Dietz v. Commissioner of Social Security
Filing
19
DECISION AND ORDERIT HEREBY IS ORDERED, that Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Docket No. 14) is DENIED.FURTHER, that Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Docket No. 16) is GRANTED.FURTHER, that the Clerk of Court is directed to CLOSE this case.SO ORDERED.Signed by William M. Skretny, United States District Judge on 2/16/2022. (JCM)-CLERK TO FOLLOW UP-
Case 1:20-cv-00836-WMS Document 19 Filed 02/16/22 Page 1 of 13
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
______________________________________
RANDY D.,
Plaintiff,
DECISION AND ORDER
20-CV-836S
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
______________________________________
1.
Plaintiff Randy D. 1 challenges the determination of an Administrative Law
Judge (“ALJ”) that he is not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act (“the
Act”). Plaintiff alleges that he has been disabled since February 9, 2014, due to various
physical and mental conditions. Plaintiff maintains that he is entitled to disability benefits
because his impairments render him unable to work.
2.
Plaintiff filed applications for disability benefits and supplemental security
income on March 24, 2016. After denial at the agency level, Plaintiff proceeded to a video
hearing before an ALJ, which took place before ALJ Eric Eklund on February 26, 2019.
At the time of the hearing, Plaintiff was 54 years old, with at least a high school education
(GED), and no past relevant work. The ALJ considered the case de novo and, on March
13, 2019, issued a written decision denying Plaintiff’s applications for benefits. The
Appeals Council thereafter denied Plaintiff’s request for review on May 7, 2020.
In accordance with this district’s Standing Order of November 18, 2020, and consistent with guidance
from the Committee on Court Administration and Case Management of the Judicial Conference of the
United States, this Decision and Order identifies the plaintiff by first name and last initial only.
1
1
Case 1:20-cv-00836-WMS Document 19 Filed 02/16/22 Page 2 of 13
3.
Plaintiff filed the current action on July 6, 2020, challenging the
Commissioner’s final decision. 2
After filing of the administrative record, the parties
cross-moved for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12 (c) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, with briefing concluded on April 29, 2021. (Docket Nos. 10, 14, 16, 17.) The
Clerk of Court assigned the case here on October 6, 2021, at which time this Court took
the motions under advisement without oral argument. (Docket No. 18.) For the following
reasons, Plaintiff’s motion will be denied, and Defendant’s motion will be granted.
4.
A party is entitled to judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12 (c) “only if it
has established that no material issue of fact remains to be resolved and that it is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.” Juster Assocs. v. City of Rutland, 901 F.2d 266, 269 (2d
Cir. 1990) (internal quotation marks omitted). In social security appeals, the district court
may “enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming,
modifying, or reversing a decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, with or without
remanding the case for a rehearing.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 405 (g), 1383 (c)(3).
5.
A court reviewing a denial of disability benefits may not determine de novo
whether an individual is disabled. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 405 (g), 1383 (c)(3); Wagner v. Sec’y
of Health & Hum. Servs., 906 F.2d 856, 860 (2d Cir. 1990). Instead, the court’s inquiry is
limited to two issues: (1) whether the Commissioner applied the correct legal standards,
and (2) whether the Commissioner’s factual findings are supported by substantial
evidence. See Greek v. Colvin, 802 F.3d 370, 374-75 (2d Cir. 2015) (per curiam); see
also Norman v. Astrue, 912 F. Supp. 2d 33, 70 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“The Court first reviews
the Commissioner’s decision for compliance with the correct legal standards; only then
The ALJ’s March 13, 2019 decision became the Commissioner’s final decision in this case when the
Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review.
2
2
Case 1:20-cv-00836-WMS Document 19 Filed 02/16/22 Page 3 of 13
does it determine whether the Commissioner’s conclusions were supported by substantial
evidence.”). In conducting this inquiry, the court cannot substitute “its own judgment for
that of the [Commissioner], even if it might justifiably have reached a different result upon
a de novo review.” Valente v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 733 F.2d 1037, 1041 (2d
Cir. 1984). Consequently, if the Commissioner’s determination is free from legal error
and supported by substantial evidence, the court must affirm. See Grey v. Heckler, 721
F.2d 41, 46 (2d Cir. 1983); Marcus v. Califano, 615 F.2d 23, 27 (2d Cir. 1979).
6.
As it relates to the legal-error inquiry, the court must determine whether “the
claimant has had a full hearing under the [Commissioner’s] regulations and in accordance
with the beneficent purposes of the [Social Security] Act.” Moran v. Astrue, 569 F.3d 108,
112 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotations and citations omitted). “Failure to apply the correct
legal standard constitutes reversible error, including, in certain circumstances, failure to
adhere to the applicable regulations.” Kohler v. Astrue, 546 F.3d 260, 265 (2d Cir. 2008)
(citation omitted). This inquiry is completed first because “[w]here there is a reasonable
basis for doubt whether the ALJ applied correct legal principles, application of the
substantial evidence standard to uphold a finding of no disability creates an unacceptable
risk that a claimant will be deprived of the right to have her disability determination made
according to the correct legal principles.” Johnson v. Bowen, 817 F.2d 983, 986 (2d Cir.
1987).
3
Case 1:20-cv-00836-WMS Document 19 Filed 02/16/22 Page 4 of 13
7.
As it relates to the substantial-evidence inquiry, the standard is not high.
See Biestek v. Berryhill, __ U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154, 203 L. Ed. 2d 504 (2019).
The United States Supreme Court defines substantial evidence as only “more than a mere
scintilla,” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S. Ct. 1420, 1427, 28 L. Ed. 2d
842 (1971), and has clarified that “[i]t means—and means only—'such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion,’” Biestek, 139
S. Ct. at 1154 (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S 197, 229, 59 S. Ct. 206, 83
L. Ed. 126 (1938)).
Because the Commissioner’s factual findings are conclusive if
supported by substantial evidence, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 405 (g), 1383 (c)(3), review is
properly focused on whether substantial evidence supports the Commissioner’s
determination, not whether substantial evidence might also support the plaintiff’s position.
See Zacharopoulos v. Saul, 516 F. Supp. 3d 211, 220 (E.D.N.Y. 2021) (noting that “the
relevant question is not whether substantial evidence supports plaintiff’s position, but
whether ‘substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision’”) (quoting Bonet ex rel. T.B.
v. Colvin, 523 F. App’x 58, 59 (2d Cir. 2013) (emphasis in original)). This is “a very
deferential standard of review—even more so than the ‘clearly erroneous’ standard.”
Brault v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm’r, 683 F.3d 443, 448 (2d Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (citing
Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 153, 119 S. Ct. 1816, 144 L. Ed. 2d 143 (1999)).
8.
“To determine on appeal whether [the Commissioner’s] findings are
supported by substantial evidence, a reviewing court considers the whole record,
examining the evidence from both sides, because an analysis of the substantiality of the
evidence must also include that which detracts from its weight.” Williams on Behalf of
Williams v. Bowen, 859 F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir. 1988).
4
If supported by substantial
Case 1:20-cv-00836-WMS Document 19 Filed 02/16/22 Page 5 of 13
evidence, the Commissioner's factual findings must be sustained “even where substantial
evidence may support the plaintiff's position and despite that the court's independent
analysis of the evidence may differ from the [Commissioner’s].” Rosado v. Sullivan, 805
F. Supp. 147, 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). Similarly, where evidence is deemed susceptible to
more than one rational interpretation, the Commissioner’s conclusion must be upheld.
See Rutherford v. Schweiker, 685 F.2d 60, 62 (2d Cir. 1982). In short, the substantialevidence standard requires that once an ALJ finds facts, those facts can be rejected “‘only
if a reasonable factfinder would have to conclude otherwise.’” Brault, 683 F.3d at 448
(quoting Warren v. Shalala, 29 F.3d 1287, 1290 (8th Cir. 1994) (emphasis in original)).
9.
The Commissioner has established a five-step sequential evaluation
process to determine whether an individual is disabled under the Act. See 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520, 416.920. The Supreme Court recognized the validity of this analysis in Bowen
v. Yuckert, and it remains the proper approach for analyzing whether a claimant is
disabled. 482 U.S. 137, 140-42, 107 S. Ct. 2287, 2291, 96 L. Ed. 2d 119 (1987).
10.
The five-step process is as follows:
First, the [Commissioner] considers whether the claimant is
currently engaged in substantial gainful activity. If he is not,
the [Commissioner] next considers whether the claimant has
a “severe impairment” which significantly limits her physical or
mental ability to do basic work activities. If the claimant
suffers such an impairment, the third inquiry is whether, based
solely on medical evidence, the claimant has an impairment
which is listed in Appendix 1 of the regulations. If the claimant
has such an impairment, the [Commissioner] will consider her
disabled without considering vocational factors such as age,
education, and work experience; the [Commissioner]
presumes that a claimant who is afflicted with a “listed”
impairment is unable to perform substantial gainful activity.
Assuming the claimant does not have a listed impairment, the
fourth inquiry is whether, despite the claimant's severe
impairment, she has the residual functional capacity to
5
Case 1:20-cv-00836-WMS Document 19 Filed 02/16/22 Page 6 of 13
perform her past work. Finally, if the claimant is unable to
perform her past work, the [Commissioner] then determines
whether there is other work which the claimant could perform.
Berry v. Schweiker, 675 F.2d 464, 467 (2d Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (quotations in original);
see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920; Rosa v. Callahan, 168 F.3d 72, 77 (2d Cir.
1999).
11.
The claimant has the burden of proof on the first four steps; the
Commissioner has the burden of proof on the fifth step. See Bowen, 482 U.S. at 146 n.5;
Ferraris v. Heckler, 728 F.2d 582, 584 (2d Cir. 1984). The fifth step is divided into two
parts.
First, the Commissioner must assess the claimant's job qualifications by
considering his or her physical ability, age, education, and work experience. Second, the
Commissioner must determine whether jobs exist in the national economy that a person
having the claimant's qualifications could perform. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 423 (d)(2)(A), 1383
(c)(1)(A); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 (f), 416.920 (a)(4); Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458,
460, 103 S. Ct. 1952, 1954, 76 L. Ed. 2d 66 (1983).
12.
In this case, the ALJ found the following with regard to the five-step process
set forth above: (1) Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since February
9, 2014, the alleged onset date (R. at 14); 3 (2) Plaintiff had multiple severe impairments
within the meaning of the Act 4 (R. at 14-15); (3) Plaintiff does not have an impairment or
3
Citations to the underlying administrative record are designated as “R.”
4
The ALJ found that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments:
degenerative disc disease with spurring at the C3-C4 and C5-C6;
narrowing at the C3-C4 with moderate foraminal narrowing at the C5-C6;
retrolisthesis of C5 relative to C6; mild scoliosis; right AC joint
osteoarthritis; right shoulder impingement; right shoulder rotator cuff tear;
chronic obstructive pulmonary disease; asthma; history of syncope and
collapse; and attention deficit disorder.
6
Case 1:20-cv-00836-WMS Document 19 Filed 02/16/22 Page 7 of 13
combination of impairments that meet or medically equal any of the impairments listed in
20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (R. at 15-18); (4) Plaintiff retained the residual
functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b)
and 416.967 (b), with certain exceptions5 (R. at 18-25); (5) Plaintiff had no past relevant
work (R. at 25); and (6) Plaintiff could perform jobs that exist in significant numbers in the
national economy given his age, education, work experience, and RFC (R. at 26).
Accordingly, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was not under a disability as defined by the
Act from February 9, 2014, through March 13, 2019. (R. at 12, 26.)
13.
Plaintiff offers a single challenge to the ALJ’s decision: He argues that the
RFC determination is not supported by substantial evidence because the ALJ
impermissibly based it on his own lay interpretation of bare medical evidence, rather than
a fully credited medical opinion. In response, the Commissioner argues that the ALJ’s
decision is supported by substantial evidence and free from legal error and should
therefore be affirmed. This Court agrees with the Commissioner.
(R. at 14.)
5
The ALJ found that Plaintiff had the RFC to perform light work, with the following exceptions:
no climbing of ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; no crawling; occasional
climbing balancing, stooping, kneeling, and crouching; occasional
climbing of ramps and stairs; frequent rotation and extending of the neck;
occasional foot control operations; occasional pushing and pulling with the
right upper extremity; frequent reaching with the right upper extremity;
overhead reaching no more than 5% of the work day with the right upper
extremity; no exposure to extreme could, heat, wetness, humidity,
concentrated chemicals, dusts gasses, and poorly ventilated areas; no
exposure to moving machinery and unprotected heights no driving in the
work setting; work is limited to simple, unskilled work in a los stress job
setting defined as occupation requiring only occasional decision-making
and only occasional changes in the work setting.
(R. at 18.)
7
Case 1:20-cv-00836-WMS Document 19 Filed 02/16/22 Page 8 of 13
14.
RFC is “what an individual can still do despite his or her limitations.” Melville
v. Apfel, 198 F.3d 45, 52 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *2). To
properly determine RFC, the ALJ must assess all relevant medical and other evidence in
the record. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545 (a)(1), 416.945 (a)(1). Such evidence includes,
inter alia, objective medical evidence, medical opinions, medical history, clinical findings,
and the claimant’s own assessment of limitations. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1513 (a)(1)-(5),
416.913 (a)(1)-(5); see also Josua S. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 6:19-CV-1434 (ML), 2021
WL 105769, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 2021) (“In rendering an RFC determination, the ALJ
must consider objective medical facts, diagnoses, and medical opinions based on such
facts, as well as a plaintiff’s subjective symptoms, including pain and descriptions of other
limitations.”) (collecting cases). All of this evidence must be considered in determining
RFC, “not just . . . the medical opinions alone.” Richard B. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 1:19CV-579 (WBC), 2021 WL 22504, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 2021) (citing Trepanier v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 752 F. App’x 75, 79 (2d Cir. 2018)).
15.
While the ALJ is precluded from substituting his or her own lay opinion for
competent medical evidence, the ALJ is nonetheless entitled to weigh all of the evidence,
resolve conflicts within it, and reach an RFC that is consistent with the record as a whole.
See Quinn v. Colvin, 199 F. Supp. 3d 692, 712 (W.D.N.Y. 2016). And the ALJ’s RFC
determination need neither track nor correspond perfectly with any single medical opinion.
Id. Finally, “[a]lthough the ALJ has the responsibility to determine the RFC based on all
the evidence in the record, the burden is on the Plaintiff to demonstrate functional
limitations that preclude any substantial gainful activity.” Richard B., 2021 WL 22504, at
*4.
8
Case 1:20-cv-00836-WMS Document 19 Filed 02/16/22 Page 9 of 13
16.
Here, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff could perform light work, with the
exceptions set out in footnote 5 above. (R. at 18-25.) To be considered capable of
performing a full range of light work, an individual must generally have the substantial
ability to lift 20 pounds or less at a time, frequently lift or carry objects weighing up to 10
pounds, walk or stand a good deal, and push and pull arm or leg controls while seated.
See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567 (b), 416.967 (b).
17.
The ALJ reached his RFC determination after reviewing and evaluating the
record evidence. First, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s statements concerning the intensity,
persistence, and limiting effects of his physical symptoms were not entirely consistent
with the medical evidence. (R. at 19-20.) In doing so, the ALJ explained his consideration
of Plaintiff’s statements as weighed against the medical evidence (including physical
exam findings, diagnostic evidence, and treatment notes) pertaining to each severe
impairment. (R. at 19-20 (shoulder and back impairments); R. at 20-21 (neck pain with
radiating symptoms); R. at 21-22 (COPD and asthma); R. at 22-23 (ADD and syncope
(fainting)). In each case, the ALJ found insufficient objective evidence to support a finding
that Plaintiff is unable to perform a reduced range of light work consistent with the RFC.
Notably, the ALJ found it significant that Plaintiff’s course of treatment for his shoulder
and neck pain remained routine and conservative (R. at 20), that Plaintiff failed to
consistently use his narcotic pain medication according to his controlled-substance
agreement (R. at 20), that Plaintiff postponed scheduled shoulder procedures for nonmedical reasons (R. at 21), and that Plaintiff routinely advised his medical providers that
he was actively working and pursuing employment in the construction field (R. at 14, 21,
23-24).
9
Case 1:20-cv-00836-WMS Document 19 Filed 02/16/22 Page 10 of 13
18.
Second, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s admitted activities of daily living were
inconsistent with the significant limitations he alleged, including independently performing
nearly all activities of daily living (R. at 23), independence managing financial affairs (R.
at 23), working in the construction field (R. at 14, 21, 23-24), doing yard work (R. at 23),
and working as a handyman (R. at 24). In summarizing his findings, the ALJ wrote that
“[t]he claimant’s ability to perform strenuous work in construction and maintenance jobs
(whether reported or unreported earnings) is persuasive evidence that he has the physical
capacity to perform a reduced range of light work as defined by the [RFC].” (R. at 24.)
19.
Third, the ALJ considered the only medical opinion concerning Plaintiff’s
physical limitations. That opinion was rendered by David Brauer, M.D., who opined that
Plaintiff had no limitation in the ability to sit, stand, or walk; and had only mild limitations
in climbing, pushing, pulling, carrying heavy objects, and raising objects about his head.
(R. at 24.) The ALJ afforded Dr. Brauer’s opinion “partial weight” because it was not a
function-by-function assessment of Plaintiff’s maximum abilities despite his impairment.
(Id.) The ALJ did, however, credit Dr. Brauer’s opinion to the extent that his findings of
mild limitations were inconsistent with a finding of disability. (Id.) Plaintiff did not submit
any treating-physician medical-source statements regarding his physical functioning,
which the ALJ found detracted from his claim. (Id.)
20.
As to Plaintiff’s mental limitations, the ALJ considered Nurse Practitioner
Debra Stacey’s opinion but gave it little weight. (R. at 25.) Stacey determined that Plaintiff
had a global assessment of functioning (GAF) score of 70, but the ALJ found that the
assessment was not representative of Plaintiff’s baseline functioning with continued
psychiatric treatment. (R. at 25.) And again, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff failed to submit
10
Case 1:20-cv-00836-WMS Document 19 Filed 02/16/22 Page 11 of 13
any treating-physician medical-source statement regarding his mental functioning, which
weakened his claim. (R. at 24.)
21.
Against this backdrop, Plaintiff argues that the RFC determination is
unsupported by substantial evidence because the ALJ gave only partial weight to Dr.
Brauer’s opinion, leaving the RFC unsupported by any medical opinion evidence. Medical
opinion evidence, however, is just one subset of evidence that the ALJ must consider in
reaching an RFC determination. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1513 (a)(1)-(5); 416.913 (a)(1)(5). While medical opinion evidence is undoubtedly important, it is not error, per se, for
an ALJ to formulate an RFC in the absence of it, so long as the RFC determination is
otherwise supported by the evidence as a whole. See, e.g., Monroe v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., 676 F. App’x 5, 8-9 (2d Cir. Jan. 18, 2017) (stating that where “the record contains
sufficient evidence from which an ALJ can assess the claimant’s [RFC], a medical source
statement or formal medical opinion is not necessarily required”) (quotation marks and
citations omitted); Johnson v. Colvin, 669 F. App’x 44, 46-47 (2d Cir. 2016) (“[B]ecause
the record contained sufficient other evidence supporting the ALJ’s determination and
because the ALJ weighed all of that evidence when making his residual functional
capacity finding, there was no ‘gap’ in the record and the ALJ did not rely on his own ‘lay
opinion.’”); Desirae D. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., CASE # 20-cv-54, 2021 WL 2042576, at
*4 (W.D.N.Y. May 21, 2021) (“The Second Circuit has rejected plaintiff’s argument and
held that an RFC may be supported by substantial evidence, even if it does not
correspond to any particular medical opinion.”) (collecting cases). Here, the ALJ found
an RFC more restrictive than Dr. Brauer’s opinion, and the RFC is amply supported by
the cited medical evidence.
11
Case 1:20-cv-00836-WMS Document 19 Filed 02/16/22 Page 12 of 13
22.
Plaintiff further appears to argue that the ALJ impermissibly interpreted
diagnostic imaging that Dr. Brauer did not review. Plaintiff does not explain how the ALJ
“translate[d] radiologic reports,” see Plaintiff’s Memorandum, Docket No. 14-1, p. 15, but
in any event, an ALJ is permitted to consider all relevant medical evidence, including
diagnostic imaging. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1513 (a)(1)-(5); 416.913 (a)(1)-(5). This
Court’s review of the record reveals no impermissible interpretation of bare medical
findings by the ALJ, but rather, a consideration of diagnostic findings in arriving at an
appropriate RFC, which, again, is more restrictive than the submitted medical opinion
evidence. 6
23.
As set out above, the ALJ’s RFC determination is the product of his
consideration and weighing of Plaintiff’s subjective assessment of his physical limitations,
his daily activities, the objective medical evidence, and the medical opinion evidence.
See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1513 (a)(1)-(5); 416.913 (a)(1)-(5). As he is required to do, the ALJ
properly weighed all of the available evidence to make his RFC determination, and there
is no indication that he substituted his own opinion for that of any medical provider or
impermissibly interpreted bare medical findings. See Matta, 508 F. App’x at 56. The RFC
is also consistent with the credited portion of Dr. Brauer’s opinion and the record evidence
as a whole. See Richard B., 2021 WL 22504, at *5 (noting that an ALJ must formulate
RFC based on the record as a whole). Moreover, the reasoning and record support for
each component of the RFC is explained in the ALJ’s decision.
Plaintiff also includes an undeveloped argument that the ALJ impermissibly interpreted the evidence
concerning his mental limitations, but again, avers no specific error in the ALJ’s consideration of that
evidence. See Plaintiff’s Memorandum, Docket No. 14-1, p. 16.
6
12
Case 1:20-cv-00836-WMS Document 19 Filed 02/16/22 Page 13 of 13
24.
Accordingly, having reviewed the ALJ’s decision in light of Plaintiff’s
arguments, this Court finds that it is free from legal error and supported by substantial
evidence. It is therefore affirmed. See Grey, 721 F.2d at 46; Marcus, 615 F.2d at 27.
Plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the pleadings is denied, and Defendant’s motion
seeking the same relief is granted.
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED, that Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
(Docket No. 14) is DENIED.
FURTHER, that Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Docket No.
16) is GRANTED.
FURTHER, that the Clerk of Court is directed to CLOSE this case.
SO ORDERED.
Dated:
February 16, 2022
Buffalo, New York
s/William M. Skretny
WILLIAM M. SKRETNY
United States District Judge
13
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?