2) (“Although we consider opinions
from medical sources on issues such as . . . your residual functional capacity . . . the final
responsibility for deciding these issues is reserved to the Commissioner.”).
The ALJ next considered NP Warriner’s opinion that Plaintiff was unable to maintain
competitive employment due to marked limitations in social functioning, concentration, and
episodes of decompensation, assigning the opinion little weight. Tr. 463 (citing Tr. 1326-28). In
doing so, the ALJ first pointed out that although NP Warriner had a longitudinal treatment history
with Plaintiff, he was not an acceptable medical source within the meaning of the regulations
applicable to her claim, but instead he was an “other medical source.” Tr. 463; 20 C.F.R. §
416.927(f), 20 C.F.R. § 416.902(a)(7) (providing that the list of acceptable medical sources
includes nurse practitioners “only with respect to claims filed…on or after March 27, 2017”). In
addition, the ALJ noted, the issue of whether an individual can work or is “disabled” is reserved
to the Commissioner. Tr. 463; see also 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d); LaValley v. Colvin, 672 F. App’x
129, 130 (2d Cir. 2017).
Moreover, the ALJ explained that NP Warriner’s opinion was not consistent with
Plaintiff’s mental healthcare treatment records. Tr. 463. As the ALJ noted, Plaintiff’s progress
notes showed that she had improvements in mood, was stable, had grossly normal mental status
examination findings, and engaged in a wide range of activities that were not consistent with the
significant limitations set forth in the MSSM form completed by NP Warriner. Tr. 463; 345-48,
402, 918, 924, 1043, 1097, 1102, 1129, 1176, 1180-81, 1330-34, 1340, 1342-43, 1350-53.
Consequently, and despite NP Warriner’s treating history with Plaintiff, the ALJ stated that she
afforded the opinion little weight due to its overall inconsistency with the totality of the evidence.
Tr. 463. Thus, the ALJ sufficiently explained her assignment of weight to NP Warriner’s opinion.

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See Suttles v. Berryhill, 756 F. App’x 77, 78 (2d Cir. 2019) (the ALJ properly considered treating
providers’ opinions, including “accord[ing] little weight to [a nurse practitioner’s] opinions
because she was not an acceptable medical source and her opinions were inconsistent with [the
claimant’s] medical records.”); Wynn v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 342 F. Supp. 3d 340, 346 (W.D.N.Y.
2018) (ALJ appropriately assigned “little weight” to psychiatric NP’s opinion due to
inconsistencies with other evidence).
The ALJ is obligated to formulate a claimant’s RFC based on the record as a whole, not
just upon the medical opinions alone. Trepanier v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 752 F. App’x 75,
79 (2d Cir. 2018). The ALJ did just that in this case. After considering the record as a whole, the
ALJ appropriately accounted for the mental limitations she found supported by the overall record
by limiting Plaintiff to simple, routine and repetitive tasks, not at a production rate pace, with only
occasional interaction with supervisors and rare interaction with co-workers and the public. Tr.
460. The RFC finding is not defective merely because it “does not perfectly correspond with any
of the opinions of medical sources cited in [the ALJ’s] decision.” Trepanier, 752 F. App’x at 79;
see also Monroe v. Com'r of Soc. Sec., 676 F. App’x 5, 8 (2d Cir. 2017) (rejecting argument that
remand was required because ALJ discounted the only medical opinion such that “there was no
competent medical opinion that supported the ALJ’s RFC determination.”). Although the ALJ did
not adopt these opinions in their entirety, she adequately explained her reasons for not doing so.
Accordingly, the Court finds that the ALJ did not substitute her own lay judgment for a competent
medical opinion. Wynn, 342 F. Supp. 3d at 349 (W.D.N.Y. 2018). Therefore, Plaintiff’s argument
fails.
With respect to the other objective evidence, the ALJ pointed out that Plaintiff’s inpatient
admission in 2007 coincided with the ending of a long-term relationship with her boyfriend whom

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she planned to marry but found out was cheating on her. Tr. 171, 200, 461. As the ALJ noted,
Plaintiff’s mental healthcare records reflected grossly normal mental status examination findings,
including that she had normal thought processes and content, was cooperative and oriented in all
spheres, and had normal cognitive functioning and memory. Tr. 461 (citing Tr. 390, 814, 889,
1020, 1102, 1180, 1217, 1271, 1307, 1350-53). The ALJ also recognized that Plaintiff’s treatment
records revealed that she was clinically stable on medication. Tr. 461 (citing Tr. 814, 889, 1020,
1102, 1180, 1217, 1271, 1350-53). In addition, the ALJ observed, those records showed that:
Plaintiff’s mood improved; she utilized support systems; her medications were effective, even with
decreased dosage and taking them as needed; and she reported positive or cheerful mood during
the time period at issue. Tr. 462 (citing Tr. 345, 346, 347, 351, 697, 918, 1056, 1331, 1347). As
the ALJ noted, records from other clinicians similarly reflected grossly normal mental status
findings, including the findings of consultative examiner Dr. Jensen, as well as those of Plaintiff’s
primary care physician, to whom she denied mood and personality changes (Tr. 462, 309-10, 362,
365, 369, 377-78, 1443). See Marnell v. Comm. of Soc. Sec., No. 17-CV-6201P, 2018 WL
3620152, at *12 (W.D.N.Y. July 30, 2018) (ALJ appropriately considered the medical evidence
which indicated that therapy and medication were generally effective in controlling depression and
anxiety symptoms).
Moreover, as the ALJ observed, Plaintiff’s treatment records also showed that her
exacerbated symptoms coincided with situational stressors, including her father’s 2011 liver
cancer diagnosis and grieving over his subsequent death, the passing of two of her cats, and anxiety
about her disability paperwork and the administrative proceeding. Tr. 462 (citing 305, 349, 387,
392, 1369). In addition, a great deal of Plaintiff’s complaints about increased stressors related to
conflicts with her mother and drug-addicted sister, as well as interpersonal issues with a “friend

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causing drama” and another long-term friend who had a drinking problem. Tr. 344, 669, 675, 902,
906, 923-24, 929, 951, 967, 987, 1027, 1032, 1037, 1097, 1106, 1112, 1118, 1126, 1141, 1148-49,
1165, 1199, 1207, 1305, 1320, 1332-40.
“Situational stressors are not a basis for a finding of disability and may be considered when
evaluating a claimant’s subjective reports.” Taillon v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 17-CV-6812, 2019
WL 1396837, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2019) (citing Morgan v. Colvin, No. 14-CV-0549, 2016
WL 3527906, at *15 (N.D.N.Y. June 23, 2016); see also Gonzalez v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No.
6:07-CV-629, 2010 WL 55933, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 2010) (The plaintiff’s “situational periods
of stress” were due to family problems and financial difficulties, rather than her depressive
disorder, and therefore supported the ALJ’s conclusion that plaintiff's claims regarding the extent
her mental condition precluded her from working were not credible.); Townsend v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., No. 17-CV-6742-FPG, 2018 WL 6697001, at *7-*8 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2018) (ALJ
observed that claimant’s “anxiety was generally situational in nature, and waxed and waned
depending on circumstances in life;” although there was evidence of ongoing symptoms, the record
also revealed that claimant “regularly had normal thought processes, thought content, and
cognition and that situational triggers—like her finances, managing her daughter, poor
transportation, and issues with the father of her child—often increased her stress and anxiety.”);
Jones v. Colvin, No. 11-CV-445 MAT, 2014 WL 1976921, at *11 (W.D.N.Y. May 15, 2014)
(evidence contradicted suggestion that claimant’s mental symptoms were disabling; treatment
records “indicate[d] that [her] complaints of depression were largely situational and triggered by
stressors, such as caring for her elderly mother, and her abusive marital relationship.”).
Plaintiff received outpatient mental healthcare services at WCA Health Center, including
medication management and individualized therapy with Martha Blackstock, M.S. (“Ms.

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Blackstock”), a licensed marriage and family therapist. Tr. 177-211, 228-307, 341-59, 386-444,
445-50, 646-1321, 1349-81. On July 7, 2011, a few weeks before her SSI application date, Plaintiff
reported anxiety and depression about her finances; she was working with a job opportunity
placement service but was nervous as to whether she could handle a job; and she was
uncomfortable with much contact with the public. Tr. 303. On mental status examination, she was
mildly anxious but focused, within normal limits, and had no suicidal ideation. Id. Ms. Blackstock
noted that Plaintiff was “considering SSI but aware she may not be approved” Id. Records of her
most recent sessions with Ms. Blackstock documented her reported general improvement, positive
mood, and no significant major concerns, although she did mention that she worried that her
mother might be continuing to give her sister money and was upset about pending internet
deregulation as she relied on the internet for selling her artwork and for entertainment. Tr. 462,
1363, 1364.
The ALJ also observed that Plaintiff’s reported daily activities were not entirely consistent
with her allegations of disabling mental symptoms and limitations. Tr. 461. For instance, the ALJ
pointed out that Plaintiff was able to tend to her personal hygiene, prepare simple meals, engage
in household chores, care for pets, drive, visit with friends and family, shop, play “Dungeons &
Dragons,” handle finances, and watch television. Tr. 32-33, 121-31, 461, 742. In addition, the ALJ
noted that Plaintiff was able to attend the Pittsburg “comic-con” street costume parade in July 2015
and reported plans to attend, and/or participate in, costume conventions and parades in 2011, 2014,
and 2015, activities that were inconsistent with her alleged fear of crowds and people she did not
know. Tr. 30, 34, 38, 301, 461, 829, 866, 1294, 1255, 1300. She also reportedly went on a camping
trip with friends in October 2015, and reported playing “Pokemon Go” in July, August, and
October 2016. Tr. 1126, 1129, 1141, 1255, 1260. The ALJ also noted Plaintiff’s treatment records

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referencing her job-hunting activities and her reported excitement about a job interview after her
alleged disability onset date; she also told Ms. Blackstock in 2012 that she very much enjoyed her
volunteer work. Tr. 307, 344-47, 398-99, 461. Moreover, as mentioned above, Plaintiff reported
that she sold her artwork and costumes online to bring in some income during the relevant time
period. Tr. 303, 461, 746, 792, 918, 924, 1248, 1330.
Based on the foregoing, the ALJ appropriately considered the medical evidence and other
evidence of record, including Plaintiff’s activities of daily living and her conservative and routine
treatment history, in concluding that the record failed to support her allegation that her mental
impairments rendered her incapable of a reduced range of work activity. See Vennor v. Colvin, No.
15-CV-6385-FPG, 2016 WL 3181171, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. June 3, 2016) (ALJ appropriately
“analyzed the medical evidence and concluded that the objective findings failed to provide strong
support for [the claimant]’s allegedly disabling symptoms and limitations.”).
Office treatment notes from Chautauqua Medical Services in June 2017 note that Plaintiff
denied depression. Tr. 1398-1400. Her affect was normal; memory intact; and symptoms of
anxiety appeared to be well controlled. Id. Her patient health questionnaire indicated that she did
not feel depressed, and the only box checked was trouble with her ability to concentrate, and her
total score was 1, indicating less than minimal symptoms. Tr. 1405-06. Records from the same
facility in 2016 and 2015 indicated a denial of psychiatric symptoms. Tr. 1407,1411,1416. In sum,
there was ample record evidence for the ALJ to arrive at the conclusions she did.
II.

The ALJ Did Not Violate SSR 85-15.
Plaintiff also contends that the ALJ failed to adequately evaluate the effect of her ability to

tolerate stress on her ability to work as required by SSR 85-15. See ECF No. 8-1 at 27-28. Plaintiff
claims the ALJ did not make any “particularized findings about Plaintiff’s stress, the circumstances

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that trigger it, and how this would specifically impact her ability to work,” and therefore, according
to Plaintiff, remand is required. Id. at 27. The Court disagrees. The ALJ’s RFC assessment reflects
adequate consideration of Plaintiff’s stress-related limitations and is set forth “with sufficient
specificity to enable the court to decide whether the determination is supported by substantial
evidence.” Ferraris v. Heckler, 728 F.2d 582, 587 (2d Cir. 1984).
As Plaintiff correctly points out, SSR 85-15 states: “it is not unusual that the mentally
impaired have difficulty accommodating to the demands of work and work-like settings,” and
“[t]he reaction to the demands of work (stress) is highly individualized, and mental illness is
characterized by adverse responses to seemingly trivial circumstances.” SSR 85-15. As a result,
SSR 85-15 recognizes that “[d]etermining whether these [mentally impaired] individuals will be
able to adapt to the demands or ‘stress’ of the workplace is often extremely difficult,” and “requires
careful consideration of the assessment of RFC,” including whether the individual retains the
ability “to understand, carry out, and remember simple instructions; to respond appropriately to
supervision, coworkers, and usual work situations; and to deal with changes in a routine work
setting.” Id. In considering whether an individual is capable of working despite any difficulties
attributable to his or her mental impairments, SSR 85-15 thus “emphasizes the importance of
thoroughness in evaluation on an individualized basis,” and explains that “[a]ny impairmentrelated limitations created by an individual’s response to demands of work…must be reflected in
the RFC assessment.” Id.
Here, the ALJ conducted such a thorough evaluation in accordance with SSR 85-15’s
guiding principles emphasizing the individualized nature of the inquiry. With respect to interacting
with others, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff has a moderate limitation. The ALJ noted Plaintiff’s
reports of difficulties getting along with siblings and some family members and panic attacks

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resulting in social isolation. Tr. 458 (citing Tr. 127-29). However, the ALJ also noted evidence in
the record inconsistent with the marked levels of difficulty interacting with others alleged by
Plaintiff. For example, the ALJ pointed to evidence showing that Plaintiff was comfortable during
examinations and was cooperative and interactive. Tr. 458 (citing 173, 200, 244, 356, 370, 673,
1444). She also noted that Plaintiff reported being able to go out alone; shop in stores; engage in
online socialization; and visit with friends. Id. (citing Tr. 124-26). The ALJ further noted that
Plaintiff attended comic-con functions, including attending a comic-convention in Pittsburg and
participating in the street parade for her online costume business, and did volunteer work. Id.
(citing Tr. 303,345-46, 1294). The ALJ also pointed to medical evidence and opinions from Drs.
Jensen and Echevarria. Dr. Jensen reported that Plaintiff was cooperative and responsive, and her
manner of relating, social skills, and overall presentation were adequate. Id. (citing Tr. 309). Dr.
Echevarria opined that Plaintiff would have moderate impairments relating adequately with others.
Id. (citing Tr. 328). Thus, the ALJ’s finding of moderate limitations regarding Plaintiff’s ability to
interact appropriately with others was supported by substantial evidence in the record.
To account for the limitations attributable to Plaintiff’s severe mental impairments,
including the finding that Plaintiff had moderate difficulties with regard to concentration,
persistence, or pace, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff could perform simple, routine and repetitive
tasks, not at a production rate pace. Tr. 458, 460. The ALJ also accounted for the difficulties in
social functioning she found to be consistent with the overall record by limiting Plaintiff to only
occasional interaction with supervisors and rare (meaning less than occasional, but not never)
interaction with co-workers and the public. Tr. 458, 460. Although the ALJ did not specifically
use the word “stress” in the RFC finding, she imposed specific restrictions as part of Plaintiff’s
RFC to offset any workplace-related stressors and demands with which Plaintiff might have

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difficulty as a result of her mental impairments, and appropriately translated the mental limitations
she found to be supported by the record into concrete, work-related terms to address the impact of
Plaintiff’s mental impairments on her ability to work. Tr. 460. See SSR 96-8p. An RFC
determination may adequately account for a claimant’s stress-related limitations even without
explicitly referencing stress limitation. See Ridosh v. Berryhill, No. 16-CV-6466L, 2018 WL
6171713, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2018) (citing Cosme v. Colvin, 2016 WL 4154280, *13
(W.D.N.Y. 2016) (finding that the ALJ’s RFC finding “adequately accounted for [claimant’s]
limitations, including any limitations dealing with stress”; “[t]he ALJ’s finding explicitly required
positions involving unskilled work that did not require any contact with coworkers or the public
and only limited contact with supervisors. This conclusion is consistent with both [medical
opinions] that [claimant] had significant difficulties interacting with others, but was otherwise able
to perform simple work independently”). The record in this case reflects that, in assessing workrelated mental limitations as a part of the RFC finding, the ALJ considered whether Plaintiff
“w[ould] be able to adapt to the demands or ‘stress’ of the workplace” despite the difficulties
attributable to her mental impairments. Tr. 457-64.
Based on the foregoing, and considering the record as a whole, the Court finds that the ALJ
complied with SSR 85-15’s directive that “[a]ny impairment-related limitations created by an
individual’s response to demands of work, however, must be reflected in the RFC assessment.”
SSR 85-15; see, e.g., Reyes v. Colvin, No. 14-CV-734-JTC, 2016 WL 56267, at *6 (W.D.N.Y. Jan.
5, 2016) (“In the court’s view, although the ALJ did not specifically include stress limitations in
his RFC assessment, his reliance on the findings and observations of the consultative medical
sources in terms of their consideration of plaintiff's stress-related functional limitations, as well as
his comprehensive consideration of the hearing testimony, objective medical evidence, and

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treating and consultative medical source opinions, represents the kind of thorough, individualized
mental RFC evaluation contemplated by SSR 85-15 and the overall requirements of the Social
Security regulations and rulings.”). Accordingly, Plaintiff is not entitled to reversal of the
Commissioner’s determination, or remand for further proceedings, for any alleged failure to
comply with SSR 85-15.
III.

The ALJ Did Not “Stigmatize” Mental Disability, As Plaintiff Claims.
Finally, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ impermissibly assumed that to be disabled “means

that one must be completely shut off from society, socialization, and the pursuit of important goals”
and “should be expected to vegetate in a dark room and be excluded from all form of human
contact.” See ECF No. 8-1 at 28-29. This argument makes little sense. Despite Plaintiff’s
contention, however, the record establishes that the ALJ appropriately considered the evidence of
Plaintiff’s reported activities in concluding that the overall record failed to support her allegations
of disabling anxiety and social limitations. See Wavercak v. Astrue, 420 F. App’x 91, 94 (2d Cir.
2011) (“The ALJ’s conclusion is also consistent with the claimant’s own account of his
participation in a range of daily activities during the period in question, including cleaning,
cooking, driving, picking up his son at school, reading, shopping, as well as visiting friends and
family.”); Kennedy v. Astrue, 343 F. App’x 719, 720–21 (2d Cir. 2009) (affirming ALJ’s
conclusion that claimant was not disabled; noting that she told her doctor that she was looking for
work); Ewing v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 17-CV-68S, 2018 WL 6060484, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. Nov.
20, 2018) (“Indeed, the Commissioner’s regulations expressly identify ‘daily activities’ as a factor
the ALJ should consider in evaluating the intensity and persistence of a claimant’s symptoms.”)
(citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(c)(3)(i)).

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Plaintiff’s reliance on Doldan v. Colvin, Civ. No. 1:13-cv-00854-MAT-LGF, ECF No. 20,
to support her argument is misplaced, as the facts in Doldan are distinguishable from the facts in
this case. In Doldan, the ALJ found that plaintiff’s testimony that he “did not utilize specialeducation services in college” was “very admirable and an indication that [he did] not want to be
considered disabled, as he [was] trying his best to become a productive member of society.”
Doldan, Civ. No. 1:13-cv-00854-MAT-LGF, ECF No. 20 at 13 (internal citations omitted). As
Judge Telesca explained, the Court was “troubled” by this statement for several reasons, but
primarily because it was improper for the ALJ to suggest that “to be adjudicated disabled is to
carry stigma, and that individuals who are disabled cannot “become [] productive member[s] of
society.” Id. at 14. In this case, the ALJ did not even remotely suggest that “to be adjudicated
disabled is to carry stigma.” Id. at 14. As noted above, the record establishes that Plaintiff
performed a wide range of activities, including participating in comic-con functions, promoting
her online costume business, and doing volunteer work, and the ALJ properly considered these
activities, along with other evidence in the record as a whole, failed to support Plaintiff’s
allegations of disabling anxiety and social limitations.
In sum, the record reflects that the ALJ conducted a proper evaluation of Plaintiff’s mental
health impairments, and her RFC assessment was based on substantial evidence. See 42 U.S.C. §
405(g); Burgess v. Astrue, 537 F.3d 117, 128 (2d Cir. 2008). The Commissioner’s findings of fact
must be upheld unless “a reasonable factfinder would have to conclude otherwise.” Brault v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 683 F.3d 443, 448 (2d Cir. 2012). The question is not whether there is
substantial evidence to support Plaintiff’s position, but whether there is substantial evidence to
support the ALJ’s decision. Bonet ex rel. T.B. v. Colvin, 523 F. App’x 58, 59 (2d Cir. 2013). Thus,
“[i]f evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, the Commissioner’s

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conclusion must be upheld.” McIntyre v. Colvin, 758 F.3d 146, 149 (2d Cir. 2014). The Court,
accordingly, finds no error in the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff is not disabled.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (ECF No. 8) is DENIED, and the
Commissioner’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (ECF No. 13) is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s
Complaint (ECF No. 1) is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. The Clerk of Court will enter
judgment and close this case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

_______________________
DON D. BUSH
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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