McGuire v. Town of Cheektowaga et al

Filing 63

ORDER denying 54 Motion to Certify the Town Defendants' Appeal as Frivolous ; and denying 54 Motion for Reconsideration filed by Stacie McGuire. Signed by Chief District Judge Christina Clair Reiss on 8/28/24. (SG)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
STACIE MCGUIRE,
Plaintiff,
V.

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)
)
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TOWN OF CHEEKTOWAGA;
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BRIAN WESOLOSKI, individually, and
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in his capacity as a Town of Cheektowaga
Police Officer; JOSE DOMENECH,
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individually, and in his capacity as a Town
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of Cheektowaga Police Officer; DENNIS
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KUSAK, individually, and in his capacity as
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a Town of Cheektowaga Police Officer;
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JOHN WANAT, individually, and in his
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capacity as a Town of Cheektowaga Police
Officer; PAT CHLUDZINSKI, individually,
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and in his capacity as a Town of Cheektowaga )
Police Officer; JOHN DOE(S), individually,
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and in his/her capacity as a Town of
Cheektowaga Police Officer; and
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COREY MCGUIRE,
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Defendants.
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Case No. 1:20-cv-01632

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO
CERTIFY THE TOWN DEFENDANTS' APPEAL AS FRIVOLOUS
AND FOR RECONSIDERATION
(Doc. 54)
Plaintiff Stacie McGuire brings this civil rights action against Defendants Town of
Cheektowaga (the "Town"), Brian Wesoloski, Jose Domenech, Dennis Kusak, John
Wanat, and Pat Chludzinski (the "Law Enforcement Defendants") (collectively, the
"Town Defendants"), arising out of an incident on November 8, 2017 that resulted in her
arrest and detention. She moves to certify the Town Defendants' appeal from the court's
Opinion and Order granting in part and denying in part the Town Defendants' motion for

summary judgment (the "Summary Judgment Opinion and Order") as frivolous and for
reconsideration of the court's Summary Judgment Opinion and Order. (Doc. 54.) On
March 20, 2024, the Town Defendants opposed Plaintiffs motion. (Doc. 55.) Plaintiff
filed her reply on March 26, 2024, (Doc. 57), at which point the court took the pending
motion under advisement.
Plaintiff is represented by Chad A. Davenport, Esq., R. Anthony Rupp, III, Esq.,
and Young Woo Kim, Esq. The Town Defendants are represented by Kevin Eugene
Loftus, Jr., Esq., and Nicholas M. Hriczko, Esq.

I.

Factual and Procedural Background.
Plaintiff alleged the following claims against the Town Defendants: false arrest for

violations of her rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments (Count I); false
imprisonment for violations of her rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments
(Count II); malicious prosecution (Count 111); failure to intervene for violations of her
rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments (Count IV); deliberate indifference
to her serious medical needs pursuant to her rights under the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendments (Count V); conspiracy to violate her rights pursuant to the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments (Count VI); and violation of her due process rights pursuant to
the Fourteenth Amendment (Count VII). She also brings a claim against the Town for
violation of her rights pursuant to the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments for the Town's
policy, custom, and practice of failing to supervise and train its police officers (Count
VIII). Plaintiff requests compensatory and punitive damages.
On January 31, 2024, the court issued the Summary Judgment Opinion and Order,
granting in part and denying in part the Town Defendants' February 10, 2023 motion for
summary judgment. (Doc. 33.) The court concluded that disputed issues of fact precluded
judgment as a matter of law on some of Plaintiffs claims and on the Town Defendants'
arguments that they were entitled to qualified immunity. The Summary Judgment
Opinion and Order denied summary judgment on Plaintiffs claims for false arrest (Count
I), false imprisonment (Count II), and malicious prosecution (Count III), and granted
summary judgment on Plaintiffs claims for deliberate indifference to serious medical
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needs (Count V), conspiracy to violate her constitutional rights (Count VI), violation of
her right to substantive due process (Count VII), and supervisory liability (Count VIII).
Regarding Plaintiffs claim for failure to intervene (Count IV), the Summary Judgment
Opinion and Order denied the Town Defendants' motion as it pertained to her arrest but
granted the motion as it pertained to her prosecution.
The Summary Judgment Opinion and Order also dismissed Plaintiffs request for
punitive damages against the Town but denied without prejudice the motion as it
pertained to Plaintiffs punitive damages request against the individual law enforcement
officers in their individual capacities. The Town Defendants thereafter filed an
interlocutory appeal of the denial of their motion for summary judgment on the issue of
qualified immunity.

II.

Conclusions of Law and Analysis.
A.

Whether the Court Should Certify the Town Defendants' Appeal as
Frivolous.

Plaintiff argues the Town Defendants' appeal is frivolous because their qualified
immunity claims require a resolution of genuine disputes of material fact and because
they did not preserve any arguments that would permit the Second Circuit to resolve
issues that are exclusively matters of law. 1
"[A] district court's denial of a claim of qualified immunity, to the extent that it
turns on an issue oflaw, is an appealable 'final decision' within the meaning of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291 notwithstanding the absence of a final judgment." Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S.
511, 530 ( 1985). If a district court's qualified immunity decision is "based on
determinations of evidentiary sufficiency[,]" or "if resolution of the immunity defense
depends upon disputed factual issues[,]" it is not immediately appealable. Jok v. City of

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Plaintiff cites several decisions from other district courts in the Second Circuit in which the
court applied a "dual jurisdiction" rule to "certify as 'frivolous' an appeal from a denial of
qualified immunity if the denial was based on a factual dispute." Kistner v. City of Buffalo, 2023
WL 21219, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2023) (declining to apply the dual jurisdiction rule due to the
Second Circuit's silence on the practice). The Second Circuit has not endorsed this practice.

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Burlington, 96 F.4th 291,295 (2d Cir. 2024) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted).
However, even when a district court denies qualified immunity based on
the presence of disputed material facts, an appellant may still invoke
appellate jurisdiction on an interlocutory basis if the appellant contends that
on stipulated facts, or on the facts that the plaintiff alleges are true, or on
the facts favorable to the plaintiff that the trial judge concluded the jury
might find, the immunity defense is established as a matter oflaw.

Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). It is the appellant's burden to
demonstrate that this requirement has been met. Id.
The Town Defendants intend to argue on appeal that they are entitled to qualified
immunity based on "the undisputed facts or even Plaintiffs version of the facts." (Doc.
55 at 6.) Provided the Town Defendants agree to "facts that the plaintiff alleges are true,"
or "facts favorable to the plaintiff that the trial judge concluded the jury might find[,]"
and rely on those facts when raising arguments on appeal, the barrier to an interlocutory
appeal is removed. Jok, 96 F .4th at 295. Although Plaintiff asserts that any such
arguments would not be preserved because the Town Defendants' arguments before this
court were based on their version of the facts, lack of preservation is not a jurisdictional
defect. See In re Nortel Networks Corp. Sec. Litig., 539 F.3d 129, 133 (2d Cir. 2008)
("We recognize that this court has discretion to consider arguments waived below
because our waiver doctrine is entirely prudential."). For this reason, the court DENIES
Plaintiffs request to certify the Town Defendants' appeal as frivolous.

B.

Whether the Court Should Reconsider its Grant of the Town
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on her Failure to
Intervene Claim Regarding her Prosecution.

Plaintiff contends the court's conclusion that there was sufficient evidence to
support the Town Defendants' personal involvement for her malicious prosecution claim
is inconsistent with its conclusion that there was insufficient evidence of the Town
Defendants' personal involvement for her failure to intervene claim as it relates to her
prosecution. She asks the court to modify its decision to permit her to bring her failure to
intervene claim in the alternative to her malicious prosecution claim.
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"It is well-settled that a party may move for reconsideration and obtain relief only

when the [movant] identifies 'an intervening change of controlling law, the availability of
new evidence, or the need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice."' Kole!

Beth Yechiel Mechil ofTartikov, Inc. v. YLL Irrevocable Tr., 729 F.3d 99, 108 (2d Cir.
2013) (quoting Virgin At!. Airways, Ltd. v. Nat'! Mediation Bd., 956 F.2d 1245, 1255 (2d
Cir. 1992)). "[T]he standard for granting a ... motion for reconsideration is strict[.]"

Analytical Survs., Inc. v. Tonga Partners, L.P., 684 F.3d 36, 52 (2d Cir. 2012) (alteration
adopted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70
F .3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995)). Reconsideration "is not a vehicle for relitigating old
issues, presenting the case under new theories, securing a rehearing on the merits, or
otherwise taking a second bite at the apple[.]" Id. (internal quotation marks omitted)
(citing Sequa Corp. v. GBJ Corp., 156 F .3d 136, 144 (2d Cir. 1998)). Plaintiff does not
cite an intervening change of controlling law or proffer new evidence.
In granting partial summary judgment in the Town Defendants' favor with respect
to Plaintiffs failure to intervene claim, the court concluded that "Plaintiff adduced
evidence that the Law Enforcement Defendants were present for and participated to
varying degrees in her arrest[,]" but that she did not "establish[] that they played a
material role in bringing charges against her." (Doc. 49 at 21.) Plaintiff now cites
evidence that Officer W esoloski signed the criminal complaint containing the charges
against her as the reporting officer. See Shabazz v. Kai/er, 201 F. Supp. 3d 386, 392
(S.D.N.Y. 2016) ("A [New York] police officer may initiate criminal proceedings by
bringing charges and having the plaintiff arraigned, by filling out complaining and
corroborating affidavits, and by signing felony complaints."). Officer Chludzinski also
signed the criminal complaint as the supervisor, however, his role was to review reports
for completeness rather than for the adequacy of the charging officer's probable cause
determination. (Doc. 40 at 420.) Plaintiff further cites deposition testimony that Officers
Domenech, Wanat, and Kusak were present for discussions regarding whether to arrest
Plaintiff.
In Plaintiffs memorandum of law in opposition to the Town Defendants' motion

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for summary judgment, she did not cite admissible evidence of any individual officer's
involvement in filing criminal charges against her. Instead, she repeatedly referred to the
Town Defendants generally. Although she cited the criminal complaint, she did not cite
evidence that anyone other than Officer Wesoloski, who signed the criminal complaint,
played a material role in initiating or continuing the prosecution against her. Nor does
plaintiff cite "controlling decisions" that the court overlooked. Shrader, 70 F .3d at 257
(emphasis supplied).
Because Plaintiff has not pointed to a clear error of law or a plausible manifest
injustice that would require reconsidering summary judgment on her failure to intervene
claim for malicious prosecution, the court DENIES Plaintiffs motion for reconsideration.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs motion to certify the Town Defendants'
appeal as frivolous and for reconsideration is DENIED. (Doc. 54.)
SO ORDERED.
Dated this ...A~ay of August, 2024.

Christina Reiss, Distric
United States District Court

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