Hodgkin v. Commissioner of Social Security
Filing
15
DECISION AND ORDER The Commissioner's motion for judgment on the pleadings 12 is denied, and Hodgkin's motion for judgment on the pleadings 8 is granted. This matter is remanded to the Commissioner for calculation and payment of benefits. Signed by Hon. Marian W. Payson on 3/26/2020. (KAH)-CLERK TO FOLLOW UP-
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
_______________________________________
KALA M. HODGKIN,
DECISION & ORDER
Plaintiff,
18-CV-0703MWP
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
_______________________________________
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Plaintiff Kala M. Hodgkin (“Hodgkin”) brings this action pursuant to Section
205(g) of the Social Security Act (the “Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review of a
final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (the “Commissioner”) denying her
applications for Supplemental Security Income Benefits and Disability Insurance Benefits
(“SSI/DIB”). Pursuant to the Standing Order of the United States District Court for the Western
District of New York regarding Social Security cases dated June 1, 2018, this case has been
reassigned to, and the parties have consented to the disposition of this case by, the undersigned.
(Docket # 14).
Currently before the Court are the parties’ motions for judgment on the pleadings
pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Docket ## 8, 12). For the
reasons set forth below, I hereby vacate the decision of the Commissioner, and this claim is
remanded solely for the calculation and payment of benefits.
DISCUSSION
I.
Standard of Review
This Court’s scope of review is limited to whether the Commissioner’s
determination is supported by substantial evidence in the record and whether the Commissioner
applied the correct legal standards. See Butts v. Barnhart, 388 F.3d 377, 384 (2d Cir. 2004)
(“[i]n reviewing a final decision of the Commissioner, a district court must determine whether
the correct legal standards were applied and whether substantial evidence supports the
decision”), reh’g granted in part and denied in part, 416 F.3d 101 (2d Cir. 2005); see also
Schaal v. Apfel, 134 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1998) (“it is not our function to determine de novo
whether plaintiff is disabled[;] . . . [r]ather, we must determine whether the Commissioner’s
conclusions are supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole or are based on an
erroneous legal standard”) (internal citation and quotation omitted). Pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g), a district court reviewing the Commissioner’s determination to deny disability benefits
is directed to accept the Commissioner’s findings of fact unless they are not supported by
“substantial evidence.” See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“[t]he findings of the Commissioner . . . as to
any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive”). Substantial evidence is
defined as “more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401
(1971) (internal quotation omitted).
To determine whether substantial evidence exists in the record, the court must
consider the record as a whole, examining the evidence submitted by both sides, “because an
analysis of the substantiality of the evidence must also include that which detracts from its
weight.” Williams ex rel. Williams v. Bowen, 859 F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir. 1988). To the extent
2
they are supported by substantial evidence, the Commissioner’s findings of fact must be
sustained “even where substantial evidence may support the claimant’s position and despite the
fact that the [c]ourt, had it heard the evidence de novo, might have found otherwise.” Matejka v.
Barnhart, 386 F. Supp. 2d 198, 204 (W.D.N.Y. 2005) (citing Rutherford v. Schweiker, 685 F.2d
60, 62 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1212 (1983)).
A person is disabled for the purposes of SSI and disability benefits if he or she is
unable “to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable
physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or
can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C.
§§ 423(d)(1)(A) & 1382c(a)(3)(A). When assessing whether a claimant is disabled, the ALJ
must employ a five-step sequential analysis. See Berry v. Schweiker, 675 F.2d 464, 467 (2d Cir.
1982) (per curiam). The five steps are:
(1)
whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial
gainful activity;
(2)
if not, whether the claimant has any “severe impairment”
that “significantly limits [the claimant’s] physical or mental
ability to do basic work activities”;
(3)
if so, whether any of the claimant’s severe impairments
meets or equals one of the impairments listed in Appendix
1 of Subpart P of Part 404 of the relevant regulations;
(4)
if not, whether despite the claimant’s severe impairments,
the claimant retains the residual functional capacity
[(“RFC”)] to perform his or her past work; and
(5)
if not, whether the claimant retains the [RFC] to perform
any other work that exists in significant numbers in the
national economy.
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v) & 416.920(a)(4)(i)-(v); Berry v. Schweiker, 675 F.2d at 467.
“The claimant bears the burden of proving his or her case at steps one through four[;] . . . [a]t
3
step five the burden shifts to the Commissioner to ‘show there is other gainful work in the
national economy [which] the claimant could perform.’” Butts v. Barnhart, 388 F.3d at 383
(quoting Balsamo v. Chater, 142 F.3d 75, 80 (2d Cir. 1998)).
II.
Procedural History
Hodgkin protectively filed for SSI and DIB on May 21, 2012, alleging disability
primarily due to Crohn’s disease and depression. (Tr. 145, 149).1 On November 7, 2012, the
Social Security Administration (the “SSA”) denied Hodgkin’s claim for benefits, finding that she
was not disabled. (Tr. 64-65). Hodgkin requested and was granted a hearing before
Administrative Law Judge Stanley A. Moskal, Jr. (“ALJ Moskal”). (Tr. 80-81, 93-98). ALJ
Moskal conducted a hearing on March 14, 2014. (Tr. 31-57). In a decision dated April 23, 2014,
ALJ Moskal found that Hodgkin was not disabled and was not entitled to benefits. (Tr. 10-19).
On June 24, 2015, the Appeals Council denied Hodgkin’s request for review of the ALJ’s
decision. (Tr. 1-6).
Hodgkin commenced an action seeking review of the Commissioner’s decision.
(Tr. 579-607). On March 8, 2016, pursuant to a stipulation of the parties, United States District
Judge Frank P. Geraci, Jr., vacated the Commissioner’s decision and remanded the matter for
further proceedings. (Tr. 608-13). Upon remand, the Appeals Council determined that the
administrative record had not been adequately developed with respect to Hodgkin’s Crohn’s
disease, particularly with respect to “the frequency of the claimant’s need for restroom breaks.”
(Tr. 616). The Appeals Council directed that the ALJ assigned to the matter on remand obtain
additional evidence regarding Hodgkin’s Crohn’s disease, including if available, a consultative
examination and a medical source statement, reconsider her RFC in light of any additional
1
The administrative transcript shall be referred to as “Tr. __.”
4
evidence obtained, and conduct a new hearing and consult a vocational expert if warranted.
(Tr. 617).
Upon remand, Administrative Law Judge Bryce Baird (the “ALJ”) attempted to
develop the record regarding Hodgkin’s Crohn’s disease in several respects. He accepted and
considered additional evidence submitted to the record, including treatment records and a
medical source statement from Hodgkin’s treating gastroenterologist James Campion
(“Campion”), MD. (Tr. 795-860, 872-92). Next, he ordered a consultative internal evaluation of
Hodgkin, which was conducted by Michael Rosenberg (“Rosenberg”), MD, on November 29,
2017. (Tr. 893-903). Finally, the ALJ conducted an additional administrative hearing held on
October 24, 2017, and requested and secured the assistance of a testifying vocational expert at
that hearing. (Tr. 495-555).
In a decision dated March 23, 2018, the ALJ found that Hodgkin was not disabled
and was not entitled to benefits. (Tr. 472-88). Hodgkin commenced this action on June 21,
2018, seeking review of the Commissioner’s final decision. (Docket # 1).
III.
ALJ’s Decision
In his decision, the ALJ followed the required five-step analysis for evaluating
disability claims. (Tr. 472-88). At step one of the process, the ALJ found that Hodgkin had not
engaged in substantial gainful activity since May 15, 2012, the application date. (Id.). At step
two, the ALJ concluded that Hodgkin had the severe impairments of Crohn’s disease and
adjustment disorder. (Id.). At step three, the ALJ determined that Hodgkin did not have an
impairment (or combination of impairments) that met or medically equaled one of the listed
impairments. (Id.). With respect to Hodgkin’s mental limitations, the ALJ found that she
5
suffered from moderate limitations in interacting with others and concentrating, persisting or
maintaining pace, and mild limitations in understanding, remembering, or applying information
and adapting or managing oneself. (Id.). The ALJ concluded that Hodgkin had the RFC to
perform light work involving occasional interactions with the public but no teamwork, and
simple, routine tasks which can be learned after short demonstration or within thirty days. (Id.).
Additionally, the ALJ concluded that Hodgkin could only perform positions requiring occasional
kneeling, crouching, stooping, bending, or climbing ramps and stairs, but never requiring
crawling, climbing ropes or ladders, or exposure to workplace hazards. (Id.). Finally, the ALJ
determined that Hodgkin must be permitted three unscheduled bathroom breaks lasting ten
minutes in duration during an eight-hour workday. (Id.). At steps four and five, the ALJ
determined that Hodgkin could return to her past relevant work as a child monitor as it was
actually performed and that jobs existed in the national economy that Hodgkin could also
perform, including the positions of stock checker, housekeeping, and mail room clerk. (Id.).
Accordingly, the ALJ found that Hodgkin was not disabled. (Id.).
IV.
Hodgkin’s Contentions
Hodgkin contends that the ALJ’s determination that she is not disabled is not
supported by substantial evidence and is the product of legal error. (Docket ## 8, 13). First,
Hodgkin challenges the ALJ’s RFC determination on the grounds that the ALJ relied upon his
own lay opinion when determining that she would only require three unscheduled breaks during
an eight-hour workday. (Docket ## 8-1 at 13-16; 13 at 1-5). Next, Hodgkin maintains that the
ALJ improperly failed to give controlling weight to the opinion authored by Campion, her
treating gastroenterologist. (Docket # 8-1 at 17-24). The Commissioner maintains that the ALJ
6
properly rejected Campion’s opinion regarding the number of bathroom breaks Hodgkin would
need during a workday, and that this determination is supported by substantial evidence in the
record. (Docket # 12-1).
V.
Analysis
I turn first to Hodgkin’s contention that the ALJ’s RFC assessment was flawed
because the ALJ improperly rejected Campion’s opinion that she would require eight
unscheduled bathroom breaks during an eight-hour workday. (Docket ## 8-1 at 13-16; 13 at
1-5).
An ALJ should consider “all medical opinions received regarding the claimant.”
See Spielberg v. Barnhart, 367 F. Supp. 2d 276, 281 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (citing 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1527(d)2). Generally, a treating physician’s opinion is entitled to “controlling weight”
when it is “well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques
and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [the] case record.” 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1527(c)(2); see also Estrella v. Berryhill, 925 F.3d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 2019) (“[t]he opinion of
a claimant’s treating physician as to the nature and severity of an impairment is given controlling
weight so long as it is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic
techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in the case record”)
(internal quotations and brackets omitted). Thus, “[t]he opinion of a treating physician is
generally given greater weight than that of a consulting physician[] because the treating
physician has observed the patient over a longer period of time and is able to give a more
2
This regulation applies to claims filed before March 27, 2017. For claims filed on or after March 27,
2017, the rules in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c apply.
7
detailed picture of the claimant’s medical history.” Salisbury v. Astrue, 2008 WL 5110992, *4
(W.D.N.Y. 2008).
“An ALJ who refuses to accord controlling weight to the medical opinion of a
treating physician must consider various ‘factors’ to determine how much weight to give to the
opinion.” Halloran v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 28, 32 (2d Cir. 2004). The ALJ must explicitly
consider the “Burgess factors”:
(1)
the frequency of examination and length, nature, and extent
of the treatment relationship,
(2)
the amount of medical evidence supporting the opinion,
(3)
the consistency of the opinion with the record as a whole,
(4)
whether the opinion is from a specialist, and
(5)
whatever other factors tend to support or contradict the opinion.
Gunter v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 361 F. App’x 197, 199 (2d Cir. 2010); see also Estrella v.
Berryhill, 925 F.3d at 95-96 (“[f]irst, the ALJ must decide whether the opinion is entitled to
controlling weight[;] . . . if the ALJ decides the opinion is not entitled to controlling weight, it
must determine how much weight, if any, to give it[;] [i]n doing so, it must ‘explicitly consider’
the . . . nonexclusive ‘Burgess factors’”). “At both steps, the ALJ must ‘give good reasons in its
notice of determination or decision for the weight it gives the treating source’s medical
opinion.’” Estrella, 925 F.3d at 96 (quoting Halloran v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d at 32); Burgess v.
Astrue, 537 F.3d 117, 129-30 (2d Cir. 2008) (“[a]fter considering the above factors, the ALJ
must comprehensively set forth [his] reasons for the weight assigned to a treating physician’s
opinion[;] . . . [f]ailure to provide such ‘good reasons’ for not crediting the opinion of a
claimant’s treating physician is a ground for remand”) (citations and quotations omitted); Wilson
v. Colvin, 213 F. Supp. 3d 478, 482-83 (W.D.N.Y. 2016) (“an ALJ’s failure to follow the
8
procedural requirement of identifying the reasons for discounting the opinions and for explaining
precisely how those reasons affected the weight given denotes a lack of substantial evidence,
even where the conclusion of the ALJ may be justified based on the record”) (alterations,
citations, and quotations omitted). “This requirement allows courts to properly review ALJs’
decisions and provides information to claimants regarding the disposition of their cases,
especially when the dispositions are unfavorable.” Ashley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2014 WL
7409594, *1 (N.D.N.Y. 2014) (citing Snell v. Apfel, 177 F.3d 128, 134 (2d Cir. 1999)).
In his decision, the ALJ acknowledged that Campion had a treating relationship
with Hodgkin and was a specialist, but accorded his opinion only “some weight” because it was
inconsistent with the record as a whole, including Campion’s own treatment records
demonstrating improvement with treatment and Hodgkin’s own testimony concerning the
frequency of her bowel movements during the workday. (Tr. 485).
Specifically, the ALJ stated:
Some weight is given to the September 2017 opinion of
[Campion,] the claimant’s gastroenterologist who opined the
claimant would have reduced abilities in lifting, standing and
walking as well as unscheduled restroom breaks up to 8 times per
day for approximately 15-20 [minutes] and would be absent more
than four days per month[.] . . . [T]he evidence as a whole,
including his correlating and contemporaneous treatment records
do not support such extreme limitations as opined, nor does the
record as a whole provide a basis for his bathroom break
regulations. For example, the claimant’s reports and testimony
show less bowel movements reported per day ([hearing testimony],
29F/1). Additionally, his treatment records also reflect her
symptoms are well-controlled with medication compliance and
infusion therapy (2F/10, 24F/10, 28F/12). As such, his opinion is
given only some weight despite his specialty and treatment history
with the claimant as the totality of the evidence does not support
that the claimant is as limited as opined.
(Id.).
9
Having reviewed the ALJ’s decision, the record, and Campion’s opinion, I
conclude that the grounds provided by the ALJ for rejecting Campion’s bathroom break
restrictions do not constitute “good reasons.” As an initial matter, I disagree that Hodgkin’s
testimony and Campion’s treatment notes are inconsistent with Campion’s conclusion that she
would need eight restroom breaks during the workday. (Id.). Although Hodgkin testified that
she typically used the restroom approximately six times while her children were at school, she
also testified that the frequency of her bathroom use varied drastically depending upon how
recently she had received an infusion, her diet, and whether she was experiencing a “bad” day.
(Tr. 539-43). Indeed, the record reflects that Hodgkin routinely complained of using the
facilities more than five, and up to ten times per waking day, as well as needing to wake during
the night to use the restroom. (Tr. 256, 296, 404, 407, 413, 416, 799, 803, 820, 826, 881).
Further, the record simply does not support the conclusion that Hodgkin’s
symptoms were “well-controlled with medication compliance and infusion therapy.” (Tr. 485
(citing Tr. 250, 804, 883)).3 To the contrary, treatment records demonstrate that despite starting
infusion treatment, Hodgkin continued to experience up to ten bowel movements per day,
including experiencing continued accidents and blood in her stool. (Tr. 799, 803, 881). To
address this, Campion wanted to increase the frequency of her infusion treatments, but
Hodgkin’s insurance company denied this request approximately two months prior to the second
administrative hearing. (Tr. 799, 885). Further, an endoscopy performed less than a month prior
3
Both the ALJ and the Commissioner have cited to several pages of the administrative transcript to
support their assertion that the record demonstrates improvement with treatment. (Tr. 485 (citing Tr. 250, 804, 883);
Docket # 12-1 at 22-23 (citing Tr. 805, 814, 820, 846-47)). None of these record citations support the conclusion
that Hodgkin’s condition significantly improved with treatment. (Tr. 250 (treatment note from 2010 prior to
deterioration in condition as a result of pregnancy), 803-05 (6-9 bowel movements per day despite treatment with
prednisone and Entyvio infusions), 814 (reporting less bowel movements due to decreased food intake, combination
of prednisone and pentasa not effective to manage symptoms), 820-21 (reporting 9-12 bowel movements per day
with blood in stool), 846-47 (reporting fewer bowel movements but continuing to suffer from fecal frequency and
abdominal pain), 881-83 (although laboratory results were improved Hodgkin continued to report accidents and
several bowel movements per day, including three in the morning and again after eating)).
10
to the hearing demonstrated “evidence of severe Crohn colitis,” a large amount of pseudopolyps,
and a stricture in Hodgkin’s right lower area as well as in her sigmoid colon. (Tr. 892). Indeed,
Campion assessed that Hodgkin’s condition was not yet under control. (Tr. 874).
In sum, I find that the ALJ’s conclusion that the “evidence as a whole, including
[Campion’s] correlating and contemporaneous treatment records” was inconsistent with the
bathroom break frequency assessed by Campion is not supported by the record. (Tr. 485). Other
than Hodgkin’s purported improvement with treatment, and her hearing testimony, both of which
are discussed above, the ALJ did not identify anything in the treating notes that was inconsistent
with Campion’s assessment. Without identifying, let alone explaining, the alleged
inconsistencies, the ALJ has failed to provide a justifiable basis for discounting the opinion. See
Marchetti v. Colvin, 2014 WL 7359158, *13 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (“[u]nder the treating physician
rule, an ALJ may not reject a treating physician’s opinion based solely on . . . conclusory
assertions of inconsistency with the medical record”) (collecting cases); Ashley v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec., 2014 WL 7409594 at *2 (“this . . . conclusory statement about the treatment records
fails to fulfill the heightened duty of explanation”); Crossman v. Astrue, 783 F. Supp. 2d 300,
308 (D. Conn. 2010) (ALJ’s statement that treating physician’s opinion was “inconsistent with
the evidence and record as a whole” was “simply not the ‘overwhelmingly compelling type of
critique that would permit the Commissioner to overcome an otherwise valid medical opinion’”)
(quoting Velazquez v. Barnhart, 2004 WL 367614, *10 (D. Conn. 2004)).
“Sentence four of Section 405(g) provides district courts with the authority to
affirm, reverse, or modify a decision of the Commissioner ‘with or without remanding the cause
for a rehearing.’” Butts, 388 F.3d at 385 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 405 (g)). “Remand is appropriate
where, due to inconsistencies in the medical evidence and/or significant gaps in the record,
11
further findings would . . . plainly help to assure the proper disposition of [a] claim.” McGregor
v. Astrue, 993 F. Supp. 2d 130, 145 (N.D.N.Y. 2012) (internal quotations omitted) (adopting
report and recommendation). In contrast, where there is “no apparent basis to conclude that a
more complete record might support the Commissioner’s decision,” a remand for calculation of
benefits, as opposed to further fact gathering, is appropriate. See Butts, 388 F.3d at 385-86
(quoting Rosa v. Callahan, 168 F.3d 72, 83 (2d Cir. 1999)); see also Sublette v. Astrue, 856
F. Supp. 2d 614, 619 (W.D.N.Y. 2012) (remanding for calculation of benefits where medical
provider opinions, properly weighed, clearly justified finding of disability); Salisbury v. Astrue,
2008 WL 5110992 at *8-9 (remanding for calculation of benefits; “[t]hese opinions [properly
credited], together with the [p]laintiff’s testimony, provide substantial evidence to support a
finding that the [p]laintiff is disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act and that
further evidentiary proceedings would serve no further purpose”).
After reviewing the record, including the opinion of Campion, which is entitled to
controlling weight, I conclude that substantial evidence supports a finding that Hodgkin is
disabled, that no further development of the record would assist the determination, and that a
remand for calculation of benefits is warranted. In reaching this conclusion, I find that the ALJ
erred in his credibility determination and that his conclusion that Hodgkin requires only three
unscheduled bathroom breaks during the workday is not supported by substantial evidence.
Indeed, my independent review of the record establishes that the bathroom break limitations
assessed by Campion are well-supported by, and consistent with, the evidence of record. If
properly credited, this opinion, when considered in light of the vocational expert’s testimony that
six unscheduled bathroom breaks per day would preclude competitive employment, strongly
supports the conclusion that Hodgkin’s suffers from a substantial inability to remain on task for
12
approximately 85% of the workday, as required for competitive work, justifying a finding of
disability. (Tr. 551-52).
A longitudinal review of the treatment records demonstrates that Hodgkin
received routine ongoing treatment for Crohn’s disease from Campion between 2013 and 2017.4
(Tr. 399-420, 795-860). During that period, Hodgkin was treated with a combination of
medications, including prednisone, which Campion repeatedly advised was not meant for
long-term use. (Tr. 250, 799, 803, 806, 820, 829, 831, 833, 834, 837, 843). Attempts to wean
Hodgkin from prednisone were not successful, primarily due to her status as either pregnant or
nursing during the majority of this time period, precluding treatment with more effective or
appropriate long-term medication options. (Id.). As a result, Hodgkin did not begin infusion
therapy until September 2016, and although this therapy improved her laboratory results
significantly, she continued to experience frequent bowel movements, accidents, and blood in
her stool despite the ongoing infusion treatment. (Tr. 799, 803, 806-08, 881). Based upon these
continued symptoms, Campion opined on September 29, 2017, that Hodgkin’s condition was
“not under control yet.”5 (Tr. 875). Moreover, the bathroom break limitation assessed by
Campion is entirely consistent with Rosenberg’s opinion – the only other medical opinion in the
record relating to Hodgkin’s Crohn’s-related symptoms – that Hodgkin was unable to engage in
work-related activities unless she was provided “close proximity to bathroom facilities.”
(Tr. 896).
4
Hodgkin treated with Campion prior to 2013, but not consistently. (Tr. 241-50).
5
It is entirely possible that over time a treatment regimen that better controlled Hodgkin’s symptoms was
identified and implemented. Under such circumstances, in the event that the frequency and unpredictability of
Hodgkin’s bowel movements were sufficiently reduced, a finding of disability would not be appropriate. Whether
such events occurred is, of course, not before this Court on this record. For purposes of this determination, it is
sufficient to conclude that at the time of the ALJ’s decision the record did not support the conclusion that Hodgkin’s
condition had sufficiently improved with treatment to preclude a finding of disability.
13
Despite the persistence of Hodgkin’s colitis-related symptoms throughout her
treatment history with Campion, the ALJ concluded that the record does not support Hodgkin’s
claims of disability based, in part, upon her ability to engage in some daily activities – including
caring for her personal hygiene and children, managing her household, and for a period of time
providing childcare services to other families from her home – and her failure to comply
consistently with her medication regimen. (Tr. 480-81). I disagree. A thorough review of
Hodgkin’s treatment history supports Campion’s assessment of the severity of Hodgkin’s
impairments and her inability to perform work-related activities on a day-to-day basis in a
competitive work setting.
As an initial matter, although Hodgkin’s capacity to care for her children and
other children is relevant to the disability question, the ALJ’s decision suggests that he may have
equated her ability to care for children with an ability to work. Yet, the ALJ apparently
overlooked or ignored Hodgkin’s testimony that she was only able to manage childcare
responsibilities while in her house, with ready access to a bathroom and the ability to use the
restroom at will. (Tr. 514-15). Further, Hodgkin testified that she relied upon her family to
provide childcare during periods of intense gastrointestinal symptoms. (Tr. 508-09, 530).
Although, as noted by the ALJ, the treatment records suggest that Hodgkin
experienced periods of noncompliance with appointments and recommended treatment, she
explained that these periods primarily occurred when she relocated from the area where
Campion’s office was located. (Tr. 404, 513, 529, 884). Indeed, Hodgkin indicated that she
ultimately moved back to the Jamestown-area in order to be in closer proximity to Campion’s
office, as well as to receive assistance from her grandmother. (Tr. 256, 510, 513, 529).
14
The record in this case is extensive and contains a comprehensive set of treatment
notes documenting Hodgkin’s frequent and ongoing gastrointestinal treatment over a period of
four years. It includes an opinion from the health provider who treated her consistently during
that period, as well as an opinion from an examining physician. Properly credited, the opinion
from Hodgkin’s treatment provider supports the conclusion that Hodgkin does not have the
ability to perform the activities required to engage in competitive work. Under these
circumstances, a remand for further administrative proceedings is not warranted because there
are no inconsistencies or gaps in the record and further evidence does not need to be developed.
See Bradley v. Colvin, 110 F. Supp. 3d 429, 447 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (remanding for calculation of
benefits where “the ALJ disregarded a well-developed record with little explanation, giving the
[c]ourt no basis to conclude that remanding to obtain additional evidence would support the
Commissioner’s decision”) (internal quotations omitted); Henningsen v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.
Admin., 111 F. Supp. 3d 250, 272-73 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (“[b]ecause the record provides
persuasive proof of plaintiff’s disability, [and] proper application of the legal standards would
not contradict the weight of this evidence in the record . . . , the proper course of action is to
reverse the ALJ [d]ecision and remand the matter to the Commissioner for a calculation of
disability benefits”) (internal quotations omitted). Accordingly, remand for the calculation and
payment of benefits is warranted.
15
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Commissioner’s motion for judgment on the
pleadings (Docket # 12) is DENIED, and Hodgkin’s motion for judgment on the pleadings
(Docket # 8) is GRANTED. This matter is remanded to the Commissioner for calculation and
payment of benefits.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/Marian W. Payson
MARIAN W. PAYSON
United States Magistrate Judge
Dated: Rochester, New York
March 26, 2020
16
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?