Hairston v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 11

DECISION & ORDER This Court finds that the Commissioner's denial of SSI was based on substantial evidence and was not erroneous as a matter of law. Accordingly, the ALJ's decision is affirmed. The Commissioner's motion for judgment o n the pleadings 8 is granted. Plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings 7 is denied, and plaintiff's complaint 1 is dismissed with prejudice. Signed by Hon. Marian W. Payson on 2/5/2024. (KAH)Clerk to Follow up

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
_______________________________________
TINA H., 1
Plaintiff,
v.

DECISION & ORDER
21-CV-1064MWP

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
_______________________________________

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Plaintiff Tina H. (“plaintiff”) brings this action pursuant to Section 205(g) of the
Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review of a final decision of the
Commissioner of Social Security (the “Commissioner”) denying her application for
Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”). Pursuant to the Standing Order of the United States
District Court for the Western District of New York regarding Social Security cases dated June
29, 2018, this case has been reassigned to, and the parties have consented to the disposition of
this case by, the undersigned. (Docket # 10).
Currently before the Court are the parties’ motions for judgment on the pleadings
pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Docket ## 7, 8). For the
reasons set forth below, this Court finds that the decision of the Commissioner is supported by
substantial evidence in the record and is in accordance with applicable legal standards.

Pursuant to the November 18, 2020 Standing Order of the United States District Court for the Western
District of New York regarding identification of non-governmental parties in social security opinions, the plaintiff in
this matter will be identified and referenced solely by first name and last initial.
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Accordingly, the Commissioner’s motion for judgment on the pleadings is granted, and
plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the pleadings is denied.

DISCUSSION
I.

Standard of Review
This Court’s scope of review is limited to whether the Commissioner’s

determination is supported by substantial evidence in the record and whether the Commissioner
applied the correct legal standards. See Butts v. Barnhart, 388 F.3d 377, 384 (2d Cir. 2004)
(“[i]n reviewing a final decision of the Commissioner, a district court must determine whether
the correct legal standards were applied and whether substantial evidence supports the
decision”), reh’g granted in part and denied in part, 416 F.3d 101 (2d Cir. 2005); see also
Schaal v. Apfel, 134 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1998) (“it is not our function to determine de novo
whether plaintiff is disabled[;] . . . [r]ather, we must determine whether the Commissioner’s
conclusions are supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole or are based on an
erroneous legal standard”) (internal citation and quotation omitted). Pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g), a district court reviewing the Commissioner’s determination to deny disability benefits
is directed to accept the Commissioner’s findings of fact unless they are not supported by
“substantial evidence.” See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“[t]he findings of the Commissioner . . . as to
any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive”). Substantial evidence is
defined as “more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401
(1971) (internal quotation omitted).

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To determine whether substantial evidence exists in the record, the court must
consider the record as a whole, examining the evidence submitted by both sides, “because an
analysis of the substantiality of the evidence must also include that which detracts from its
weight.” Williams ex rel. Williams v. Bowen, 859 F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir. 1988). To the extent
they are supported by substantial evidence, the Commissioner’s findings of fact must be
sustained “even where substantial evidence may support the claimant’s position and despite the
fact that the [c]ourt, had it heard the evidence de novo, might have found otherwise.” Matejka v.
Barnhart, 386 F. Supp. 2d 198, 204 (W.D.N.Y. 2005) (citing Rutherford v. Schweiker, 685 F.2d
60, 62 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1212 (1983)).
A person is disabled for the purposes of SSI and disability benefits if he or she is
unable “to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable
physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or
can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C.
§§ 423(d)(1)(A) & 1382c(a)(3)(A). In assessing whether a claimant is disabled, the ALJ must
employ a five-step sequential analysis. See Berry v. Schweiker, 675 F.2d 464, 467 (2d Cir. 1982)
(per curiam). The five steps are:
(1)

whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial
gainful activity;

(2)

if not, whether the claimant has any “severe impairment”
that “significantly limits [the claimant’s] physical or mental
ability to do basic work activities”;

(3)

if so, whether any of the claimant’s severe impairments
meets or equals one of the impairments listed in Appendix
1 of Subpart P of Part 404 of the relevant regulations (the
“Listings”);

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(4)

if not, whether despite the claimant’s severe impairments,
the claimant retains the residual functional capacity
[(“RFC”)] to perform [her] past work; and

(5)

if not, whether the claimant retains the [RFC] to perform
any other work that exists in significant numbers in the
national economy.

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v) & 416.920(a)(4)(i)-(v); Berry v. Schweiker, 675 F.2d at 467.
“The claimant bears the burden of proving his or her case at steps one through four[;] . . . [a]t
step five the burden shifts to the Commissioner to ‘show there is other gainful work in the
national economy [which] the claimant could perform.’” Butts v. Barnhart, 388 F.3d at 383
(quoting Balsamo v. Chater, 142 F.3d 75, 80 (2d Cir. 1998)).

II.

The ALJ’s Decision
In his decision, the ALJ followed the required five-step analysis for evaluating

disability claims. Under step one of the process, the ALJ found that plaintiff had not engaged in
substantial gainful activity since July 5, 2016, the application date. (Tr. 17). 2 At step two, the
ALJ concluded that plaintiff had severe mental impairments, variously diagnosed as bipolar
disorder, alcohol use disorder, antisocial personality disorder, and schizoaffective disorder.
(Tr. 18). The ALJ also found that plaintiff suffered from several nonsevere physical
impairments. (Id.). At step three, the ALJ determined that plaintiff did not have an impairment
(or combination of impairments) that met or medically equaled one of the listed impairments in
the Listings. (Tr. 18-20). With respect to plaintiff’s mental impairments, the ALJ considered the
four broad categories of mental functioning. (Id.). Specifically, the ALJ determined that

The administrative transcript (Docket # 6) shall be referred to as “Tr. ___,” and references thereto utilize
the internal Bates-stamped pagination assigned by the parties.
2

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plaintiff had mild limitations in understanding, remembering, or applying information and
concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace and moderate limitations in interacting with others
and adapting or managing herself. (Id.).
The ALJ concluded that plaintiff retained the RFC to perform work at all physical
exertional levels but with certain mental limitations. (Tr. 20-26). Specifically, the ALJ found
that plaintiff could perform work involving simple, routine, and repetitive tasks and requiring
simple work-related decisions and occasional interaction with supervisors and coworkers, but she
was unable to work at a production rate pace or interact with the public. (Id.).
At step four, the ALJ found that plaintiff had no past relevant work. (Tr. 26). At
step five, the ALJ determined that other jobs existed in significant numbers in the national
economy that, based on her age, education, work experience, and RFC, plaintiff could perform,
such as vehicle cleaner, salvage laborer, and cleaner. (Tr. 27). Accordingly, the ALJ found that
plaintiff was not disabled. (Tr. 28).

III.

Plaintiff’s Contentions
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s determination that she is not disabled is not

supported by substantial evidence and is the product of legal error. (Docket ## 7-1; 9).
Specifically, plaintiff maintains that the mental portion of the ALJ’s RFC assessment conflicts
with certain of the limitations contained in a December 2020 opinion authored by her treating
mental health counselor, Leah Mruczek, MSW, even though the ALJ purported to give
Mruczek’s opinion “great weight.” (Docket # 7-1 at 11-14). In addition, plaintiff argues that the
ALJ improperly relied upon and mischaracterized plaintiff’s daily activities in concluding that
plaintiff was capable of occasional interaction with coworkers and supervisors. (Id. at 14-17).

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IV.

Analysis
An individual’s RFC is her “maximum remaining ability to do sustained work

activities in an ordinary work setting on a continuing basis.” Melville v. Apfel, 198 F.3d 45, 52
(2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Soc. Sec. Ruling 96–8p, 1996 WL 374184, *2 (1996)). In making an
RFC assessment, the ALJ should consider “a claimant’s physical abilities, mental abilities,
symptomology, including pain and other limitations which could interfere with work activities
on a regular and continuing basis.” Pardee v. Astrue, 631 F. Supp. 2d 200, 221 (N.D.N.Y. 2009)
(citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)). “To determine RFC, the ALJ must consider all the relevant
evidence, including medical opinions and facts, physical and mental abilities, non-severe
impairments, and [p]laintiff’s subjective evidence of symptoms.” Stanton v. Astrue, 2009 WL
1940539, *9 (N.D.N.Y. 2009) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(b)-(e)), aff’d, 370 F. App’x 231 (2d
Cir. 2010).
A.

The ALJ’s Consideration of Mruczek’s Opinion
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed “to provide some reasoning why [he] would

give ‘great weight’ to [Mruczek’s] [December 2020] opinion[,] . . . yet not credit the limitations
found therein.” (Docket # 7-1 at 14). In plaintiff’s view, Mruczek’s opinion that plaintiff would
be unable to understand, remember and carry out very short and simple instructions for up to
20% of the workday is inconsistent with the ALJ’s conclusion that Mruczek could engage in
competitive work. (Id.).
On July 16, 2020, Mruczek completed an earlier Mental RFC Questionnaire
relating to plaintiff. (Tr. 1666-70). Mruczek indicated that plaintiff had been diagnosed with
schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type. (Id.). At the time, Mruczek reported that she was meeting
with plaintiff weekly for approximately thirty minutes. (Id.).

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Mruczek opined that plaintiff was precluded from traveling in unfamiliar places
or using public transportation and was unable to perform several areas of mental work-related
functions for more than 20 percent of the workday: namely, remembering work procedures;
maintaining attention for two-hour segments; maintaining regular attendance and being punctual
within customary, usually strict tolerances; sustaining an ordinary routine without special
supervision; working in coordination with or proximity to others without being unduly
distracted; making simple work-related decisions; completing a normal workday and workweek
without interruptions from psychologically-based symptoms; performing at a consistent pace
without an unreasonable number and length of rest periods; asking simple questions or
requesting assistance; interacting appropriately with the general public; accepting instructions
and responding appropriately to criticism from supervisors; getting along with coworkers or
peers without unduly distracting them or exhibiting behavioral extremes; and, responding
appropriately to changes in a routine work setting. (Id.). She also opined that plaintiff was
unable to perform several areas of work-related mental functions for 11 to 20 percent of the
workday: namely, understanding, remembering, and carrying out detailed instructions; dealing
with normal work stress; being aware of normal hazards and taking appropriate precautions; and,
setting realistic goals or making plans independently of others. (Id.). According to Mruczek,
plaintiff had no limitation in her ability to understand, remember, and carry out very short and
simple instructions. (Id.).
Mruczek reported that plaintiff struggled most with social interactions and that
her history of trauma triggered intrusive thoughts and consistent distractions, which interfered
with plaintiff’s ability to sustain concentration and memory. (Id.). She opined that plaintiff

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would be off task more than thirty percent of the workday and that she would be absent more
than four days per month. (Id.).
Mruczek completed another medical source statement five months later, on
December 10, 2020. (Tr. 2038-40). She noted that plaintiff’s mental health symptoms fluctuated
from time to time but that she had been responsive to outpatient treatment, which she continued
to receive on a weekly basis. (Id.). Mruczek opined that for eleven to twenty percent of the
workday plaintiff would be unable to remember work procedures, understand, remember, and
carry out very short and simple instructions, understand and remember detailed instructions, ask
simple questions or request assistance, or set realistic goals or make plans independently of
others. (Id.). According to Mruczek, for less than ten percent of the workday plaintiff would be
unable to carry out detailed instructions, maintain attention for two-hour segments, sustain an
ordinary routine without special supervision, make simple work-related decisions, deal with
normal work stress, and be aware of normal hazards and take appropriate precautions. (Id.).
Mruczek opined that plaintiff had no limitation in her ability to maintain regular attendance and
be punctual within customary, usually strict tolerances, work in coordination with or proximity
to others without being unduly distracted, complete a workweek without interruptions from
psychologically-based symptoms, perform at a consistent pace without an unreasonable number
and length of rest periods, interact appropriately with the general public, accept instructions and
respond appropriately to criticism from supervisors, get along with coworkers without distracting
them or exhibiting behavioral extremes, respond appropriately to changes in a routine work
setting, and travel to unfamiliar places or use public transportation. (Id.). According to
Mruczek, plaintiff was likely to be absent four or more days per month. (Id.).

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The ALJ considered and weighed Mruczek’s July and December 2020 opinions. 3
With respect to the July 2020 opinion, the ALJ determined it was entitled to “little weight,”
concluding that the severe limitations assessed were inconsistent with the longitudinal medical
record and plaintiff’s activities of daily living. (Tr. 24-25). Although the ALJ recognized the
treatment relationship between Mruczek and plaintiff, the ALJ found that the assessed limitations
in the July 2020 opinion were inconsistent with plaintiff’s mental health treatment records
documenting that plaintiff’s mental health had remained stable for the previous several years and
her minimal mental status examination findings. (Id.). The ALJ also found that the assessed
limitations were inconsistent with plaintiff’s daily activities, which included caring for her two
young children and obtaining a college degree. (Id.).
In determining that Mruczek’s December 2020 opinion was entitled to “great
weight overall,” the ALJ noted that the limitations assessed by Mruczek reflected her opinion
that plaintiff’s mental functional capacity had improved – an opinion the ALJ found more
consistent with the record than Mruczek’s earlier opinion. (Tr. 25-26). According to the ALJ, he
viewed the limitations assessed by Mruczek in her December 2020 opinion to be consistent “with
a finding of an overall moderate limitation” and accounted for the moderate limitations in the
mental RFC by restricting plaintiff to simple work and decision-making and limited social
interactions. (Id.).
Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s finding that she was capable of performing simple,
routine work on the grounds that it conflicted with Mruczek’s opinion that plaintiff “would be
unable to understand, remember and carry out ‘very short and simple’ instructions for up to 20%

Mruczek apparently also authored opinions on July 8, 2019 and November 4, 2020. (Tr. 2018-19,
2028-29). The ALJ considered the July 2019 opinion but attributed it to Mruczek’s treating psychiatric nurse
practitioner, Sheryl Campbell Julien, N.P. (Tr. 24). The ALJ did not mention or apparently consider Mruczek’s
November 2020 opinion.
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of the time.” (Docket # 7-1 at 13). Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ failed to explain this
alleged conflict. (Docket ## 7-1 at 13-14; 9). Upon review of the ALJ’s decision and the record,
I find that the mental portion of the ALJ’s RFC determination does not necessarily conflict with
Mruczek’s opined limitations, and, in any event, the ALJ adequately explained how he
incorporated Mruczek’s opinion into the RFC.
I disagree with plaintiff’s contention that Mruczek’s assessment that she would be
unable to perform simple work-related tasks for between eleven and twenty percent of the
workday necessarily means she is disabled. During the administrative hearing, the vocational
expert testified that an individual may be off task for up to fifteen percent of the workday and
still maintain competitive employment. (Tr. 89). Based upon that opinion, a limitation in the
ability to perform certain tasks between eleven and twenty percent of the workday is not
necessarily incompatible with competitive employment. In other words, according to the
vocational expert’s testimony, although the inability to perform simple work-related tasks for
twenty percent of the workday would be work preclusive, the inability to do so for eleven
percent of the workday would not necessarily have the same result. See Pollino v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec., 366 F. Supp. 3d 428, 436 (W.D.N.Y. 2019) (“[p]laintiff’s argument is based on a
mischaracterization of the record[;] . . . based on [the doctor’s] assessment that [p]laintiff has
moderate limitations (meaning unable to function eleven to twenty-five percent of the time) in
some areas of mental functioning[,] [p]laintiff’s counsel [erroneously] extrapolates that
[p]laintiff is ‘unable to function’ or will be ‘off task’ twenty-five percent of the workday”); see
also Bates v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2019 WL1301960, *5 (E.D. Tenn. 2019) (“the low ends of
the . . . ranges opined to by [the doctor] are somewhat more consistent with sedentary work[,]
[b]ut . . . the high ends of [the doctor’s] ranges clearly cover the limitations adopted by the

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ALJ[;] [t]hus, the ALJ did not ‘reject’ [the doctor’s] opinion; rather, she properly incorporated it
into her findings and provided good reasons for doing so”).
Moreover, while the ALJ determined that Mruczek’s opinion was entitled to great
weight “overall,” the ALJ’s discussion of the opinion demonstrates that the ALJ considered the
opinion congruous with the longitudinal record to the extent that it was “consistent with a finding
of an overall moderate limitation” in mental functioning. (Tr. 26). According to the ALJ, the
record showed moderate mental limitations because it demonstrated that plaintiff maintained
stable mental health throughout the relevant period with occasional exacerbation of her mental
symptoms. (Id.). Additionally, moderate limitations were consistent with the other medical
opinions of record, which the ALJ determined were entitled to “great weight,” including the
April 2017 and June 2018 opinions of treating nurse practitioner Rosanna Carter, DNP, who
assessed that plaintiff suffered from some moderate mental work-related limitations (Tr. 24
(citing Tr. 1679-80, 1683-84)), and Mruczek’s July 2019 opinion, 4 which also assessed moderate
limitations (Tr. 24 (citing Tr. 1685-86)).
The ALJ accounted for plaintiff’s moderate mental health symptoms by limiting
her to simple, non-production rate work involving simple decision-making and limited social
interactions. (Tr. 20). On this record, I find that the ALJ adequately explained his consideration
of Mruczek’s opinion and his view that her opinion was that plaintiff had moderate mental
limitations in mental functioning; I further find that the ALJ assessed an RFC that was generally
consistent with that opinion. See, e.g., Bethany A. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2022 WL 170405, *5
(W.D.N.Y. 2022) (“[a] finding of moderate limitations in mental functioning does not preclude
the ability to perform unskilled work[;] [t]he Second Circuit has held that moderate limitations in
As noted above, the ALJ attributed this opinion to nurse practitioner Sheryl Campbell Julien, although it
was apparently signed by Mruczek. (Compare Tr. 24 with Tr. 1686).
4

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work related functioning does not significantly limit, and thus prevent, a plaintiff from
performing unskilled work”) (collecting cases); Cory W. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2021 WL
5109663, *5 (W.D.N.Y. 2021) (“[m]oderate mental limitations do not necessarily indicate
disabling functional restrictions that would prevent a claimant from performing the basic mental
demands required for unskilled work”) (collecting cases). Accordingly, I find that remand is not
warranted on this basis.
B.

The ALJ’s Assessment of Plaintiff’s Subjective Complaints
I turn next to plaintiff’s contention that the ALJ improperly discounted her

subjective complaints concerning her ability to interact with others by mischaracterizing and
exaggerating her activities of daily living. (Docket # 7-1 at 14-17). For the reasons explained
below, plaintiff’s challenge is without merit.
An evaluation of subjective complaints should reflect a two-step analysis. See 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1529, 416.929. First, the ALJ must determine whether the evidence reflects that
the claimant has a medically-determinable impairment or impairments that could produce the
relevant symptoms. See id. Next, the ALJ must evaluate “the intensity, persistence, or
functionally limiting effects of [the] symptom[s].” Id. The relevant factors for the ALJ to weigh
include:
(1) [the claimant’s] daily activities; (2) [t]he location, duration,
frequency and intensity of [the claimant’s] pain or other
symptoms; (3) [p]recipitating and aggravating factors; (4) [t]he
type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any medication the
claimant take[s] or ha[s] taken to alleviate [her] pain or other
symptoms; (5) [t]reatment, other than medication, [the claimant]
receive[s] or ha[s] received for relief of [her] pain or other
symptoms; (6) [a]ny measures [the claimant] us[es] or ha[s] used
to relieve [her] pain or other symptoms . . . ; and (7) [o]ther factors

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concerning [the claimant’s] functional limitations and restrictions
due to pain or other symptoms.
See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3)(i)-(vii), 416.929(c)(3)(i)-(vii)).
The ALJ concluded that plaintiff’s statements “concerning the intensity,
persistence and limiting effects of [her] symptoms are not entirely consistent with the medical
evidence and other evidence in the record for the reasons explained in this decision.” (Tr. 21).
The ALJ assessed plaintiff’s subjective complaints in the context of the entire record. I disagree
with plaintiff that, in doing so, the ALJ misconstrued the record evidence.
Plaintiff’s challenge largely rests on her disagreement with the ALJ’s
characterization of the evidence relating to her ability to engage in activities of daily living.
(Docket # 7-1 at 14-17). Contrary to plaintiff’s contention, the ALJ applied the proper legal
standards in analyzing plaintiff’s subjective complaints, and substantial evidence supports the
ALJ’s determination that, for the reasons he stated, plaintiff’s complaints were not consistent
with the record evidence. See Luther v. Colvin, 2013 WL 3816540, *7 (W.D.N.Y. 2013) (ALJ
properly assessed subjective complaints where she “reviewed all of [p]laintiff’s subjective
complaints . . . [and] properly considered [p]laintiff’s activities of daily living, inconsistent
testimony and how her symptoms affected her attempts at maintaining a job”). In his decision,
the ALJ recounted much of plaintiff’s mental health treatment history, noting that the treatment
records demonstrated that plaintiff’s symptoms were generally stable throughout the relevant
period, although she continued to experience situational life stressors. (Tr. 21-23). The ALJ
further noted that plaintiff’s testimony and the medical records demonstrated that, despite
complaints of disabling symptoms, she was able to engage in significant activities of daily living,
including being able to “excel and earn a college degree in business,” raise her twin daughters,
and maintain relationships with family and friends. (Tr. 22). In addition, the ALJ noted that
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despite situational stressors, including housing difficulties, a miscarriage, and pregnancy with
twins, plaintiff was able to maintain stability of her psychiatric symptoms through treatment and
self-care techniques. (Tr. 21).
With respect to plaintiff’s ability to interact with others, the ALJ acknowledged
plaintiff’s testimony and reports to her treating providers that she had difficulty being around
other people. (Id.). The ALJ determined that those complaints were not completely consonant
with the record, which demonstrated that she maintained psychiatric stability over time and
without medication, completed a college degree with high grades, including attending in-person
classes and an in-person internship, and maintained interpersonal relationships, including caring
for her infant twin daughters. (Tr. 23-25).
Although plaintiff contends that the ALJ overlooked interaction accommodations
made by her school and placed undue emphasis on her relationship with her mother and sister
(Docket # 7-1 at 16-17), I do not find that the ALJ overlooked material evidence or
mischaracterized the record evidence concerning the plaintiff’s treatment, interpersonal
relationships, or ability to engage in activities of daily living. In sum, plaintiff’s challenge
amounts to a disagreement with the ALJ’s consideration of conflicting evidence. “[U]nder the
substantial evidence standard of review, [however,] it is not enough for [p]laintiff to merely
disagree with the ALJ’s weighing of the evidence or to argue that evidence in the record could
support her position.” Warren v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2016 WL 7223338, *6 (N.D.N.Y.), report
and recommendation adopted by, 2016 WL 7238947 (N.D.N.Y. 2016). Rather, she must “show
that no reasonable factfinder could have reached the ALJ’s conclusions based on the evidence in
the record.” Id.; see also Avant v. Colvin, 2016 WL 5799080, *3 (W.D.N.Y. 2016) (“as the
Second Circuit has explained, ‘whether there is substantial evidence supporting the claimant’s

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views is not the question . . . , rather, the [c]ourt must decide whether substantial evidence
supports the ALJ’s decision’”) (quoting Bonet ex rel. T.B. v. Colvin, 523 F. App’x 58, 59 (2d Cir.
2013) (summary order) (brackets omitted)). The ALJ’s decision in this case demonstrates that he
weighed the record evidence, including the conflicting evidence; no basis exists for this Court to
overturn the ALJ’s assessment of the evidence or his resolution of the conflicts in it. See Casey
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2015 WL 5512602, *9 (N.D.N.Y. 2015) (“[i]t is the province of the
[ALJ] to consider and resolve conflicts in the evidence as long as the decision rests upon
adequate findings supported by evidence having rational probative force[;] . . . [the ALJ]
properly considered the totality of the record evidence, and concluded that the evidence quoted
above outweighed [plaintiff’s] evidence to the contrary”) (internal quotation omitted).

CONCLUSION
After a careful review of the entire record, this Court finds that the
Commissioner’s denial of SSI was based on substantial evidence and was not erroneous as a
matter of law. Accordingly, the ALJ’s decision is affirmed. For the reasons stated above, the
Commissioner’s motion for judgment on the pleadings (Docket # 8) is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s
motion for judgment on the pleadings (Docket # 7) is DENIED, and plaintiff’s complaint
(Docket # 1) is dismissed with prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/Marian W. Payson
MARIAN W. PAYSON
United States Magistrate Judge
Dated: Rochester, New York
February 5, 2024

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