Young v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 13

DECISION AND ORDERIT HEREBY IS ORDERED, that Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Docket No. 6) is DENIED.FURTHER, that Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Docket No. 9) is GRANTED.FURTHER, that the Clerk of Court is directed to CLOSE this case.SO ORDERED.Signed by William M. Skretny, United States District Judge on 9/24/2024. (JCM)-CLERK TO FOLLOW UP-

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
______________________________________
RONNY Y.,
Plaintiff,
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

DECISION AND ORDER
23-CV-804S

Defendant.
______________________________________
1.

Plaintiff Ronny Y. 1 brings this action pursuant to the Social Security Act (“the

Act”), seeking review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security that
denied his application for supplemental security income under Title XVI of the Act.
(Docket No. 1.) This Court has jurisdiction over this action under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
2.

Plaintiff protectively filed his application with the Social Security

Administration on January 21, 2020. He alleged disability beginning on January 21, 2019,
due to mental impairments characterized as bipolar disorder, major depressive disorder,
generalized anxiety disorder, substance use disorders, and learning disability with
difficulty reading and writing, as well as such physical impairments as bursitis in left knee,
low back pain, obesity, left shoulder injury, hypertension, history of clavicle fractures, and
hip problems. His application was denied and he thereafter requested a hearing before
an administrative law judge (“ALJ”).

1 In accordance with this Court’s Standing Order of November 18, 2020, and consistent with
guidance from the Committee on Court Administration and Case Management of the Judicial Conference
of the United States, this Decision and Order will identify Plaintiff by first name and last initial.

3.

On November 22, 2021, ALJ William M. Weir held a telephonic hearing due

to COVID-19 pandemic at which Plaintiff—represented by counsel—and Vocational
Expert Christina Boardman appeared and testified. (R. 2 at 16, 33-72.) At the time of the
hearing, Plaintiff was a 50-year-old man with a limited education. He performed such
past relevant work as a building superintendent and construction worker II. (R. at 26.)
4.

The ALJ considered the case de novo and, on May 3, 2022, issued a written

decision denying Plaintiff’s application for benefits. (R. at 16.) After the Appeals Council
denied Plaintiff’s request to review the ALJ’s decision (R. at 1), he filed this action
challenging the Commissioner’s decision. 3 (Docket No. 1.)
5.

Both parties moved for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

(Docket Nos. 6, 9.)

Plaintiff filed his reply on

January 24, 2024, stating that no formal reply was needed. (Docket No. 10.) This Court
then took the Motions under advisement without oral argument. For the reasons that
follow, Plaintiff’s Motion will be denied and Defendant’s Motion will be granted.
6.

A court reviewing a denial of disability benefits may not determine de novo

whether an individual is disabled. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3); Wagner v. Sec’y
of Health & Human Servs., 906 F.2d 856, 860 (2d Cir. 1990). Rather, the Commissioner’s
determination will be reversed only if it is not supported by substantial evidence or there
has been a legal error. See Grey v. Heckler, 721 F.2d 41, 46 (2d Cir. 1983); Marcus v.
Califano, 615 F.2d 23, 27 (2d Cir. 1979). Substantial evidence is that which amounts to
“more than a mere scintilla,” and it has been defined as “such relevant evidence as a

2

Citations to the underlying administrative record are designated as “R.”

The ALJ’s May 3, 2022, decision became the Commissioner’s final decision on this matter when
the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review.
3

2

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v.
Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S. Ct. 1420, 26 L. Ed. 2d 842 (1971). Where evidence is
deemed susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, the Commissioner’s
conclusion must be upheld. See Rutherford v. Schweiker, 685 F.2d 60, 62 (2d Cir. 1982).
7.

“To determine on appeal whether an ALJ’s findings are supported by

substantial evidence, a reviewing court considers the whole record, examining the
evidence from both sides, because an analysis of the substantiality of the evidence must
also include that which detracts from its weight.” Williams ex rel. Williams v. Bowen,
859 F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir. 1988).

If supported by substantial evidence, the

Commissioner’s finding must be sustained “even where substantial evidence may support
the plaintiff’s position and despite that the court’s independent analysis of the evidence
may differ from the [Commissioner’s].” Rosado v. Sullivan, 805 F. Supp. 147, 153
(S.D.N.Y. 1992). In other words, this Court must afford the Commissioner’s determination
considerable deference and will not substitute “its own judgment for that of the
[Commissioner], even if it might justifiably have reached a different result upon a de novo
review.” Valente v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 733 F.2d 1037, 1041 (2d Cir. 1984).
8.

The Commissioner has established a five-step sequential evaluation

process to determine whether an individual is disabled under the Act. See 20 C.F.R.
§ 416.920. The Supreme Court of the United States recognized the validity of this
analysis in Bowen v. Yuckert, and it remains the proper approach for analyzing whether
a claimant is disabled. 482 U.S. 137, 140-42, 107 S. Ct. 2287, 96 L. Ed. 2d 119 (1987).
9.

The five-step process is as follows:
First, the [Commissioner] considers whether the claimant is
currently engaged in substantial gainful activity. If he is not,
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the [Commissioner] next considers whether the claimant has
a “severe impairment” which significantly limits his physical or
mental ability to do basic work activities. If the claimant
suffers such an impairment, the third inquiry is whether, based
solely on medical evidence, the claimant has an impairment
which is listed in Appendix 1 of the regulations. If the claimant
has such an impairment, the [Commissioner] will consider him
disabled without considering vocational factors such as age,
education, and work experience; the [Commissioner]
presumes that a claimant who is afflicted with a “listed”
impairment is unable to perform substantial gainful activity.
Assuming the claimant does not have a listed impairment, the
fourth inquiry is whether, despite the claimant’s severe
impairment, he has the residual functional capacity to perform
his past work. Finally, if the claimant is unable to perform his
past work, the [Commissioner] then determines whether there
is other work which the claimant could perform.
Berry v. Schweiker, 675 F.2d 464, 467 (2d Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (quotations in original);
see also 20 C.F.R. § 416.920; Rosa v. Callahan, 168 F.3d 72, 77 (2d Cir. 1999).
10.

At Step Two, an impairment is deemed “severe” if it significantly limits a

claimant’s ability to perform basic work activities. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c). An impairment
or combination of impairments is found to be “not severe” when medical evidence
establishes only a slight abnormality or a combination of slight abnormalities which would
have no more than a minimal effect on a claimant’s ability to work. See SSR 85-28,
1985 SSR LEXIS 19 (1985); 20 C.F.R. § 416.922; Donahue v. Colvin, No. 6:17-CV-06838
(MAT), 2018 WL 2354986, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. May 24, 2018). At this Step, the claimant
bears the burden of establishing the severity of his impairment, “which is ‘any impairment
or combination of impairments which significantly limits [the claimant’s] ability to do basic
work.’” Miller v. Berryhill, No. 16CV6467, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153578, at *20 (W.D.N.Y.
Sept. 20, 2017); see 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c).

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11.

Proof of this severity requirement, however, is de minimis “and is meant

only to screen out the weakest of claims.” Herman S. v. Comm’r, 577 F. Supp. 3d 190,
195 (W.D.N.Y. 2022); see also Dixon v. Shalala, 54 F.3d 1019, 1030 (2d Cir. 1995).
12.

Although the claimant has the burden of proof at the first four steps, the

Commissioner has the burden of proof at the fifth and final step. See Yuckert, 482 U.S.
at 146 n.5; Ferraris v. Heckler, 728 F.2d 582, 584 (2d Cir. 1984). The final step is divided
into two parts. First, the Commissioner must assess the claimant’s job qualifications by
considering his physical ability, age, education, and work experience.

Second, the

Commissioner must determine whether jobs exist in the national economy that a person
having the claimant’s qualifications could perform.

See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A);

20 C.F.R. § 416.920(f); see also Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 460, 103 S. Ct. 1952,
76 L. Ed. 2d 66 (1983).
13.

The ALJ analyzed Plaintiff’s claim for benefits under the five-step process

set forth above. At Step One, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial
gainful activity since the application date. (R. at 18.) At Step Two, the ALJ found that
Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: mental impairments characterized as
bipolar disorder, major depressive disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, and substance
use disorders including alcohol and cocaine use disorders, but not Plaintiff’s claimed
physical impairments, that is obesity, knee bursitis, low back pain, or hypertension. (R.
at 19-20.) At Step Three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or
combination of impairments that meets or medically equals any impairment(s) listed in
20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (R. at 20-22.)

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14.

Next, the ALJ found that Plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity

(“RFC”) to perform medium work with stated limitations. Specifically, the ALJ found that
Plaintiff was limited to performing simple, repetitive one- and two-step tasks while he
could not perform complex work or make changes to general work settings or tasks during
the workday. (R. at 22.)
15.

At Step Four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff could not perform his past relevant

work. (R. at 26.) At Step Five, the ALJ posed hypotheticals to the Vocational Expert of
a claimant sharing Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and RFC. The Expert
opined that such a hypothetical claimant could perform such representative jobs as a
cleaner, laundry laborer, and cleaner sweeper. (R. at 26-27.) Accordingly, the ALJ found
that Plaintiff was not disabled. (R. at 27.)
16.

Plaintiff now argues that the ALJ failed to adequately account for all his non-

severe physical limitations and failed to incorporate the overhead reaching limitation
found by state agency physician D. Brauer, M.D.
17.

For the reasons that follow, this Court finds that the ALJ appropriately

considered Plaintiff’s claimed physical limitations and properly weighed the medical
evidence and opinions in this record in concluding that these claimed conditions were not
severe impairments.
18.

Plaintiff first objects to the ALJ’s severity finding at Step Two of the

sequential analysis finding that his physical impairments from knee bursitis, low back
pain, hypertension, obesity, left shoulder pain, and rheumatoid arthritis were not severe.
Plaintiff argues that these impairments were severe and supported this conclusion by
relying on his testimony that his knees and ankles swelled and that he had low back pain.

6

Plaintiff also testified that he was in constant pain with some days better than others with
limping some days and having trouble bending to the ground, crouching, stooping, and
kneeling. (R. at 22-23, 47-48, 50-51.)
19.

This Court finds, however, that the ALJ had substantial evidence supporting

his consideration of these ailments.
20.

Addressing each ailment in turn, consultative examiner Nikita Dave, M.D.,

noted that Plaintiff’s left shoulder had a somewhat reduced range of motion but his arms
possessed normal strength. (R. at 1071.) Furthermore, Plaintiff denied seeking treatment
for his shoulder. (R. at 657, 1071, 1077, 1180, 1195.)
21.

The ALJ found that, despite Plaintiff’s left shoulder pain, left knee bursitis,

and low back pain, Plaintiff admitted that he had very little treatment for these ailments.
The ALJ also noted that Plaintiff went to the hospital emergency room claiming shoulder
pain as a drug seeking effort. The ALJ concluded that the evidence did not support a
severe shoulder impairment or reaching limitations related to the same. (R. at 19.)
22.

As for his knee and lower back, the ALJ observed that Plaintiff reported

using a cane occasionally, but he did not recall whether the cane was prescribed. (Id.)
The ALJ noted that Plaintiff’s gait, straight leg raising, and leg strength each were normal
and determined that examination findings revealed non-severe impairments despite
Plaintiff’s complaints of disabling pain. (Id.) The ALJ cited Plaintiff’s January 19, 2020,
x-ray of his left knee which revealed small to moderate knee effusion and small superior
and inferior patella enthesophytes. (R. at 672-73; see R. at 19.) On September 10, 2021,
however, a further x-ray of that knee was negative. (R. at 1200, 1203; see R. at 19.)

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23.

Meanwhile, on November 24, 2020, Dr. Dave examined Plaintiff. During

this examination, Plaintiff did not volunteer that he had problems with his knee, shoulder,
and low back until asked and stated that he did not seek a specialist for these problems.
(R. at 1069.) Plaintiff said that he used a cane as needed when having a “bad day” but
he did not recall when the cane was prescribed and he did not use it during the
examination for in-room mobility or transfers. (R. at 1070.)
24.

Dr. Dave found that Plaintiff’s range of motion for his shoulders showed

forward flexion and abduction 135 to 140 degrees without tenderness or swelling. (R. at
1071.) The doctor found that “[t]here may be mild limitations for prolonged walking” while
noting that Plaintiff had no acute distress and had a normal gait and stance. (R. at 1070,
1072.)
25.

The ALJ found that the doctor’s examination findings revealed only non-

severe impairments. (R. at 24.) Nevertheless, the ALJ reviewed this evidence in the light
most favorable to Plaintiff and limited him to medium exertion work, that is defined in the
regulations as the ability to lift no more than 50 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or
carrying of objects weighing up to 25 pounds. 20 C.F.R. § 416.967(c). (R. at 19.)
26.

Moreover, the ALJ relied upon Plaintiff’s activities of daily living such as his

maintaining personal hygiene, preparing simple meals, grocery shopping, and performing
odd chores such as lawn mowing, which suggested to the ALJ that Plaintiff had a greater
degree of functional capacity. Considering all his impairments (severe or not), the ALJ
concluded that Plaintiff could perform work despite the claimed limitations. (R. at 23.)
27.

As for Plaintiff’s knee bursitis, back pain, and shoulder ailments, this Court

first finds that Plaintiff met the de minimis severity requirement at Step Two for these

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otherwise non-severe impairments. The ALJ, however, considered these three ailments
(among his other non-severe conditions) in determining the limitations in the RFC at
Step Three of the analysis. Further, the ALJ viewed the evidence for these ailments in
the light most favorable to Plaintiff thus limiting him to medium exertion work. (R. at 1920.)
28.

This Court finds that Plaintiff bears the burden of proof at the first four steps

of the analysis but has not done so by failing to refute the ALJ’s finding that he admitted
to seeking “very little treatment” for his bursitis, shoulder condition, and low back pain
while using a possibly nonprescribed cane. (R. at 19; see R. at 1070.) Plaintiff apparently
sought hospital treatment of his shoulder to obtain drugs. He also does not refute the
finding that he had normal strength in his arms. (See R. at 1071.) Furthermore, Plaintiff
has not shown any occupational limitations arising from these conditions.
29.

Thus, the record supports the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff’s physical ailments

were not severe. Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings for these ailments is
denied.
30.

Plaintiff next contends that the ALJ disregarded his hypertension.

31.

The ALJ, however, found that Plaintiff was treated for elevated blood

pressure but there was no evidence of ongoing issues arising from hypertension. (R. at
20.) The ALJ nevertheless declared that he considered Plaintiff’s hypertension with his
other impairments in determining his RFC. (R. at 20.)
32.

From this record, this Court finds that Plaintiff has not shown the debilitating

effects from his hypertension to meet the de minimis severity standard at Step Two of the
analysis.

(R. at 20.)

The sole basis for Plaintiff’s hypertension claim arises from

9

Dr. Dave’s opinion. The record, however, reveals no limitation from hypertension and
only one instance of elevated blood pressure. Although Plaintiff rests upon Dr. Dave’s
assessment of his hypertension (see R. at 1069, 1072), this opinion also did not address
the severity or any limitations arising from his hypertension.
33.

While Dr. Dave diagnosed Plaintiff with hypertension during his examination

on November 24, 2020, he found that Plaintiff’s blood pressure was 110/70. (R. at 1069,
1070, 1072.) Plaintiff reported to Dr. Dave that he had hypertension for a few months.
(R. at 1069.) Dr. Dave found that Plaintiff had mild limitations for prolonged walking but
did not make any connection between Plaintiff’s hypertension and prolonged walking. (R.
at 1072.)
34.

The record showed that Plaintiff generally had a normal4 blood pressure.

For instance, on July 18, 2018, Melitta Mendonca, PA of WNY Medical, PC, examined
Plaintiff and noted that his blood pressure was 121/71. (R. at 802.)
35.

On January 19, 2020, Plaintiff was admitted to Buffalo General Medical

Center Emergency Room for treatment of dizziness, left arm numbness, and swelling with
elevated blood pressure reading of 148/99. (R. at 652, 656, 657, 664.) However, Plaintiff
was discharged later that day with a normal blood pressure reading of 130/89. (R. at
659.) In diagnosing his dizziness and chest pain, Deborah Swain, M.D., found that
Plaintiff’s cardiac silhouette and central pulmonary vasculature were within normal limits.
(R. at 651.)

4 For the definition of a “normal” blood pressure, see High Blood Pressure – Understanding the
Silent Killer, https://www.fda.gov/drugs/special-features/high-blood-pressure-understanding-silent-killer
(last visited August 13, 2024) (normal pressure is 120/80 mm. of mercury or lower); Clayton L. Thomas,
ed., Taber’s Cyclopedic Medical Dictionary 226 (16th ill. ed. 1989) (normal, relaxed, sitting adult’s systolic
blood pressure is between 100 and 140 mm. of mercury).

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36.

On October 14, 2020, however, Plaintiff denied having hypertension or any

other significant medical conditions. (R. at 1097, 1173.) Two days later, Plaintiff had a
blood pressure of 112/71. (R. at 1173, 1195.) On April 21, 2021, Plaintiff had a blood
pressure reading of 128/81. (R. at 1173, 1189.). On April 26, 2021, Brendan Farnand,
PA, of Urban Family Practice, P.C., diagnosed Plaintiff with hypertension and prescribed
medication which had no ill effects but rated his hypertension symptoms as mild in
severity while finding his blood pressure of 111/70. (R. at 1172, 1183, 1184.) On
August 11, 2021, PA Farnand found Plaintiff’s blood pressure was 134/92. (R. at 1172,
1179.)
37.

This Court further notes that Plaintiff’s own treating physician Raul Vazquez,

M.D., of Urban Family Practice, did not include hypertension as a condition he was
treating in his April 21, 2021, report of Plaintiff’s care despite PA Farnand’s diagnosis on
April 26, 2021. (But cf. R. at 1091, 1183.) Otherwise, the record shows that Plaintiff’s
hypertension was mild with no identified ill effects therefrom and was controlled with
medication. The ALJ thus properly considered this ailment was non-severe. Plaintiff’s
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings on this condition is denied.
38.

Plaintiff next argues that the ALJ also failed to account for his obesity in the

RFC. As noted by the ALJ, Plaintiff weighed 219 lbs., was 5’8” tall, and thus had a body
mass index of 33.3. (R. at 19; see R. at 159, 351.)
39.

The ALJ, however, found that there was no evidence of more than minimal

functional limitation due to obesity and factored Plaintiff’s obesity by limiting him to
medium exertion work. (R. at 19, citing R. at 159, 351.)

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40.

Obesity “is not a listed impairment; however, the functional limitations

caused by the [medically determinable impairment] of obesity, either alone or in
combination with another impairment(s), may medically equal a listing.” Social Security
Ruling, SSR 19-2p; Titles II and XVI: Evaluating Cases Involving Obesity, 84 Fed. Reg.
22,924, 22,924 (May 20, 2019); see Guadalupe v. Barnhart, No. 04 CV 7644 HB,
2005 WL 2033380, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 2005) (the ALJ should consider obesity in
combination with other impairments); see also 20 C.F.R. § 416.926 (medical
equivalence). Under SSR 19-2p, “if the person’s obesity, alone or in combination with
another impairment(s), significantly limits his or her physical or mental ability to do basic
work activities, we find that the impairment(s) is severe.” 84 Fed. Reg. at 22,925. The
ALJ establish obesity as a medically determinable impairment “by considering objective
medical evidence (signs, laboratory findings, or both) from an [acceptable medical source.
The ALJ] will not use a diagnosis or a statement of symptoms to establish” the existence
of a medically determinable impairment. Id.
41.

This Court finds that Plaintiff has not shown any limitations arising from his

obesity either by itself or in conjunction with other ailments. Despite arguing that the ALJ
did not account for obesity and its impact on his back and knees at Step Four of the
sequential analysis, Plaintiff nevertheless has the burden of proving disability therefrom
at that Step. Thus, as for this ground, Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is
denied.
42.

Plaintiff next claims that he suffered from rheumatoid arthritis and

osteoarthritis and that the ALJ did not consider these ailments despite his medical record
establishing these ailments and supporting greater limitations.

12

He contends that

radiology established limitations in his left shoulder (see R. at 173, 1077) and faults the
ALJ for making his own lay interpretation of the medical record and improperly
disregarding the radiology results, and issuing a decision that was contrary to the
supportability of and consistency with evidence.
43.

Rheumatoid arthritis is a form of arthritis with inflammation of the joints,

stiffness, swelling, cartilaginous hypertrophy, and pain.

Taber’s Cyclopedic Medical

Dictionary, supra, at 1603.
44.

This Court finds that the medical record for Plaintiff’s alleged rheumatoid

arthritis does not show a disabling impairment. Specifically, on January 23, 2018, John
Bauers, M.D., of WNY Medical, PC, examined Plaintiff for his complaints of pain in his
right wrist, knee, and ankle. Noting some swelling in that wrist, crepitus of the right knee,
and tenderness of the right ankle, Dr. Bauers found that Plaintiff generally appeared
healthy and well developed with no signs of apparent distress, and ordered rheumatoid
factor bloodwork. (R. at 914-15.) Subsequent examinations, however, revealed normal
findings and negative rheumatology bloodwork. (R. at 781, 802-03, 828, 846-47, 870-71,
884-85, 889, 902.) On February 26, 2018, Dr. Bauers found that there was no evidence
of inflammatory or autoimmune process in Plaintiff’s right wrist or ankle, with Plaintiff
having rheumatoid factor below 14, a negative result. (R. at 885, 889.)
45.

On July 17, 2018, PA Mendonca noted Plaintiff’s diagnosis for osteoarthritis

in 2012 but found no documentation or report from a specialist confirming that diagnosis.
(R. at 801.) PA Mendonca noted that Plaintiff then appeared healthy and well-developed
without any sign of apparent distress. (Id.)

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46.

On October 16, 2020, PA Farnand examined Plaintiff with Plaintiff reporting

that his shoulder pain was mild with activity. PA Farnand found this pain was acute,
prescribed x-rays, and told Plaintiff that treatment of the pain would not change the natural
history of his osteoarthritis. (R. at 1193, 1196-97.)
47.

On December 23, 2020, Dr. Shifteh of the IMA Group x-rayed Plaintiff’s

shoulder and found “large bulky osteophytes and joint space loss at the glenohumeral
joint is suspected likely osteoarthropathy,” concluding that Plaintiff had advanced
osteoarthropathy of that joint. (R. at 1077.)
48.

In his letter of April 21, 2021, Dr. Vazquez diagnosed Plaintiff with

rheumatoid arthritis, among other conditions. (R. at 1091.) PA Farnand also examined
Plaintiff that day and found that his rheumatoid arthritis was stable as he discontinued
Prednisone. (R. at 1190.)
49.

Meanwhile, consultative examiner Dr. Dave noted that Plaintiff’s range of

motion of his shoulders showed forward flexion and abduction 135 to 140 degrees without
tenderness or swelling, but Plaintiff did not have redness, heat, swelling, or effusion. (R.
at 1071.)
50.

This Court finds that the record reveals that Plaintiff has not established that

his rheumatoid arthritis limited him. This record shows that Plaintiff merely cites his
subjective complaints while also containing normal clinical examination findings and
negative rheumatology bloodwork. (R. at 781, 802-03, 828, 846-47, 870-71, 884-85, 889,
902.) Thus, rheumatoid arthritis was not a medically determinable impairment here
because it was based on Plaintiff’s subjective reports of his symptoms and not on
objective evidence contained in the record. Cf. 20 C.F.R. § 416.921. Further, this record

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shows that any impairment Plaintiff suffered was mild, only limited his range of motion in
his shoulders, and did not produce other symptoms. Importantly, this record does not
show how this condition limited Plaintiff’s ability to work.
51.

Therefore, Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings on this ground

is denied.
52.

Finally, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to incorporate the overhead

reaching limitation found by state examiner Dr. Brauer. Indeed, on January 5, 2021,
Dr. Brauer reviewed Plaintiff’s medical records including his January 2020 examination
report and December 2020 x-ray report, and noted that these x-rays showed that
Plaintiff’s left shoulder had overhead reaching limitations which restricted his range of
motion. Dr. Brauer found that Plaintiff suffered from advanced osteoarthropathy of the
glenohumeral joint, restricting him to limited overhead reach. (R. at 172, 173, 1081.)
53.

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ should have relied upon Dr. Brauer’s shoulder

overhead reach limitations. The ALJ, however, found Dr. Brauer’s opinion unpersuasive
because it was not consistent with or supported by the examination findings of Dr. Dave
or other examinations and objective findings in the record. (R. 25.) The ALJ found that
the evidence showed that Plaintiff had merely non-severe physical impairments. (R. at
24.) Nevertheless, the ALJ viewed the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff
and found that he could perform medium exertion work. (R. at 24-25.)
54.

This Court notes that the ALJ has the discretion to resolve conflicts within

the evidence, Veino v. Barnhart, 317 F.3d 578, 588 (2d Cir. 2002), and this Court defers
to the ALJ’s reasonable interpretation of the evidence. McIntyre v. Colvin, 758 F.3d 146,
149 (2d Cir. 2014). Under pertinent Social Security regulations for this post-March 27,

15

2017, application, the Commissioner does not defer to any medical opinion. 20 C.F.R.
§ 416.920c(a). Rather, under these regulations, the ALJ evaluates medical opinions for
their persuasiveness, judged on their supportability by objective medical evidence and
their consistency with other medical and nonmedical sources, the most important factors
in determining its persuasiveness. Id. § 416.920c(a), (b)(2), (c)(1)-(2).
55.

This case presents the difference in opinion on the severity of Plaintiff’s

limitations in his left shoulder. Where there are conflicting opinions and the ALJ resolved
these conflicts, this Court finds that this resolution is supported by substantial evidence.
The evidence of Plaintiff’s reduced range of motion in his left shoulder is contrasted by
his normal arm strength, the lack of tenderness or swelling, and the absence of medical
treatment of the shoulder supporting the severity of his shoulder impairment. (R. at 19,
657, 1071, 1077, 1180, 1193.) Thus, there is no basis for questioning the ALJ’s present
determination. See Perales, 402 U.S. at 399; Veino, 312 F.3d at 588.
56.

Thus, Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings on this ground also

is denied.
57.

Accordingly, having reviewed the ALJ’s decision and considered Plaintiff’s

argument, this Court finds that the ALJ appropriately weighed the medical evidence and
opinion evidence in this record. Although Plaintiff met the de minimis standard for the
severity of these non-severe impairments at Step Two of the sequential analysis, the ALJ
appropriately considered these disputed impairments in the subsequent steps in finding
that Plaintiff could perform medium exertion work.

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IT HEREBY IS ORDERED, that Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
(Docket No. 6) is DENIED.
FURTHER, that Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Docket No. 9)
is GRANTED.
FURTHER, that the Clerk of Court is directed to CLOSE this case.
SO ORDERED.

Dated:

September 20, 2024
Buffalo, New York

s/William M. Skretny
WILLIAM M. SKRETNY
United States District Judge

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