Faltisko v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 25

DECISION AND ORDER: Plaintiff's motion for attorneys fees under § 406(b) (ECF No. 21) is GRANTED and Plaintiff is awarded $33,297 in fees. The Court directs the Commissioner to release those funds withheld from Plaintiff's benefits award. After counsel receives the § 406(b) fee, counsel must remit the $9,330.15 EAJA fee to Plaintiff. SO ORDERED. Signed by Hon. Frank P. Geraci, Jr. on 1/7/2025. (MFM)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
MICHELLE F.,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case # 23-CV-51-FPG
DECISION AND ORDER

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Michelle F. brought this appeal of the Social Security Administration’s (“SSA”)
decision to deny her disability benefits. ECF No. 1. On January 23, 2024, the Court granted
Plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the pleadings and remanded the case for further proceedings.
ECF No. 17. The Court entered a Stipulation and Order awarding Plaintiff’s attorney, Rebecca M.
Kujawa, $9,330.15 in fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412.
ECF No. 20.
Thereafter, the SSA issued a Notice of Award granting Plaintiff benefits. See ECF No. 213. Plaintiff now moves for $33,297 in attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). ECF No. 21.
For the reasons that follow, Plaintiff’s motion is GRANTED, counsel is awarded $33,297
in fees, and counsel shall remit the $9,330.15 in EAJA fees to Plaintiff.
DISCUSSION
The Social Security Act provides that
[w]henever a court renders a judgment favorable to a claimant under this subchapter
who was represented before the court by an attorney, the court may determine and
allow as part of its judgment a reasonable fee for such representation, not in excess
of 25 percent of the total of the past-due benefits to which the claimant is entitled
by reason of such judgment.
42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A).
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Within the 25% boundary, “the attorney for the successful claimant must show that the fee
sought is reasonable for the services rendered.” Abbey v. Berryhill, No. 6:17-CV-06430-MAT,
2019 WL 336572, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2019) (quoting Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789,
807 (2002)). The statute also requires “court review of [contingent fee] arrangements as an
independent check, to assure that they yield reasonable results in particular cases.” Id.
After a court confirms that the fee is within the 25% statutory boundary, it analyzes three
factors to determine if the resulting fee is reasonable. Those factors are: (1) whether the requested
fee is out of line with the “character of the representation and the results the representation
achieved”; (2) whether the attorney unreasonably delayed the proceedings in an attempt to increase
the accumulation of benefits and thereby increase his fee; and (3) whether “the benefits awarded
are large in comparison to the amount of time counsel spent on the case,” the so-called “windfall”
factor. Id. (citation omitted).
The Court has reviewed each factor to assure that the requested fee is reasonable. As an
initial matter, counsel’s request for $33,297 in fees represents 25% of the award and does not
exceed the statutory cap. See ECF No. 21-3 at 2.
As to the first factor, the Court finds that the requested fee is in line with the character of
the representation and the results it achieved, because counsel filed a motion for judgment on the
pleadings with non-boilerplate arguments and obtained a remand, which ultimately led to a
favorable decision awarding Plaintiff benefits. See ECF Nos. 13, 17. As to the second factor,
there is no evidence that counsel unreasonably delayed the proceedings in an attempt to inflate
past due benefits and the potential fee award.
As to the third factor, i.e., whether the fee award constitutes a windfall to the attorney,
courts often examine the lodestar figure to help them make this determination. See Abbey, 2019

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WL 336572, at *2; see generally Fields v. Kijakazi, 24 F.4th 845 (2d Cir. 2022). Here, counsel
spent 39.4 hours in connection with the appeal to this Court. ECF No. 21-6 at 2. Dividing the
$33,297 fee requested by 39.4 hours yields an hourly rate of $845.10. This Court has found even
higher rates reasonable where, as here, counsel developed meritorious, non-boilerplate arguments
on the claimant’s behalf. McDonald v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 16-CV-926, 2019 WL 1375084,
at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2019) (awarding fees with effective hourly rate of $1,051.64); see also
Torres v. Colvin, No. 11-CV-5309, 2014 WL 909765, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2014) (“[A]
substantial body of caselaw has awarded rates that approach, if they do not exceed, $1,000.00.”);
Morrison v. Saul, No. 16-CV-4168, 2019 WL 6915954, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2019) (approving
fees based on effective hourly rate of $935.52). Accordingly, based on all of the above, the Court
concludes that the requested fee award is reasonable. Furthermore, counsel must refund the EAJA
fees to Plaintiff.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s fees under § 406(b) (ECF No. 21) is GRANTED and
Plaintiff is awarded $33,297 in fees. The Court directs the Commissioner to release those funds
withheld from Plaintiff’s benefits award. After counsel receives the § 406(b) fee, counsel must
remit the $9,330.15 EAJA fee to Plaintiff.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: January 7, 2025
Rochester, New York

______________________________________
HON. FRANK P. GERACI, JR.
United States District Judge
Western District of New York

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