Noyes v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 14

DECISION AND ORDER: Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (ECF No. 9) is DENIED, the Commissioner's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (ECF No. 12) is GRANTED. The complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, and the Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment and close this case. SO ORDERED. Signed by Hon. Frank P. Geraci, Jr. on 3/12/2025. (EMC)Clerk to Follow up

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
Jammy N., 1
Plaintiff,
v.

Case # 24-CV-99-FPG
DECISION AND ORDER

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Jammy N. brings this action pursuant to the Social Security Act seeking review of
the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security that denied her application for Disability
Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) under Title II of the Act. ECF No. 1. The Court has jurisdiction over
this action under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
Both parties moved for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(c). ECF Nos. 9, 12. For the reasons that follow, Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment on
the Pleadings is DENIED, the Commissioner’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is
GRANTED, and the complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
BACKGROUND
In May 2022, Plaintiff protectively applied for DIB benefits with the Social Security
Administration (“the SSA”). Tr. 2 173–74. She alleged disability since January 3, 2022. Tr. 190.
The claim was initially denied on November 2, 2022, and upon reconsideration on March 23, 2023.

Under this District’s Standing Order, any non-government party must be referenced solely by first name and last
initial.

1

2

“Tr.” refers to the administrative record in this matter. ECF No. 3.

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Tr. 16. On July 25, 2023, Administrative Law Paul Georger (“the ALJ”) held a hearing. Tr. 28–
62. The ALJ issued a decision finding that Plaintiff was not disabled on August 29, 2023. Tr. 13–
27. Plaintiff requested review by the Appeals Council, but the request was denied on November
28, 2023. Tr. 1–7. This action seeks review of the Commissioner’s final decision. ECF No. 1.
LEGAL STANDARD
I.

District Court Review
“In reviewing a final decision of the SSA, this Court is limited to determining whether the

SSA’s conclusions were supported by substantial evidence in the record and were based on a
correct legal standard.” Talavera v. Astrue, 697 F.3d 145, 151 (2d Cir. 2012) (quotation marks
omitted); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Act holds that a decision by the Commissioner is
“conclusive” if it is supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). “Substantial evidence
means more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Moran v. Astrue, 569 F.3d 108, 112 (2d Cir. 2009)
(quotation marks omitted). It is not the Court’s function to “determine de novo whether [the
claimant] is disabled.” Schaal v. Apfel, 134 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1998) (quotation marks
omitted); see also Wagner v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 906 F.2d 856, 860 (2d Cir. 1990)
(holding that review of the Secretary’s decision is not de novo and that the Secretary’s findings are
conclusive if supported by substantial evidence).
II.

Disability Determination
An ALJ must follow a five-step sequential evaluation to determine whether a claimant is

disabled within the meaning of the Act. See Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 470–71
(1986). At step one, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful
work activity. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b). If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, the ALJ

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proceeds to step two and determines whether the claimant has an impairment, or combination of
impairments, that is “severe” within the meaning of the Act, meaning that it imposes significant
restrictions on the claimant’s ability to perform basic work activities. Id. § 404.1520(c). If the
claimant does not have a severe impairment or combination of impairments, the analysis concludes
with a finding of “not disabled.” If the claimant does, the ALJ continues to step three.
At step three, the ALJ examines whether a claimant’s impairment meets or medically
equals the criteria of a listed impairment in Appendix 1 of Subpart P of Regulation No. 4 (the
“Listings”). Id. § 404.1520(d). If the impairment meets or medically equals the criteria of a Listing
and meets the durational requirement, id. § 404.1509, the claimant is disabled. If not, the ALJ
determines the claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”), which is the ability to perform
physical or mental work activities on a sustained basis, notwithstanding limitations for the
collective impairments. See id. § 404.1520(e)-(f).
The ALJ then proceeds to step four and determines whether the claimant’s RFC permits
him or her to perform the requirements of his or her past relevant work. Id. § 404.1520(f). If the
claimant can perform such requirements, then he or she is not disabled. Id. If he or she cannot, the
analysis proceeds to the fifth and final step, wherein the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show
that the claimant is not disabled. Id. § 404.1520(g). To do so, the Commissioner must present
evidence to demonstrate that the claimant “retains a residual functional capacity to perform
alternative substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy” in light of his or her
age, education, and work experience. See Rosa v. Callahan, 168 F.3d 72, 77 (2d Cir. 1999)
(quotation marks omitted); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(c).

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DISCUSSION
I.

The ALJ’s Decision
The ALJ analyzed Plaintiff’s claim for benefits under the process described above. At step

one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged
onset date. Tr. 18. At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments:
major depressive disorder, posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) with dissociative episodes,
degenerative disk disease of the cervical spine, migraine headaches, and vertigo. Tr. 18. At step
three, the ALJ concluded that none of Plaintiff’s impairments met or medically equaled one of the
impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. Tr. 18–20.
Next, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the following RFC:
[She can] perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) except occasionally
reaching overhead with the left arm, for all other reaching she can reach
occasionally to the left. [She] can climb ramps and stairs occasionally, never climb
ladders, ropes or scaffolds; [she can] balance, kneel, crouch and crawl occasionally.
[She is] able to perform simple, routine and repetitive tasks but not at a production
rate pace (e.g., assembly line work); [she] is able to perform simple work-related
decision[s]; [she can have] occasional interaction with supervisors, coworkers and
the general public; [she] is able to tolerate few changes in a routine work setting
defined as occasional changes to the worksite and routine. [She can have no]
exposure to bright light, loud noise and string [sic] odors; [she can have] occasional
exposure to unprotected heights and moving mechanical parts, [but] no operation
of a motor vehicle.
Tr. 20. At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was unable to perform her past relevant work. Tr.
22. At step five, the ALJ found that, given Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and RFC,
there were jobs available in the national economy that she could perform. Tr. 22–23. Accordingly,
the ALJ found that Plaintiff is not disabled. Tr. 23.
II.

Analysis
Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence because

the ALJ erred in his consideration of the opinion evidence, which resulted in an insufficient RFC
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assessment. ECF No. 9-1 at 18. Specifically, she argues that the ALJ (a) failed to properly evaluate
opinions from state agency consultants regarding social contact; (b) failed to properly evaluate
opinions from state agency consultants regarding noise environments; and (c) failed to resolve
conflicts within the Vocational Expert (VE) testimony. Id. For the reasons discussed below, the
Court concludes that remand is not warranted on these grounds.
a. Evaluation of Consultative Opinions Regarding Social Contact
First, Plaintiff argues that because the ALJ found the opinions of state-agency consultants
Dr. Haus and Dr. May persuasive, the ALJ must explain why he rejected their findings that Plaintiff
would be limited to jobs with “brief, superficial contact with others” in the RFC determination. Id.
at 19–20. As the ALJ did not discuss why he rejected these findings in the RFC, Plaintiff argues
that remand is warranted. Id. at 22.
As a general matter, an ALJ is not required to “reconcile explicitly every conflicting shred
of medical testimony,” Dioguardi v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 445 F. Supp. 2d 288, 297 (W.D.N.Y.
2006) (quotation and citation omitted), and “[t]here is no absolute bar to crediting only portions of
medical source opinions,” Younes v. Colvin, No. 14-CV-170, 2015 WL 1524417, at *8 (N.D.N.Y.
Apr. 2, 2015). However, where the ALJ’s “RFC assessment conflicts with an opinion from a
medical source, the [ALJ] must explain why the opinion was not adopted,” Dioguardi, 445 F.
Supp. 2d at 297 (quoting S.S.R. 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *7 (S.S.A. July 2, 1996)).
Plaintiff argues that this case must be remanded because Dr. Haus’s and Dr. May’s findings
that Plaintiff is limited to “brief and superficial contact” are inconsistent with the RFC limiting
Plaintiff to “occasional interaction.” ECF No. 9-1 at 22. The Court disagrees. Many courts have
found that where, as here, an ALJ properly gave considerable weight to a medical opinion stating
a Plaintiff’s ability to handle brief and superficial contact, an RFC containing a limitation to

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“occasional interaction” is supported by substantial evidence. Amos v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No.
18-CV-1367, 2020 WL 1493888, at *5–6 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2020) (finding that the RFC
providing for occasional interaction with the public and coworkers was supported by substantial
evidence where the ALJ gave significant weight to a medical opinion that plaintiff could handle
brief and superficial contact); Torres v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 17-CV-579, 2019 WL 2117651,
at *3–4 (W.D.N.Y. May 15, 2019) (finding that the RFC limiting plaintiff to occasional interaction
with the public was supported by substantial evidence even where the ALJ completely omitted
consideration of a medical opinion that plaintiff could handle brief and superficial contact); Ward
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec, No. 18-CV-1317, 2020 WL 3035850, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. June 5, 2020)
(finding that the RFC’s limitation to “occasional interaction” accounted for a medical opinion
limiting plaintiff to brief and superficial contact).
Accordingly, the RFC limiting Plaintiff to occasional interaction with supervisors,
coworkers, and the public is supported by substantial evidence and remand is not warranted on
this ground. 3
b. Evaluation of Consultative Opinions Regarding Noise Exposure
Next, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by failing to “evaluate, assess, or even make
mention of the limitation to avoid even moderate noise exposure,” which was opined by
consultative physicians Dr. Lawerence and Dr. Miller. ECF No. 9-1 at 22. Plaintiff contends that
the ALJ found the opinions unpersuasive because they did “not adequately consider the claimant’s
degenerative disk disease and migraines.” Id. Plaintiff maintains that because the opinions did

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Plaintiff also argues in this section that the ALJ failed to discuss (a) parts of Dr. Fabiano’s opinion, (b) Plaintiff’s
100% service-connected disability for PTSD, (c) her military sexual trauma, and (d) sexual abuse, and Plaintiff implies
that the case must be remanded because without discussion of this evidence, it is unclear if the ALJ even considered
it. See ECF No. 9-1 at 20–21; ECF No. 13 at 2. However, an ALJ is not required to “mention[ ] every item of testimony
presented to him” in his decision. Mongeur v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 1033, 1040 (2d Cir. 1983). Therefore, the ALJ’s
failure to discuss this evidence, without more, does not warrant remand.

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specifically consider Plaintiff’s migraines, the ALJ must not have considered these opinions when
crafting the RFC, and as such, remand is warranted. Id. at 23.
The Court disagrees. The ALJ did not find Dr. Lawrence’s and Dr. Miller’s opinions
unpersuasive because they failed to consider Plaintiff’s migraines. See Tr. 21. Instead, the ALJ
explained that because Dr. Lawerence and Dr. Miller indicated that Plaintiff had no exertional
limits, he found their opinions unpersuasive because they did not adequately consider Plaintiff’s
degenerative disk disease and migraines. Tr. 21. The ALJ also explained that he found the opinions
unpersuasive because evidence was added to the record after their opinions were rendered. Tr. 21.
As Dr. Lawrence’s and Dr. Miller’s opinions indicated that Plaintiff had no exertional limits and
were rendered prior to evidence being added to the record, the Court cannot conclude that the
Plaintiff is correct that the ALJ failed to consider these opinions.
Plaintiff further argues that the ALJ erred by not explaining his failure to incorporate Dr.
Lawrence’s and Dr. Miller’s opinions that Plaintiff must avoid even moderate noise in the RFC.
ECF No. 9-1 at 22–23. However, the ALJ is under no such obligation. “A finding that a medical
opinion is ‘unpersuasive’ rather than ‘somewhat persuasive’ or even ‘minimally persuasive’
indicates that the opinion was given no effect by the ALJ.” Leslie H. L. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
21CV00150, 2021 WL 5937649, at *5 (D. Conn. Dec. 6, 2021). Consequently, so long as the ALJ
adequately explains why he found the opinions unpersuasive, it is of no importance that he failed
to discuss their specific findings because “[as] a matter of plain language and common sense, an
unpersuasive opinion [can] have no role in the decision-making process.” Id. In this case, the ALJ
adequately explained that he found Dr. Lawerence’s and Dr. Miller’s opinions unpersuasive
because the opinions lacked exertional limitations and because evidence was added to the record

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after their opinions were rendered. Tr. 21. The Court therefore concludes that remand is not
warranted on this ground.
c. Failure to Resolve Conflicts Within VE Testimony
Finally, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to resolve conflicts in the VE’s testimony. ECF
No. 9-1 at 24. Specifically, she argues that the ALJ failed to obtain a reasonable explanation for
conflicts between the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”) and the VE’s testimony. Id. at
26. The Court disagrees. Plaintiff cites to testimony in the record where the ALJ gave the VE
hypothetical limitations, and the VE responded with jobs that would be available to Plaintiff. Id.
at 24–25. Initially, the VE gave one assessment, but after the ALJ clarified the limitations, the VE
realized that she had misunderstood the question. Tr. 57. The VE then changed her assessment to
correctly respond to the ALJ’s hypothetical. Tr. 57–59. Thus, there were no inconsistencies in the
testimony—there was simply a misunderstanding during the hearing, which was rectified when
the ALJ clarified what he was asking. Plaintiff cites no inconsistencies between the DOT and the
VE’s assessment following the clarification, and as such, remand is not warranted on that ground. 4
Plaintiff also argues that remand is warranted because when the VE identified what
occupations would be available to Plaintiff based on the hypothesized limitations, she did not
explain the process by which she reduced the numbers of jobs available in the national economy
to account for the specific limitations. ECF No. 9-1 at 25. While Plaintiff frames this as an
inconsistency between the testimony and the DOT, the DOT does not report how many jobs are
available in the economy and therefore, there can be no inconsistency. See Brault v. Soc. Sec.

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Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ did not fulfill his obligation to uncover apparent conflicts in the VE testimony
because he did not resolve the internal conflicts within the testimony. ECF No. 13 at 4. However, the case law cited
to support this proposition specifically states that “ALJs are required to obtain a reasonable explanation for any
apparent—even if non-obvious—conflict between the Dictionary and a vocational expert’s testimony.” Gibbons v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 22-2730, 2023 WL 3830774, at *2 (2d Cir. June 6, 2023) (quotation omitted). As Plaintiff
cites no inconsistencies between the DOT and the VE’s assessment, the Court need not address this argument.

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Admin, Comm’r, 683 F.3d 443, 446 (2d Cir. 2012). Nevertheless, the VE did explain that her
calculations regarding the reduction in jobs were based on her “professional experience and
education.” Tr. 59. Despite Plaintiff’s argument to the contrary, that is an adequate explanation of
the basis for the VE’s reductions in jobs and consequently, remand is not warranted. See McIntyre
v. Colvin, 758 F.3d 146, 152 (2d Cir. 2014) (holding that the ALJ reasonably credited a VE’s
testimony where the basis for the VE’s conclusion was his professional experience and clinical
judgment).
CONCLUSION
For all of the reasons stated, Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (ECF No. 9)
is DENIED, the Commissioner’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (ECF No. 12) is
GRANTED. The complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, and the Clerk of Court is directed
to enter judgment and close this case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: March 12, 2025
Rochester, New York

______________________________________
HON. FRANK P. GERACI, JR.
United States District Judge
Western District of New York

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