Gatta v. Special Metals Corporation

Filing 27

DECISION AND ORDER: For the reasons stated in the decision and in the R&R, SMC's motion for judgment on the pleadings, Docket Item 17 , is DENIED as to Gatta's Labor Law section 200 claim, but it will be GRANTED as to Gatta's common l aw negligence claims unless, within 30 days of the date of this order, Gatta files a second amended complaint addressing the deficiencies in those claims. The case is referred back to Judge Schroeder for further proceedings consistent with the referral order of August 13, 2020, Docket Item 4 . SO ORDERED. Signed by Hon. Lawrence J. Vilardo on 12/14/2023. (DJ)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
BARRON GATTA,
Plaintiff,
v.
SPECIAL METALS CORPORATION,

20-CV-884-LJV-HKS
DECISION & ORDER

Defendant.
On January 24, 2020, the plaintiff, Barron Gatta, commenced this action in New
York State Supreme Court, Chautauqua County, alleging that he was injured due to the
negligence of the defendant, Special Metals Corporation (“SMC”). Docket Item 1-3.
After SMC removed the action to this Court, Docket Item 1, the case was referred to
United States Magistrate Judge H. Kenneth Schroeder, Jr., for all proceedings under 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and (B), Docket Item 4. On June 7, 2021, SMC moved for
judgment on the pleadings, Docket Item 17; on July 15, 2021, Gatta responded, Docket
Item 19, and submitted a proposed second amended complaint, 1 Docket Item 19-3; and
on August 19, 2021, SMC replied, Docket Item 21.
On August 16, 2023, Judge Schroeder issued a Report and Recommendation
(“R&R”) finding that SMC’s motion should be granted in part and denied in part. 2
Docket Item 22. More specifically, Judge Schroeder recommended that the motion be
Before the case was removed, Gatta amended his complaint, Docket Item 1-9,
and SMC answered the amended complaint, Docket Item 1-10.
1

Judge Schroeder did not consider the proposed second amended complaint or
the affidavit submitted with it. Docket Item 22 at 4-6. But he recommended granting
Gatta leave to amend the complaint a second time. Id. at 6 n.3.
2

granted with leave to amend as to Gatta’s common law negligence claims and denied
as to Gatta’s claim under New York Labor Law § 200 (“Labor Law section 200”). Id.
On August 30, 2023, SMC objected to the R&R on the ground that Judge
Schroeder should have recommended granting the motion in its entirety. Docket
Item 23. On October 11, 2023, Gatta responded to the objection. Docket Item 25. And
on October 25, 2023, SMC replied. Docket Item 26.
A district court may accept, reject, or modify the findings or recommendations of
a magistrate judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). The court must
review de novo those portions of a magistrate judge’s recommendation to which a party
objects. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). But neither 28 U.S.C. § 636
nor Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72 requires a district court to review the
recommendation of a magistrate judge to which no objections are raised. See Thomas
v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149-50 (1985).
This Court has carefully and thoroughly reviewed the R&R; the record in this
case; the objection, response, and reply; and the materials submitted to Judge
Schroeder. Based on that de novo review, the Court accepts and adopts Judge
Schroeder’s recommendation. Accordingly, SMC’s motion is denied as to Gatta’s Labor
Law section 200 claim but will be granted as to Gatta’s common law negligence claims
unless Gatta files a second amended complaint addressing the deficiencies noted in the
R&R.
LEGAL PRINCIPLES
The standard for deciding a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings is
“the same standard [that applies] to dismissals pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).” L-7 Designs,
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Inc. v. Old Navy, LLC, 647 F.3d 419, 429 (2d Cir. 2011) (alterations omitted). “To
survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted
as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court
to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “The plausibility standard is not akin to
a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant
has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
DISCUSSION
The Court assumes the reader’s familiarity with the facts alleged in the amended
complaint, see Docket Item 1-9, and Judge Schroeder’s analysis in the R&R, see
Docket Item 22, and refers to them only as necessary to explain its decision. 3
I.

COMMON LAW NEGLIGENCE CLAIMS
Gatta asserts common law negligence claims based on SMC’s alleged inaction,

failure to train, failure to supervise, and failure to abide by industry standards. Docket
Item 1-9 at ¶¶ 17-33. Judge Schroeder recommended that each of those claims be
dismissed, Docket Item 22 at 6-11, but that if Gatta seeks leave to amend, “leave to
amend be granted,” id. at 6 n.3.

On a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c), as on a motion to
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court “accept[s] all factual allegations in the complaint
as true and draw[s] all reasonable inferences in [the] plaintiff’s favor.” In re Thelen LLP,
736 F.3d 213, 218 (2d Cir. 2013).
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3

Neither party objected to that recommendation, see Docket Items 23, 25-26, and
this Court therefore is not required to review it, see Thomas, 474 U.S. at 149-50 (neither
28 U.S.C. § 636 nor Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72 requires a district court to
review the recommendation of a magistrate judge to which no objections are raised).
Nevertheless, the Court in its discretion has reviewed that portion of the R&R.
Based on that review and the absence of any objection, the Court accepts and
adopts the R&R’s finding that Gatta has failed to state claims for common law
negligence. But in light of Judge Schroeder’s recommendation that Gatta be given
leave to amend his complaint a second time, see Docket Item 22 at 6 n.3; id. at 9 n.5
(noting that the proposed “second amended complaint and supporting affidavit may
change th[e] analysis” of Gatta’s common law negligence claims), those claims will not
be dismissed if Gatta files a second amended complaint, reasserting those claims and
addressing the deficiencies noted in the R&R, within 30 days of the date of this order.
II.

LABOR LAW SECTION 200 CLAIM
“Labor Law [section] 200 codifies the common law duty of an owner or employer

to provide employees a safe workplace.” Homola v. Praxair, Inc., 2010 WL 2160348, at
*3 (W.D.N.Y. May 27, 2010) (citing Comes v. N.Y. State Elec. & Gas Corp., 82 N.Y.2d
876, 631 N.E.2d 110 (1993); Russin v. Louis N. Picciano & Son, 54 N.Y.2d 311, 429
N.E.2d 805 (1981)). It “applies to owners, contractors, or their agents, who ‘have the
authority to control the activity bringing about the injury to enable it to avoid or correct
an unsafe condition.’” Id. (quoting Russin, 54 N.Y.2d at 317, 429 N.E.2d at 807).
“Cases involving Labor Law [section] 200 fall into two broad categories: namely,
those where workers are injured as a result of dangerous or defective premises
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conditions at a worksite, and those involving the manner in which the work is
performed.” Ortega v. Puccia, 57 A.D.3d 54, 61, 866 N.Y.S.2d 323, 329 (2d Dep’t
2008). “Where the alleged defect or dangerous condition arises from the [plaintiff’s]
methods and the owner . . . ‘exercises no supervisory control over the operation, no
liability attaches to the owner . . . under section 200 of the Labor Law.’” 4 Vega v. FNUB,
Inc., 217 A.D.3d 1475, 1478, 192 N.Y.S.3d 863, 868 (4th Dep’t 2023) (quoting Lombardi
v. Stout, 80 N.Y.2d 290, 295, 604 N.E.2d 117, 119 (1992)).
Judge Schroeder found that Gatta had not plausibly alleged that he was injured
due to a dangerous condition on SMC’s premises. Docket Item 22 at 13. Neither party
objected to that finding. 5 See Docket Items 23, 25-26. But Judge Schroeder also found
that Gatta has alleged a plausible Labor Law section 200 claim based on the manner in
which Gatta performed his work. Docket Item 22 at 13-16.

SMC contends that the Second Department has a different standard for Labor
Law section 200 claims than the other Appellate Division departments and that Judge
Schroeder applied the incorrect standard in the R&R. Docket Item 23 at 8-9. More
specifically, it says that in the Second Department, an owner can be held liable under
Labor Law section 200 if it had “authority to supervise the work” at issue, while in the
other departments—including the Fourth Department, which covers the Western District
of New York—an owner can be held liable only if it actually “exercised supervision of or
control over the work that led to the injury.” Id. (citing Abreu v. Frocione Props., LLC,
199 A.D.3d 1452, 154 N.Y.S.3d 620 (4th Dep’t 2021)). Gatta responds that there is no
such split among the departments. Docket Item 25 at 5-7.
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Because this Court finds that Gatta has plausibly alleged that SMC actually
supervised or controlled the work that caused his injury, infra at 5-7, it need not
determine whether New York court decisions on Labor Law section 200 create a split.
Gatta’s suggestion that Judge Schroeder “concluded that [SMC] had . . . actual
or constructive notice of [a] dangerous condition” is incorrect and immaterial. See
Docket Item 25 at 7.
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SMC objects to that conclusion. Docket Item 23 at 7-11. More specifically, SMC
argues that Gatta’s “factual allegations are insufficient” to support his “conclusory”
statement that “SMC actually exercised supervision and control over the manner of [his]
work.” Docket Item 23 at 9-10; see Docket Item 1-9 at ¶ 37. This Court disagrees.
Gatta alleges that on the day he was injured, he delivered a shipment of metal
rods—each of which weighed “about 2000 pounds”—to a manufacturing facility
operated by SMC. Docket Item 1-9 at ¶¶ 3-8. He says that after he arrived at the
facility, he “requested that [SMC’s] employees use a crane or a forklift, or otherwise
assist him, to remove the [rods] from the trailer.” Id. at ¶¶ 9-10. But, he alleges, SMC’s
employees “declined to assist [him] and informed him he was solely responsible for
unloading the product.” Id. at ¶ 11. Gatta says that when he then attempted to do that,
“[t]he rods shifted under [his] feet” and he fell “from the trailer bed from a height of about
6 to 8 feet,” sustaining serious injuries. Id. at ¶¶ 12-16.
As Judge Schroeder found, “[d]rawing all reasonable inferences in [Gatta’s]
favor,” those specific factual allegations suggest that SMC actually exercised control
over the manner in which Gatta unloaded the rods. See Docket Item 22 at 15. Gatta’s
truck was delivering heavy rods to SMC, and those rods had to be unloaded for Gatta to
complete his task. Docket Item 1-9 at ¶¶ 5-8. He asked for help, but SMC employees
told him that he had to do it himself. Id. at ¶¶ 9-11. Under the circumstances, Gatta
had little choice other than to do what the SMC employees told him to do. Id. at ¶ 12.
This is not a situation where Gatta attempted to perform his work without advice
from SMC. Cf. Affri v. Basch, 13 N.Y.3d 592, 596, 921 N.E.2d 1034, 1036 (2009)
(finding that homeowner defendants did not exercise sufficient supervisory control over

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plaintiff’s work because they did not instruct plaintiff about “the method or manner in
which the work was . . . to be performed” and were not present when plaintiff performed
the work). On the contrary, Gatta asked for assistance and SMC’s employees
instructed him to unload the rods himself. See Docket Item 1-9 at ¶¶ 9-11. What is
more, it certainly is plausible—based on Gatta’s allegation that he asked SMC
employees to use a crane or forklift to unload the rods—that SMC controlled heavy
machinery that could have been used to unload the rods safely. See id.; see also
Docket Item 22 at 15 (“Indeed, one can reasonably infer [that] . . . [SMC] bore at least
some responsibility for unloading the truck or providing proper equipment to do so.”); id.
at 16 n.9 (noting that SMC “has not established that it was solely [Gatta’s] responsibility
to unload the truck”). And if a crane or forklift was available and Gatta amends his
complaint as the R&R suggested, that might support both Labor Law and negligence
claims.
In sum, Gatta has plausibly alleged that SMC controlled and instructed him as to
the manner in which he should perform the work that led to his injury. He therefore has
stated a plausible claim under Labor Law section 200.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above and in the R&R, SMC’s motion for judgment on the
pleadings, Docket Item 17, is DENIED as to Gatta’s Labor Law section 200 claim, but it
will be GRANTED as to Gatta’s common law negligence claims unless, within 30 days
of the date of this order, Gatta files a second amended complaint addressing the
deficiencies in those claims. The case is referred back to Judge Schroeder for further
proceedings consistent with the referral order of August 13, 2020, Docket Item 4.
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SO ORDERED.

Dated:

December 14, 2023
Buffalo, New York

/s/ Lawrence J. Vilardo
LAWRENCE J. VILARDO
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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